ML17313A374
| ML17313A374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17313A373 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-95-24, 50-529-95-24, 50-530-95-24, NUDOCS 9805210095 | |
| Download: ML17313A374 (6) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1
DOCUMENT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION NOTICE OF VIOLATION Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Docket:
50-528 50-529 50-530 License:
NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74 During an NRC inspection conducted on December 11-15,
- 1995, three violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
Appendix C, the violations are listed below:
Paragraph 2.E. of the Facility Operating License No.
NPF-41 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station requires the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical
- security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans, including all amendments to those plans made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55, and pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
A.
10 CFR 73.55 (c)(4) requires that detection of penetration or attempted 'penetration of the protected area shall assure that adequate response by the security organization can be initiated.
Paragraph 3.1.5 of the licensee's physical security plan states that the perimeter intrusion detection systems both have a high level of assurance and are designed to detect a running, walking, crawling, rolling, or jumping intruder.
Contrary to the above, on December 12-13,
- 1995, NRC inspectors and contractors tested the protected area detection systems and determined that five of the zones, using various methodologies within the capabilities of the design basis threat, would not detect a simulated intruder.
The failed zones indicate that an adequate response by the security organization would not be initiated.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)
(528/9524-01, 529/9524-01, 530/9524-01).
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DOCUMENT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION B.
C.
10 CFR 73.55 (g) (1) requires that the licensee develop and employ compensatory measures including equipment, additional security personnel, and specific procedures
'to assure that the'ffectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment.
Paragraph 3.1.5 of the licensee's physical security plan requires that compensatory measures are to be taken in the event of partial or total failure of the protected area detection system in accordance with station security procedures.
Paragraph 3.7. 1 of Station Security Procedure 20SP-OSK08 states that security shift supervision will post a member of the securi ty force on the affected sector until the system is repaired.
Contrary to the above, on December 13,
- 1995, the inspectors determined that on December 12,
- 1995, a security officer posted as a compensatory measure for a fai led zone was removed before the zone was properly repaired.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)
(528/9524"02, 529/9524-02, 530/9524-02).
10 CFR 73.55 (d)(1) requires that the licensee access control search function, for personnel entering the protected
- area, must be accomplished through the use of firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices.
Paragraph 1.6.4.3 of the licensee's physical security plan states that personnel will undergo a search including a search for metal masses by metal detectors.
Paragraph 1.6.6 of the licensee's physical security plan states that access will be granted only after successful authorization of an individual through both systems (keycard and hand geometry) except 'for visitors and emergency personnel access.
Contrary to the above, on December 13, 1995, fixed metal detectors used to search for metal masses such as firearms were determined to be unable to detect test weapons.
On August 16,
- 1995, an employee caused an explosive detector alarm and was allowed to t
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DOCUMENT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION proceed into the protected area without being adequately searched after the alarm.
On November 2,
- 1995, a security officer allowed an authorized employee to enter the protected area without adequate identification after the biometric handreader refused him entry.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)
(528/9524-03, 529/9524-03, 530/9524-03).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Arizona Public Service Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S.
'luclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, O.C.
20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas
- 76011, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).
This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation:
(1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results
- achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or
- revoked, or why such other action as may,be proper should not be taken.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
Dated at Arlington, Texas this 22nd day of January 1996 t
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