ML17311B309
| ML17311B309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1995 |
| From: | Thomas C NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17311B310 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9512140024 | |
| Download: ML17311B309 (30) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 RI ONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ET AL.
OCK T 0.
OM N TO FACT OP RAT UN T C NSE Amendment No.
102 License No.
NPF-41 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Mater and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated July 3, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 2.
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:
95i2i40024 95ii28 PDR ADGCK 05000528 PDR ~
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(2)
Technical S ecifications, and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 102, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and expires upon the completion of the next refueling outage for Unit No. l.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION harles R. Thomas, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical'pecifications Date of Issuance:
November 28, 1995
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ATTACHNENT TO LICENS N HEN NDMENT NO.
102 0
F CILITY OPERA NG CENSE NO.
PF-4 OCKET NO.
STN 50-5 8 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by Amendment.number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE B 3/4 8-3 NSERT 3/4 8-2a B 3/4 8-3 B 3/4 8-4
4l J
C R CAL POWER SYSTEMS LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued
~CTION (Continued) f.* With switchyard voltage less than 524 kV and with three startup transformers in service, restore OPERABILITY of one trai~ of A.C.
sour ces by blocking fast bus transfer within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; ND either:
1.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by starting, loadiyg, and separating from offsite power within the next hour; ND restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND within 6 days from the discovery of failure to meet the LCO; OR 2.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining train of.A.C. sources by blocking fast bus transfer within the next hour; OR 3.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
g.*
With switchyard voltage less than 525 kV and.with two startup transformers in service, restore OPERABILITY of one train of A.C.
sources by blocking fast bus transfer within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; AND'ither:
1.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by starting, loadiyg, and separating from offsite power within the next hour; AND restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND within 6 days from the discovery of failure to meet the LCO; OR 2.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining train of A.C. sources by blocking fast bus transfer within the next hour; OR 3.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- This amendment will expire upon full implementation of the final modification.
'nter applicable conditions and requirements of TS LCO 3.8.1.1 ACTION a and ACTION b for the INOPERABLE,train.
In addition, with no A.C. power source to one train, enter applicable conditions and ACTIONS of TS LCO 3.8.3.1, "Onsite Power Distribution Systems Operating."
Enter appl.icable conditions and requirements of TS LCO 3.8. 1. 1 ACTION a for the INOPERABLE offsite circuit.
PALO VERDE UNIT 1 3/8 8-2a Amendment No.
102
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ECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES
.C SOURC S
D.C.
SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)
ACTION requirements 3.8.1.l.f. and 3.8.1.1.g provide restrictions upon continued unit operation commensurate with degradation of switchyard voltage and restoration of OPERABILITY of the required A.C. sources.
In an effort to minimize the risk to the health and safety to the public, ACTIONS 3.8.1. l.f and 3.8.1.1.g balance, the risk of a forced shutdown against the risk of remaining at power with a switchyard voltage. in the lower portion of the expected range.
The risk during ACTIONS 3.8.1.l.f and 3.8.1. I.g due to a switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range and an independent accident is less than the risk associated with a normal shutdown including a reactor trip.
Conformance to GDC-17 requires maintenance of switchyard voltages at or above those identified in ACTIONS 3.8.1. l.f and 3.8. 1. I.g.
At voltages below those identified, a unit trip resulting from an ESF signal, coincident with low switchyard voltages, will result in sequencing of ESF, equipment on preferred offsite power.
The Class 1E degraded voltage relays will detect a
sustained degraded vol.tage due to the fast bus transfer of non-Class 1E loads from the auxiliary transformers to the startup transformers.
The relays will actuate to strip the ESF equipment and resequence it on the emergency diesel generator.
This "double sequencing" causes an interruption in equipment credited with specific response. time in the UFSAR Chapter 6 and 15 safety
- analysis, and is unanalyzed.
Maintenance of switchyard voltage at or above the specified value prevents this effect as does the configurations authorized by ACTIONS 3.8. l.l.f and 3.8. l.l.g.
The required voltage is higher when three units are operating on two startup transformers, as two secondary windings of the startup transformers must each supply ESF power to two units.
ACTIONS 3.8.l.l.f. 1 and 3.8. l.l.g.l are preferred over ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f.2 and 3.8.1.l.g.2.
