ML17311B284
| ML17311B284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1995 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17311B283 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-95-18, 50-529-95-18, 50-530-95-18, NUDOCS 9512050275 | |
| Download: ML17311B284 (30) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1995018
Text
ENCLOSURE
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection
Report:
50-528/95-18
50-529/95-18
50-530/95-18
Licenses:
Licensee:
NPF-51
Arizona Public Service
Company
P.O.
Box 53999
Phoenix,
,Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection At:
Maricopa County, Arizona
I
Inspection
Conducted:
September
24 through
November 4,
1995
Inspectors:
K. Johnston,
Senior Resident
Inspector
J.
Kramer, Resident
Inspector
'. Garcia,
Resident
Inspector
D. Acker, Senior Project Engineer
Approved:
uey, Acting
C
>e
,
eactor
ProJects
anc
F
te
Ins ection
Summar
Areas
Ins ected
Units
1
2
and
3
Routine,
announced
inspection of onsite
response
to plant events,
operational
safety,
maintenance
and surveillance
activities, onsite engineering,
refueling activities
and licensee
event report
review.
Results
Units
1
2
and
3
0 erations
~
A control
room supervisor
in Unit 3 reviewed the wrong section of
the steam generator
blowdown system procedure,
which led to
exceeding
licensed
thermal
power.
A non-cited violation was
identified (Section 2,1).
~
A control
room supervisor
demonstrated
excellent
command
and
control during the planned
shutdown in Unit 3 (Section 2.2).
95l2050275
951%24
ADOCK 05000528
6
'
.
An auxiliary operator in Unit 3 displayed
good attention to detail
for identifying non-seismic qualified scaffolding in safety-
related
equipment
rooms.
The use of improperly qualified
was identified as
a non-cited violation (Section 2.3).
A work control senior reactor operator in Unit 3 failed to
properly review
a work order clearance,
resulting in
a loss of
system inventory.
A non-cited violation was
identified (Section 2.4).
Two auxiliary operators
in Unit 3 failed to properly align and
independently verify a valve required for reactor coolant
system
draindown.
A non-cited violation was identified (Section 2.5).
A reactor engineer
in Unit 3 displayed
a lack of attention to
detail resulting in
a mispositioned
fuel assembly
in the spent
fuel pool.
Also, refueling personnel
exhibited insensitivity
towards
a reactivity management
issue.
A non-cited violation was
identified (Section
6. 1).
Refueling machine
personnel
were knowledgeable
about refueling equipment
and procedures
(Section 6.2).
t
Haintenance
Surveillance
~
Electrical maintenance
personnel
responded
appropriately to
a
failure of the Unit 2, Train
B diesel
generator
(Section 3. 1).
~
Hechanical
maintenance
personnel
displayed
good judgement during
troubleshooting efforts on the Unit 2, Train A auxiliary feedwater
pump (Section 3.2).
En ineerin
and Technical
Su
ort
~
Haintenance
engineering
displayed
a questioning attitude
and good
knowledge of Technical Specifications
when evaluating
a high pressure
safety injection
pump relief valve lifting (Section
5. 1).
Summar
of Ins ection Findin s:
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow a steam
generator
blowdown procedure
(Section
2. 1).
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow a procedure
for installing seismically qualified scaffolding (Section 2.3).
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow a clearance
generation
procedure
(Section 2.4).
A
'l'
,
,,[
ld
'fi
l
~
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow a
valve'osition
verification procedure
(Section 2.5).
~
A non-cited violation was identified associated
with mispositioning of a
fuel assembly
in the spent fuel pool (Section 6. 1).
~
One licensee
event report was reviewed
and closed
(Section 7).
Attachments:
1.
Persons
Contacted
and Exit Meeting
2.
List of Acronyms
0
l
l
l
l
e
4-
1
PLANT STATUS
Units
1 and
2 operated
throughout the inspection
period at full power with no
significant events.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at
100 percent
power.
On October
14, the
unit was taken off-line in preparation for a refueling outage.
On October
18,
the unit entered
Node
6. and
began
a core offload on October 20.
The unit
ended
the inspection
period with the core offloaded to the spent fuel pool.
2
OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION
(71707)
2. 1
Misali nment in the Steam Generator
Blowdown
S stem - Unit 3
On September
23, operators
placed
the steam generator
blowdown system in a
configuration that was not consistent
with that
assumed for the secondary
calorimetric calculation performed
by the core operating limits supervisory
system
(COLSS).
