ML17342A412
| ML17342A412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1986 |
| From: | Brewer D, Elrod S, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17342A410 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-86-05, 50-250-86-5, 50-251-86-05, 50-251-86-5, NUDOCS 8603110317 | |
| Download: ML17342A412 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1986005
Text
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UNITEDSTATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-250/86-05
and 50-251/86-05
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Fl orida 33102
Docket Nos ~: 50-250
and 50-251
Facility Name: Turkey Point
3 and 4
License Nos.:
DPR-31 and
Inspection
Conducted:
January
3 - February 10,
1986
Inspectope: W
i
+ T.
A. Peebles,
Senior Resident
Inspector
5: Ci
4 D.
R. Brewer,
Resid nt Inspector
Approved by: ~ S
Q Stephen
A. Elrod, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
Date
igned
Date
igned
Date
S gned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This
rnoutine,
unannounced
inspection
entailed
238 direct inspection
hours at the site, including 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> of backshift inspection,
in the areas
of
licensee
action
on
previous
inspection
findings,
annual
and
monthly
surveillance,
maintenance
observations
and
reviews,
operational
safety,
independent
inspection,
and plant
events.'esults:
Violation
Failure to meet the requirements
of Technical Specifi-
cation (TS) 6.8. 1 (paragraph
8).
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II,
REPORT DETAILS
Licensee
Employees
Contacted
C.
M. Wethy, Vice President
Turkey Point
~C. J.
Baker, Plant Manager - Nuclear
~D.
D. Grandage,
Operations
Superintendent
Nuclear
T.
A. Finn, Operations
Supervisor
J. Crockford, Assistant Operations
Supervisor
J.
Webb, Operations/
Maintenance
Coordinator
K.
L. Jones,
Technical
Department Supervisor
"B. A. Abrishami, Inservice Test (IST) Supervisor
D. Tomaszewski,
Plant Engineering Supervisor
D.
A. Chancy,
Corporate
Licensing
"J. Arias, Regulation
and Compliance Supervisor
R.
L. Teuteberg,
Regulation
and Compliance
Engineer
"R. Hart, Regulation
and Compliance
Engineer
"J.
W. Kappes,
Maintenance
Superintendent
- Nuclear
0.
E. Suero, Electrical Maintenance
Supervisor
R.
A. Longtemps,
Mechanical
Maintenance
Supervisor
E.
F.
Hayes,
Instrument
and Control (IC) Maintenance
Supervisor
V. A. Kaminskas,
Reactor Engineering Supervisor
R.
G.
Mende,
Reactor
Engineer
R.
E. Garrett,
Plant Security Supervisor
P.
W. Hughes,
Health Physics
Supervisor
W.
C. Miller, Training Supervisor
J.
M. Donis, Site Engineering Supervisor
J.
M. Mowbray, Site Mechanical
Engineer
L.
C. Huenniger, Start-up Superintendent
R.
H. Reinhardt,
Acting Quality Control
(QC) Supervisor
R. J. Acosta, Quality Assurance
(QA) Superintendent
"W. Bladow, Quality Assurance
Supervisor
J.
A. Labarraque,
Performance
Enhancement
Program
(PEP)
Manager
D.
W. Hasse,
Safety Engineering
Group Chairman
"R. J. Earl, Quality Control Inspector
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
construction
craftsmen,
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
electricians
and security
force members.
~Attended exit interview.
Exit Interview
The
inspection
scope
and findings
were
summarized
during
management
interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager-
Nuclear and selected
members of his staff.
An exit meeting
was
conducted
on February 12,
1986.
The areas
requiring
management
attention
were reviewed.
I
One violation
was identified:
Failure to meet the requirements
of TS 6.8. 1, in that
the requirements
of Administrative Procedure
(AP) 0103.4,
section
8.7,
were
not
implemented
when
licensee
personnel
operated
clearance
tagged
valves
without completing
required
temporary lift
authorizations
(250,251/86-05-01)
(paragraph
8).
Two Inspector
Followup
Items (IFIs) were identified:
(1)
Improve
0109.3,
On the Spot Changes to Procedures,
such that changes
which are not
time sensitive
are
implemented
by procedure
change
requests
rather than
spot
change
requests
(IFI 250,251/86-05-02)
(paragraph 8);
and (2) Modify
the
Inservice
Test
Program for Valves to delete
the exemption
request
specifying
only cold shutdown testing for the
steam
generator
blowdown
isolation valves (IFI 250,251/86-05-03)
(paragraph
6).
