ML17312A739
| ML17312A739 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17312A736 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-96-05, 50-528-96-5, 50-529-96-05, 50-529-96-5, 50-530-96-05, 50-530-96-5, NUDOCS 9605070063 | |
| Download: ML17312A739 (34) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1996005
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos:
50-528/96-02,
50-529/96-05,
50-530/96-05
License
Nos:
Report
No:
50-528/96-05,
50-529/96-05,
50-530/96-05
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service
Company
Facility:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Units
1,
2,
and
3
Location:
Maricopa County, Al
Dates:
March
10
April 20,
1996
Inspectors:
J.
Kramer,
Resident
Inspector
D. Garcia,
Resident
Inspector
D. Carter,
Resident
Inspector
D. Acker, Senior Project Inspector
C. Orsini, Resident
Inspector,
D.C.
Cook
J. Russell,
Resident
Inspector,
J.
Sloan,
Senior Resident
Inspector,
B. Olson,
Project Inspector
Approved:
D.
F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Projects
Branch
F
9605070063
960502
ADOCK 05000528
8
J
I
t
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station
NRC Inspection
Report 50-528/96-05,
50-529/96-05,
50-530/96-05
This integrated
inspection
included aspects
of licensee
operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
and plant support.
The report covers
a 6-week
period of resident
inspection.
~0erations
~
Operators
responded effectively to the Unit 2 control building fires and
promptly declared
an Alert due to I~'.ential degradation
to safety-related
equipment
(Section 01.2).
~
Operators
performed the Unit
1 shutdown effectively and in
a professional
manner.
Operators
responded
appropriately to procedure deficiencies
and
equipment malfunctions,
and promptly initiated corrective actions for the
problems
(Section 01.3).
O.
The inspectors
noticed
a continued excellent
performance
by the operating
crews during the Unit
2 midloop condition (Section 01.4).
In general,
the Unit 2 core offload was effectively performed
in
accordance
with approved
procedures
and in
a safety-conscious
manner
(Section 01.5).
~
The licensee
assessment
of the operability determination
process
was
critical and identified several
areas
requiring enhancements
(Section 03.1).
~
A reactor operator failed to follow a procedure
which resulted
in
a loss
of offsite power and
a loss of shutdown cooling.
The reactor
operator
(RO) failed to utilize the stop, think, act,
and review
techniques
when manipulating the breaker
handswitch
and failed to stop
and seek direction from the control
room supervisor
(CRS)
when the
expected
response
was not obtained.
The failure to follow procedure
was
identified as
a violation (Section 04.1).
~
An auxiliary operator
(AO) exhibited
good attention to detail
by
identifying
a loose conduit
on the
Emergency
Diesel Generator
1A
(Section M1.4).
Maintenance
~
The inspectors
observed multiple maintenance
activities during the report
period.
Overall,
the maintenance
and surveillance activities were
thorough
and performed professionally
(Sections Ml.l and M1.2).
4
e
I
I
l
I
~
Maintenance activities to disassemble
and assemble
the auxiliary
pump turbine were completed
in an effective
and controlled
manner
(Section M1.3).
En ineerin
~
Engineering
provided
a timely evaluation of the impact of a loose conduit
on the
Emergency Diesel
Generator
1A (Section Ml.4).
~
Engineering activities following the Unit 2 control building fires were
thorough
and effective (Section El. 1).
Plant
Su
ort
An inspector identified that radiation
area posting
signage
was grouped
in one area rather than spread
over the barrier rope,
which radiation
protection personnel
promptly corrected
(Section Rl. 1).
The staffing of the Technical
Support Center,
as
a result of the Unit 2
control building fires,
was timely (Section Pl. 1).
The fire department
responded
appropriately to the Unit
2 control
building fires (Section Fl.l).
I
Re ort Details
Summar
of Plant Status
Unit
1
began this inspection period at
100 percent
power.
On April 16,
1996,
the unit was
shutdown
due to increased
vibration on Reactor Coolant
Pump
2B
with a continuation to cold shutdown
the following day.
