ML17332A389

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Amends 184 & 169 to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,respectively, Re Changes to TS to Allow Extended Action Time for Improper Boron Concentration & to Provide Consistent Action Statement
ML17332A389
Person / Time
Site: Cook  
Issue date: 11/08/1994
From: Hannon J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML17332A390 List:
References
NUDOCS 9411150600
Download: ML17332A389 (15)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 205NI001 NDIANA MICHIGAN OWER COMPANY OO<<ET IIO. 5 ONALD C; COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO.

1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 184 License No.

DPR-58 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated November 12,

1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9411150600 941108~i-PDR ADOCK 05000315, P

PDR

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-58 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.i84

, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

November Q

]994 John N. Hannon, Director Project Directorate III-I Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

0 ATTACHH NT C NSE NDNENT 0.

84 TO FACI ITY OPE TING LICENSE 0.

OPR-58 T

0.

0-5 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

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3/4 5-1 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-1 lEKBI 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-la

4 5

RGEN CO COOLING S

S C

IMI ING CO I 0

R OPE ON 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b..A contained borated water volume of between 921 and 971 cubic feet, c.

A boron concentration between 2400 ppm and 2600 ppm, and d.

A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 585 and 658 psig.

~OTION:

a.

With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits, restore boron concentration to within limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than or equal to 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one accumulator inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration not within limits, restore the accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or be in at least Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than or equal to 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure-in the tanks, and 2.

Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

  • Pressurizer Pressure above 1000 psig.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO 444, 424, 184

ERGENCY COR CO G

S S

S V

LLANCE RE U S

Co t ued b.

At least once per 31 days and, for the affected a cccnclat or(

s),

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1X of tank volume (that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank) by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution.

C.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig, by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected by removal of the breaker from the circuit.

COOK NUCLEAR PIANT - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 AMENDMENT NO. 407., 444,

$ 84

4 5

EHE G NCY CO E COO I G

ST S

ASES 345 C

ORS The OPERABILITY of each RCS accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water willbe immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron. concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

If the boron concentration of one accumulator is not within limits, it must be returned to within the limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

In this Condition, ability to maintain subcriticality or minimum boron precipitation time may be reduced.

The boron in the accumulators contributes to the assumption that the combined ECCS water in the partially recovered core during the early reflooding phase of a large break LOCA is sufficient to keep that portion of the core subcritical.

One accumulator below the minimum boron concentration limit, however,'ill have no effect on available ECCS water and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality during reflood.

Boiling of ECCS water in the core during reflood concentrates boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core.

In addition, current analysis techniques demonstrate that the accumulators do not discharge following a large main steam line break for the majority of plants.

Even if they do discharge, their impact is minor and not a design limiting event.

Thus, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed to return the boron concentration to within limits.

If one accumulator is inoperable for a reason other than boron concentration, the accumulator must be returned to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

In this Condition, the required contents of three accumulators cannot be assumed to reach the core during a LOCA.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> completion time to open the valve, remove power to the valve, or restore the proper water volume or nitrogen cover pressure ensures that prompt action will be taken to return the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status.

The completion time minimizes the potential for exposure of the plant to a LOCA under these conditi.ons.

Ifthe accumulator cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated completion time. the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and pressurizer pressure reduced to s 1000 psig within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The COOK MJCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO. m 184

ERG CY CORE COOLING SYST S

allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Ifmore than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

34 and 3453ECCSSUB S

EM The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating fn conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in'the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - 'UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-la mENDZENT NO. m~

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UNlTED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O.C. 205M-0001 INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY OCKET

0. 50-316 DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO.

2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.

License No.

DPR-74 l.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated November 12, 1993, complies with the standards and requi rements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commi ssi on; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied; 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B,

as revised through Amendment No.

i6g, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

November 8, 1994

/

John N. Hannon, Director Project Directorate III-I Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

TTACH NT TO C NSE AHENDMENT 0.

169 ACILITY OPERAT NG IC NSE NO. DPR-74 RQttKtT IIO. 50-3 6

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

HOVE 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-2 8 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-la

4 5 RGENCY CORE COOLING S

CC I ING CO TION FO 0

3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

b.

c d.

The isolation valve open, A contained borated water volume of between 921 and 971 cubic feet, A boron concentration between 2400 ppm and 2600 ppm, and A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 585 and 658 psig.

~CYIDN:

a

~

With one accumulator inoperable due to'oron concentration not within limits, restore boron concentration to within limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than or equal to 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one accumulator inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration not within limits, restore the accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or be in at least Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than or equal to 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and 2.

Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

+Pressurizer Pressure above 1000 psig.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO.

44+, 434,

]pc

ERGENCY CORE COOLING STEMS V I C

Co ued At least once per 31 days and, for the affected accumulator(s),

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase greater than or equal to 1X of tank volume (that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank) by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected by removal of the breaker from the circuit.

COOK NUCLEAR FIANT - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 AMENDMENT NO. M, 434

4 5

EME GENCY CORE COOLING

~AS~E 3451 C

T The OPERABILITY of each RCS accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated ~ater will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator in]ection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

If the boron concentration of one accumulator is not within limits, it must be returned to within the limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

In this Condition, ability to maintain subcriticality or minimum boron precipitation time may be reduced.

The boron in the accumulators contributes to the assumption that the combined ECCS water in the partially recovered core during the early reflooding phase of a large break LOCA is sufficient to keep that portion of the core subcritical.

One accumulator below the minimum boron concentration limit, however, willhave no effect on available ECCS water and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality during reflood.

Boiling of ECCS water in the core during reflood concentrates boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core.

In addition, current analysis techniques demonstrate that the accumulators do not discharge following a large main steam line break for the ma]ority of plants.

Even if they do discharge, their impact is minor and not a design limiting event,.

Thus, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed to return the boron concentration to within limits.

If one accumulator is inoperable for a reason other than boron concentration, the accumulator must be returned to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

In this Condition, the required contents of three accumulators cannot be assumed to reach the core during a LOCA.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> completion time to open the valve, remove power to the valve, or restore the proper water volume or nitrogen cover pressure ensures that prompt action will be taken to return the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status.

The completion time minimizes the potential for exposure of the plant to a LOCA under these conditions.

If the accumulator cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated completion time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and pressurizer pressure reduced to s 1000 psig within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO. M, 169

RGEN CO 00 G

(Continued) allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Ifmore than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

4 5

and 3 4 5 3 CCS SU S

S The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the. peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

If a safety injection cross-tie valve is closed, safety injection would be limited to two lines assuming the loss of one safety injection subsystem through a single failure consideration.

The resulting lowered flow requires a decrease in THEE'lAL POti'ER to limit the peak clad temperature within acceptable limits in the event of a postulated small break LOCA.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 V

B 3/4 5-la AMENDMENT NO. jP, 169,