ACTIONS 3.8.1.l.f.l and 3.8.1.1.g.l are designed to balance the probability of double sequencing (should no actions to mitigate be undertaken) due to switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range coincident with an accident, which is unlikely, against the probability of natural circulation (should both trains of fast bus transfer be blocked) due to a unit trip coincident with switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected
- range, which is also unlikely but more probable.
ACTIONS 3.8.l.l.f.l and 3.8.1.1.g.l provides offsite power to half of the non-class lE loads for forced circulation to respond to a normal plant trip, as well as EDG power and the second offsite power circuit to the two trains of ESF equipment to respond to any accident.
ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f.2 and 3.8. l.l.g.2 are provided to allow operation of both trains of fast bus transfer blocked in the unlikely event of problems with the emergency diesel generators.
PALO VERDE UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-3 Amendment No.
102
41 LECTRICA 0
YSTEHwhich are, ther> t'estedi os a rotating basis to ensure that all breake'rs are t'ested.
i[f a i<ide vai:iety'exi'sts w'ithiri. any manufacturer's brarid iof ciI~cuit breakers it is necessary to'ivide that manufacturer's br'eakeIs in1to'roups and treat each group;as a:separate ty'pe of br'eaker'or s'urveillance.purposes:.
1~here ar4 neo kur'yeill'anr'e requirem'ents one fuses.
For in-line fuses, the. applicable surveil'lance would require removing'he fuses from the circuIit which woul,d destroy thd fus4.
The test data
)for s'urveillance on th'e'other fuses: would not inIficate whether the fuse was degrading
'which,.has bIeeni sItated by the fuse itianufactur'er and Idaho,. National~
Engineering Laborator y.
The 'OPERABILITY'-of'he motor-otic'rated'al ver, thermal dverload protection and/o'.
bypass devices ensures that these devices will not, prevent safety related valves from performing their, function.
Tt>e surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABIL'ITY of thiese device.i are in accordance with Regulatory Guide '1.10i5',
"Tliermal Overload PrbtectionI for Electric'Motors on Motor, 'Operated Val u~es, " 'Revi si or> 1, March 1977.
PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-4 Amendment No.
102
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UNITED STATES
'NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C.'20555-0001 R
ONA U
C S
N OC 0.
50-5
'PALO V RDE UCL AR G
N T
NG STA ON UNIT NO.
ENDMENT TO F
C Y OPERATING'ICENS Amendment No.
90 License No. NPF-51 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the. Commission) has found that:
'A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Hexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and
- Power, and Southern California 'Public Power Authority dated July 3,
- 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set.forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted'ithout endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
.2.
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by.changes to the Technical, Specifications as indicated in the attachment. to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No.
NPF-51. is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 90, and the.Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the.facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and expires upon the completion of the next refueling outage for Unit No. 2.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Charles R. Thomas, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
'Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
November 28, 1995
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T CHM NT 0
EN MEN 0.
9O TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-51 OCKET NO.
S 50-5 9
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding.
overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document, completeness.
QQOllE B 3/4 8-3
~S'JQ 3/4 8-2a B 3/4 8-3 B 3/4 8-4
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I
LECT C
L POWER SYS NS LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued
)<CT~0 (Continued) f.* With switchyard voltage less than 518 kV and with three startup transformers in service, restore OPERABILITY of one trai~ of A.C.
sources by blocking fast bus transfer within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; AND either:
1.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by starting, 1oadi~g, and separating from offsite power within the next hour; AND restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND within 6 days from the discovery of failure to meet the LCO; OR 2.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining train of A.C. sources by blocking fast bus transfer within the next hour; OR 3.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
g.*
With switchyard voltage less than 525 kV. and with two startup transformers in service, restore OPERABILITY of one train of A.C.
sources by blocking fast bus transfer within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; AND'ither:
1.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by starting, loadiyg, and separating from offsite power within the next.hour;, AND restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND within 6 days from the discovery of failure to meet the LCO; OR 2.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining train of A.C.. sources by blocking fast bus transfer within the next hour; OR 3.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- This amendment will expire upon full implementation of the final modification.
~ Enter applicable conditions and requirements of TS LCO 3.8.1.1 ACTION a and ACTION b for the INOPERABLE train.
In addition, with no A.C. power source to one train, enter applicable conditions and ACTIONS of TS LCO 3.8.3.1, "Onsite Power Distribution Systems Operating."
Enter applicable conditions and requirements of TS LCO 3.8.1.1 ACTION a for the INOPERABLE offsite circuit.
PALO VERDE UNIT. 2 3/4 8-2a Amendment No. 90
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C C
POW S
STEMS B SES
.C.