The unit ended
the
inspection period in Mode 5.
Unit 2 began this inspection period at
95 percent
power in an end-of-core life
power coastdown.
On March 16,
1996,
the unit entered
into Refueling
Outage
2R6.
During the core offload, the operators
noted
a damaged
and stuck
fuel assembly.
On April 4,
a fire occurred
in two locations of the control
building.
The unit ended
the inspection
period defueled.
Unit 3 operated
at essentially
100 percent
power throughout the inspection
period.
I. 0 erations
Ol
Conduct of
Operations'1.
1 General
Comments
71707
Using Inspection
Procedure
71707,
the inspectors
conducted
frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general,
the conduct of
operations
was professional
and safety conscious;
specific events
and
noteworthy observations
are detailed
in the sections
below.
In
particular,
the inspectors
observed
continued excellent
performance
by
the operating
crews during the Unit 2 midloop condition.
01.2 Control Buildin
Fires
Unit 2
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
93702
At approximately
5 p.m.
on April 4, with Unit 2 in Node 6,
a security
officer reported
smoke
and fire in the back panel
area of the control
room located
on the 140-foot elevation of the control building.
Subseq'uently,
a second fire was discovered
in direct current
(DC)
equipment
Room
B located
on the 100-foot elevation of the control
building.
The inspectors
observed
the licensee's
response
to the event,
including the declaration of an Alert.
The inspectors
also observed
the
licensee's
followup actions after the fire.
~
'Topical
headings
such
as
01,
NS, etc.,
are
used
in accordance
with the
NRC standardized
reactor inspection report outline.
Individual reports
are
not expected
to address
all outline topics.
0
e
e
b. Observations
and Findin
s
The licensee
sounded
the fire alarm within a minute of identifying the
control
room fire.
The licensee's
onsite fire department
responded
in
6 minutes.
The licensee
identified that the Fire was in an electric
distribution panel
and in an uninterruptible
power supply located in the
back panel
area of the control
room.
Operators
determined that the
control
room was not required to be evacuated
as
a result of the fire.
The control
room operators
dispatched
the
AOs to check their assigned
areas.
Approximately II minutes after the control
room fire was
identified,
an
AO heard
a local fire alarm at the 100-foot elevation of
the control building and discovered
a second fire in
DC equipment
Room B.
The fire was in
a regulating transformer which supplied
power to the
components
involved in the fire in the control
room.
At 5: 14 p.m.,
the licensee
declared
an Alert based
on the potential
degradation
of safety-related
equipment.
At 5:24 p.m.,
the licensee
notified the state officials of the Alert.
At 5:35 p.m.,
the licensee
staffed the Technical
Support Center.
The licensee
extinguished
both fires by 5:31 p.m.,
and the Alert was
subsequently
terminated
at 6:05 p.m.
The licensee
noted that
no
personnel
injuries occurred during the event,
and
no other plant
equipment
was
damaged.
At the time of the event, all Unit 2 fuel
was
offloaded to the spent fuel pool with the exception of one fuel assembly
which was stuck.
The inspector
noted that the fires did not affect the
ability to cool the spent, fuel pool or the stuck fuel assembly.
In
addition,
the fires did not affect Units I or 3, which remained
operating
at
100 percent
power.
As
a result of the fires,
one train of essential
for the control
room was inoperable
which decreased
the general
area
lighting.
However,
the inspector
concluded that the'ecrease
in lighting
did not adversely affect the overall control
room lighting and did not
affect control
room activities.
The inspectors
observed
that the licensee's
overall
response
was quick
and effective.
Additional operations
personnel
responded
to the fire to
assist
the Unit 2 control
room staff.
The inspector
observed
the control
room staff exhibit strong
command
and control.
The licensee
suspended
all fuel handling activities.
Electricians
were quickly dispatched
to
disconnect
the batteries
powering the uninterruptible
power supply.
The
inspector
observed that communications
between
the control
room and the
fire brigades
were clear,
unambiguous,
and included
Feedback
to ensure
parties
understood
the communications.
