ML17319A742
| ML17319A742 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17319A743 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103110189 | |
| Download: ML17319A742 (20) | |
Text
partial Review
'quipment Evaluation Report By The Office of Nuclear Reactor Requlation For Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 0.
C.
Cook Units 1 and 2
Docket No. 50-315/316 8103zyQIWl'
Partial Review EQUIPMENT EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION FOR INDIANA AND MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY D.
C.
COOK UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NO. 50-315/316 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF.
SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3
EQUIPMENT EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the licensee's response included an onsite inspection of selected Class IE equipment and an examination of the licensee's report for completeness and acceptability.
The criteria described in the DOR guidelines and in NUREG-0588, in part, were used as a basis for the staff evaluation of the adequacy of the licensee's qualification program.
The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement performed (1) a preliminary evalu-ation of the licensee's
- response, documented in a technical evaluation report (TER) and (2) an onsite verification inspection (June 16-17, 1980) of selected safety-related electrical equipment.
The engineered safety features actuation, air-recirculation, and containment isolation systems were inspected at Unit 1; the containment spray system was inspected at Unit 2.'he inspection at both units verified proper installation of equipment, ovei all interface integrity, and manufacturers'ameplate data.
The manufacturer's name and model number from the nameplate data were compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee s report.
The site inspection is documented for Units 1 and 2 in an onsite inspection report (from D.
W.
Hayes to E.
L. Jordan, dated July 1, 1980).
No deficiencies were noted.
For this review, the documents referenced above have been factored into the overall staff evaluation.
- 3. 1 Com leteness of Safet -Related E ui ment In accordance with IEB 79-01B, the licensee was directed to (1) establish a
list of systems and equipment that are required to mitigate a LOCA and an HELB and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display information, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring.
The staff developed a generic master. list based upon a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures.
The instrumentati'on selected includes para-meters to monitor overall plant performance as well as to monitor the performance of the systems on the list.
The systems list was established on the basi's of the functions that must be performed for accident mitigation (without regard to location of equipment relative to hostile environments).
The list of safety-related systems provided by the licensee was reviewed against the staff-developed master list.
Based upon information in the licensee s submittal, the equipment location references, and in some cases subsequent conversations with the licensee,
'the
staff has verified and determined that the systems included in the licensee's submittal are those required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor
- shutdown, (2) containment isolation, (3) reactor core cooling, (4) containment
,heat removal, (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of signifi" cant release of radioactive material to the environment.
,The staff therefore concludes that the systems identified by the licensee (listed in Appendix D) are acceptable, with the exception of those items discussed in Section 5 of this report.
Display instrumentation which provides information for the reactor operators to aid them in the safe handling of 'the plant was not specifically identified by the licensee.
A complete list of all display instrumentation mentioned in the LOCA and HELB emergency procedures must be provided.
Equipment qualifi-cation information in the form of summary sheets should be provided for all components of the display instrumentation exposed to harsh environments.
Instrumentation which is not considered to be safety related but which is men-tioned in the emergency procedure should appear on the list.
For these instru-
- ments, (1) justification should be provided for not considering the instrument safety related and (2) assurance should be provided that its subsequent failure will not mislead the operator or adversely affect the mitigation of the conse-quences of the accident.
The environmental qualification of post-accident sampling and monitoring and radiation monitoring equipment is closely related to the review of the TMI Lessons-Learned modifications and will be performed in conjunction with that review.
\\
The licensee identified 125 items of equipment in Unit 1 and 137 items in Unit 2 which were assessed by the staff.
Because Units 1 and 2 are nearly identical,"
the review can be performed as one.
Differences in the units will be identified by a parenthetical expression, with the applicable unit number enclosed.
3.2 Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 requires that the DOR guidelines and the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety-related electrical equipment environmental quali-fication program.
These documents provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these documents.
On this basis, the staff has
- assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes for D.
C.
Cook Units 1 and 2, relative to the temperature,
- pressure, and the containment spray caustics, has been per-formed in accordance with the requirements stated above.
The staff has reviewed the qualification documentation to ensure that the qualification specifications envelope the conditions established by the licensee.
In.addition, the staff
- assumed, and requires the licensee to verify, that the containment spray system is not subjected to a disabling single-component failure.
~p<<h R
R d
g Rg p
not part of Unit 2's engineered safeguards actuation and (2) Unit 1 does not have a dedicated post-accident monitoring system.
Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists that flooding of equipment may result from HELBs.