SOURC S
D.C.
SOURC S A D ONSITE POWE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)
ACTION requirements 3.8.1.1.f and 3.8.1.1.g provide restrictions upon continued unit operation commensurate with degradation of switchyard voltage and restoration of OPERABILITY of the required A.C. sources.
In an effort to minimize the risk to the health and safety to the public, ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f and 3.8.l.l.g balance the risk of a for ced shutdown against
.the risk of remaining at power with a switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range.
The risk during ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f and 3.8.1.l.g due to a switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range and an independent accident is less than the risk associated with a normal shutdown including a reactor trip.
Conformance to GDC-17 requires maintenance of switchyard voltages at or above those identified in ACTIONS 3.8. l.l.f and 3.8. l.l.g.
At voltages below those identified, a unit trip resulting from an ESF signal, coincident with low switchyard voltages, will result in sequencing of ESF equipment on preferred offsite power.
The Class lE degraded voltage relays will detect a
sustained degraded voltage due to the fast bus transfer of non-Class 1E loads from the auxiliary transformers to the startup transformers.
The relays will actuate to strip the ESF equipment and resequence it on the emergency diesel generator.
This "doubl'e sequencing" causes an interruption in equipment credited with specific response time in the UFSAR Chapter 6 and 15 safety
- analysis, and is unanalyzed.
Maintenance of switchyard voltage at or above the specified value prevents this effect as does the configurations authorized by ACTIONS 3.8.1. l.f and 3.8.l.l.g.
The required voltage is higher when three units are operating on two startup transformers, as two secondary windings of the startup transformers must each supply ESF power to two units.
ACTIONS 3.8. l.l.f.l and 3.8. l.l.g. 1 are preferred over ACTIONS 3.8.1. l.f.2 and 3.8.1. l.g.2.
ACTIONS 3.8. 1. l.f.l. and 3.8. l.l.g. 1 are designed to balance the probability of double sequencing (should no actions to mitigate be undertaken) due to switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range coincident with an accident, which is unlikely, against the probability of natural circulation (should both trains of fast bus transfer be blocked) due to a unit trip coincident with switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected
- range, which is also unlikely but more probable.
ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f.l and 3.8.1.l.g.l provides offsite power to half of the non-class 1E loads for forced circulation to respond to a normal plant trip, as well as EDG power and the second offsite power circuit to the two trains of ESF equipment to respond to any accident.
ACTIONS 3.8. 1. l.f.2 and 3.8.1.l.g.2 are provided to allow operation of both trains of fast bus transfer blocked in the unlikely event of problems with the emergency diesel generators.
PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. 90
C RICA:POWER 'S)!'STEM.')
BASES 3 4;8.
LECTRICA ~EU~PME!N~ PROTECTI[VE~DV~IE Containment electrical'enetrations anted pienetrat'ion cc>nductor ar'ei protected by eith'er deenergizing circuits not, required duririg reactor
.operation or'by demonstrating the-OPERABILITY of p} im'ary and backup overcurrent protection. circuit br'eaker.s duririg pe!riodic'. suryeillance.
The circuit breakers will be test,ed in accordancie viitll NEMA Staridard Publication No. AB-2-1980.
For a frame s;iz'e pf:l?50 an>peres oir less,. the field tole'rane'es of the high and low settin!g qf the i'njected decurrent wi'Ill be within
+40X/-'-2SX.'f the setpoint (pickup) valuate.
For a frame sizeI.of '400 amperes or gr'eater, the field tolerances will Ibe k2!~X of the setpoi'nt'(pickup)'alue.
The circuit breakers should not be affected when tested withiri-these tollerances,.
The surveillarice, reqiuirements applicable ~toj1o'w'er v'o'itage circuit
'breakers provide
- a. surance.of'breaker reliabili'ty by.-tes'ting:at,least'.one representative'ample of each'anufacturer's brarid of circuiit briaker.,
Eac'h
'anufacturer'.s,molded case: and metal case'cilrcuit breakers.are groupe'd'-ihtai representative samples'. which are then tested oni a rotating 'basis,:to ensure that all:bre'akers are tested; If. a,wide variety exists wi'thiri any manufacturer's brand of. circuit breakers it-is 'necessary 'to divide that manufacturer.'s. breakers into groups and trIeaIt eiach group 'as'a separate type of,'reaker'for surveilllance;purpio'ses.
There,arie nio surveilTance requirements on<
fuses.
