LER-1995-007, Forwards LER 95-007-02 Re Adverse Affect of Low Bench Set on Fisher Air Operated Letdown/Containment Isolation Valves |
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CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION, NBR:9703040091 DOC.DATE: 97/02/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET I FAC"L:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION OVERBECK,G.R.
Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards LER 95-007-02 re adverse affect of low bench set on fisher air operated letdown/containment isolation valves.
DZSTRZBUTION CODE: 'ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL J SIZE:
+ 0 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
C NOTES:STANDARDIZED PLANT RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POOREEW.
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME CLIFFORD,J AEOQ/%~BLAB Qjg CEma~R; NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN4 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCEgJ H
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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO FEDUCE WASTE!
CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EXT. 415-2083)
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Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Gregg R. Overbeck Vice President Nuclear Production TEL 602/3934148 FAX 602Q934077 Maii Station 7602 P.O. Box 62034 Phoenix, AZ85072-2034 192-00986-GRO/AKK/RAS February 20, 1997 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PYNGS)
Units 1,2, and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530 License Nos. NPF41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Licensee Event Report 95407-02 Attached please find Supplement 2 to Licensee Event Report (LER)95-007 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.
This supplement provides information on how past maintenance activities may have affected AOV bench set pressures, includes as-found bench set pressures, and valve modification completion dates not previously reported.
Unlike the previous supplement to this LER, the event is no longer being reported in accordance with a specific 10CFR50.73 criterion.
This determination is based upon recently completed event evaluations which have demonstrated the valves would have been able to perform their intended function during accident conditions.
Because it is likely that other plants may have made, but not discovered, the same errors, this event is being reported voluntarily. The LER reports how weaknesses in the recognition and prompt correction of AOV degradation can lead to less than desirable system performance.
Should you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Daniel G. Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, at (602) 393-6492.
9703040091 970220 PDR ADOCK 05000528 S
PDR Sincerely, GRO/DGM/RAS/rs
4k
NRC Document Control Desk Page 2 Licensee Event Report 1-95-007-02 Attachment (all with attachment) cc:
L. J. Callan K. E. Perkins K E. Johnston INPO Records Center
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| 05000528/LER-1995-001, :on 950215,plant Switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 525 Kv for Approx 2.5 Minutes & Caused TS LCO 3.0.3 to Exist.Prepared Personnel for Potential Voltage Drops |
- on 950215,plant Switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 525 Kv for Approx 2.5 Minutes & Caused TS LCO 3.0.3 to Exist.Prepared Personnel for Potential Voltage Drops
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000529/LER-1995-001-02, :on 940817,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failed.Issued Night Order on 940831 to Alert CR Personnel to Problems Experienced W/Failed 2JSIAUV664 to Close 940817 |
- on 940817,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failed.Issued Night Order on 940831 to Alert CR Personnel to Problems Experienced W/Failed 2JSIAUV664 to Close 940817
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000530/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950412,leak Identified Through Cracked Weld in Piping Near Charging Pump Suction Drain Valve.Caused by Defective Weld.Pump Weld Repaired & Returned to Svc |
- on 950412,leak Identified Through Cracked Weld in Piping Near Charging Pump Suction Drain Valve.Caused by Defective Weld.Pump Weld Repaired & Returned to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000530/LER-1995-002, Forwards LER 95-002-00 Re Condition Where Max Power Level of Facility OL Exceeded for Nine H.Highest Rolling 12 H Average 100.97 Percent Power | Forwards LER 95-002-00 Re Condition Where Max Power Level of Facility OL Exceeded for Nine H.Highest Rolling 12 H Average 100.97 Percent Power | | | 05000530/LER-1995-002-02, :on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised |
- on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised
| | | 05000528/LER-1995-002, :on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified |
- on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000529/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950519,TS LCO 3.1.2.2 & LCO 3.1.2.4 Action Statements Not Met.Caused by an Unsatisfactory Swagelok Compression at Union of Flexible Tubing & Rigid Tubing. Pressure Transmitter Sensing Line Repaired |
- on 950519,TS LCO 3.1.2.2 & LCO 3.1.2.4 Action Statements Not Met.Caused by an Unsatisfactory Swagelok Compression at Union of Flexible Tubing & Rigid Tubing. Pressure Transmitter Sensing Line Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000528/LER-1995-002-01, Forwards LER 95-002-01,providing Addl Info on Cause, Corrective Actions & Safety Significance of Temp Dependent Shutdown Margin Used in Mode 3 Steam Line Break Analysis Reported in Original Submittal | Forwards LER 95-002-01,providing Addl Info on Cause, Corrective Actions & Safety Significance of Temp Dependent Shutdown Margin Used in Mode 3 Steam Line Break Analysis Reported in Original Submittal | | | 05000529/LER-1995-003, :on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector Replaced |
- on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short Duration |
- on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short Duration
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000529/LER-1995-004-01, :on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected |
- on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(4)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-004, :on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational |
- on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-005, Forwards Suppl LER 95-005 Reporting Six Electrical Penetration Circuits | Forwards Suppl LER 95-005 Reporting Six Electrical Penetration Circuits | | | 05000529/LER-1995-005-01, :on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event |
- on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-006, :on 930418,identified That Motor Pinion Key for Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve Occurred.Caused by Improper Key Matl.All Identified Valves Had Motor Pinion Keys Replaced |
- on 930418,identified That Motor Pinion Key for Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve Occurred.Caused by Improper Key Matl.All Identified Valves Had Motor Pinion Keys Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000528/LER-1995-007, :on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified |
- on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-007-02, Forwards LER 95-007-02 Re Adverse Affect of Low Bench Set on Fisher Air Operated Letdown/Containment Isolation Valves | Forwards LER 95-007-02 Re Adverse Affect of Low Bench Set on Fisher Air Operated Letdown/Containment Isolation Valves | | | 05000528/LER-1995-010, :on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection Boxes |
- on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection Boxes
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(ii)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(v)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-011, :on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs |
- on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000528/LER-1995-013, :on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety Concerns |
- on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety Concerns
| | | 05000528/LER-1995-014, :on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of FWCS Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power Supply |
- on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of FWCS Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power Supply
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000528/LER-1995-016, :on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct Position |
- on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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