As
a result, for a period of approximately nine hours,
underestimated
actual
power by approximately 0. 11 percent
power.
The
secondary calorimetric provided by COLSS was the primary indication of power
used
by operators
and
as
a result,
the plant
was operated slightly above
100
percent
power for approximately
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The steam generator
blowdown system
has three
modes of operation;
normal,
abnormal,
and high rate.
On September
23, chemistry personnel
requested
that
operators
return the system to normal rate from the abnormal rate.
The
control
room supervisor
had both the abnormal
blowdown flow control valve and
the isolation valves closed.
At the following shift turnover, the*night shift control
room supervisor
informed the oncoming day shift control
room supervisor that the
abnormal
blowdown isolation valves were isolated.
The day shift control
room
supervisor
determined that the isolation valves
should
have
been
open
and
directed
an auxiliary operator to reopen
the valves.
The day shift control
room supervisor
recognized that the abnormal
blowdown
lineup was not consistent
with the lineup established
for the test
used to
develop the blowdown flow constant that is entered
into the
COLSS for the
secondary calorimetric calculation.
The test
was performed with the
abnormal
blowdown isolation valves in the open position
and the flow control valves in
the closed position.
The flow control valves
are not designed to be leak
tight in the closed position,
and
an
assumed
leakage rate
was incorporated
into the blowdown constant test.
The inspector
noted that in COLSS,
the steam flow equals
feed flow minus
,blowdown flow.
With the abnormal
blowdown isolated,
actual
blowdownflow was
less
than the constant
inserted into COLSS.
Therefore,
actual
steam flow was
greater
than
COLSS calculated
steam flow.
Since
secondary
power was directly
related to steam flow, actual
power was greater
than indicated
power.
l
The licensee
subsequently
determined that licensed
thermal
power
had
been
exceeded.
The operators
reduced reactor
power from 100 percent to 98.8
percent for an hour to ensure that the
12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> average
power was less
than
100
percent.
The licensee
calculated that the highest hourly power was
100. 14
percent
and the highest
12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> rolling average
power was 100.07 percent.
The licensee initiated
a condition report/disposition
request
(CRDR) to
evaluate
the event.
They found that the control
room supervisor
had reviewed
the wrong section of the
blowdown system operating
procedure,
and noted that
the control
room supervisor
had performed the actions to isolate the blowdown
isolation valves without including the rest of the control
room team in the
decision.
Additionally, the licensee
found that the precaution
and
limitations steps
provided misleading
informati.on and noted other causal
factors that
may have contributed to the event.
Also, the licensee"noted
that
the change
in operating philosophy to leave the blowdown isolation valves to
the blowdown flash tank open
was communicated
to Units
1 and 2, but there
was
no documented
evidence that this change
was effectively communicated
to Unit
3.
e
The licensee
performed the following corrective actions:
~
Issued
a night order to all- three units describing the event
and the
procedure
weaknesses.
Initiated
a procedure
change to eliminate the inaccurate
precaution
and
limitation step
and subsequently
issued
a
new revision to the procedure.
Counseled
the control
room supervisor
on the event.
Issued 'a letter to the shift supervisors
and control
room supervisors
detailing operation
teamwork issues
and expectations.
Issued
an operations
news flash
on the procedure
change
process
and the
necessity of informing operators
of procedure
changes.
Planned to discuss
the event in licensed operator training.
The inspector
reviewed the
CRDR and the corrective actions.
Additionally, the
inspector
reviewed
a Licensee
Event Report (50-530/95-02).
The inspector
noted that the event
was
bounded
by the assumptions
in the Updated
Final
Safety'nalysis
Report for thermal
power of 102 percent.
This licensee
identified and corrected violation is being treated
as
a non-cited violation,
consistent
with Section VII of the
NRC Enforcement
Policy.
2.2
Plant Shutdown
Unit 3
On October
14,
1995', during
a night shift tour, the'inspector
observed
operations
personnel
commence
a planned reactor
shutdown in preparation of the
fifth refueling outage for Unit 3.
The operations staff began the decrease
in
P
,
reactor
power at approximately
10:24 p.m.
The inspector
observed
the reactor
operator manually trip the reactor at 27 percent reactor
power.
Following the reactor trip, the control
room operators
implemented
the
standard
post trip procedures.
The inspector
observed
control
room operators
respond to plant anomalies
and various alarms.