For 'in-'1 ini~ fuses,,
thie applicable survei 1-:I ance "would require
.removi'ng.'he fuses 'from'the..'circuit;whi'ich woulld destroy tthe fuse. 'he test data for surveillance on: the other 'fuses would.not.i'nidicate whether.the, fuse was,
'egrading.
which;has been stated-by the fuse manufacturer and.Idaho Natiorral
'Engineering Laboratory.
The OPERABILITY of tlhe motor-operated valves thermal overload protecti'on and/or bypass dev'ices ensures that these devices sill not prevent safety'related valves 'from performinig,-.their function.
'The surveillance requirements for de'monstr'ating th'e Oi>ERABILITY'ofthese diavicek arein'cc'o'rdance.,with Regul'atory Guide 1,. 106,
".TIherma'I'verload: Protection for Electric Motor s'n'otor Operated Valves,," Revis'ioh 1', March'977.
PAL'O'ERDE -:UNIT.2
,B 3/4 '8-4'meridment,Nt).
90
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON> D.C. 20555-o001 ONA B
C S
V CKE 0
S 0-ALO VERDE NUC AR GENE ING S 0
0 FA 2.
Amendment No.
73 License No.. NPF-74 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt
.River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso
- Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angel'es Department of'ater and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated July 3, 1995,. complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and.the rules and regulations of the Commission; There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 0.
The issuance of this amendment will not, be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 nf the Commission's regulations and all applicable.,requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated, in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating 'License No. NPF-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:
0 I
3.
(2)
Tec nical S ecifications and 'Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A,.as revised through Amendment No. 73, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are 'hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where. otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and'xpires upon the completion of the next refueling outage for Unit No. 3.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION harles R. Thomas, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachmaat:
- Changes. to the Technical Speci'fications Date of Xssuance:
November 28, 1995
'I
ACHMENT TO IC S
DMEN ENT 0.
73 TO FAG T
E T
G CENSE 0
P-DOCKET NO.
S 50-5 0
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
EHOV B 3/4 8-3 NSER 3/4 8-2a B 3/4 8-3 B 3/4 8-4
I!
0 J
' g
SYST HS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued
~C~O (Continued) f.* With switchyard voltage less than 518 kV and with three startup transformers in service, restore OPERABILITY of one trai~ of A.C.
sources by blocking fast bus transfer within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; AND 'ither:
1.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by starting, loadiyg, and separating from offsite power within the next hour; AND restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND within 6 days from the discovery of failure to meet the LCO; OR 2.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining, train of A.C. sources by blocking fast bus transfer within the next hour; OR 3.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within. the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
g.*
With switchyard voltage less than 525 kV and with.two startup transformer s in service, restore OPERABILITY of one train of A.C.
sources by blocking fast bus transfer within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; AND'ither:
1.
Restore OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by starting, loadi~g, and separating from offsite power within the next hour; AND restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND within 6 days from the discovery of failure to meet the LCO; OR 2.
Restore OPERABIL'ITY of the remaining train of A.C. sources by blocking fast bus transfer within the next hour;.
OR 3.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- This amendment will expire upon full implementation of the final modification.
'nter applicable conditions and requirements of TS LCO 3.8. 1.1 ACTION a and ACTION b for the INOPERABLE train.
In addition, with no A.C. power, source to one train, enter applicable conditions and ACTIONS of TS LCO 3.8.3.1, "Onsite Power Distribution Systems Operating."
a Enter applicable conditions and requirements of TS.LCO 3.8.1.1 ACTION a for the INOPERABLE offsite circuit.
PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 3/4 8-2a Amendment No.
73
il 0
,A
CTRICA POW R
S S
EMS BASES C.
SOURCES D.C.
SOURCES AND ONSIT OWER DISTRIBUTION S STEMS (Continued)
ACTION requirements 3.8.1.l.f and 3.8.l.l.g provide restrictions upon continued unit operation commensurate with degradation of switchyard voltage and restoration of OPERABILITY of the required A.C. sources.
In an effort to minimize the risk to the health and safety to the public, ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f and 3.8.1. l.g balance the risk of a forced shutdown against the risk of remaining at power with a switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range.
The risk during ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f and 3.8.1. I.g due to a switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range and an independent accident is less than the risk associated with a normal shutdown including a reactor trip.
Conformance to GDC-17 requires maintenance of switchyard voltages at or above those identified in ACTIONS 3.8.1.'1.f and 3.8.1.l.g.