After the fire, the licensee
convened
an investigation
team to determine
the
scope of plant repairs,
determine
the root caus
,
and evaluate
the
, esponse
to the event.
The inspectors
observed
that the
team
was
'
i
l
I
01.3
multi-disciplined and included maintenance,
engineering,
and fire
protection personnel.
The inspectors
attended
meetings
held by the
investigation
team
and observed
good interaction
between
team
members
in
developing
followup items
on
a broad range of issues.
In addition to the loss of one train of control
room emergency
and
essential
lighting, the licensee
determined that several fire detection
panels
were
powered
from the burned control
room distribution panel.
The
licensee
established
continuous fire watches
in the affected
areas of the
control
and auxiliary buildings.
The licensee initiated troubleshoot'<<g
of the distribution pane(
and installed
reenergize
the affected lighting systems
and fire detection
panels.
On
April 6, the licensee
completed
the modification.
During review of the potential
cause of the fires,
the licensee
identified
a design deficiency that could affect the ability to achieve
and maintain safe
shutdown.
The design deficiency, related to grounding
of the
DC equipment
room regulating transformer
and the control
room
uninterruptible
power supply,
was reported to the
NRC in Event
Notification 30243,
dated April 6,
1996.
The licensee
implemented
additional fire watches
in all three units
as
a result of the finding.
At the
end of the inspection period,
the licensee
had not established
a
root cause for the fires
and
had not issued
a report of lessons
learned.
The inspector will follow the licensee's
evaluation
as part of the
licensee
event report
(LER) closure.
Shutdown Observations
Unit
1
Ins ection
Sco
e
71707
On April 15, the operators
performed
a reactor
shutdown
as
a result of
increasing vibration on the Reactor
Coolant
Pump
2B.
The inspector
observed
the unit shutdown,
operator
communications,
supervisory control,
and
use of the following plant procedures:
~
Standard
Post Trip Actions
~
~
EPIP-02
Event Classification
b. Observations
and Findin
s
The inspector
observed
that the
CRS demonstrated
good
command
and control
of the board operations
and the
RO switch manipulations.
The
communications
between
and the
CRS included verbatim repeat
backs.
While 'transferring
power sources
from the unit auxiliary transformer to
the startup transformer,
in accordance
with Procedure
"13.8 Kv Electrical
System,"
the
RO observed
a voltage differential
t
between
the buses'and
immediately informed the
CRS.
The
CRS consulted
engineering
to resolve
the problem.
Engineering
determined that the
voltage differences
were within the tolerances
of the meters.
The shift
supervisor
noted that Procedure
410P-INAOI, lacked criteria
as to what
was
an acceptable
voltage difference
and initiated
an instruction
change
request
to address
the deficiency.
At 3:22 a.m.
on April 16, the operators
tripped the reactor
in accordance
with Procedure
"Plant Shutdown
Mode I to Mode 3," and entered
into Procedure
When verifying that all full-length control
element
assemblies
(CEAs) were inserted,
the operators
noticed that one
CEA bottom light did not illuminate and another light flashed
on and off.
The inspector
observed that the operators
quickly verified, through
redundant
information, that all the
CEAs were fully inserted.
The
licensee
generated
a work request
to troubleshoot
and repair the
indication anomaly.
01.4
The inspector
observed
the
CRS determination of whether
an event
classification
was required in accordance
with Procedure
Step 4.
The inspector
observed
that the
CRS correctly entered
Procedure
EPIP-02
and determine that
an emergency classification
was not
required.
Reduced
Inventor
0 erations
Unit 2
Ins ection
Sco
e
71707
b.
The inspector
reviewed
and operation's
preparations
for and control of
the Unit 2 bperations
reduced
inventory operations,
conducted
in
accordance
with Procedure
"RCS Drain Operations."
Observations
and Findin
s
During preparations
for the reactor coolant
system
(RCS) drain to
'midloop, the inspector
observed
that the licensee
had the required
emergency
equipment available,
the containment
was properly closed,
the
required valve lineups
were completed,
and the required level indication
equipment
was operable.