The inspector
noted
good
procedure
usage
and communications.
The inspector
concluded that the control
room supervisor'isplayed
excellent
command
and control, the operators
were
attentive
and responded
appropriately to various alarms.
2.3
Non-seismicall
uglified Scaffoldin
Installed
Unit 3
On October
16,
1995, during routine area
rounds.,
an auxiliary operator
identified non-seismic
scaffolding installed in both trains of the essential
cooling water heat
exchanger
rooms.
The auxiliary operator notified the shift
supervisor
and discussed,
the. operability concern for the essential
cooling
water heat exchanger.
The backshift scaffolding supervisor,
site shift
manager,
and the outage control
manager
were also informed of the event.
The scaffolding supervisor
determined that the scaffolding was not built to
the required seismic qualifications
and directed
a scaffolding crew to rebuild
the scaffolding in accordance
with seismic qualifications stated
in Procedure
Revision 5, "Scaffolding Instructions."
A previous
example of
non-seismic scaffolding installed in areas with safety-related
equipment
was
identified by the
NRC and documented
in Inspection
Report 95-12.
The licensee
initiated
and
a
CRDR.
Licensee
management
initiated
a stop work for all scaffolding installation, briefed the
scaffolding crews
on the event,
and performed
a walkdown of all installed
scaffolding in Unit 3.
The scaffolding
crew, installed the scaffolding
on October
14 using Procedure
Revision 4.
Revision
4 allowed the scaffolding crew foreman the
flexibilityto determine
whether or not scaffolding would be installed to
seismic qualifications.
The previous day, Revision
5 to the procedure
became
effective
as part of the corrective actions for the inspector's
previous
concerns.
In addition to other enhancements
to the procedure,
Revision
5 did
not allow the foreman the flexibilityto determine
whether or not scaffolding
would be installed to seismic qualifications.
The licensee
had briefed
7 of
the
9 scaffolding crews
on Revision
5 to the'procedure.
The other two crews
'ad
been
on their scheduled
days off.
The scaffolding crew in question
had
not been
aware of the
new procedure revision.
The two crews were briefed
after the scaffolding
had
been installed incorrectly.
However,
the
scaffolding crew did not question
the adequacy of the installed scaffolding.
The inspector
noted that the scaffolding crew failed to construct
the
scaffolding in accordance
with Revision
4 of the procedure.
In addition, the
scaffolding foreman responsible for the October
14 job had also
been
involved
with the previous
events
documented
in Inspection
Report 95-12.
The inspector
t
noted the inadequacy
of communications
and the improper verification of the
most current procedure revision.
P
I
0
The non-seismic
was identified by the auxiliary operator
when the
unit was in Node 5.
Technical Specifications
do not require the essential
cooling water heat
exchangers
to be operable
in Node 5.
However,
the
had
been installed
on October
14,
when the plant was in Node
4
when both trains of essential
cooling water heat
exchangers
were required to
, be operable.
Design engineering
performed
an evaluation
which determined that the as-found
conditions of the scaffolding would not have
damaged
the essential
cooling
water heat
exchangers
during
a seismic event.
Therefore,
the non-seismic
had
no impact
on the operability of the essential
cooling water
'eat
exchanger.
The inspector discussed
this determination with the design
engineer
and agreed with the licensee's
conclusion.
The licensee
counselled
and disciplined the foreman
who was involved in both
events
and provided additional training to the scaffolding crews.
The
licensee
issued
a night order to all op'erators
describing the event.
The
night order indicated that operations
personnel will make the decision for the
approval of non-seismic scaffolding in seismic areas.
The normal expectation
is to have seismic scaffolding always erected
around safety-related
components.
This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated
as
a non-cited violation, consistent
with Section VII of the
NRC Enforcement
Policy.
2.4
Im ro erl
Authorized Clearance
Causes
a Loss of Reactor Coolant
S stem
Inventor
Unit 3
On October
16, three
days into the Unit 3 refueling outage,
the work control
senior reactor operator authorized
a clearance
without first ensuring that the
required plant configuration
had
been established.
Approximately
15 minutes
after the clearance
was hung,
a reactor operator identified an increasing
level in the reactor drain tank and that leakage
was
coming from the reactor
coolant
system.
The control
room staff evaluated
the activities in progress
and determined that
a recently issued
clearance
drained the reactor coolant
system through the reactor coolant
pumps.
