ML17331B436

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Insp Repts 50-315/94-12 & 50-316/94-12 on 940601-08. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection Insp of Surveillances,Equipment,Fire Brigade Training & Drills & Fire Protection Audits
ML17331B436
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 06/15/1994
From: Schrum D, Shafer W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17331B434 List:
References
50-315-94-12, 50-316-94-12, NUDOCS 9406220332
Download: ML17331B436 (6)


See also: IR 05000315/1994012

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION

REGION III

Report Nos.

50-315/94012(DRS);

50-316/94012(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-315;

50-316

Licensee:

Indiana Hichigan Power

Company

1 Riverside

Plaza

Columbus,

OH

43216

License

Nos.

DPR-58;

DPR-74

Facility Name:

Donald

C. Cook Nuclear

Power Plant, Units

1 and

2

Inspection At:

Donald

C. Cook Site,

Bridgman,

HI

Inspection

Conducted:

June 1-8,

1994

Inspector:

c rum

ate

Approved By:

LIDPQ

a er,

Haintenance

an

le

Outages

Section

lisl

ate

Ins ection

Summar

Ins ection

on June

1-8

1994

Re ort Nos.

50-315 94012

DRS

~R-

11

RR

11

OR

Areas Ins ected:

Routine fire protection inspection of surveillances,

equipment, fire brigade training and drills, and fire protection audits.

The

inspector utilized selected

portions of NRC inspection procedure

64704,

92902,

and 92904.

Results:

Overall, fire protection

program activities were effectively

implemented in meeting the safety objectives of the program.

The fire

protection program

was rated excellent

and improving.

The staff was

experienced

and knowledgeable

and had taken appropriate

actions to correct

most issues

and problems.

Strengths

included

a low number of impairments;

a

dedicated

and well-trained fire brigade; the staff was being proactive in

improving and maintaining fire protection equipment;

and the audits performed

were good.

A violation was identified for the failure to remove combustible

materials within 35 feet of a "hotwork" activities (paragraph 3.4).

Additional weaknesses

observed

during this work activity was the use of

herculite

and untreated

wood for a barrier.

In addition, the fire watch, fire

brigade,

and maintenance

supervisors

did not enforce the 35 foot combustible

free zone during their duties.

A weakness

noted during the fire drill was

that updated fire strategies

(pre-fire plans)

were not made available to the

fire brigade;

however,

updated

plans

are currently in the process of being

issued.

9406220332

9406 f5

PDR

ADOCK 050003'

8

PDR

DETAILS

1.0

Persons

Contacted

  • A.
  • }(
    • J
  • W.
  • p

p.

    • B
    • G

D.

  • J

J.

J.

  • J
  • M.

Blind, Plant Manager

Baker, Assistant Plant Manager-Production

Greendonner;

Fire Protection Coordinator-Operations

Rutkowski, Assistant

Plant Manager-Support

Hodge,

Plant Protection Superintendent

Russell,

Fire Protection Supervisor

Jacques,

Fire Protection Coordinator-Systems/Training

Depuydt,

License Coordinator

Auer, guality Assurance Auditor

Gane,

Production Supervisor

Bladeren,

PLE/Staff Assistant

Johns,

Appendix

R Administrator

Wiebe, Safety

L Assessment

Superintendent

Murtha,

Performance

Engineer

Schrader,

Preventive

Maintenance

Supervisor

White,

SNS

Barfelz,

NS/A Supervisor

U. S. Nuclear

Re ulator

Commission

NRC

2.0

  • D. Hartland,

Resident

Inspector

'I

  • Denotes

those individuals attending the exit meeting

on June 8,

1994.

Ins ection Follow-u

Items

2.1

2.2

2.3

Closed Violation 315 316 93015-01:

This item addressed

a violation for

improper scheduling of preventive mainten'ance

tasks which were

aut'omatically scheduled late due to computer software, that used the job

order close out date for scheduling rather than the date the preventive

maintenance

(PM) task was actually performed.

A tracking system

was

implemented for the

PM tasks which is reviewed

by management

on

a daily

basis to ensure timely close out of items.

Those

items that are delayed

beyond the scheduled

cycle are manually rescheduled

to fall within there

normal preventive maintenance

cycle.

The tracking system

had cor rected

the stated

problem and this item is closed.

Closed

Violation 315 316 93015-02:

This item addressed

a violation

for not properly controlling outdated

maintenance

procedures.

The

licensee

performed

a 100 percent

inspection

on the procedures

in

question.

The above problem was corrected

by causing the group making

a

major document

change in a site library, responsible

to ensure, that

documents

no longer used are sent

back to the issuing group, which

ensures

removal

from the site library.

No new problems of this type had

been found.

This item is closed.

Closed

Violation 315 316 93015-03:

This item addressed

a concern with

preventive maintenance

being delayed for an extended

period of time

resulting in no corrective actions for inoperable

emergency lights in

the plant.

Extensive actions

had

been taken to resolve

emergency

3.0

lighting problems

and surveillances

are

no longer delayed

beyond their

normal cycle.