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings without dissenting
comments.
3.
Management
Meeting
a.
A management
meeting
was held on January
31, 1986, with the licensee
representatives
identified below.
The meeting
was conducted in the
Region II office at the
NRC's request
to discuss
the status of the
following issues:
The licensee's
discovery of construction
debris
in the Unit 3
and Unit 4 emergency
containment coolers.
The modifications being
made to the Unit 4 reactor cavity seal.
The licensee's
system availability/reliabil-
ity study.
The licensee's
schedule for submittal
and implementation of the
Standard
Technical Specifications.
These
discussions
with the licensee
proved to be very beneficial in
clarifying the history of these
issues,
their current status,
and the
licensee's
plans
to further resolve
the
NRC's
concerns
in these
areas.
b.
Licensee
Attendees
C. J.
Baker, Plant Manager - Nuclear
F.
H. Southworth,
Senior Technical Advisor
D.
A. Chancy,
Nuclear Licensing Supervisor
J. Arias, Regulation
and Compliance Supervisor
J.
A. Labarraque,
Performance
Enhancement
Program Manager
E. Preast,
Site Engineering
Manager
J.
J. O'eill, Licensing Engineer
L.
F. Pabst,
Power Plant Engineer
J.
E. Sheetz,
Power Plant Engineer
NRC Attendees
R.
D. Malker, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
A.
F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
V.
M. Panciera,
Chief, Reactor Projects
Branch
2
S.
A. Elrod, Chief, Reactor Projects
Section
2C
D.
R. Brewer, Resident Inspector
S. Guenther,
Project Engineer
G. Schnebli,
Reactor Inspector
4.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(92702)
'a ~
b.
Performance
Enhancement
Program
(PEP)
Summary
The following personnel
changes
were recently
announced:
D. Jones
has
been
assigned
supervisor
of the
Procedure
Upgrade
Project;
E. Preast
was selected
to a new position of Site Engineering
Manager;
and
J.
Labarraque
will
be
returning
as
the
Supervisor
of the
Technical
Department.
Previously Identified Items
(CLOSED)
Licensee
Event Report
(LER) 250-84-38 - The leaking vent
pipe on the "B" emergency
diesel
generator
day tank was replaced with
'
flexible, braided
metal
hose.
The flexible hose
has withstood
vibration effects
since
December
1984 without incident.
The repair
appears
satisfactory.
(OPEN)
LER 250-85-40
and Violation 250/85-42-01 - This
LER documented
a Unit 3 reactor trip that occurred
when
a reactor operator improperly
installed the fuses for source
range nuclear instrument N-32.
This
event
resulted
in the
issuance
of violation 250/85-42-01.
The
instrument occasionally fails to energize
as
designed
when reactor
power is reduced to the source
range.
It is possible to energize
the
instrument
by
removing
and reinserting
the
power
supply
fuses.
During this procedure
the
channel
must
be placed in trip bypass to
preclude the power surge
induced flux spike indication from initiating
a reactor trip signal.
On February
12,
1986,
the instrument again
failed to energize
when reactor
power was reduced to the source
range
following a reactor trip.
The
fuses
were
removed
and
replaced
causing
the
channel
to energize.
The
licensee
has
determined,
however, that
a preamplifier must be replaced to correct this problem.
Parts
are
not available onsite
but have
been
ordered;
delivery is
expected
in six weeks.
This
LER and the associated
violation remain
open pending replacement of the preamplifier.
(OPEN) Violation 250/84-35-02
and
251/84-36-02
- This violation,
issued
on December
27, 1984,
concerned
inadequate
surveillance of the
(AFW) system flow control valves.
The valves in
the
AFW train not receiving flow were not verified to respond to open
and close
signals
from the
steam supply valves.
In response
to the
violation 'the
licensee
modified Operating
Procedure
(OP)
7304. 1,
System - Periodic Test, to require this verifica-
tion.
However,
the modified procedure,
since
revised
and
renamed
Operations
Surveillance
Procedure
(OSP)
3/4-OSP-075. 1, Auxiliary
System Train 1 Operability Verification, remains
inadequate
with respect to flow control valve verifications.
