ML17331B036
| ML17331B036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1993 |
| From: | Kobetz T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17331B034 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-93-19, 50-316-93-19, NUDOCS 9311090056 | |
| Download: ML17331B036 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1993019
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION
REGION III
Report Nos.
50-315/93019(DRP);
50-316/93019(DRP)
Docket Nos.
50-315;
50-316
Licensee:
Company
1 Riverside
Plaza
Columbus,
OH
43216
License
Nos.
Facility Name:
Donald
C.
Cook Nuclear
Power Plant, Units
1
and
2
Inspection At:
Donald
C.
Cook Site,
Bridgman,
HI
Inspection
Conducted:
September
11 through October
19,
1993
(I
Inspectors:
J.
A.
Isom
D. J. Hartland
Reactor
rojects Section
2A
~~,
9
ate
Ins ection
Summar
Inspection
from September
11 through October
19,
1993
(Report Nos.
50-315/93019(DRP);
50-316/93019(DRP))
Areas
Ins ected:
Routine,
unannounced
inspection
by the resident
and
Headquarters
inspectors
of: plant operations;
maintenance
and surveillance;
engineering
and technical
support;
actions
on previously identified items;
reportable
events;
and,
NRC Region III requests.
Results:
Two violations were identified (paragraphs
S.d
and 5.e) for which no
Notice of Violation is being issued
based
on conformance
to criteria for
exercise of discretion contained
in the
h
d.
monitoring of equipment/system
parameters
in the plant
by the auxiliary
operators
was
found to be informal in that they were not required to take data
on operating
systems.
En ineerin
Technical
Su
ort:
The investigation into problems with the
auxiliary feed
pump bearing oil was good.
Safet
Assessment
ualit
Verification:
Overall, the licensee's
root cause
evaluation
and corrective actions for open
items closed during this inspection
period
was satisfactory.
9311090056
931101
ADOCK 05000315
8
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted:
- A. A.
- K. R.
L. S.
- J
E
B. A.
- T
P'-.
F.
D. L.
L. J.
T. K.
S.
A.
P.
G.
- J. S.
L. H.
- G. A.
- D
H. L.
B3 ind,
Pl ant Manager
Baker, Assistant
Plant Manager-Production
Gibson, Assistant
Plant Manager-Projects
Rutkowski, Assistant
Plant Hanager-Technical
Svensson,
Executive Staff Assistant
Beilman, Maintenance
Superintendent
Carteaux,
Training Superintendent
Noble, Radiation Protection
Superintendent
Matthias, Administrative Superintendent
Postlewait,
Design
Changes
Superintendent
Richardson,
Operations
Superintendent
Schoepf,
Project Engineering
Superintendent
Wiebe, Safety
& Assessment
Superintendent
Vanginhoven,
Site Design Superintendent
Weber,
Plant Engineering
Superintendent
Loope,Chemistry
Superintendent
Horvath, guality Assurance
Supervisor
Support
The inspector also contacted
a number of other licensee
and contract
employees
and informally interviewed operations,
maintenance,
and
technical
personnel.
- Denotes
some of the personnel
attending the Management
Interview on
October 25,
1993.
Plant
0 erations
71707
71710
42700
The inspector
observed
routine facility operating activities
as
conducted
in the plant
and from the main control
rooms.
The inspector
monitored the performance of licensed
Reactor Operators
and Senior
Reactor Operators,
and of Auxiliary
Equipment Operators
including procedure
use
and adherence,
records
and
logs,
communications,
and the degree of professionalism of control
room
activities.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
evaluation of corrective action
and response
to off-normal conditions.
This included compliance with
any reporting requirements.
The inspector
noted the following with regard to the operation of Units
1
and
2 during this reporting period:
a.
Unit
1 status:
The licensee
operated
the unit at full power during the inspection
period except
between
September
10-14,
1993,
when the licensee
b.
reduced 'power to 55 percent to perform
a Clamtrol treatment of its
lake water systems'or
zebra
mussel
infestation.
The licensee
did not experience
any significant operational
problems during the
inspection period.
