ML17319A989
| ML17319A989 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1981 |
| From: | Jackiw I, Ring M, Robinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17319A987 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-81-14, 50-316-81-18, NUDOCS 8107270151 | |
| Download: ML17319A989 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1981014
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE
OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-315/81-14;
50-316/81-18
Docket No. 50-315;
50-316
License
No. DPR-58;
Licensee:
American Electric .Power Service
Corporation
and Michigan Power
Company
2 Broadway
New York, NY
10004
Facility Name:
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units
1 and 2
Inspection At:
D. C.
Cook Site,
Bridgman,
MI
Inspection Conducted:
June
16-19, 22-23,
1981
Inspectors:
M. A. Ring
7
/
D. L. Robin on~
Approved By: I.
.
c i , Acting Chic
Test Program Section
7 ~mls
Ins ection
Summa
Ins ection on June
16-19
22-23
1981
(Re ort No. 50-315/81-14'0-316/81-18)
refueling activities, refueling surveillance,
and maintenance activities during
the refueling outage.
The inspection involved a total of 70 inspector-hours
onsite by two NRC inspectors
including
10 inspector-hours
on off shifts.
Results:
Of the four areas
inspected,
two apparent
items of noncompliance
were
identified in two areas (failure to follow procedures
- Paragraphs
3 and 5;
failure to maintain adequate
cleanliness
- Paragraph
3).
8107270151
810715
ADOCK 05000315
6
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
>D. Shaller, Plant Manager
-.E. Townley, Assistant Plant Manager
- B. Svenson,
Assistant Plant Manager
+J. Stietzel, Quality Assurance
Supervisor
-H. Chadwell, Outage/Design
Change Coordinator
+R. Keith, Operations
Superintendent
E. Abshagen,
Assistant
Outage Planning Coordinator
D. Dudding, Maintenanace
Superintendent
H. Bolinger, In-service Inspection Coordinator
Additional plant technical
and administrative personnel
were contacted
during the course of the inspection by the inspector.
-Denotes
those attending the exit interview.
Pre aration for Refuelin
(Unit, 1
'I
The inspectors verified that technically adequate
procedures
for Unit 1
cycle V-VI were approved for fuel handling, transfers,
core verification,
inspection of .fuel to be reused
and handling of other core internals.
These procedures
were in a large part incorporated in the vendor Refuel-
ing Procedure
PP-AEP-R5 which the inspectors verified to have been re-
viewed and approved by the licensee in accordance
with Technical Speci-
fications.
The inspectors verified that the licensee
had submitted
a
proposed
core reload Technical Specification
change
to'NRR.
The
inspectors
also reviewed the licensee's
program for overall outage
control.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
Refuelin
Activities
The inspectors verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core,
all surveillance testing required by the Technical Specifications
and
licensee's
procedures
had been
completed.
The inspectors verified that
during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment
was being performed
as required by Technical Specifications.
The in-
spectors
reviewed the qualifications of the refueling contractor personnel
and verified that licensee staffing during refueling was in accordance
with Technical Specifications
and approved procedures.
The inspectors
also observed portions of three shifts of fuel handling operations
(removal, inspection
and insertion).
Prior to fuel handling operations
actually starting
and with the reactor
head
removed,
the inspectors
made
a tour of the Unit 1 containment
on June
17,
1981 and noted the following
.items:
a.
A radiation protection technician carried
a hand-held radiation
meter (Teletector)
across
the manipulator crane bridge and around
the refueling cavity without the meter being lanyarded to either
the individual or a fixture.
b.
On the left side of the refueling cavity (as
seen
from containment
access)
four five-gallon poly bottles
and
a one quart bottle were
left within the safety railing and not tied down.
c ~
On either side of the containment, within the safety railing,
radiation protection areas
had been created.
On the tour, four
duck feet were noted loose
on the left side of the cavity.
On
both sides, poly bags
had been taped to the safety railing to
serve
as trash containers.
The taping was
done in such
a manner
as to make full bags
(which was the condition during the tour)
very susceptible
to spilling over into the cavity pool.
d.
e.