Inspection
Report 250,251/85-40
documented
an unresolved
item
(UNR
250,251/85-40-12)
concerning
the
simultaneous
operation
of steam
supply
valves
(MOV-1404 and
MOV-1405) during train
1
AFW system
testing.
When
the
valves
are
operated
together,
as
required in
3/4-OSP-075. 1, it is not possible
to verify that
each
valve is
capable
of independently
causing
the train 2 flow control valves to
open
on system actuation,
and close
upon system
shutdown.
In response
to Inspection
Report 250,251/85-40,
the licensee
stated,
in letter L-86-29, of January
31, 1986, that procedures
3/4-0SP-075.1
were again modified and that the procedures
now require that each
be independently
capable of opening all flow control valves.
Procedures
3/4-OSP"075. 1 were
reviewed by the inspectors
on February
10,
1986,
and it was
determined that the procedures still failed to
adequately
address
the
steam
supply
valve - flow control
valve
surveillance.
The procedures
are
adequate
for testing the
"A" AFW
pump, in that
MOV-1404 is used to supply steam to the pump,
and the
,train "B" flow control
valves
are verified to open
and close at the
appropriate
times.
The
"C"
AFW pump is tested
using steam supplied
through
MOV-1405.
However, verification that
the train "B" flow
control
valves
open in response
to opening
MOV-1405 is optional.
A
note in section
7.2 of the procedures
states
that "step
19 may be
marked
N/A if AFW pump
A has
been tested
during the performance of
this procedure."
Step
19 of section 7.2 is the step during which the
flow control
valves
are verified to
have
opened
in response
to
opening the steam supply valve,
MOY-1405.
The procedure
change
which was referenced
in licensee letter L-86-29
was
made
by
On The Spot
Change
(OTSC)
3651,
dated October 9, 1985.
The
OTSC failed to address all the procedure
corrections
necessary
to
fully test
the
response
of the flow control valves with respect to
operation
of the
steam
supply valves.
Due to
an oversight,
the
licensee failed to identify this discrepancy; this resulted
in letter
L-86-29 containing inaccurate
information.
The licensee
is processing
an additional
OTSC to correct the problem.
This violation (250/84-35-02,
251/84-36-02) will remain
open pending
completion of the licensee's
corrective action
and resolution of UNR
250,251/85-40-12.
IE Information Notice (IEIN) Followup (92717)
(OPEN)
IEIN 85-94,
Potential for Loss of Minimum Flow Paths
Leading to
(Emergency
Core Cooling System)
Pump
Damage
During
a
LOCA (Loss
of'oolant
Accident).
In addition to the corrective
actions
described
in
Inspection
Report
250,251/85-44,
the
licensee
has
b'locked
open
the
recirculation flow path valves
(856A and B) for each unit.
Mechanically
blocking these
valves in the
open position should
assure
that a minimum
flow path always exists
between the discharge of the safety injection pump
and
the
containment
spray
pumps to the refueling water storage
tanks.
Long term corrective actions
are under development.
Monthly and Annual Surveillance Observation
(61726/61700)
The inspectors
observed
TS required surveillance testing
and verified the
following:
that the test procedure
conformed to the requirements
of the
TS,
that testing
was performed in accordance
with adequate
procedur'es,
that test
instrumentation
was calibrated,
that limiting conditions for
operation
(LCOs)
were
met,
that test
results
met acceptance
criteria
requirements
and
were
reviewed
by personnel
other
than the individual
directing the test, that deficiencies
were identified,
as appropriate,
and
were properly
reviewed
and
resolved
by
management
personnel
and that
system
restoration
was
adequate.
For
completed
tests,
the inspector
verified that testing
frequencies
were
met
and tests
were
performed
by
qualified,individuals.
The
inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions
of the
following test
activities:
Unit 3
AFW Train 1 Operability Verification
AFW Special
Test 85-16
Inservice
Pump Testing for the "A" AFW pump
"A" AFW Turbine Electronic and Mechanical
Testing
During the performance
of procedure
3-OSP-075. 1, the inspectors
noticed
that the procedure
did not adequately verify the ability of all
AFW steam
supply valves to operate
the opposite train's flow control valves.