During draining operations,
the inspector
observed
that the licensee
properly controlled
RCS water inventory and
monitored reactor
vessel
level.
The licensee
augmented
the normal control
room staff with a dedicated,
midloop reactor operator
and senior reactor operator with the specific
assignment
to monitor and control the
RCS drain to midloop.
The licensee
controlled
and minimized unnecessary
work while the unit was in a reduced
inventory condition.
In addition,
the licensee
maintained
sources
of
offsite and onsite
power available,
and limiting access
to critical
equipment
areas.
0'
i
I
l
i
f
I
l
I
I
I
01.5 Refuelin
0 erations
Unit
2
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
71707
On March 25, the inspector
observed
portions of core offload from the
refueling machine
deck.
In addition,
the inspector
reviewed the
following licensee
refueling related
procedures:
Refueling Machine Operations
72IC-9RX03 Core Reloading
30AC-9WP01 Foreign Material Exclusion
and
Zone III Controls
b. Observations
and Findin
s
The inspector
observed
good communications
between
the refueling senior
reactor operator
(SRO)
on the refueling deck the reactor engineer
in the
'ontrol
room.
The inspector
observed that the refueling
SRO demonstrated
appropriate
command
and control of the refueling operation.
01.6 Conclusions
on Conduct of 0 erations
The licensee's
immediate
response
to the control building fires was
excellent
and minimized the effects of the
two fires, while providing
timely notification of an Alert.
The licensee
quickly convened
an
investigation
team to determine
the root cause of the fires.
Operators
performed the Unit
1 shutdown effectively and in a professional
manner.
Operators
responded
appropriately to procedure deficiencies
and
equipment malfunctions,
and promptly initiated corrective actions for the
problems.
The operators effectively controlled the initial draining of the Unit 2
RCS to midloop and continuously monitored the
RCS level.
The operators
demonstrated
good safety consciousness
by maintaining
normal
and
emergency
systems
during the evolution.
In general,
the Unit 2 core offload was performed thoroughly
and in a
safety-conscious
manner.
02
Operational
Status of Facilities
and Equipment
02. 1
Dama
ed
Fuel
Assembl
Unit 2
71707
During the core offload, the licensee
identified
a damaged,
stuck fuel
assembly
in the
A7 core location.
On April 7, the licensee
successfully
freed
and physically removed
the assembly
from the core.
The licensee's
actions to free the assembly,
the root cause
analysis,
and corrective
actions will be assessed
by
a special
inspection
(NRC Inspection
Report 50-529/96-06).
03
Operations
Procedures
and Documentation
03.1
0 erabilit
Determination
Process
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
71707
The inspector
reviewed
Procedure
to evaluate
the licensee's
(OD) process.
In
addition,
the inspector
reviewed the licensee's
assessment
of the
implementation of the
OD process
and discussed
the
OD process
with
operations
and engineering
personnel.
b. Observations
and Findin s:
The inspector determined that the
OD procedure reflects the guidance
provided in
The licensee's
assessment
on the
implementation of the
OD process
identified that
improvements
were needed
in certain 'areas:
assuring
that management
expectations
were clear
and
understood;
enhancing
communications
between organizations
involved in
the
OD process;
and training of organizations
involved in the
OD process.
Accordingly, the licensee
provided the following corrective actions:
~
Provide additional training of other organizations,
along with
operations
department,
on the
OD process.
~
Clearly delineate
the responsibilities of licensing
and engineering
in the development of an initial OD and the final operability
evaluation.
~
Clearly identify management
expectations
concerning
the
OD process
in the
OD procedure.
The inspector
noted .that the licensee
planned
to'implement
a revised
process
procedure bj the
end of Hay 1996.
c. Conclusions
The licensee
assessment
of the
OD process
was self-critical
and
identified several
areas
requiring enhancements.
04
Operator
Knowledge
and Performance
04. 1 Loss of Offsite Power
Unit 2
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
71707
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
investigation
and response
to the
April
1 loss of offsite power situation in Unit 2.