At least
seven pens
(including a metal-encased felt marker) were
observed in use in the upper volume.
On the left side of the cavity (as
seen
from containment
access)
outside of the safety railing,
a pile of debris
had accumulated.
Pieces of herculite,
tape,
empty tape cores,
rubber gloves,
and
paper were lying in disarray
and were wet with condensation
and
dripping from a valve station directly overhead.
These
items .were contrary to licensee
procedures
FP-AEP-R5, Refueling
Procedure,
and PMSI-069, Unit 1 Refueling Outage which require loose
article controls such as; lanyards tied from hand tools to th'e person
using them or to a permanent fixture; the banning of pens
and marking
materials which will not float from the upper volume; loose materials
and equipment
removed or placed in a location where there is no pos-
sibility that they might become accidently dislodged
and fall into the
reactor cavity; eyeglasses
securely attached
to the wearer;
and dosi-
metry securely
taped to anti-contamination clothing (Anti-C's).
Following the June
17,
1981 tour, the problems noted were discussed
with the licensee
management
and the licensee
took some immediate steps
to correct part of the problem (such
as, removal of the trash).
However,
on June 21,
1981,
a contractor individual dropped his eyeglasses
into
the refueling pool,. and on June 22,
1981,
a headset
was pulled off of
the SRO-Core Alterations and into the pool.
During a dayshift tour
on June
22,
1981, five individuals were noted in the containment with-
out dosimetry taped to their Anti-C's, and
a rag and two 'pieces of tape
were noted floating in the pool over the fuel transfer canal area.
During a nightshift tour on June
22,
1981,
an additional five individuals
were noted without dosimetry, taped to their Anti-C's, and one individual
was noted carrying two hand tools around the cavity edge without lanyards.
0
1
E
N
The lack of an adequate
program to maintain cleanliness
and enforce the
licensee's
own'rocedures
as required by ANSI N45.2.3 is inconsistent
with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, and is considered
to be
an -item of noncompliance
(315/81-14-01).
It should be noted that pre-
vious inspection reports 316/81-08,
315/81-12
and 315/80-01 discussed
similar cleanliness
and loose articles control problems.
4.
Maintenance-Refuelin
The inspectors
reviewed the reactor coolant pump seal inspections,
main
steam isolation valve disc guide replacement
and drain l'ine removal,
and the
RHR relief valve replacement
maintenance
work items in order to
determine whether the maintenance
procedures
included administrative
approvals for removal
and return of systems
to service;
hold points
for inspection/audit
and sign-off by gA or other licensee
personnel;
provisions for operational testing following maintenance;
provisions
for fire watch responsibiliti'es;
review of material certifications;
provisions for- assuring
LCO requirements
were met during repair; pro-
visions for housekeeping
during and following maintenance;
and
responsibilities for reporting defects to management.
The inspectors
observed portions of the main steam isolation valve and
RHR relief
valve work items to ensure
the work was being accomplished in accordance
with approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
5.
Surveillance-Refuelin
0
The z.nspectors
observed
the Emergency Diesel Generator
System Periodic
Inspection,
12MHP5921.032,001I,
on Unit
1 for the
CD Diesel to verify
that the operation
was covered by properly approved procedures;
that
the procedures
used were consistent with regulatory requirements,
licensee
commitments,
and administrative controls; that minimum crew
requirements
were met, prerequisites
were completed,
special test
equipment
was calibrated
and in service,
and required data
was re-
corded for final review and analysi;s; that the qualifications of
personnel
conducting the inspection were adequate;
and that the
results
were adequate.
During the Diesel Generator
Inspection review, the inspectors
noted
that procedure
No. PMP2110.CPS.001,
Clearance
Permit, System,
requires
the following:
"When an Emergency Diesel Generator is to be removed
from service
the other Emergency Diesel Generator for that Unit is to be proven
and will then be left running until the diesel engine
being removed from service
has been isolated,
the Clearance
Permit
tags placed
as required,
and the Clearance
Permit has been accepted
by the individual who will be performing the designated
work.