This
discrepancy
is
discussed
in paragraph
4
as
a followup to violation
250/84-35-02
and 251/84-36-02.
On February 5,
1986,
the inspectors
noticed that the "3A" and "3C" steam
generator
blowdown
isolation
valves
(CV-3-6275A
and
CV-3-6275C,
respectively)
were
each
tagged with a Plant
Work Order
(PWO) indicating
that the
valves
had
exceeded
their normal closing stroke times.
The
had increased
by 25 percent or more over the previous timing
results
but had not exceeded
the maximum allowed stroke time.
A review
was
conducted
to determine if the valves,
which are
normally
tested
quarterly,
had
been shifted to a monthly test schedule
as required
by the
ASME Boiler and
Pressure
Vessel
Code,
Section
XI, Rules for
Inservice Inspection of Nuclear
Power Plant Components.
It was determined
that the valves
were o'nly being tested during cold shutdowns
based
on the
licensee's
submittal of a relief request
from the quarterly at-power test
requirements
specified in the Code.
The relief request
was included in a
revised
pump
and valve inservice test program submitted
on March 30,
1984
(L-84-84) and applied to all three
blowdown isolation valves
(6275A,
B and C).
The basis for the relief request
read
as follows:
"These
valves
must
remain
open
in order to meet
steam
generator
manufacturer
warranty requirements
and to minimize steam
generator
degradation."
As
a result,
the licensee
stated that the valves
would only be tested
during cold shutdowns.
The inspectors
determined that cycling these
valves for test purposes
does
not invalidate the manufacturers
warranty
on the
steam
generators.
The
limiting stroke
time is
15 seconds,
so during
a routine stroke timing
test,
the valves would be shut for less than
30 seconds.
A typical stroke
time for these.
valves is approximately
5 seconds.
No steam
generator
degradation
should occur with the valves closed for such
a short period of
time.
Discussions
with licensed
control
room operators
indicated that
no
administrative
instructions
preclude
closing the valves for short periods
of time.
Several
operators
indicated that they
had cycled the valves
while at power
on numerous
occasions
and that the practice
was considered
acceptable
for short-term closures.
Since it is both
common and permissible for the control
room operators
to
cycle the valves while at power, the request for exemption
does
not appear
to provide adequate justification for limiting testing to the cold shutdown
condition.
IFI 250,251/86-05-03 will be used to track this issue
and will
remain
open 'pending
additional
licensee
justification documenting
the
problems associated
with the short-term cycling of the valves.
Maintenance
Observations
(62703/62700)
Station
maintenance
activities
on safety-related
systems
and
components
were
observed
and
reviewed
to ascertain
that they
were
conducted
in
accordance
with approved procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and
standards
and in conformance with TS.
The following items
were considered
during this review,
as appropriate:
that
LCOs were
met while components
or systems
were removed
from service;
that
approvals
were obtained prior to initiating work; that activities
were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures
and
were
inspected
as
applicable;
that procedures
used
were
adequate
to control
the activity;
that
troubleshooting
activities
were
controlled
and
repair
records
accurately
reflected
what took place;
that functional
testing
and/or
calibrations
were performed prior to returning
components
or systems
to
service;
that
gC
records
were
maintained;
that activities
were
accomplished
by qualified personnel;
that parts
and materials
used were
properly certified; that r'adiological controls were properly implemented;
that
gC hold points
were established
and observed
where required; that
fire prevention
controls
were
implemented;
that outside contractor force
activities were controlled in accordance
with the approved
gA program;
and
that housekeeping
was actively pui sued.
The following maintenance activities were observed
and/or reviewed:
Repair of the
AFW turbine steam admission
stop check valves
Inspection
and repair of the "A" AFW turbine mechanical
trip device
(PWO 69-2920)
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors
observed control
room operations,
reviewed applicable logs,
conducted
discussions
with control
room
operators,
observed
shift
turnovers
and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors
verified the operability of selected
emergency
systems,
verified that
maintenance
work orders
had
been
submitted
as required
and that followup
and pr'ioritization of work was
accomplished.
The inspectors
reviewed
tagout records,
verified compliance with TS
LCOs and verified the return
to service of affected
components.
By observation
and direct interviews, verification
was
made that the
physical security plan was being implemented.
Plant
housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and
implementation
of
radiological controls were observed.
