ML17339A267
| ML17339A267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1979 |
| From: | Robert E. Uhrig Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | O'Reilly J NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17339A265 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911150077 | |
| Download: ML17339A267 (10) | |
Text
FLORIOA POWER I, LIGHTCOMPANY October 23, 1979 L-79-295 Hr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enfortement U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Harietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Nr. O'Reilly:
Re.
RII.RWZ 50-250/79-27 50-251/79-27 t(
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II Florida Power 8 Light Company has reviewed the subject inspection report and a response is attached.
There is no proprietary information in the report.
Very truly yours,
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v" Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 5 Technology REU/HAS/cph Attachment cc:
Harold Reis, Esquire voiiiso o:;,g~
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ATTACHMENT Re:
RI I: RMZ 50-250/79-27 50-251/79-27 The subject inspection report contains three findings, which are all related to one incorrect valve alignment.
The valve misalignment, which was caused by a single personnel
'error, led to an overflow of the spent fuel pit.
A small portion of the overflow passed into a drywell by way of a storm drain.
- Thus, the "licensed material" in question (spent fuel pit water) was not intentionally buried in the dry well, but was unintentionally deposited there because of personnel error.
A more detailed response to each finding is provided below.
~Fi ndi n A
As required by Section 6.8.1 of the Technical Specifications, written procedures and administrative policies that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972 and Appendix A of USNRC.Regulatory Guide 1.33 shall be implemented.
Contrary to the above on August 28, 1979, the Spent Fue)
Pool was aligned with the Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer awhile the Refueling Mater Storage Tank was also aligned with the Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer which is contrary to Section 8.2 of Operating Procedure 3500.1.
Response
A The valve misalignment discussed in the finding was the primary cause of the spent fuel pit overflow that occurred on August 28, 1979.
An investigation of the sequence of events leading to the misalignment showed that the misalignment was the result of personnel error.
The operator was not fully aware of the system status at the time of the occurrence and did not use the applicable procedure (OP 3500.1) because he was not aware that there was such a procedure.
To prevent recurrence, the following actions were canpleted by October 5, 1979, at which time compliance was achieved:
1)
The operator was verbally cautioned against changing system alignments until he is certain he is aware of the existing system configuration.
2)
All plant personnel were reinstructed on the need for strict compliance with plant procedures.
3)
Adherence to procedural requi rements was assessed by management.
The results of the assessment were discussed with Region II IEE management on October 5, 1979.
I
4)
A new file of procedures has.been established to provide the nuclear operators with spare copies of current procedures for use in the plant.
5)
A senior reactor operator in the plant training department has been assigned full time to work on shift to provide the nuclear operators with additional training on the use'.of procedures and proper performance as operators of nuclear related equipment.
In addition, the guality Control Department will conduct a followup check by June 1,
1980 to verify procedurpl compliance by nuclear operators over the intervening time period.
ed by 10 CFR 20.105.b.l, "...no licensee shall
- possess, use or transfer licensed material in such a manner as to create in any unrestricted area from radioactive material and other sources of radiation in his possession:
(1)
Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present in the area, could result in his receiving a dose in excess of two millirems in any one hour."
Response
B As corrective action, a
new sec)ion was added to the fence encompassing the Radiation Controlled Area (restricted area) so that the drywell is now located inside the restricted area-This will prevent recurrence of the noncompliance.
Full compliance was achieved by September 14, 1979.
~Fi ndi n C
As required by 10 CFR 20.304(a),
no licensee shall dispose of licensed material by burial in soil if the quantities of material buried at any one location and time exceeds 1,'000 times the amount specified in 10 CFR 20 Appendix C.
Contrary to the above, at least 2.4 millicuries of cobalt 60 was added to the subterranean gravel filled drainage field on August 28, 1979.,
This is an infraction.
~lt The actions taken in response to Finding A are also applicable to this finding.
In addition, the following actions will be taken:
1)
An engineering study to provide for modification of the storm drain system to preclude deposition of licensed material in the drywell has been scheduled for completion by January 31, 1980.
2)
A program of periodic sampling of storm drains has been initiated in order to monitor for activity.
Such sampling will be discontinued upon completion of the storm drain system modification.
I t
P.O. OOX 62S100, MIAMI,F L 33162
'(",< lg "'p. 32 FLORIDA POWER 6 LIGHTCOMPANY October 16, 1979 L-79-290 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Re:
50-250/79-27 50-251/79-27 As discussed with Mr. John Dyer of your staff,, Florida Power 8 Light Company's response to the subject inspection report will be submitted by October 22, 1979.
Please. feel free to call if you should have any question.
Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems and Technology REU/GDIJ/ah cc:
Harold F. Reis, Esquire t9xxz5o v g~
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