Unit 2 status:
c
~
The licensee
operated
the unit at
75 percent
power during the
inspection period except
between
September
10-14,
1993,
when the
licensee
reduced'power
to 55 percent to perform
a Clamtrol
treatment of its lake water systems for zebra
mussel
infestation.
'The licensee
did not experience
any significant operational
problems during the inspection period.
Auxiliar
E ui ment 0 erator Plant Tours:
The inspector
accompanied
several
auxiliary equipment operators
(AEOs) for both units during the performance of shiftly plant
tours,
which are prescribed
by 01
L 02-OHP 5030.001.001,
"Plant
Tour Guidelines."'he
procedure
is
a guide for the
AEOs on the
performance of equipment
checks
and what types of plant conditions
are, considered
normal
and should
be expected
during their plant
tours.
In addition to the tour guidelines,
the operators
take
some local readings for input into 01
8
02-OHP 4030.STP.030,
"Daily and Shiftly Surveillance
Checks,"
such
as containment
run time meter readings
and battery
room temperatures,
The inspector
noted
a weakness
with the
"Plant Tour Guidelines"
procedure.
The procedure
does
not contain data
sheets
with
entries for logging local plant readings,
therefore
the AEO's.
plant tours
can potentially miss
components
that are prescribed
to
be monitored
by the guidelines.
This was discussed
with plant
management.
They had
been reluctant to implement data
sheets
for
plant tours
because
they do not want to limit the items that the
AEOs look at during their tours.
They want the
AEOs to maintain
a.
questioning attitude
about all plant equipment rather than
confining them to looking at specific gauges for logging data
points.
Therefore,
they have
implemented
the guidance for plant
tours
and expect the
AEOs to become familiar with all the
equipment
on their tours
and
be aware of any changing conditions
and potentially degraded
equipment.
Licensee
management
was already
aware of the potential
weaknesses
with the
AEO tours
and are considering
plans to upgrade
them.
= They are investigating the
use of computer
pads for the AEOs,
which would allow them to take data points off of local gauges
and
produce
immediate trends of various parameters
on plant equipment.
System engineers
are currently reviewing the "Plant Tour
Guidelines"
procedure
and to determine
what types of parameters
the
AEOs should log for various
components.
Ho violations, deviations,
unresolved
or inspector followup items were
identified.
Maintenance
Surveillance
62703
61726
42700
The inspector
reviewed maintenance
activities
as detailed
below.
The
focus of the inspection
was to assure
the maintenance
activities were
conducted
in accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides
and
industry codes or standards,
and in conformance with Technical
Specifications.
The following items were considered
during this review:
the Limiting Condi.tions for Operation
were met while components
or
systems
were removed
from service;
approvals
were obtained prior to
initiating the work; activities were accomplished
using
approved
procedures;
and post maintenance
testing
was performed
as applicable.
The following activities were inspected:
a.
Unit
1 Turbine-driven Auxiliar
Pum
Turbine
Bearin
Oil Level:
b.
The inspector
reviewed licensee
actions
in response
to
a problem
encountered
with the Unit
1
TDAFW pump turbine bearing oil system.
The inspector determined that the licensee's
root cause
investigation
and corrective action to the problem were good.
On October
5,
1993,
the licensee
removed the
pump from service for
planned
maintenance,
which included change-out of the turbine
bearing oil
~
The following day, while running the
pump for post-
maintenance
testing,
licensee
personnel
observed that the oil
level
had fallen below the minimum level indicated
in the sight
glass
and that oil was leaking out of the outboard
bearing
housing..
After discussions
with the
pump vendor
and further troubleshooting
activities,
the licensee
determined that the draw-down of the oil
level
was
due to absorption
by the system,
which was expected
during initial pump startup after the oil change.
The licensee
also determined that the leakage
out of the outboard
bearing
was
due to the overfilling of the system.
As corrective action,
the licensee
lowered the
maximum level
indication
on the sight glass to prevent overfilling the system in
the future.
The licensee
was evaluating
enhancement
to the
applicable plant instruction to ensure that the system is properly
vented
when filling.