Those

new problems identified with emergency lighting

were corrected

in a timely manner.

This item is closed.

Routine Fire Protection

Pro ram Review

3.1

This inspection consisted of plant area observations

and reviews of fire

protection surveill.ances,

maintenance

on fire protection equipment, fire

brigade training and drill.s, fire reports, deviation reports,

work

requests,

safety evaluations,

and audits of fire protection activities.

Plant Area Observations

The inspector toured the areas of the turbine building, the screen

house,

and the

new fire pump building to observe

the adequacy

and

control of combustibles, fire doors,

hose stations,

detection

equipment,

extinguishers,

sprinkler systems,

emergency lights,

and housekeeping.

With the exception of "hotwork", the control of combustibles

in the

plant was good.

This included control of transient combustibles.

A

minimal amount of combustible materials

was noted in storage

cages.

Flammable liquids were stored in safety cans.

Most wood and plastics

used in the plant were fire resistant.

Equipment oil leaks were minimal

with oil being collected

on absorbers

and removed before

becoming

excessive.

3.2

The material condition of most fire protection equipment

was good.

This

included dampers, fire extinguishers,

hose stations,

and fire pumps.

A

new building with new diesel

and electric fire pumps

had

been built

onsite with a dedicated

water supply to ensure that biofouling would not

effect the reliability of the fire protection

system.

Most fire doors

in the plant were in excellent condition which included self-closure

and

latching.

A site locksmith contributed to timely door repairs.

A fire

protection

system valve replacement

project is in the planning stage to

correct problems with leakage

when isolating specific sections of the

fire protection systems for maintenance.

Surveillances

indicated that

fire protection system equipment condition, for those surveillances

reviewed,

appeared

to be good, except for emergency lighting.

A large

number of emergency lighting failures were occurring

as

a result of

battery design.

The batteries

were replaced

when they fail.

Extinguishers

had been inspected

and had

a current inspection date.

Fire fighting foam was being replaced prior to the expiration date.

A

new fire truck had also

been

purchased

during this assessment

period.

The plant was clean

and housekeeping

was good.

Transient combustibles

were being tracked

by a computer tracking system, with a daily update,

and calculations

were being maintained for fire loading in plant areas.

Compensatory

actions

were taken for those

areas

exceeding

the fire

loading requirements.

Fire Barriers

Inoperable fire barrier penetration

gap seals

are currently

a major

problem.

A barrier gap seal

was found with untreated

styrofoam behind

the outer silicon sheeting rather then

a required fire barrier material.

3.3

A proactive program was started to inspect

485 additional

gap seals.

So

far

42 additional

gap seals

were found with untreated

styrofoam

and were

being repaired during the inspection.

Appropriate compensatory

measures

were taken

by assigning

a one hour fire watch until barrier gap seals

were repaired.

Also, minimizing the risk to the plant were fire

detection

and fire suppression

available in most the effected areas.

A

review of other impairments indicated that the plant had

been proactive

in getting impairments repaired.

The plant had very few impairments,

excluding the recent

gap seal

problems.

Fire Watches

3.4

Missed fire watch inspections for impairments

had

been

a problem during

the early part of this year.

A new contractor

had

been hired;

As

a

result

new fire watches

lacked training and

an awareness

of the

importance of their fire watch responsibilities.

These

problems

were

corrected.

Some of the contractor's

employment

was terminated

when they

did not measure

up to expectations.

The licensee

took additional

corrective actions

as needed.

An improved fire watch training program

was implemented to enhance

the learning of fire watch tasks.

In

addition, all supervisors

are

now required to identify new impairments

(and its location) to fire watch personnel

to ensure

the correct areas

are inspected.

On a sample basis, fire protection

management

were making spot checks to

ensure that fire watches

were doing their job.

guality assurance

(gA)

sur veillances

were also being conducted

on the fire watches

as they made

their inspections.

No problems with the one hour fire watch requirement

bei'ng violated were found during these

gA surveillances.

The corrective

actions for the fire watch problems

appeared

to be effective.

Weldin

and Cuttin

Permits

There were

a significant number of fires in the plant during the

assessment

period.

The inspector reviewed the fire reports

and noted

that

a larger than normal

number of fires had occurred during "hotwork"

with most fires occurring near the work indicating that combustible

controls for "hotwork" were not being implemented.

During a tour of the turbine building with the fire protection

supervisors,

the inspector

observed

"hotwork" (welding, grinding,

cutting activities) at three job locations were not being performed

according to plant procedures

and good work practices.

Two job

locations contained

an untreated

wood frame supporting herculite for a

barrier.

In addition, the areas

contained

a garbage

can with

combustibles,

cloth tool bags,

coats,

papers,

boxes, plastic buckets,

and other combustible materials.

D. C.

Cook Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires

adherence

to fire

protection

program implementing procedures.