The licensee
suspended
the
clearance,
and stopped
the loss of reactor coolant
system inventory.
The
licensee
calculated that
a
6 gpm reactor coolant
system leak occurred for
total of 51 minutes.
The licensee
determined that the work control senior reactor operator
was
busy
at the beginning of the shift and
numerous
clearances
required authorization
prior to issuance.
An outage coordinator placed
several
pump
clearances
in the work control senior reactor operator's
basket for review and
authorization.
One of the clearances
required plant conditions to be at half-
pipe,
whereas
actual
plant condition was approximately
50 percent pressurizer
level.
The licensee
defined half-pipe
as
a midloop condition with the core
offloaded.
The work control senior reactor operator
performed
an abbreviated
review of, the clearances
and authorized
implementation.
The work control
senior reactor operator indicated
he recognized
the
scope of the work on the
pump clearance,
but did not consider
the clearance
scope in
I
conjunction with the plant conditions present
at that time.
The licensee
reinforced the procedure
requirement of 40DP-90P29,
"Clearance
Generation,"
which requires that special
instructions
be placed
on the
clearance
cover sheet that explain the required plant conditions to hang the
clearance.
The licensee
reviewed all the clearances
and
added
special
instructions to the clearances
when necessary.
The licensee initiated
a
clearance
process
review as
a result of this
and previous clearance
problems.
In addition, the licensee
planned to ensure that sufficient additional
work
control
manpower is available'uring
periods of increased
outage activity.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee
evaluation,
discussed
the corrective
actions with operations
management,
and concluded that the corrective actions
were appropriate.
Although the licensee failed to follow the procedure for
clearance
generation,
this licensee identified and corrected violation is
being treated
as
a non-cited violation, consistent
with Section VII of the
NRC
2.5
m ro er Valve
ineu
Durin
S stem Draindown
Unit 3
On October
17, operations
personnel
attempted to lower reactor coolant system
level
by performing
a draindown to the refueling water tank.
The operators
reviewed
a previously performed valve lineup and discovered that
a required
open valve,
was closed.
The control
room staff directed
an auxiliary
operator to reposition the valve,
and the draindown continued
as expected.
The licensee identified that
an auxiliary operator
had failed to properly
.position valve CH-495 when performing the valve lineup prior to the draindown,
and another auxiliary operator
had failed to properly perform an independent
verification that the valve was open.
During the performance of the initial
positioning
and independent verification, the 'licensee
noted that both
auxiliary operators
were in the
same
room during the valve manipulation.
The
inspector
noted that, while the licensee
procedure
does
not require phys'ical
separation
during verification activities, it recommends
physical
separation
to avoid errors.
The licensee
issued
a night order
and operations
news flash describing
the
event
and the expectations
for proper
independent
review.
The licensee
initiated
a
CRDR to evaluate
the event
and identify further corrective
actions.
The inspector concluded that the initial corrective actions
were
adequate.
The inspector will continue to monitor auxiliary operator
performance.
At the exit meeting,
the inspector
noted the weaknesses
in auxiliary operator
performance
which were identified in the previous
inspection
period
(NRC
Inspection
Report 50-528/95-16;
529/95-16;
530/95-16),
and expressed
concern
for the recent auxiliary operator
performance
problems.
Licensee
management
acknowledged
the recent operations
performance
problems,
and described
current
actions to address
human performance
errors
and weaknesses
in the
implementation of .the equipment
clearance
program.
The inspector
noted that
0
1
the licensee's
reviews in these
areas
were appropriate
and plans to assess
these
areas
in a future inspection.
This licensee
identified and corrected
violation is being treated
as
a non-cited violation, consistent
with Section
VII of the
3
MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS
(62703)
3. 1
Overs
eed Tri
s on Diesel
Generator
Durin
Testin
- Unit
2
During the month of October
1995,
the Unit 2 Train
B diesel
generator
experienced
three
non-emergency trips during operability surveillance testing.
None of the involved trips would have affected the ability of the diesel
generator
to properly function during
an actual
emergency start condition.
Electrical
maintenance
engineering
provided action plans for troubleshooting
and correcting the problems.
The inspector
observed partial troubleshooting
efforts
by the electrical
maintenance
technicians.
The inspector
concluded
that the maintenance
activities were performed appropriately
and these trips
did not impact the safety function of the diesel
generator.
3.1.1
First Trip
On October 3, the diesel
generator
experienced
a trip.