Surveillances
observed:
The inspector
observed
the following surveillances
and noted
no
deficiencies:
"Unit 2 Essential
Service
Water High Differential Pressure
Hotor
Operator Valve Testing,"
- 02-0HP.SP.106.
"Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed
Pump Trip and Throttle Valve
Operability Test,"
2-OHP 4030.STP.017TV..
No violations, deviations,
unresolved
or inspector followup items were
identified.
En ineerin
and Technical
Su
ort
37828
The inspector monitored engineering
and technical
support activities at
the site
and,
on occasion,
as provided to the site from the corporate
office.
The purpose of this monitoring was to assess
the adequacy of
these
functions in contributing, properly to other functions
such
as
operations,
maintenance,
testing, training, fire protection
and
configuration management.
a.
Em t
Unit 2 "Auxiliar
AFA
Pum
Oil Bubbler:
b.
On October
2,
1993,
the inspector
accompanied
the
AFW system
engineer to determIne
the quantity of oil which could
be removed
from the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater
(TDAFW) pump outer
bearing before oil lubrication using the slinger ring would be
lost.
The test
was performed using the spare
TDAFW pump to
. determine
whether the low oil condition found by
NRC inspectors
on
September
2,
1993,
was
a situation in which no oil was available
for lubrication of the outboard
bearings
(see
paragraph
2d of
50-315/93018(DRP); 50-316/93018(DRP)
.
The system engineer's
discussion
with the vendor indicated that
lubrication could still be provided to the bearings
as long
as the
slinger ring was
immersed
in oil.
The engineer
determined that
the bearing
housing contains
360 milliliters of oil from the
bottom of the bubbler assembly to
a level below the slinger ring.
Therefore,
based
on the 320 milliliters it took to refill the
bearing
housing to the bottom of the bubbler assembly
on
September
2, it appeared
that there 'was about
40 milliliters
available to provide lubrication to the bearings.
This
showed
that the oil level
was not found
so low as to render the
AFW pump
Unit 2 West Centrifu al Char in
Pum
The inspector
examined
the licensee's
investigation into the
failure of the Unit 2
"W" centrifugal charging
pump
(CCP)
(50--
315/93016(DRP);
50-316/93016(DRP))
through reviews of various
licensee
documents
and interviews with system engineers.
The
failed internal
assembly
was sent to We'stinghouse
for disassembly
and inspection to determine
the cause of the breakdown,
The high
vibrations
on the
pump were caused
by
a four inch,
180 degree
circumferential
crack through the number
9 impeller shaft
keyway.
also reported
2 minor cracks
on the number
3 and
number
8 impeller shaft
keyways.
A metallurgical
analysis of the
shaft is still in progress.
personnel
believe that
excessive
radial loadings
were applied to the keyways.
System
engineers
are continuing to perform
a root cause
determination
by .
reviewing the
pump operating history.
The inspector will continue
to follow the licensee's
determination of the root cause of the
pump failure and the corrective actions taken,
as appropriate.
c.
Unit
1 East Centrifu al
Char in
Pum
While performing predictive maintenance activities, the licensee
identified an increasing
trend
on the Unit
1 "E" CCP outboard
bearing vibration.
Although,this bearing
was not required to be
monitored
by the licensee's
IST program, this condition could have
been
symptomatic of a problem with the
pump which could result in
pump failure.
The inspector
reviewed licensee activities in
response
to this condition
and determined
that they were
satisfactory.
The licensee
responded
to this increasing
trend in vibration by
increasing
the surveillance
frequency of bearing vibration
measurement
from quarterly to biweekly.
In 'addition, the licensee
installed temporary instrumentation
to measure
the phase
angle of
the shaft.
A shift in the phase
angle would have
been indicative
of a circumferential
crack propagating
in the shaft.
No such
phase
angle shift was observed.
The licensee
also took the
pump out of service
on October 4,
1993,
to perform
a hot alignment check of the
pump
and motor shafts,
and
to check the tightness of the base plate
and foundation bolts.
The licensee
did not identify any deficiencies
associated
with
this work activity.