3.3 Tem erature Pressure and Humidit Conditions Inside Containment The licensee has provided the results of the accident analysis as follows:
Max Tem
(
F Max Press si )
Humidit (X
LOCA MSLB Lower Compartment Upper Compartment Lower Compartment Upper Compartment 241 130 328 158 10 8
9.9 8.1 100 100 100 100 The staff has concluded that the minimum temperature profile for equipment qualification purposes should include a margin to account for analytical uncertainties in the calculated temperature profiles for postulated accidents.
The licensee's minimum temperature profile for qualification purposes is based on a conservative MSLB analytical model that results in temperatures higher than what might realistically be expected and is acceptable.
The staff has also concluded that, for the equipment which is qualified for.
the LOCA environment only, use of the steam saturation temperature corresponding to the total building pressure (partial pressure of steam plus partial pressure of air) versus time will provide an acceptable margin for a postulated LOCA environmental effect on equipment.
The licensee's specified temperature (service condition) of 241 F for the lower compartment during a LOCA satisfies the above requirement and is therefore acceptable.
However, the specified temperature (service condition) of 130 F
for the upper compartment does not satisfy the above requirement.
A saturation temperature corresponding to pressure profile (234 F peak temperature at 8 psig) should be used instead.
The staff also requires that, for equipment in the upper compartment which is used for the MSLB, the same service conditions as for LOCA conditions in the upper compartment should be used.
The licensee should update his equipment summary tables to reflect this change.
If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must either provide justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.
C 3.4 Tem erature Pressure and Humidit Conditions Outside Containment The licensee has provided the temperature,
- pressure, humidity and applicable environment associated with an HELB outside containment.
The following areas outside containment has been addressed:
(1)
Auxi1iary bui 1 ding The staff has verified that the parameters identified by the licensee for the MSLB are acceptable.
The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the licensee.
Unless otherwise noted, the staff assumed for this review that the methodology employed by the licensee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as estab" lished by Commission Memorandum and Order'LI-80-21.
The licensee's value for maximum submergence is at elevation 614 ft 0 in.
Equip-ment below this 1'evel has been identified by the licensee, along with the pro-posed corrective action.
The licensee identified 29 safety-related electrical components for Unit 1 and 35 for Unit 2 as having the potential for becoming submerged after a postulated event.
Most of these components are electrical cables (power, control, instrument) inside floodup -tubes.
- However, no evidence of environmental qualification of these floodup tubes was provided by the licen-see.
Furthermore, some electrical penetrations, transmitters, cable terminations, and valve motor operators have the potential of being submerged.
The licensee stated that the components in question perform their function immediately after the accident, long before they are submerged, and are not required to operate after a LOCA.
The staff considers that a component can be exempt from submer-gence qualification if the licensee can provide an assessment of the failure modes associated with the submergence of the component.
The licensee should also provide assurance that the subsequent failure of this component will not adversely affect any other safety functions or mislead an operator.
Additionally, the licensee should discuss operating time, across the spectrum of events, in relation to the time of submergence.
If the results of the licensee's assessment are acceptable, then this component may be exempt from the submergence param-eter of qualification.
- 3. 6
~CI The licensee's FSAR value for the chemical concentration is 2000 ppm boric acid solution;
- however, the exact volume percent and pH values were not provided by the licensee.
Therefore, for the purpose of this review, the effects of chemical spray will be considered unresolved.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
- 3. 7
~Ain Section 7 of the DOR guidelines does not require a qualified life to be estab-lished for all safety-related electrical equipment.
However, the following actions are required:
(1)
Make a detailed comparison of existing equipment and the materials identi-fied in Appendix C of the DOR guidelines.
The first supplement to IEB-79-01B requires licensees to utilize the table in Appendix C and identify any additional materials as the result of their effort.
(2)
Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and maintenance records to identify potential age-related degradations.
(3)
Establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.
The licensee identified a number of equipment items for which a specified quali-fied life was established (for examples, 5 years, 15 years, or 40 years).
In its assessment of these submittals, the staff did not review the adequacy of the methodology nor the basis used to arrive at these values; the staff has assumed that the established values are based'on state-of-the-art technology and are acceptable.
For this review, however, the staff requires that the licensee submit supple-mental information to verify and identify the degree of conformance to the above requirements.
The response should include all the equipment identified as required to maintain functional operability in harsh environments.,
The licensee indicated that this phase of the response is outstanding and that the review is in progress.
The staff will review the licensee s response when it is submitted and discuss its evaluation in a supplemental report.
3.8 Radiation Inside and Outside Containment The licensee has provided values for the radiation levels postulated to exist following a LOCA.