The local
panel
indicated
an "overspeed trip" alarm,
but the overspeed butterfly valve did not
shut, confirming that
an actual
overspeed trip had not occurred.
During an
actual
condition, the mechanical
governor would trip the
butter'fly valve in the turbocharger air inlet.
Operations
personnel
notified
the electrical
maintenance
engineers
and initiated
a
CRDR.
The electrical
maintenance
technician identified
a loose wire connection
in a
junction box from one of the overspeed butterfly valve limit switches.
There
are
two limit switches
on the butterfly valve which provide overspeed trip
signals
in both the emergency
and test
mode.
The loose connection
made
up the
one out of two logic signals required for a non-emergency
mode trip.
The
licensee
tightened
the wire and initiated
a work request to inspect the
junction boxes for loose connections
on the remaining diesel
generators.
The
inspection of the other junction boxes did not identify other loose wire
connections.
After a satisfactory test run, the Train
8 diesel
generator
was
returned to operable
status.
3. 1.2
Second Trip
On October
18, the diesel
generator
experienced
another indicated
trip during
a surveillance test.
The indications
were similar to the previous
overspeed trip that occurred
on October 3.
After extensive troubleshooting,
electrical
maintenance
engineers
identified
a problem with a fiber optic
receiver board.
The technicians
replaced
the fiber optic receiver
board
and
other circuitry boards
and relays.
The trip circuitry and power supplies
had
been
checked.
The limit switches
mounted
on the diesel
were checked for
continuity,
however the inside of the limit switches
could not
be tested
without taking them apart.
The diesel
generator
was tested
and returned to
0'
I
I
-10-
service.
The electrical
maintenance
engineer
suspected
that both trips could have
been
induced
by vibration since both trips occurred after the diesel
generator
had
been started
and loaded.
The trip circuitry remains
energized
at all times
and there were
no indications of a non-emergency trip while the diesel
was in
stand-by
mode.
The electrical
maintenance
department
leader,
site shift
manager,
and shift supervisor conferred
and decided to replace
the two
overspeed limit switches.
3.1.3
Third Trip
On October
21, after the replacement
of the limit switches,
the diesel
generator
was tested
and tripped at full load
on
" Incomplete
Sequence,"
another
non-emergency trip. If the diesel
engine
does
not attain the first
speed point before the timer times out,
an incomplete
sequence
is initiated
and the unit shuts
down.
The diesel
was quarantined
and electrical technicians
began troubleshooting.
An electrical
maintenance
technician identified another
bad fiber optic relay
board.
The inspector
questioned
the electrical
maintenance
engineer
about the
previous
board replacement
and whether or not this board should
have
been
replaced.
The engineer
stated that this board
was not related to the previous
maintenance
activities or the overspeed trips.
The electrical
maintenance
department
leader,
engineers,
technicians,
and the site shift manager
had
a
conference call with the inspectors
and regional
management
to discuss
the
plan of action.
The electrical
maintenance
engineer stated that
no other
malfunctions were identified,
and that the fiber optic board
was replaced
and
the diesel
generator
was satisfactorily retested.
Operations
returned the
Train
B diesel
generator
to service.
3. 1.4
Conclusions
A multi-discipline diesel
generator
task force team
was established
to
determine
the root cause of failure of the recent trips and to provide
an
assessment
of the trips
and control problems.
The team planned to assess
all
trips since
1993
and major events
relevant to the Train
B diesel
generator
for
common
mode failures
and adverse
trends.
The corrective actions will also
be
evaluated
by the
team for effectiveness.
The inspector
concluded that appropriate
actions
were being taken for the
recent trips to the diesel
and the initiation of the task force team
was noted
as
a good effort by management.
3.2
Auxiliar
Pum
Hi
h Vibrations
Unit 2
On October 23,
1995, during the performance of a surveillance test,
the Unit 2
steam driven auxiliary feedwater
pump failed to meet the acceptance
criteria
for pump bearing vibration,
and the
pump
was subsequently
declared
Mechanical
maintenance
engineers
were notified and
a
CRDR was initiated.
k
!
The mechanical
maintenance
engineer
developed
an action plan to determine the
cause of .the vibration.
The inspector
attended
meetings with mechanical
maintenance
engineers
and vibration experts
to discuss
possible
causes.
Oil
samples
were taken,
and the licensee
concluded that bearing
damage
was not the
cause.
