ML17319B038
| ML17319B038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1981 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Dolan J INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109150098 | |
| Download: ML17319B038 (9) | |
Text
DISTRIBUTION:
TERA Docket File-2 NSIC NRC PDR ORBbl Rdg L PDR DEisenhut Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316 SNiner CParrish OELD AEOD IE-3 ACRS-10 Sfp 0.4
$98t htr. John Dolan, Yice President jndiana and Michigan Electric Company P. 0. Box 18 Bowling Green Station New York, New York 10004
Dear Hr. Dolan:
From our review of the information provided in your letters dated April 24,
- 1981, M@ 29, 1981 and July 2, 1981 regarding the D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Plant equipment response to hydrogen burns,,we find that we require additional information.
The information required.iseoutlined in the enclosure.
A copy of the enclosure has already,bt;en given to your staff, In order to support our schedule for. review and approval of the deliberate ignition system by January 1982 we requiIe your responses by October 1, 1981.
Si ncerely, 51'igina1 signe4 b7.
- s. A. varga Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branchy/1 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/enclosure:
See next page ORB81:DL OFFICE/
wwooo ~ ~ ~ o ~ oooo
~
~ ~ ~ ~
Sr'erjc SURNAME)
~ ~ ~ ooooo ~ oooeoo (e ~ ~ ~
. 9/3/81
..ai0 C-RBgl:
L
~
~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
9/.
1 04 Si09150098 PDR ADOCK 05000315 NR$
P PDR Ie ~
~ ~
FFlCIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 19dl-dd5-960
~
e e
J.
e
~
3 n, e
,et
Mr. John Dolan Indiana and Michigan Electric Company cc:
Mr. Robert W. Jurgensen Chief nuclear Engineer American Electric Po>>'er Service Corporation 2 Broadway Hew York, Hew York 10004 Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
- Shaw, Pi ttman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 N Street, H.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 t)aude Preston Palenske Memorial Library 500 Market Street St. Joseph, Michigan 49085 Mr. D. Shaller, Plant Manager Donald C.
Cook-HucTear P1ant 0.
Box 458 Bridgman, Michigan 49106 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office 770 Red Arrow Highway Stevensville, Michigan 49127 William J.
- Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, l'richigan, 48103 The Honorable Tom Corcoran United States House of Representatives Washington, D.
C.
20515
D. C.
K NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS NO.
1 2
DOCKETS 50-315/316 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH Enclosure We have reviewed the information regarding D. C.
Cook plant equipment temperature response to hydrogen burns submitted in AEP letters dated April 24,
- 1981, Hay 29, 1981 and July 2, 1981.
We need the following additional information before we can complete our evaluation:
A.
Equipment Survivability l.
Your letter of July 2, 1981 reports results of modified CLASIX analysis results for D. C. Cook and states conclusions regarding the temperature response of certain Cook plant equipment items. based on J'equoyahplant equipment temperature analysis and assuming similar temperature response of Cook equipment.
a.
Provide information to demonstrate that the similarities between Cook and Sequoyah equipment are close enough to justify that Sequoyah equipment temperature/pressure response analysis results can be applied directly to Cook equipment.
This information should include similarities in equipment design, materials, containment
- location, and environmental exposure.
b.
Where Cook equipment cannot be shown to be similar to Sequoyah equipment as discussed in l.a.
- above, provide separate Cook plant equipment temperature/pressure response analysis.
2.
The equipment pressure/temperature response information submitted in your three letters indicated above contains considerable reference to Sequoyah plant equipment response
- analyses, Therefore, we consider that our concerns about the Sequoyah plant equipment analyses also apply to D.
C.
Cook and request that you respond to these concerns in relation to D.
C.
Cook plant equipment.
Attached are: our requests for additional information on the Sequoyah plant equipment survivability analysis.
Note - Cook plant need not respond to the Item B request in the attachment.
Similar requests applicable to D.
C.
Cook are in Item B. below.
B.
Potential Secondary 'Fire l.
Exposed Cable Your submittal of April 24, 1981 references Sandia cable fire.test results and takes credit for exposed cable being wetted by containment sprays as the basis for exposed cable surviving. the hydrogen burn environment.
To support this basis, provide.the following information:
% ~
~
b.
c ~
Verify that all exposed cable locations are wetted by the con-tainment sprays..
Provide the basis for the statement that cable insulated with Hypalon or a synthetic ca@pound made by Kerite.are believed to exhibit superior fire resisting capability than those tested by Sandia.'emonstrate that the Sandia cable fire test exposure and exposed cable temperature response is more severe than that expected for Cook cable following exposure to the containment environment pre-dicted by modified,CLASIX analyses which result in the maximum temperature response for exposed cable.