Tours of the intake structure
and diesel, auxiliary, control
and turbine
buildings were
conducted
to observe
plant equipment conditions including
potential fire hazards, fluid leaks
and excessive
vibrations.
The
inspectors
walked
down
accessible
portions
of the
following
safety-related
systems
on Unit 3 and Unit 4 to verify operability and
proper valve/switch alignment:
(EDGs)
4160 volt and 480 volt switchgear
Control
Room Vertical Panels
and Safeguards
Racks
Between
November
19 and December
10, 1985, the "B" EDG day tank sight
glass
was out of service while maintenance
was in progress
on
a tank
level switch.
The
same valves
used to isolate the level switch also
isolated
the sight glass.
The sight glass
level is required to be
recorded
by the
Unit 3 Nuclear Plant Operator
each
day at 1:00 a.m.
During a'eview of the Nuclear
P1ant Operator's
logs it was noted
that the level
readings
on the "B" EDG day tank varied slightly over
the time period when the sight glass
was isolated.
Since the
EDG had
not been
run
and the sight glass
remained
isolated,
the inspectors
asked
the licensee
to explain the level variations.
The licensee
determined that
some Nuclear Plant Operators
had,
on occasion,
opened
the isolation valves to allow the sight glass
to register the tank
level.
At the
time,
clearance
tags
were attached
to the valves,
specifying that they were not to be opened.
, Administrative Procedure
0103.4, In-Plant Equipment Clearance
Orders,
dated
August 28,
1985, specifies
requirements
for the administrative
control
of clearance
tags.
Section
8.7 of the procedure
requires
completion of
a
request for temporary lift of clearance
prior to
manipulating
a clearance
tagged
valve.
Between
November
19 and
December
10,
1985,
some
Nuclear Plant Operators
operated
clearance
tagged
valves without obtaining approval for a temporary lift.
This
action constitutes
a fai lure to follow procedures.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires
that written procedures
and
administrative
policies
be established,
implemented
and maintained
that meet or exceed
the requirements
and recommendations
of sections
5.1
and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972
and Appendix
A of
USNRC Regulatory
Guide 1.33.
section 5.3.5,
requires
that permission to release
equipment for maintenance
be granted
by operating
personnel.
The
equipment shall
be
made safe to work on.
Measures
shall provide for
the protection of workers
and equipment
and strict control measures
shall
be enforced.
The failure to comply with TS 6.8.1 is a violation (250,251/86-05-01).
On February
10,
1986,
the
inspector
observed
the performance
of
surveillance testing
on the
AFW system.
Following the completion of
procedure
3-OSP-075. 1, Auxiliary Feedwater
System Train 1 Operability
Verification, the control
room operator
delayed the train 2 surveillance.
The operator
was
concerned
about the apparent conflict between
two
separate
changes
to procedure
3-0SP-075.2.
The changes
had both been
properly approved
as
OTSCs,
but when integrated into the body of the
procedure,
combined to make the procedure difficult to understand
and
implement.
The
OTSCs
were
reviewed to determine
how they combined to adversely
affect the original procedure.
OTSC
3855
was
approved
of January
23,
1986.
The purpose of the change
was to clarify instructions
and
appropriate
signoffs for testing train 2
of the system with the "C"
AFW pump
aligned
to that train.
(The
"C"
AFW pump is normally
aligned
to train 1).
OTSC
3855
was verified to
be technically
correct but the
change
required
extensive
handwritten
numbering
and
lettering changes
to 12 of the
27 pages.
OTSC
3924
was
approved
on February
10,
1986.
The purpose
of this
change
was to require closing the isolation valves for both the above
and below seat drains
on each
AFW trip and throttle (T&T) valve.
The
following discrepancies
were identified with this
change
and its
integration with OTSC 3855:
(1)
The
change
was written without regard to the existence of OTSC
3855.
It was
developed
by marking
up
a
copy of the
las"t
approved full procedure
revision (dated
November 22, 1985).
It
inadvertently
deleted
two
changes
specifically instituted
by
OTSC 3855,
by reinserting portions of original pages
17 and 22
that
OTSC
3855
had
modified.
These
changes
affected
the
requirements
to check
and independently verify that the "C" AFW
T&T valve
was returned to the
open position (attachment
2 of
the procedure)
and to return the governor
speed control
knob to
the
maximum setting after its operation in a previous step.