Vibration analysts
determined that the vibration data
and maintenance
history indicated that
a coupling misalignment
may have
been the cause.
Mechanical
maintenance
technicians
removed the
pump half of the coupling
and
found that the coupling did not have
a proper interference fit with the shaft.
After the licensee
discussed
this problem with the vendor,
the licensee
determined that the coupling misalignment
would be
a contributor to outboard
bearing vibration.
The technicians
replaced
the
pump half of the coupling
with a new coupling that
had
been field balanced.
The licensee
performed
a postmaintenance
test
and collected vibration data.
The vibrations were below the action level range,
and engineering
recommended
that operations
perform the operability surveillance test.
The surveillance
test
was performed satisfactorily
and the
pump was returned to service.
An
additional test
was performed the next day for trending purposes
to ensure
that the
pump coupling replacement
had reduced
outboard bearing vibrations.
The inspector
observed
the vibration technician obtain data.
The vibration
data obtained
was within the acceptance
criteria.
The last surveillance test performed prior to the October
23 test
was
satisfactory,
however,
because
this
pump
showed
an increasing
trend in
vibrations, the decision
was
made
by mechanical
maintenance
engineering to
place the
pump
on increased
frequency testing until the next refueling outage.
The inspector
concluded that the actions
taken
were appropriate
and will
continue to assess
the licensee's
evaluations of pump performance.
3.3
Other Maintenance
Observations
The inspectors
observed
the following maintenance
activities
and determined
that they were performed acceptably:
~
Charging
Pump
"A" Drain Line Cleaning
Unit 3
~
Ground Fault Relay Replacement
on LPSI Injection Valve - Unit 2
4
SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATION
(61726)
The inspectors
observed
the following surveillance activities
and determined
that they were performed acceptably:
~
Reactor Protection
System Functional Matrix Testing
Unit I
Integrated
Safeguards
Testing
Unit, 3
~
Battery Charger
18 Month Load Test
Unit 3
-12-
5
ONS ITE ENGINEERING '(37551)
5.1
Hi
h Pressure
Safet
In'ection
Pum
Relief Valve Lifted Durin
Surveillance
Unit
2
On October
18, during
a surveillance test of the train
B high pressure
safety
injection pump, relief valve
PSV409 lifted.
The
name plate rating of PSV409
was
10 gpm.
The onshift crew noted that the relief fully opened
and
calculated
the leakage
at
15 gpm.
The high pressure
safety injection
pump
passed
the surveillance test
acceptance
criteria of pump response
time,
differential pressure,
pump vibration,
and miniflow flow rate.
The onshift
crew performed
and concluded that the
pump was
The licensee initiated
a
CROR to further evaluate
the problem.
On October 20, maintenance
engineering
received
the
CROR and questioned
the
operability of the system to meet Technical Specification Surveillance
Requirement 4.5.2.e.4,
due to the relief valve lifting early.
The
surveillance
requirement
stated,
in part, that all emergency
core cooling
system piping outside of containment
have
a total leakage
less
than
one
gpm
when pressurized
to 40 psi:
The train
B high pressure
safety injection
pump
had
a leakage of greater
than
10
gpm at
1877 psi.
The licensee
replaced
the
relief valve and initiated the evaluation of the cause of failure.
The
inspector
concluded that the maintenance
engineer
displayed
a good knowledge
of Technical Specifications
and
a strong questioning attitude.
The licensee
tested
the relief valve to determine
the actual relief setpoint.
The relief valve lifted at
a pressure
of 2053 psi, with a required setpoint of
2050 psi.
The licensee
planned to continue to evaluate
the events
and plant
conditions that caused
the initial failure mechanism of the relief valve since
the
pop test
was not conclusive.
The inspector discussed
the Octob'er
18 high pressure
safety injection pump
operability determination with the site shift manager.
The inspector
concluded that the assumption
used
by operations
personnel
that the relief
valve would be seated
at 40 psi
was appropriate.
The inspector will continue
to monitor engineering's
evaluation of the relief valve-failure
as part of
future routine inspection.
6
REFUELING ACTIVITIES
(60705
AND 60710)
6. 1
Mis ositioned
Fuel
Assembl
in
S ent Fuel
Pool - Unit 3
On October 22, the licensee
mispositioned
a fuel assembly
in the spent fuel
pool.
The licensee
moved the fuel assembly
to the correct location
upon
discovery of the error.