D. C.

Cook Preventive

Maintenance

Inst'ruction,

PMI-2270, "Fire Protection," Revision 22,

requires

the following:

As a minimum the following items shall

be reviewed:

4.3.2.1

Removal of combustibles

from the immediate

area in which the work is to be performed

and

a

35'adius

around the work area,

not to include those

areas

cut off by walls, doors, etc.

4.3.2.3

The

necessity to use non-flammable material to cover or

shield adjacent

or lower equipment

and openings to

lower elevations.

On June 3,

1994, the inspector

observed grinding, welding,and cutting

activities in the turbine building that did not have combustibles

removed or covered within 35 feet of these activities.

This is

violation of Technical Specification 6.8. l.a(50-315/316/94012-01(DRS)).

A response

to this violation is required.

The plant determined that the employees

had received

adequate

training

but over the years the general

condition of not enforcing the 35 foot

combustible free zone

had

become

an accepted

practice.

The problem of

not enforcing this requirement

included the fire watches,

the fire

brigade,

the supervisors of the maintenance staff,

and the maintenance

employees.

However, mitigating the significance of this problem were

"hotwork" fire watches

who were

on the job site and attentive to their

duties.

3.5

The immediate corrective actions

were to inform the staff that the 35

foot combustible free zone would be enforced.

Naintenance staff that

did not comply would have the work stopped.

Ninor amounts of

combustibles

would still be needed

near the work, such

as work

procedures,

cloth work bags,

and plastic quench bottles of water.

But

in. most cases

these

items

can

be protected or covered.

Fire Protection Staffin

The staff was experienced,

knowledgeable,

and proactive in dealing with

most plant problems.

Good cooperation

was observed

among the staff.

The fire protection supervisor

was very knowledgeable

about the fire

protection

program

and Appendix R.

Since the previous fire protection

inspection

a dedicated fire protection training instructor,

a fire

protection engineer,

and

a second fire protection coordinator

had been

added to the staff.

In addition,

an Appendix

R special project team had

been created.

3.6

Fire Bri ade

The plant requirements for the fire brigade were all being met in an

effective manner.

The inspector

reviewed fire brigade qualifications

and associated

training records.

Onsite fire drill requirements

had

been

met by all brigade

members

who were listed as qualified.

Live fire

training for all brigade

members

was being conducted

on an annual

bases.

Good fire brigade"critiques

were being performed for fire drills with

associated

training to improve brigade performance.

Also, off-site

response drills were being performed

and

a good relationship existed

with the local fire department.

The fire brigade training program appeared

to be good.

A review of

records indicates that the fire brigade

was meeting its quarterly fire

brigade training.

Hembers of the fire brigade

had sufficient training

3.7

on .plant safety-related

systems with the assistance

of the operations

department

to understand

the effects of a fire on safe

shutdown

capability.

The inspectors

observed

a fire drill in the auxiliary boiler room.

The

operations

and fire fighting staff appropriately

used the pre-fire plans

to identify the risks in the area

and simulated isolating the electrical

equipment in the auxiliary boiler room.

Five fire brigade

members

responded

in a timely manner to the simulated fire with appropriate fire

fighting gear

and completed dressing for entering the space.

Fire

fighting gear

was in good condition and well organized.

The operations

and security departments

also responded

to the fire drill.

Four brigade

members

formed double

hose

teams with the simulated

use of foam to fight

the fire.

The overall

assessment

of the drill was excellent.

One weakness

noted

was the pre-fire plans

had not been

updated to reflect the

new

electrical control panel modifications for the auxiliary boiler room.

Additional time with operations

assistance

was required to ensure that

the areas

equipment

was properly isolated prior to fighting the

simulated fire.

The pre-fire plans are currently being updated

and will

be issued to the plant staff.

A critique was held at the end of the fire drill with all of the

participants in the drill present.

The participants

were allowed to

give their insights

on what they considered

as problems during the

drill.

The staffs overall

assessment

was that this was

an excellent

drill with very few problems.

Audits and Self-Assessments

of Fire Protection

Audits were detailed

and thorough with adequate staff hours devoted to

each audit.

The gA surveillances

were performance

based

observations

of

conditions in the plant and were effective in identifying fire

protection

program problems.

The audits included good findings and

recommendations

to improve the fire protection program.

The 1994 fire

protection audit was very comprehensive

with 5 quality assurance

auditors

spending

3 weeks onsite.

The findings and recommendations

had

been

used to improve the fire protection program.

The following audits

were reviewed:

a 0

b.

C.

d.

Appendix

R Compliance

gAVP 91-16, 3/19/92

Fire Protect-'on

NSDRC-186,

1/30/92

Fire Protection

(PMI-2270) gA-92-21/NSDRC 196,

12/14/92

Station Fire Protection

NSDRC-206, 2/Ol/94

4.0

Exit Meetin

The inspector

met with licensee

representatives.,(denoted

in Section

1)

on June 8,

1994,

and summarized the scope

and findings of the

inspection.

The informational content of the inspection report was

discussed

with regard to documents

reviewed during the inspection.

The

licensee did not identify any of the documents

as proprietary.