(2)
The
change
required
seat drain valves to
be shut for the T&T
valve
associated
with the
AFW pumps aligned to train
1 even
though only the train 2 test was in progress.
While this change
causes
no problem, it is not essential
to the performance of the
train
2 test
and needlessly
complicates
the train 2 procedure.
Additionally, the mixing of the train 1 seat dra'in valves with
the train
2 test represents
a change
in the philosophy that had
previously promoted separation
of train testing.
The inspectors
determined that neither
OTSC was prompted
by an urgent
need to upgrade
the surveillance
such
as
might be necessary if the
procedure did not verify a required parameter
or constituted
a threat
to reliable
equipment
operation.
The changes
were the result of the
licensee's
efforts to improve the surveillance
through fine-tuning.
Procedures
3/4-0SP-075.2
are
being
revised
to correct
these
discrepancies.
Discussions
were held with the licensee
regarding
the benefits of
reducing the
number of OTSCs to a minimum.
The licensee
stated that
staff
members
were
aware
that the
OTSC
system
was
being
used
on
occasions
when the nature of the change
would justify a request for
procedure
revision.
The procedure
revision requires
a longer time
10
period for implementation,
since
the
procedure
is
retyped
to
eliminate the use of handwritten
changes.
The licensee is evaluating
methods of reducing the
use of the
OTSC when the procedure revision
appears
to
be
a suitable alternative.
Progress
in this effort will
be reviewed at a later date
under IFI 250,251/86-05-02.
Plant Events
(93702)
An independent
review was conducted of the following events.
On January
16,
1986,
the "3C" steam generator
(S/G) pressure
transmitter,
PT-3-495, failed high causing its input to the
steam flow channel
from
that S/G to fail high.
The "3C" S/G feedwater control
system
was affected
and the operator took manual control.
On January
20,
1986, the licensee
reported that an engineering
evaluation
dated
January
13,
1986,
had identified
a single failure scenario
which
could result in only one of three
emergency
containment coolers
and one
of'hree
filters being actuated
during
an accident.
A failure of the "3B"
battery would cause
the loss of the "3B" 4160 volt sequencer
which would
de-energize
the auto-transfer circuitry for the "D" motor control center
(MCC).
On January
25,
1986,
debris
was
found in the
housing
above the cooling
coils in the
"4A" and "4B" emergency
containment coolers
(ECC).
This was
believed to
have
been left there after the S/G outage
several
years
ago.
Unit 3 was shut
down
and the three
ECCs were inspected,
found to contain
debris,
and cleaned.
On January
26,
1986,
a construction worker bumped
a relay and initiated a
spurious
Unit 4 phase
"A" containment
isolation.
The unit was in a
refueling shutdown.
All containment
parameters
were normal.
On January
28,
1986,
during a Unit 3 start-up,
the "A" and "B" main steam
isolation valves
(MSIVs) were opened normally, but the "C" MSIV failed to
open fully.
The
cause
was determined to be
a failed solenoid valve.
The
qualified valve
was
taken
apart
by
an
instrument
technician
and
no
information about the failure was obtained.
The licensee
has contacted
the vendor,
ASCO,
and has agreed that future failed solenoids will be sent
to ASCO 'for proper troubleshooting.
On February 6,
1986, circuit number
2 of phase
"A" containment isolation
was actuated
on Unit 4 while it was in refueling.
Construction personnel
were obtaining voltage
readings
and inadvertently actuated
a relay which
was thought to have
been
de-energized.
All containment
parameters
were
normal.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
10.
Independent
Inspection
The inspectors
routinely attended
meetings
with licensee
management
and
monitored shift turnovers
between shift supervisors,
shift foremen
and
licensed
operators.
These
meetings
included daily discussions
of plant
operating
and testing activities
as well
as
discussions
of significant
problems or incidents.
The inspectors
reviewed potential
problem areas to
independently
assess
the following factors:
their importance to safety;
the adequacy of proposed solutions;
improvement
and progress;
and adequacy
of corrective actions.
The inspector's
reviews of these
matters
were not
limited to the defined inspection program.
Independent
inspection efforts
were conducted in the following areas:
AFW System Stop Check Valve failure mechanism determination
Management
Control of Maintenance
Repairs
No violations or deviations
were identified.
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