The inspector
noted that the cause of the event
was
that the reactor engineer,
located
in the control
room, directed
the spent
fuel handling machine operator to place the fuel assembly into the wrong
location.
The inspector
noted that the safety significance of mispositioning
,the fuel assembly
was minimal
due to the high boron concentration
of the spent
fuel pool.
)
'
-13-
The licensee
corrected
.the immediate
concern of the mispositioned
fuel
assembly,
however,
the inspector
expressed
concern that operators
continued to
move fuel for approximately
two hours before suspending
fuel movement to
evaluate
the event
and to take action to prevent reoccurrence.
In addition,
operators relied
upon verbal direction from the reactor engineer to the spent
fuel handling machine operator
on placement of the fuel assembly.
The spent
fuel handling machine operator did not have
an independent
tracking sheet to
verify proper fuel location.
The licensee
briefed involved refueling personnel
to describe
the event
and
corrective actions.
The licensee
placed
a tracking sheet
on the spent fuel
handling machine to provide
an independent verification of the fuel assembly
placement.
The licensee
issued
a night order. describing the event
and
initial corrective actions
and initiated
a
CRDR to evaluate further corrective
actions.
The inspector
concluded that after the licensee
suspended
fuel
movement,
the corrective actions
were appropriate.
At the exit meeting,
the inspector
addressed
the concern that refueling
personnel
appeared
to be insensitive to reactivity management
problems,
and
that by not having
a tracking method for the fuel assemblies
on the spent fuel
handling machine
they lacked defense
in depth.
Licensee
management
acknowledged
the inspectors
concerns.
This licensee identified and corrected
violation is being treated
as
a non-cited violation, consistent
with Section
VII of the
The inspector
noted that operators
on the refueling machine
were knowledgeable.
about the equipment
and displayed
good verification of the required
coordinates
set in the machine to retrieve the next assembly.
The limited
senior reactor operator displayed appropriate
knowledge of the
abnormal
operating
procedure for loss of refueling pool level.
The inspector
noted
adequate
foreign material
exclusion controls'he
inspector
concluded that
the performance of refueling machine
personnel
was good.
t
6.2
Observation of Core Offload
Unit 3
On October
21, the inspector
observed
portions of core offload activities from
the control
room and the refueling machine inside containment.
The inspector
noted that in the control
room,
personnel
demonstrated
good communications
and
professionalism.*
V
i
I'
1
ATTACHMENT 1
1
PERSONS
CONTACTED
l. 1
Arizona Public Service
Com
an
- J. Bailey, Vice President,
Nuclear Engineering
- S. Burns,
Department
Leader,
Design Engineering
- I. Chavez,
Section
Leader,
Instrument
and Controls Maintenance
- P. Crawley, Director, Nuclear Fuels
Management
- B. Dayyo, Senior Representative,
Strategic
Communications
- R. Flood,
Department
Leader,
System Engineering
- R. Hazelwood,
Engineer,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- H. Hodge,
Department
Leader,
Nuclear Engineering
- W. Ide, Director, Operations
- K. Jones,
Section
Leader,
Maintenance
Services
- A. Krainik, Department
Leader,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J.
Levine, Vice President,
Nuclear Production
- R. Lucero,
Department
Leader,
Electrical
Maintenance
- D. Hauldin, Director, Maintenance
- G. Overbeck,
Vice President,
Nuclear Support
- C. Seaman,
Director, Nuclear Assurance
- B. Thiele, Section
Leader,
Nuclear Fuels
Hanagement
- H. Winsor, Section
Leader,
Mechanical
Maintenance
Engineering
1.2
NRC Personnel
- R. Huey, Chief, Region
IV Reactor Projects
Branch
F
- D. Garcia,
Resident
Inspector
- J. Kramer,
Resident
Inspector
1.3
Others
- F. Gowers, Site Representative,
El
Paso Electric
- R. Henry, Site Representative,
Salt River Project
- Denotes those present
at the exit interview meeting held
on November 3,
1995.
The inspector also held discussions
with and observed
the actions of other
members of the licensee's
staff during the course of the inspection.
2
EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting
was conducted
on November 3,
1995.
During this meeting,
the
inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the report.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspection findings documented
in this report.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any information provided to, or reviewed by,
the inspectors.
l
J
,I
'
-15-
ATTACHNENT 2
=
CRDR
LIST OF ACRONYHS
core operating limits supervisory
system
condition 'report/disposition
request