At the
end of the inspection period,
the
vibration levels
on the bearing
had
begun to trend
downward
and
were steady,
although still considered
in the "rough" range.
The
.
inspector will continue to follow the licensee's
investigation
into the bearing vibration problem.
No violations, deviations,
unresolved
or inspector followup items were
identified.
Actions on Previousl
Identified Items
92701
92702
Closed
IFI 50-315 92016-01
50-316 92016-01:
Licensee
Evaluation
of A e
Oe radation of Ex ansion Joints
This IFI involved
a concern related to failure of safety-related
expansion joints in the plant due to age degradation.
The licensee identified
a total of eight safety-related
expansion
joints in the plant.
All were installed in emergency
diesel
generator
(EDG) support
systems
(essential
service water cooling
'ater
supply
and combustion air supply).
Two of the joints had
been installed since
1990.
The licensee
was not able to determine
when the other six joints were installed.
In response,
the
licensee
contracted
a vendor to inspect the joints.
Based
on the
vendor's
recommendations,
the licensee
determined that
none of the
joints required
immediate replacement.
However,
the licensee
generated
action requests
to replace
the six joints during the
1994 refueling outages.
In addition,
the licensee
committed to
revise their preventive maintenance
program to require replacement
of the safety-related joints on
a 7-1/2 year interval.
Closed
Violation 316 92022-01:
Failure to Maintain Both EDG's
~oerable
Closed
Violation 316 92022-02:
Failure to Include Acce tance
Criteria For
EDG's
Closed
Violation 316 92022-03:
Failure to Prom tl
Identif
and
These violations were issued
in response
to the Unit
inoperability event
on September
28,
1992.
On that date,
the'EDG
tripped
on low lube oil pressure
due to insufficient oil inventory
in the
A detailed investigation into the
event,
as
documented
in IR Nos.
50-315/92022(DRP);
50-
316/92022(DRP),
established
that the
EDG was inoperable for a
period of time in excess
of that allowed by TS.
The inspector identified several
root causes
for the event.
The
surveillance
procedure that monitored the
on
a
weekly basis did not contain
any minimum acceptance
criteria.
As
long-term corrective action to this concern,
the licensee
performed
a review of the applicable tour procedures
to verify
that appropriate critical parameters
were monitored during the
AEO
tours.
The licensee
revised the
procedure es to include acceptance-
criteria
and trending methods for the parameters,
In addition,
the licensee
was currently developing
a computerized
system for
providing input and processing
the parameters
taken
on
AEO tours,
which will provide
a more formalized system for monitoring the
parameters.
The licensee
expected
to implement this system
by the
end of 1993.
Another root cause for the event
was the licensee's
failure to
take action to repair the leak which resulted
in the loss of the
lube oil inventory.
The licensee initiated
a work request
to
repair the leak several
months prior to the event,
but the request
did not quantify the leak,
and the licensee
assigned
the request
a
low work priority without periodically re-evaluating
the
significance of the leak,
In response
to this concern,
the
licensee
enhanced
the work request
review process
by requiring
a
more detailed description of deficiencies
on work requests.
The
licensee
also established
a work classification organization
within the scheduling
department,
consisting of three licensed
operators,
to review work requests
for detail
and assign
the
appropriate priority and schedule
date.
The licensee
also
added
a
requirement for system engineers
to periodically review work
requests
associated
with their assigned
systems.
Contributing factors to the event were
an inaccurate
level
indication
and the failure of the low level alarm to actuate.
In
response,
the licensee
was performing weekly dip measurements
of
the lube oil tank levels.
In addition,
the licensee verified
proper operation of each
and will
increase
the frequency of the level alarm operational
checks
from
once every four years to every refueling outage.
Closed
Unresolved
Item 315 93011-05:
CCW Flow to
Emer enc
Core
Coolin
S stem Heat
Exchan ers
During walkdown of the Component
Cooling Water
(CCW) system,
the
inspector
found that there were
no installed flow instruments
which could
be used to verify flow to the individual heat
exchangers
(which are in parallel) for the safety-related
charging
pumps.