The application and methodology employed to determine these values were presented to the licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria con-tained in the DOR guidelines, in NUREG-0588, and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-01B, Supplement 2.
Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed
- that, unless otherwise
- noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
The staff review determined that the values to which equipment was qualified enveloped the requirements identified by the licensee.
The values required by the licensee inside containment are an integrated dose of 4 x 10 to 1.5 x 10 rads.
The radiation service condition provided by the licensee is lower than provided in the 00R guidelines (4 x 10~ rads) for gamma and beta radiation., The licensee is requested to either provide justification for using the lower service condition or use the service condition provided in the DOR guidelines for both gamma and beta radiation.
If the former option is
- chosen, then the analysis including the basis, assumptions, and a sample calculationshould be provided.
A required value outside containment of 1.7 x 10~ rads has been used by the licensee to specify limiting radiation levels within the auxiliary building.
This value appears to consider the radiation levels influenced by.the source term methodology associated with post-LOCA recirculation fluid lines and is therefore acceptable.
4 QUALIFICATION OF E(UIPMENT j
The following subsections present the staff's assessment based on the licensee's submittal, of the qualification status, of safety-related electrical equipment.
The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories:
(1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional qualification information and/or corrective action, and (3) equip-ment considered acceptable if the staff s concern identified in Section 3.7 is satisfactorily resolved.
In its assessment of the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff did not review the methodology employed to determine the values established by the licensee.
However, in reviewing the data sheets, the staff made a determination as to the stated conditions presented by the licensee.
Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the licen-see (for example, test reports).
It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by the staff will provide the means to cross reference each supporting document to the referencing licensee.
If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the licensee will be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualification or replace the item(s) of concern.
This effort will begin in early 1981.'n appendix for each subsection of this report provides a list of equipment for which additional information and/or corrective action is required.
Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficiencies.
. It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that tt.e deficien-cies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
- However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation.
4.1 E ui ment Re uirin Immediate Corrective Action 4.2 E ui ment Re uirin Additional Information and/or Corrective Action Appendix B identifies equipment in this category, including a tabulation of deficiencies.=-
The deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to the legend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient for the qualification parameter or condition.
~Le end R
- radiation T
- temperature gT - qualification time RT
- required time P
- pressure H
- humidity CS
- chemical spray A
- material-aging evaluation; replacement schedule; ongoing equipment surveillance S
- submergence M
- margin I
- HELB evaluation outside containment not completed U
-6"
gM - qualification method RPN - equipment relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN - exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate-effects qualification justification inadequate gI
- qualification information being developed RPS - equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided As noted in Section 4, these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified; However, the deficiencies are cause for concern ahd require further case-by-case evaluation.
The staff has-determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established provided the following can be established and verified by the licensee:
(1)
Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in the harsh environ-
- ment, and equipment failure in the harsh environment will not impact safety-related functions or mislead an operator.
(2a) Equipment performs its function before its exposure to the harsh environ-
- ment, and the adequacy for the time margin provided is adequately justified, and (2b) Subsequent failure of the equipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
(3)
The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single-failure criterion.
(4)
Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented by providing resolutions to the deficiencies identified; these resolutions should include a description of the corrective action, schedules for its completion (as applicable),
and so forth. The staff will review the licensee's
- response, when it is submitted, and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
It should be noted that in cases where testing is being conducted, a condition may arise which results in a determination by the licensee that the equipment does not satisfy the qualification test requirements.
"For that equipment, the licensee will be required to provide the proposed corrective action, on a timely basis, to ensure that qualification can be established by June 30, 1982.
4.3 E ui ment Considered Acce table or Conditionall Acce table Based on the staff review of the licensee s submittal, the staff identified the equipment in.Appendix C as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualifi-cation program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant parameters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.
For the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the licensee did not clearly (1) state that an equipment material evaluation was conducted to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been
- Used, (2) establish an ongoing program to review the plant surveillance and main" tenance records in order to identify equipment degradation which may be age related, and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the'lant.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is sub-mitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
5 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS IEB 79-01B, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints for the'submission of the information associated with cold shutdown equipment and TMI lessons-learned modifications.
The staff has required that this information be provided by February 1, 1981.
The staff will provide a supplemental'afety evaluation addressing these concerns.