An
RO attempted
to
manually transfer
a nonvital
4. 16
Kv bus
(NBN-S02) from the alternate
t
-10-
b.
power supply breaker
(NBN-S01C) to the normal
power supply
breaker
(NBN-S02A).
Observations
and Findin
s
On April 1, the unit was in Mode
6 with the Train
A safety
systems
out of
service.
The core
was offloaded with the exception of a stuck fuel
assembly.
The
RO obtained
Procedure
"4. 16 Kv Non-Class
1E Power," to
perform the power source transfer evolution.'he
RO obtained
the
synchronizer
key and inadvertently placed it in the Vital 4. 16
Kv PBB-SS-S04 interlock switch in
cead of the
S02 interlock switch.
The
RO proceeded
to close
Breaker
PBB-S04L (alternate
supply breaker to
Train
B Class
4. 16 Kv Bus
PBB-S04)
instead of NBN-S02A.
After
Breaker
PBB-S04L closed,
the normal
supply Breaker
PBB-S04K opened,
as
designed.
The
AO stationed
at Breaker
NBN-S02A reported to the
RO that
the Breaker
NBN-S02A did not close.
The
RO then re-opened
Breaker
PBB-S04L, in'attempt to restore
the original lineup
and caused
a
loss-of-offsite
power to the Train
B Class
4. 16 Kv bus.
The failure of
the
RO to follow procedure
is
a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1
(50-529/9605-01).
The Train
B diesel
ge'nerator
started
and loaded onto the
bus
as designed.
The operators
restored
pump power
and flow approximately
45 seconds later.
The control
room staff subsequently
restored
the
normal electrical
system lineup.
The licensee initiated
a condition report/disposition
request
and
a human
performance
evaluation to analyze
the event.
The inspector
reviewed the
Procedure
and determined that the procedure
was adequate,
as
written.
C. Conclusions
One violation regarding
the failure of an operator to follow a procedure
in realigning
power source"
was identified.
The
RO failed to utilize the licensee's
established
stop, think, act,
and
review techniques
when manipulating the breaker handswitch.
The
failed to stop
and seek direction from the control
room supervisor
when
the expected
response
was not obtained.
II. Maintenance
Conduct of Maintenance
General
Comments
on Maintenance Activities
+)
1
-11-
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
62703
The inspector
observed all or portions of the following work activities:
~
Balance of Plant Engineering Safety Features
Actuation
System
Sequencer
Module Repair (Unit 1)
~
Clean
and Inspect of Inverter 2E-NNB-V14 (Unit 2)
b. Observations
and Findin
s
The inspectors
found these
work activities were performed in accordance
with procedures.
In addition,
see
the specific discussions
of
maintenance
observed
under Sections
M1.3.
M1.2 General
Comments
on Surveillance Activities
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
61726
The inspector
observed all or portions of the following surveillance
activities:
~
31ST-9DG01 Diesel
Engine Surveillance
Inspections
~
18 Honth Surveillance
Test of Diesel Generator
b. Observations
and Findin
s
The inspectors
found these
surveillances
were performed in accordance
with procedures.
In addition,
see
the specific discussion
of
surveillance
observed
under Section
M1.4.
M1.3 Auxiliar
Pum
Unit 2
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
62703
The inspectors
observed partial
performance of Procedure
Pump Turbine Disassembly
and Assembly,"
under Work
Package
727846.
In addition,
the inspector
discussed
the work activities
with maintenance
technicians,
engineers,
and management.
b. Observations
and Findin
s
On March 20,
the inspector
observed
mechanical
maintenance
technicians
remove the turbine upper half casing
and disassemble
the coupling
end
bearing.
The technicians
performed the work in a professional
manner
and
were familiar with the procedure.
I[
I
l
f
-12-
On March 26,
the inspector
observed
mechanical
maintenance
technicians
remove the valve internals
to the trip/throttle valve.
The inspector
observed
the mechanical
maintenance
technicians
request
assistance.
from
the electrical
maintenance
technicians
to remove electrical limit
switches.