At voltages below those identified, a unit trip resulting from an ESF signal, coincident with low switchyard voltages, will result in sequencing of ESF equipment on preferred offsite power.
The Class 1E degraded voltage relays will detect a sustained degraded voltage due to the fast bus transfer of non-Class lE loads from the auxiliary transformers to the startup transformers.
The relays will actuate to strip the ESF equipment and resequence it on the emergency diesel generator.
This "double sequencing" causes an interruption in equipment credited with specific response time in the UFSAR Chapter 6 and 15 safety analysis, and is unanalyzed.
Maintenance of switchyard voltage at or above the specified value prevents this effect as does the configurations authorized by ACTIONS 3.8. l.l.f and 3.8.1.l.g.
The required voltage is higher when three units are operating on two startup transformers, as two secondary windings of the startup transformers must each supply ESF power to two units.
ACTIONS 3.8.l.l.f.l and 3.8.1.1.g.l are preferred over ACTIONS 3.8.l.l.f.2 and 3.8.1.1.g.2.
ACTIONS 3.8.1.l.f.l and 3.8.l.l.g.l are designed to balance the probability of double sequencing (should'o actions to mitigate be undertaken) due to switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected range coincident with an accident, which is unlikely, against the probability of natural circulation (should both trains of fast bus transfer be blocked) due to a unit trip coincident with switchyard voltage in the lower portion of the expected
- range, which is also unlikely but more probable.
ACTIONS 3.8.1. 1.f.l and 3.8.1.l.g.l provides offsite power to half of the non-class 1E loads for forced circulation to respond to a normal plant trip, as well as EDG power and the second offsite power circuit to the two trains of ESF equipment to respond to any accident.
ACTIONS 3.8.1.1.f.2 and 3.8.1. l.g.2 are provided to allow operation of both trains of fast bus transfer blocked in the unlikely event of problems with the emergency diesel generators.
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 B 3/4 8-3 Amendment No.
73
~I E ECTRICAL OW R SY~SIEMS BASES
.8.4 ELEC R CA
~IUIP~MlPT."PROTECTIVE~DIt:ES Containment electrica'I -penetrations and penetratton conductors are. piro-tected by either deenergii.irig ciircuits not.required during reactor o'peration..air.'y demonstrating.
thee.OPERABILITY of, piriinary and backup overcurrent protectiion circuit. breakers dlIir'ing periodic survei ilance.
The it:ircuit.,breakers;,will'be.
tested: in ac'cordance with NEMA Staindaird Publication.,No. A8-.2-1980.;For a, frame size of 250 amperes oir less, the field tolerarices of the high and'ow setting, of,the injected:current wi'ill be within +40X/-25X of
.the'etpoint;(pickup)'alue.
For a frame, size o1I'. 400 amIperes oi greate'r, the field toleranc'es-will be
%25X of the setpoirit (pickup) value.
The cidcbit breakers.,should not
'be'ffected when tested within these tolerances.
The surveillance requirements applicable, to lowi r yol,tage circuit 'br'eakers
'provide assurance.aif breaker relialbility by testivig lt least orie.representative
.'sample of each manuifactur'er's brand'f circujit Ibre!aki>r.
Each inanufacturer'6, molded case and metal case circciit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are the'n tested'ri:a rotating.bas1s 'to'nsure that all breakers are teste'd.
If a wide variety exists within,aniy ittanisfacttirer's:brand of.',
circuit breakers it, is necessa'ry tio divide that manufacture'r'.s.breakers into
-groups and,treat each.group as. a -sepa'rate type of 'breaker, for. surveillance purposes.
There are no surveillance retluirelents-'on'uses.
For'n-l,ine 'fu+es,,
the applicable survei'I,lance -.would,-irequire retiloving.the fuses.from,the circuit which; would destroy the fu'se.
The test data for survei,11ance.cin the other fuses would not ind,i,cate whether the, fuse was degrading. which has been stated'y the 'fuse manufacturer and:,Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The OPERABILITY of the motor,-operated vklvhs 'therm'al'overload.protecti0n and/or bypass devices ensures theat these devicel will not.prevent safety
'elated-valves fromi performing the'ir function.
The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY.of 'these devicesi are, in. accordance with:
Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Theriitial Overload Protection for.Electric.Motors;on Motor Operated, Valves,," Revision, 1,, March 1977.
PALO VERDE.UNIT: 3 B.3/4 8=4 Amendment No.. 73,