ML17345B264
| ML17345B264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345B263 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309220442 | |
| Download: ML17345B264 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.'C.
20555'AFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 95 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-3'I AND AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-41 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NOS.
3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251 Introduction By letters dated August 18 and 31, 1983, Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) requested amendments to Operating License No.
DPR-31 and Operating License No.
DPR-41 for the Tur key Point Plant Unit Nos.
3 and 4, respectively.
The proposed changes would revise the Technical Specifications relating to the requirements for maximum reactor coolant activity to be in conformance with the current Standard Technical Specifications.
Discussion'urkey Point Unit 3 has noted relatively high coolant activity since the beginning of Cycle 8, However, the activity levels have significantly increased since June 1983.
The licensee was informed by their fuel vendor, Westinghouse, on August 12, 1983, that the problem of fuel fai lure has been occurring elsewhere throughout the country.
The fuel failure mechanisms and the unpredictability of such failures convinced the licensee that relief from the current Technical Specifications which require using Total Iodine for calculating radioiodine activity in lieu of the Standard Technical Specifications which allow the use of Dose Equivalent I-131.
The dose equivalent method of calculating radio-iodine would allow the licensee to operate the plant at a higher radioiodine activity in the primary coolant, by about a factor of 4, for the equi librium iodine concentration.
The level of primary activity in Turkey Point Unit 3 is rising steadily and can be extrapolated to reach the current Technical Specification limit by the first week of September 1983, thereby forcing a plant shutdown four weeks prior to the scheduled refueling outage.
'valuation This proposed change falls into the category of an emergency change since failure of the NRC to take action would result in forcing Unit 3 to shutdown the first week in September which is four weeks prior to their currently scheduled refueling outage.
The licensee's letter dated August 18, 1983, states that'they were informed by their fuel vendor, Westinghouse, on August 12, 1983, of the generic 8309220442 83b83i PDR ADOCK 05000250 P
PDR naiure of the problem, the failur mechanisms end
.he unprediciability of the failures.
The HRC Projeci )1anager was informed on August 15, 1983, of the need for the amendments and the application was submitted on August 18, 1983.
We have reviewed the facts concernino this request and conclude that the licensee has made a timely submittal, that a shutdown would be required without NRC action and that action by the licensee could not preclude this situation.
The proposed changes allow the use of Dose Equivalent, I-131 instead of'otal Iodine as required in the current Technical Specification 3.1.4.
A review of sta f files indicated that previously analyzed accidents met the applicable Standard Review Plans (SRP) guideli'nes using the Dose Equivalent 1-131 primary coolant concentration values; therefore, the proposed change to use the Dose Equivalent 1-131 values will not result in an increase in the consequences or probability of the accidents analyzed by the staff.
In addition, the proposed changes to Table 4. 1-2 o
the Technical Specifications require new surveillances for Isotopic analysis of Iodine I-131, I-133 and I-135, and a lower allowable value for the total reactor coolant system specific activity.
These changes consiitute an additional limitation, restriction and control not presently included in the Technical'pecifications.
We have reviewed the information submitted by the licensee requesting that the primary coolant activity limits and surveillance requirements of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Speci ications replace the exis.ing Technical Specifications for Turkey Point Plant, Uni is 3 and 4, and have concluded that they're acceptable.
Ou'r conclusion 'is based upon review ohe 'current t urkey Poini TechnlcaT Speci-fications for primary coolant activity which contain a normal operating limitation of 1 ijCi/gm gross iodine activity.
A review of our Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB) files indicates that a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) analysis performed in 1977 for Turkey Point met the current Standard Review Plan dose guidelines using ine Standard Technical Specifications limit for the. equi librium coolant concentration (1 qCi/gm dose equivalent I-131 (DEI-131)).
The SRP also contains acceptance criteria callingfor a dose calculation using the "spike" coolant activi ty limitation of 30 pCi/gm DEI-131 based on site meteorology and plant design.
Since 1977, the applicable dispersion parameter (the 0-2 hour EAB X/g) has been lowered by a factor of two for the Turkey Point Plant.
As a result, should ei ther Turkey Point unit have a
SGTR, the SRP dose guideline would be unlikely to be exceeded using a Standard Technica'1 Specification "spike" activity level.
Therefore, we conclude that an acceptable basis exists for granting the proposed Technical Specification Change.
In regard to the degraded fuel the proposed Technical Specification modifi-cation is acceptable for the following reasons.
While the cause of the fuel dearadation is currently unknown, the plant will shut down for refueling after approximately one more month of operation.
Thus, the degree of degradation is not expected to worsen significantly in that
- short, a time period, the degradation is expected to be gradual and the number of failures will, in any case, be limited by the revised coolant activity Technical Specification limit.
This equilibrium coolant activity will also not exceed the value used for accident analysis.
Wi:n regard to potential interference with con-rol rod insertion,
-he licensee has stated that the fission product isotope concentrations in the primary coolant indicate that the fuel rod cladding perforations are small; thus, it is inlikely that there are any loose rod segments that could inter=ere with the control rod m'otion.
It is our understanding that all the fuel currently in the core will be examined visually and sipped during the forthcoming refueling outage, that the results of the examinations, including the number and type of leakers will be reported to HRC prior to the next cycle of operation, and that all the defective fuel will be removed prior to restart.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant ervironmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4),
that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environm ntal impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
Final Ho Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The State was informed of our proposed no significant hazards consideration determination on August 22, 1983.
The State contact had no comments on the proposed determination.
The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether actions involves significant hazards considerations by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870).
Example (vi) is a change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan:
for example, a change resulting.from the application of a small refinement of a previously used calculational model or design method.
This amendment fol'iows this example in that the use of Dose Equivalent I-131 instead of Total Iodine is within the Standard Review Plan guidelines
- and, as stated in the above evaluation, a review of staff files indicate that previously analyzed accidents for these facilities met the applicable Standard Review Plan guidelines using Dose Equivalent I-131 in performing the calculations.
While the change of limit to Dose Equivalent 1-131 may increase the calcu-lated consequences of previously analyzed. accidents, the increased conse-quences are clearly within all acceptable criteria in the Standard Review Plan and the increase in consequences is not significant.
In addition, the change in coolant activity level allowing use of Dose Equivalent I-131 does not create a
new or different accident from any evaluated previously.
Finally, while this change may result in an increase in accident consequences within acceptable criteria in the Standard Review Plan, it does not signifi-cantly decrease any margin of safety.
Accordingly, the change in Dose Equivalent I-131 for coolant activity limitations does not involve sig'nif-icant hazards considerations.
In add',tion, an example of changes not likely to involve significant hazards considerations is (ii) a change thai constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications:
,or example, a more stringen. surv'eillance requirement.
As stated in the above evaluation, the amendment al so wil 1 require new surveil lance for isotopic analysis o'f Iodine I-131, I-133 and I-135, and a lower allowable value for the total reactor coolant system activity and thus fails with this example.
These new.and additional surveillance requirements will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered, will not significantly decrease a safety margin, and will not create the possibility of a new or different'accident from any evaluated previously.
Based on our review of the licensee's submittal, as described in our above evaluation, we have made a final determination that the amendment requests do not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety; and therefore, do not Involve a s ignificant hazards cons iderati on.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will no.
be endmoered by operation':in. the..proposed manner~ed JgQsucJ actttities will be conducted in compliance'ith the Commission's regulations and the 1 s s vance of the amendments will not be inimi ca 1 to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date:
August 31, 1983 Principal Contributors:
K.
Dempsey F. Akstulewicz T. Quay
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