From a review of the clearance
permit, the system operating logs and
interviews with system operators, it appears
the licensee
did not comply
with the above requirement
when the
CD diesel generator
was removed from
service
on June
16,
1981, since the last running of the
AB diesel genera-
tor occurred
on June
13,
1981.
Failure to follow the requirements
of
procedure
PMP2110.CPS.001
is inconsistent with the Technical Specifica-
tions for Unit 1, Section 6.8 and is considered to be an item of noncom-
pliance (315/81-14-02).
Dama
ed Fuel Assembl
During refueling operations
on June
19,
1981,
a fuel assembly
was
damaged
by striking a shield wall retaining lip located in the re-
fueling cavity approximately six 'inches high and several feet west
of the reactor vessel,
The assembly
was being transported
towards
the fuel transfer area by the manipulator crane, but a fouled inter-
lock had apparently allowed the gripper "full up" indicating light
to come
on without the assembly being fully inside the gripper tube.
's
a result of the collision, one rodlet from the
15 x 15 assembly
dropped to the cavity floor and lodged behind
a ladder.
Three other
rodlets
appeared
bent.
Because
the process of retrieving the dropped
rodlet and analyzing the circumstances
surrounding the event were not
complete at the time-of the exit, it was agreed that the Senior Resident
Inspector would provide the complete
documentation of the event in his
report.
Unit 2 - Refuelin
While reviewing Unit
1 refueling operations,
the inspectors
also re-
viewed
some Unit 2 correspondence
which raised additional concerns
regarding the adequacy of the review process for the Unit 2 Cycle
3
Reload core relative to 10 CFR 50.59.
On March 17,
1981,
a
memo was issued
from J. I. Castresana,
Nuclear
Safety and Licensing Section
Head (Corporate) to J. F. Steitzel, Quality
Assurance
Supervisor
(Plant) stating that'
meeting of the
NSDRC had
been held on that date
and that it had concluded that the Unit 2 Cycle
3 Reload
"does not pose
an unreviewed safety question
and that no
Technical Specification
changes
are needed."
The
memo referenced
the
reload safety evaluation report.
The inspector
reviewed
the minutes of the
NSDRC meeting
and noted that similar wording re-
garding no unreviewed safety question
and no Technical Specification
changes
was used.
On May
1 and May 7,
1981, letters
were sent from
R.
S. Hunter, Vice President of Indiana
and Michigan Electric Company
to Harold R. Denton, Director of NRR of the
NRC requesting Technical
Specification
changes for Unit 2 as
a result of the Cycle
3 Reload.
The May 7 letter referenced
the "Reload Safety Evaluation for D. C.
Cook
Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Cycle 3" which was dated
December
1980.
This
evaluation
had indicated that Technical Specification
changes
would be
required
and had been issued prior to the
NSDRC meeting
and subsequent
memo.
The inspectors
were unable to obtain
a satisfactory explanation
a
~
e
4
of the above
sequence
of events.
Therefore,
the licensee is being re-
quested
to provide the inspectors
with details of how the NSDRC and the
Nuclear Safety
and Licensing Section developed
and issued
two contra-
dictory'assessments
of the Unit 2 Cycle
3 Reload utilizing apparently
the
same Reload Safety Evaluation Report.
This item is an unresolved
item (316/81-18-01)
pending receipt
and evaluation of the requested
information.
8.
Unresolved Item
Unresolved
Items are matters
about which more information is required
.in order to ascertain
whether they are acceptable
items,
Items of Non-
compliance,
or Deviations.
An unresolved
item disclosed during the
inspection is discussed in Paragraph
7.
9.
Exit Interview
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
denoted in Paragraph
1 at the conclusion of the inspection
on June
23,
1981.
The inspectors
summarized
the purpose
and the scope of the inspection
and the findings.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspectors'tatements
with respect
to
the items of noncompliance
(Paragraphs
3 and 5).
Additionally, the
unresolved
item (Paragraph
7) was discussed
in a telephone
conversation
conducted
on July 2,
1981.
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