The inspector
noted that this was not covered
in the work
package.
The mechanical
maintenance
team leader
performed
a
"pen
and
ink" change
to the work package
to allow the work to continue. 'he
inspector
observed
that the change
was in accordance
with established
processes
and appropriately
documented.
On April 2, the inspector toured the work area during the technician's
lunch break.
The inspector
observed
that good Foreign material
exclusion
controls were in place for all identified openings.
The staged
equipment
and tools were properly tagged
and stored.
On April 4, the inspector
observed
portions of the governor valve stem
removal.
The inspector
noted that
some of the carbon
spacers
used
as
packing material
were broken.
The inspector questioned
the technician
about the broken spacers.
The technician
indicated that it was not
unusual
to find broken carbon
spacers.
The inspector discussed
the
broken spacer
issue with the maintenance
engineer.
The engineer
indicated that the carbon
spacers
are brittle and
may break during
removal of the valve stem.
The engineer
indicated that broken carbon
spacers
would not pose
a threat to operability of the valve.
The
inspector
agreed with the engineer's
assessment
of the broken spacers.
On April 10, the inspector
observed
the mechanical
maintenance
technicians
repack the governor valve stem.
The inspector
observed that
the technicians
were very cautious
when installing the carbon
spacers
and
performed appropriate
measurements
of the valve stem stuffing box to
determine
the appropriate
amount of packing material.
Ml.4 Monthl
Emer enc
Diesel
Generator
Surveillance
Unit I
a,
Ins ection
Sco
e
61726
On March 20, the inspector
observed
the performance of
Procedure
41ST-IDGOI, "Diesel Generator
A Test 4.8. 1. 1.2.a."
b. Observations
and Findin
s
An AO identified, during performance of the monthly surveillance test,
a
nonconforming condition.
The
AO identified that
a conduit
had
become
loose slightly below the point where it entered
the diesel
room floor.
The shift supervisor
and
AO determined that the conduit contained
safety-related
cables.
Operators
stopped
the emergency
diesel
generator
and declared it
inoperable until repairs
were completed,
although it remained
functional
k
0
L
-13-
during that period.
The licensee verified that similar conditions did
not exist
on the remaining
emergency
diesel
generators
for all units.
H1.5 Conclusions
on Conduct of Haintenance
Haintenance activities to disassemble
and assemble
the auxiliary
pump turbine were completed
in an effective
and controlled
manner.
The
AO exhibited
an excellent questioning attitude
by raising
a concern
with the loose conduit.
Licensee
communication
and coordination
was good
and provided for timely evaluation of the impact
on the affected
emergency diesel
generator
and the potential
impact
on the remaining
emergency
diesel
generators.
N8
Hiscellaneous
Haintenance
Issues
(92902)
H8. 1
Closed
Violation 50-530 9514-01:
failure to follow rigging procedure.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
response
to the Notice of
Violation, dated
September
27,
1995,
and verified that the corrective
actions
were acceptably
implemented.
In addition,
the inspector
reviewed
Procedure
30DP-9HPll, "Field Use of Rigging," dated
November
16,
1995,
and found that the revision appropriately defined the
"knot" configuration
as
an unacceptable
rigging practice.
El
Conduct of Engineering
El.l Control Buildin
Fires
Unit 2
92903
The inspectors
observed
that
some of the licensee's
followup actions to
investigate
the cause of the control building fires.
The engineering
activities following the control building fire were effective.
Further
aspects
of, this event
are discussed
in Section 01.2.
E8
Hiscellaneous
Engineering
Issues
(92903)
E8. 1
Closed
Unresolved
Item 50-528 9431-01:
letdown line isolation
leakage.
The licensee
has
completed their evaluation of this item and
has
issued
LER 50-528/95-007-01
to describe
the cause
and corrective
actions for the item.
Followup inspection for the
LER will resolve
any
outstanding
issues
associated
with this item.