-8"
APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action (Category 4.2)
LEGEND:
Desi nation for Deficienc R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement
- schedule, ongoing equipment, surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed
~
RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided
'rovided quipment Descri tion Control Cable Control Cable Control Cable Power Cable Control Cable Control Cable Control Cable Control Cable Control Cable Manufacturer Continental Continental GE Anaconda Continental GE Continental GE Continental 3119 3120 3120 3120 3121 3121 3122 3122 3123 QT,CS,R,M,A,S,QM QT,A,QM QT,A,QM QT,A QT,CS,R,M,A,S,QM QT,CS,R,M,A,S,QM QT,CS,R,M,A,S,QM QT,CS,R,M,A,S,QM QT,A,QM Com onent No.
Deficienc
APPENDIX B (Continued) quspment Descri tion Manufacturer Com onent No.
Deficienc Control Cable Instrument Cable GE Boston Insulated Wire Co.
3123 3064 QT,A,QM QT CS~M jAjS QM Instrument Cable Instrument Cable Instrument Cable Instrument Cable Rockbestos 3064 Continental Boston Insulated Wire Co.
3075 3075 Samuel Moore 8
Co.
3075 QT;CS,A,S,QM QT,CS,A,S,QM QT,A,QM QT,CS,R,M,A,QM Instrument Cable Cerro Wire 8 Cable Co.
3077 QT,CS,A,S,QM Instrument Cable Instrument Cable Power Cable Power Cable Continental Okonite Okonite 3077 324 324/IM0-325, 326 Samuel Moore 8
Co.
3077 QT,CS,A,S,QM QT,A,QM RT,QT,M,A RT,QT,M,CS,A,S,QM Power Cable Power Cable Power. Cable Instrument Cable Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable Essex Okonite Anaconda Okonite Anaconda Essex Kerite Anaconda Kerite 324 399 3102 3102 3116 3116 3116 3103 3127 T,P,QT,R,A,QM QT,CS,M,A,S,QM QT,T,P,A,QM QT,A QT,CS,A,S,QM QT,CS,A,S,QM QT,CS,R,M,A,S,QM QT,T,P,A,QM'T,R,A,S,QM 1
nest 1
B-2
APPENDIX B (Continued) qu>pment Oescri tion Electrical Penetrations Manufacturer Conax Corp.
EP"1 QT,CS,A,S,QM Com onent No.
Deficienc Electrical Penetrations Fan Motors Conax Corp.
Westinghouse EP-2 thr u EP-14 TBDP QT,CS,A,S,QM CS,A Hydrogen Recombiner Westinghouse NA, IO. HR"1,2 QT,CS,A Differential Pressure Transmitter ITT Barton 764 QT,T,P,M,CS,A,S,QM Differential Pressure Transmitter Foxboro E13DM-HSAHI T,A,QM (MCA)
Differential Pressure Transmitter Differential Pressure Switch Differential Pressure Transmitter Differential Pressure Transmitter Differential Pressure Transmitter ITT Barton ITT Barton Foxboro Foxboro ITT Barton 368 289A/199 E13DH"HSAHI MCA E13DH"HSAHI MCA 332 QT,T,P,H,A,QM,RPN QT,P,M,A,QM A,S,QM A,S,QM,T QT,P,M,H,A,QM Differential Pressure Transmitter Differential Pressure Transmitter Differential Pressure Transmitter Foxboro Foxboro Foxbor o E130M"HSAMI QT, P,M,A,QM E11GM-HSAEl QT,A,QM
'MCA)
E11GM-HSAE1 QT,T, P, A, QM Pressure Transmitter ITT Barton 763
'T,P,CS,M,A,QM RTD RTD Rosemount/Sostman 176KF/11834B QT,CS,A,QM Rosemount/Sos tman 176KS/11901B QT, T, CS, M,A,QM B-3
APPENDIX B (Continued) quspment Descri tion Manufacturer Com onent No.
Oeficienc Radiation Monitor Westinghouse 1101 T,P,QT,RT,M,CS,A,QM RPN Pressure Switch Limit Switch Pump Motor Electro-Pneumatic Transducer Solenoid Valve Solenoid Solenoid Valve Mercoid NAMCO Reliance Fisher Automatic Switch Co.
OA"7031" 153 QT, T, P, A,QM, RPN EA180 5810P 546 RT,CS,A A,QM,QI QT,A,QM NP-831654V QT, A,QM, CS HP"8300C58RU QT,T,P,H,A,QM,RPN HT-8300BSBRU HT-8316B17 QT, M,T, P, A,QM Control Cable Termination NA NA QT,CS,R,M,A Control Cable Termination NA At valve T,P,A,QM motor operator Control Cable Termination Various QT,A,QM Control Cable Termination Control Cable Termination At terminal QT,A,QM block At solenoid QT,T,A,QM Instrumentation Termination RTO Termination Penetration Terminations NA Barton Instrument-Termination RTD termina-tion Penetration termination QT,CS,M,R,A,S,QM QT,CS,R,A,S;QM'T,A,S,QM B-4
APPfNDIX B (Continued) quipment Descri tion Instrument Cable Termination Manufacturer NA Com onent No.