At the time, the inspector
was concerned
that the licensee
would not be able to ensure that each of the heat
exchangers
was
receiving
adequate
design flow and that the licensee
would not be
able to detect degradation
in heat
exchanger
performance.
Each safety-related
charging
pump is designed with four heat
exchangers
which provide cooling to the pump's bearing oil, gear
oil and the two mechanical
seals.
The two mechanical
seal
heat
exchangers
are in-series
and, therefore,
are effectively one heat
exchanger.
One flow instrument is provided at the
CCW return
from these
heat
exchangers
to measure total
combined
flow.
The inspector
reviewed the instrumentation
and annunciators
associated
with the charging
pump system
and found that the
control
room operators
would not be able to determine
whether
there
was
a degradation
in heat
exchanger
performance
because
they
did not have annunciators
which could alarm to alert them of
degrading
heat
exchanger
performance.
One annunciator,
"East(West)
Lube Oil Temp Or Press
Low" (drop
13 on annunciator
panel
number
209)
alarms
on decreasing
lube oil temperature
or
decreasing oil pressure.
It appeared
that this alarm was
installed to detect excessive
CCW flow being provided
and to
detect for low oil conditions.
Additionally, only the bearing oil
cooler
had
a temperature
gauge which could
be used to monitor heat
exchanger
performance.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
flow curves
and determined
that if the heat
exchangers
performed
as designed,
there should
be
adequate
flow distribution between
the three heat
exchanger
sets.
There
have
been
no adverse
pump performance
problems resulting
from lack of
CCW cooling being provided to the charging
pumps.
'dditionally,
the
CCW system is
a closed
system
such that
potential fouling of the heat
exchangers
appeared
unlikely during
normal routine operations.
Closed
Unresolved
'Item 50-315 92009-01
LER 50-315 92006:
Failure of Hain Steam 'Safet
Valves to Neet Technical
S ecification Lift Set oint Re uir ements
Due to Set oint Drift
Historically, the licensee
has
had problems meeting the Technical
'Specification
(TS) lift requirement for their steam generator
safety valves.
Although this problem has
been uncorrected for
some time, it appeared
that this was
a generic industry problem.
Since then,
the licensee
has
performed further calculations
and
analysis to allow a
TS change
request to increase
the lift
~ setpoint tolerance
from
1 to
3 percent.
The inspector's
discussion
with the
NRR project manager
indicated that this
TS
change
request,
AEP:NRC: 1169,
dated
November
11,
1992,
was
reviewed
by the
NRR technical
section
and
was found to be
acceptable.
The
TS change
should minimize or possibly eliminate
the inability for the safety valves to meet their lift setpoint
requirements'dditionally,
the licensee will perform
refurbishment for safety valves which are found to exceed
the plus
or minus
3 percent
requirement.
This problem involved
a failure to prevent repetition of a
condition prohibited
by the TS.
However, the problem
had minimal
safety significance
because
the licensee
analysis
(based
on the
new Westinghouse
analysis)
showed that safety limits were not
exceeded
for either loss of load/turbine trip or small
break loss-
of-coolant scenarios.
In addition,
the licensee
properly reported
the event
and took appropriate corrective actions.
Therefore,
pursuant to the
NRC enforcement
policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C), the
NRC is exercising
enforcement discretion for this matter,
and
no
Notice of Violation will be issued.
Closed
Unresolved
Item 50-315 92014-01
LER 50-315 92009-LL:
Failure of Two Pressurizer
Safet
Valves to Neet Technical
S ecification Lift Set oint
Re uirements
The licensee
has experienced
problems with failure of the
pressurizer
safety valves to liftwithin the required
pressures
in
the Technical Specifications
(TS).
LERs, 50-315/90016-LL for Unit
1
and 50-316/92006-LL
and 50-316/89-04 for Unit 2 dealt with the
same
problem.
Although the problem of safety valve setpoint drift
caused
a repeated
TS violation, the licensee's
complete
disassembly,
and inspection of the failed valves found no cause for
the setpoint drift.