Rl
Radiological
Protection
and Chemistry Controls
f
e
-14-
Rl. 1 Containment
Tour
Unit
2
71750
On April 10, during
a containment tour, the inspector identified that the
postings
at the containment
equipment
hatch
were all pushed
to one side
and not conspicuous
to personnel.
The inspector
informed radiation
protection
(RP) personnel.
RP personnel
immediately corrected
the
situation
and
implemented tie wrapping of the signs to the barrier rope
to prevent this situation
from reoccurring
in the future.
The inspector
concluded that
RP performed
prompt
and effective corrective action.
Pl
Conduct of Emergency Pr;cedure Activities
Pl. 1 Control Buildin
Fires
Unit 2
93702
The inspectors
observed
the licensee's
response
to the control building
fires which led to the declaration of an Alert.
The inspector
concluded
that the licensee's
notification of the Alert to offsite officials was
timely,
as
was the staffing of the Technical
Support Center.
The
inspector
observed
that communications within the Technical
Support
Center
were clear
and concise,
and that personnel
were periodically
briefed
on the status of the plant.
Further aspects
of this event are
discussed
in Section 01.2.
Fl
Control of Fire Protection Activities
Fl. 1 Control Buildin
Fires
Unit 2
93702
92904
The inspector
observed
the licensee's
fire department
respond
to the
control
room,
and noted
a fire fighter was dispatched
to the
OC equipment
Room
8 when the
second fire was reported.
The fire fighters extinguished
the fires using carbon dioxide extinguishers.
Shortly after the fires
were extinguished,
the licensee
quarantined
the burned
equipment
and
established fire watches
to watch for reflash.
The inspector
concluded
that the fire department
responded
appropriately to the fires.
Further
aspects
of this event
are discussed
in Section 01.2.
V. Kana ement Heetin
s
Xl
Exit Meeting
Summary
The inspectors
presented
the inspection results
to members of licensee
management
at the conclusion of the inspection
on April 16,
1996.
The
licensee
acknowledged
the findings presented.
The inspectors
asked
the licensee
whether
any materials
examined during the
inspection
should
be considered
proprietary.
No proprietary information was
identified.
.gE
ky
-15-
PARTIAL LIST OF
PERSONS
CONTACTED
Licensee
J
~ Bailey, Vice President,
Nuclear Engineering
P. Crawley, Director, Nuclear Fuel
Management
G. Overbeck,
Vice President,
Nuclear Support
R. Flood,
Department
Leader,
System Engineering
R. Fullmer, Department
Leader,
Nuclear Assurance
B. Grabo,
Section
Leade
, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
R. Hazelwood,
Senior Engineer,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J.
Hesser,
Director, Nuclear Engineering
W. Ide, Director, Operations
A. Krainik, Department
Leader,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
M. Shea,
Director, Radiation Protection
J. Velotta, Director, Training
P. Wiley, Department
Leader,
Operations
Support
Other Personnel
B. Drost,
E80 Comm., Salt River Project
R. Endsor,
HSED Power,
Nuclear Electric
F.
Gowens,
Site Representative,
El
Paso Electric
(,y
-16-
IP 37551:
IP 61726:
,IP 62703:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92902:
IP 92903:
IP 92904:
IP 93702:
INSPECTION
PROCEDURES
USED
Onsite Engineering
Surveillance
Observations
Maintenance
Observations
Plant Operations
Plant Support Activities
Followup
Maintenance
Followup - Engineering
Followup
Plant Support
Prompt Onsite
Response
to Events
ITEMS OPENED
AND CLOSED
O~ened
50-529/9605-01
Failure to follow electrical
system procedure
Closed
50-528/9431-01
Letdown line isolation leakage
50-530/9514-01
Failure to follow rigging procedure.
!
I
0
-l7-
LIST OF
ACRONYHS USED
LER
00
RP&C
Auxiliary Operators
Control
Element Assembly
Control
Room Supervisor
Direct Current
Public Document
Room
Licensee
Event Report
Reactor Operator
System
Radiation Protection
Radiological Protection
and Chemistry
Senior Reactor Operator