Deficienc Splice at QT,CS,M,R,A,S,QN penetration Instrument Termination Foxboro NA QT,CS,A,S,QM Power Cable Termination Power Cable Termination NA Spliced to QT,R,M,A,S,QM standard kapton Spliced to QT,R,M,A,QM standard hypalon Termination At value motor opera-
At pump motor QT,A,QM Valve Motor Operator Limitorque Valve Motor Operator Limitorque Valve Motor Operator Limitorque SMB-1,"00,-2/
CS,A,S IH0-51,52,53 54,128; ICH-111,129 SHB-1/IHO"315, CS,A,QM 316,325,326 SMB-00/QCH" CS,A,S 250 Valve Motor Operator Limitorque Various outside cont.
T,A,QM Instrument Cable Boston Insulated Mire Co.
3077 QT,CS,R,M,A,S,QM Instrument Cable Instrument Cable Instrument Cable Rayc hem Raychem Continental 3111 3112 3069 QT,CS,A,S QT,CS,A,S QT,T,P,A,QM 2
Unst 2 B"5
APPENDIX B (Continued) qu>pment Descri tion Manufacturer Com onent No.
Deficienc Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable Power Cable~
Power Cable(
)
Differential Pressure Transmitter(
Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus Anaconda Cyprus Essex Anaconda Anaconda ITT Barton 324 325 347 347 3102 324 3102 3103 764 QT,T,A,QM QT,T,A,QM QT,CS,A,S,QM QT,CS,A,S,QM QT,T,A,QM QT,T,P,A,QM QT,T,P,A,QM QT,T,P,A,QM QT,P,CS,A,S,QM 2
Un1t 2 8-6
APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable (Category 4.3)
LEGENO:
Desi nation for Deficienc R - Radiation T - Temperature gT - gualification time RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement s'chedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed gM - gualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate gI - gualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided quipment Descri tion Manufacturer Com onent No.
Deficienc Grease Pump Grease Motor Oil
,Mobil Mobil Mobil Mobilux EP-2 Mobilux 82 D.T.E. Oil Medium Motor Grease Pump Oil Coupling Grease Mobil Mobil Mobil Mobilux 82 D.T.E.
797 Oil Coupling Grease Motor Oil Coupling Grease Mobil Mobil D.T.E. Oil Heavy Medium Sovarex L-0 C-1
APPENDIX C
(Continued) qu>pment Descri tion Pump Motor Control Cable Termination Manufacturer Westinghouse Com onent No.
Deficienc 5808Z,5009H A
5009-p24 Cable Term.
A at Valve Valve Motor.Operator Limitorque Valve Motor Operator Limitorque Valve Motor Operator Limitorque Valve Motor Operator Limitorque SMB-000/VMO-
-A 101,102 Various A
outside cont.
SMB-00/NMO" A
151,152,153 SMB-2/ICM-A 306,305 C-2
APPENDIX D
Safety-Related Systems List~
Function System Emergency Reactor Shutdown Reactor Coolant Reactor Protection Safeguards Actuation Chemical and Volume Control Containment Isolation Main Steam Main Feedwater Chemical and Volume Control Residual Heat Removal s
Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Mater 4
Ice Condenser Refrigerant Supply Containment Purge Reactor Core Cooling Emergency Core Cooling Auxiliary Feedwater High Pressure Injection Intermediate Pressure Injection Low Pressure Injection Accumulators
~e NRC staff recognizes that there are differences in nomenclature of systems because of plant vintage and engineering design; consequently some systems per-forming identical or similar functions may have different names.
In those instances it was necessary to verify the system(s) function with the responsible IE regional reviewer and/or the licensee.
0"1
APPENDIX 0 (continued)
Function Containment Heat Removal System Containment Spray Containment Ventilation Containment Sump Recirculation Core Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal Power Operated Relief Valves Prevention of Significant Release of Radioactive Material to Environment Supporting Systems Main Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Component Cooling Water Essential Service Water Containment Spray (Iodine Removal)
Hydrogen Control Post Accident'onitoring Containment Radiation Sampling'mergency Power Control Room Habitability Remote Shutdown Monitoring
~o be, covered as part of TNI-2 Lessons Learned.
0-2