05000316/LER-1980-033-01, /01L-0:on 801214,containment Upper & Lower Vol CTS Headers on East Train Were Isolated.Caused by Operator Not Performing Correct Valve Lineup.Operating Shifts Retrained

/01L-0:on 801214,containment Upper & Lower Vol CTS Headers on East Train Were Isolated.Caused by Operator Not Performing Correct Valve Lineup.Operating Shifts Retrained

ML17331A522
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	12/22/1980
From:	Keith R INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML17326A806	List: 05000316/LER-1980-033, Forwards LER 80-033/01L-0 05000316/LER-1980-033-01, /01L-0:on 801214,containment Upper & Lower Vol CTS Headers on East Train Were Isolated.Caused by Operator Not Performing Correct Valve Lineup.Operating Shifts Retrained
References
LER-80-033-01L, LER-80-33-1L, NUDOCS 8101050546
Download: ML17331A522 (4)

LER-1980-033, /01L-0:on 801214,containment Upper & Lower Vol CTS Headers on East Train Were Isolated.Caused by Operator Not Performing Correct Valve Lineup.Operating Shifts Retrained

Event date:
Report date:
3161980033R01 - NRC Website

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Su lement to 10 Manual Isolation Valves CTS-124E and CTS-128E on the discharge of the East CTS Heat Exchanger were found shut at 0640 on December 14, 1980.

The two valves were opened by 0700 the same date.

Investigation revealed these valves had been shut on December 4,

1980 at about 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> to perform the surveillance test on East CTS Pump.

The valves are shut to prevent inadvertent;spray to the containment while test-ing the pump.

After pump testing was complete, an Auxi.liary Equipment Operator was assigned to restore the flow path to normal.

CTS-124E and CTS-128E are required to be locked and sealed open in the flow path.

The Auxiliary Equipment Operator locked and sealed CTS-124E and CTS-128E in the shut position, but initialled the Checkoff Sheet as having locked and sealed the two valves in the open position.

At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in.Mode 5 preparing to heat up and start up.

The heatup and startup were completed and the Unit taken to 100'5 power.

This is also a violation of T.S. 3.0.4 for entering the next higher modes of operation with the East CTS headers inoperable.

A review was made of all activities taking place on, Unit 2 since December 4, 1980.

This review revealed the West CTS headers were operable at all times while the East CTS headers were inoperable.

The RHR East and West spray headers.to the Containment upper volume were also available for use during this time if the need had arisen.

Su lement to 27 To prevent recurrence of the event, the Operations Superintendent met with each operating shift on December 19 and 20, 1980 to reemphasize the absolute requirement for making valve lineups in accordance with the procedure

and, if for some reason this could not be done, to not sign off the procedure as completed but to bring the discrepancy to the attention of the Shift Supervisors so that a resolution could be made.

It was also pointed out that we have an obligation to protect the heal.th and safety of ourselves, our fellow workers, and the general public.

We can only fulfillthis obli-gation by operating the plant in accordance with prescribed procedures and the Technical Specifications.

Additionally, Plant Manager Instruction, PMI-2110, had been revised by tem-porary sheet on December 9, 1980 to require independent verification of re-storation of valve lineups on all ECCS equipment prior to declaring operable after maintenance or surveillance testing.

Had this been in effect on De-cember 4, 1980, this event would not have happened.

The Auxiliary Equipment Operator involved in this event was terminated ef-fective December 17, 1980.

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