Also, the licensee's
evaluation
has
found
that there
was
no safety significance
from the setpoint drift
since,
in the event of an overpressure
the safety
valves would still have limited the peak transient
pressure
to
0
2659 psig.
This is below the
TS safety limit of 2735 psig.
In
addition,
the licensee
properly reported
the event
and took
appropriate corrective actions.
Therefore,
pursuant to the
NRC
enforcement
policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C), the
NRC is exercising
enforcement discretion for this matter,
and
will be issued.
Two'on-cited violations were identified.
No deviations,
unresolved
or
inspector followup items were identified.
Re ortable
Events
92700
92720
The inspector
reviewed the following Licensee
Event Reports
(LERs)
by
means of direct observation,
discussions
with licensee
personnel,
and
review of records.
The review addressed
compliance to reporting
requirements
and,,as
applicable,
that immediate corrective action
and
appropriate
action to prevent recurrence
had
been
accomplished.
Closed
LER 315 92010-LL: Hissed Surveillance
Due to the
Use of
Obsolete
Documentation
in Su
ort of Thermo-La
330 Ins ection:
The licensee
submitted this
LER because
they had determined, that
a
section of Thermo-Lag
330 which enclosed
a conduit in the Unit 2
blowdown-flash tank area
had not been
included in the survei~lance
p'rogram for fire barriers
as required
by Technical Specification
3/4.7. 10.
However, further review by the licensee
found that this
particular conduit did not need to have this fire barrier protection.
Two modifications
(12-2900-B.04
and 12-3053)
had provided redundant
indications which were routed through different fire zones.
Therefore,
the licensee
determined, that they
had not violated the
TS requirements
and retracted
LER 50-315/92010.
No violations, deviations,
unresolved
or inspector followup items were
identified.
Re ion III Re uests
92705
TI 2500 028:
Em lo ee Concerns
Pro ram:
Ttle objective of this TI was to determine
the characteristics
of the
licensee's
program to provide employees
an alternate
path from their
supervisor or normal line management
to express
safety concerns.
Additionally, this type of program would encourage
people to come
forward with their concerns
without fear of retribution.
The inspector
noted that the licensee
had just recently
implemented
the program that
met this objective; therefore,
the inspector
was unable to determine
the
effectiveness
of the program at this time.
The licensee
implemented their Human Performance
Improvement
System
(HPIS) in March 1993.
The licensee
designed
the program to supplement
and build upon the current plant corrective action program
by pro-
actively identifying precursor
events
which are indicative of
10
~
potentially significant problems.
The licensee
modeled the program
after the
INPO HPES program
and provided
an alternate
vehicle for plant
personnel
to raise safety issues.
The
Human Performance
Analyst (HPA),
reporting directly to the Safety
and Assessment
Manager,
manages
the
program.
Plant personnel
report potential
safety
issues
by filling out forms
located throughout the plant or calling the in-plant
"Human Performance
Hot-Line."
Personnel
may provide
anonymous reports,
and also
may keep
their identity from being revealed, if requested.
The HPA,was currently
conducting meetings with plant personnel
to inform them of the program,
and enhancements
to the program were also reported
by bulletin board
postings
and in the plant newsletter.
To provide
an incentive for
reporting issues,
the licensee publicly recognized
individuals who made
significant contributions
on bulletin board postings.
The licensee
was
also considering
awards for future incentive.
The
HPA followed up on issues
identified with help from cognizant plant
personnel,
as
needed.
The licensee
was currently developing procedural
guidelines for evaluating
and trending the issues identified.
In
addition,
the licensee
had not yet established
specific goals to measure
the effectiveness
of the program.
No violations, deviations,
unresolved
or inspector followup items were
identified.
Nana
ement Interview:
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
denoted
in paragraph
I
on October
25,
1993, to discuss
the scope
and findings of the
inspection.
In addition,
the inspector
also discussed
the likely
informational content of the inspection report with .regard to documents
or processes
reviewed
by the inspector during the inspection.
The
licensee
did not identify any such
documents
or processes
as
proprietary.
l'