Explain the basis for camparing the Sandia cable fire test results with the predicted containment environment and cable temperature response.
This information should cover Cook cable qualified to IPCEA 5-19-81 as well as IEEE 383 considering the differences in qualifying each type of cable and the applicability of the Sandia cable fire test results to both types.
2.
Ice Condenser Insulation Your submittal of July 2, 1981 provides information on potential degradation of polyethylene.
Provide'he following additional informati on:
Indicate how much polyethylene is associated with the insulation in the air handling ducts in the ice condenser.
State the likelihood and consequence of igniting polyethylene in this region as a result of elevated polyethylene temperature and the presence of entrapped air in the fiberglass insulation.
AT ACHHEN TYA - SEQUOYAH STATION UNITS NO.
1 AND DOCKETS 50-327/328 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORyATION CHEHICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH Me have reviewed the information regarding-Sequoyah plant equipment te-yerature response to hydrogen burns submitted in the TVA letter dated June 2, 1991.
Me need the following additional information before we can complete our evaluation:
A.
Equipment Survivability l.a.
Describe the specific criteria used for only discussing in the June 2, 1981 submittal certain of the equipment items identified in the Sequoyah SER as essential for safe plant shutdown.
Justify that the results presented provide a bounding case for equipment required.to survive the hydrogen bvrn environment; that is, show that the results apply to equipment of given type that is most sensitive to the temperature/pressure environment.
Also demonstrate that the equipment response resvlts are associated with modified CLASIX analysis which will result in the maximum temperatvre/pressure response of essential equipment; e.g.,
minimum flamo front velocity.
b.
In your submittal, yov state that burns are not predicted to occur in the dead-ended or upper compartment.
If the modified CLASIX analyses used for limiting case equipment response indicates that burns in those regions must be considered, provide an evalvation that estab-lishes that essential equipment in those regions can survive the re su 1ting env ironment and perform its s af ety funct ion.
c.
Provide analyses that demonstrate that the eqvipment temperature response to modified CLASIX results used in a.
and b. 'above will not exceed the temperature rise of the same equipment when analyzed for exposvre to the thermal environment profile used for qualifying the equipment.
The equipment temperature analysis method should be the same for both exposures.
Describe the assumptions made in modelling the equipment for analysis.
d.
To provide experimental verification of the equipment temperature.
response analysis
- method, submit the results of analyzing the temper'-.
ature response of the cable containing Teflon insulation which was exposed in the Fenwal tests and exhibited some melting of the Teflon.
2.
3.
4.
For that equipment, e.g., transmitters, that must function during the burn, provide information that will assure that during a hydrogen bdrn, the equipment will not only retain its integrity, but also will perform continuously its function.
In order for the staff to perform independent thermal response analysis af essential equipment on a selected
- basis, provide drawings (equipment dimensions and.containment arrangement) and a detailed description of'he design and materials of the equipment selected for survivability analyses and tests such as transmitter, igniter assembly, cable in conduit, exposed RTD and thermocouple cable.
Singleton Tests -'xplain how the thermal radiation from the cloud of burning gas was accounted for in calculating thermal energy exchange between the environment of'burning hydrogen and the equipment.
Nat was the velocity, and temperature of the flame'and the basis for their selection2,Mhat view factors (geunetrical factors) were used in these "calculations2 Singleton Tests - Explain how the radiation free the flame was simulated or compensated for in the tests performed in Singleton Laboratory on thermocouples, RTD and igniter cables.
7.
8.
Singleton Tests - Describe in more detail the tests performed on igniter cables.
Especially, specify the temperatures and the times of exposure used during the tests.
Explain how the exposure to,.
maximum temperature of 700 F would simulate hydrogen burn envi.ronment in the upper plenum where air temperatures were estimated to reach 1192 r and where the cables would be exposed to radiant energy free the cloud of. burning gas.
Page 33 - Explain in more. detail the reasons behind your statement that a
PORY block valve could wi'thstand hydrogen burn environment.
At the 7/23/Sl mee'ting between NRC and TYA/AEP/Duke Power co., it was indicated that the test chamber environments to which equipment was exposed was more severe than the predicted containment environment.- Confirm:that this is.
a correct understanding.
Show that the equipment temperature
C e
response and functi onal behavi or fol)owing exposure to the test chamber environments is more severe than that expected following exposure to the predicted containment environments.
Explain the basis for co@-
paring test chamber results with equipm nt survivability predictions r
in the containment.
B.
Potential Secondary Fire 1.
Review the various types of cable (safety or non-safety} in containm nt having insulation directly exposed to the hydrogen burn and provide information that demonstrates that there will be no cable fire initiated.
State'which of this information is based on analysis or test resu1ts or both.
J
~,
I'rl