ML17311B118
| ML17311B118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1995 |
| From: | Krainik A ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 102-03449-AKK-S, 102-3449-AKK-S, NUDOCS 9508220331 | |
| Download: ML17311B118 (19) | |
Text
PRIOR1TY j.
t (ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9508220331 DOC.DATE: 95/08/16 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 P
STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION R
KRAINIK,A.K.
Arizona Public Service Co.
(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards errata pages correcting error discovered in supporting CEOG repts CE NPSD-994,CE NPSD 005
& CE NPSD-996 included w/950613 proposed amend to TS to extend allowed action times for SITs,LPSI components
& EDGs.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: OR Submittal:
General Distribution NOTES:STANDARDIZED PLANT Standardized plant.
Standardized plant.
05000528 05000529 05000530 Y
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 LA HOLIAN, B THOMAS,C INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT EXTERNAL: NOAC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
1 6
6 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD TRAN,L LE C
1 NIBS//RCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1,
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 D
N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!
CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL
- DESK, ROOM OWFN 5DS (415-2083)
TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 20 ENCL 19
Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034
~
PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555-0001 102-03449-AKK/SAB/GAM August 16, 1995
Reference:
Letter No. 102-03392, dated June 13, 1995, from W. L.
Stewart, Executive Vice President - Nuclear, APS, to NRC, "Proposed Amendment to Techriical Specification Sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.7.11, 3/4.8.1.1, and Bases"
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-528/629/530 Supplement to Proposed Amendment to Technical Specification Sections 3.5.1, 3.6.2, 3.7.11, 3/4.8.1.1, and Bases Arizona Public Service Company submitted a proposed amendment to PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specifications (TS) Sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.7.11, 3/4.8.1.1, and Bases (referenced above) to extend the allowed action times for safety injection tanks (SIT), low pressure safety injection (LPSI) components, and emergency diesel generators (EDG).
The submittal
- included, as supporting documents in the enclosures, Combustion Engineering Owners Group (GEOG) Reports CE NPSD-994 (SIT Joint Applications Report), CE NPSD-995 (LPSI Joint Applications Report), and CE NPSD-996 (EDG Joint Applications Report.
The TS amendment request is part of a collaborative effort of participating GEOG members.
Since the referenced TS amendment request was submitted, a number of typographical and transcription errors were discovered in each of the supporting GEOG reports.
Enclosed with this letter are errata pages that correct these errors and also clarify the use of a specific methodology used by a participant in this joint effort (not PVNGS). The errata pages should be inserted into the front of each associated report.
These corrections do not affect the conclusions of the No SigniTicant Hazards Consideration Determination nor any other sections of the referenced letter.
cy goo 63 950822033i 9508l6
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Supplement to Proposed Amendment to TS Page 2 Should you have any questions, please call Scott A. Bauer at (602) 393-5978.
Sincerely, Angela K. Krainik, Department Leader Nuclear Regulatory Affairs AKK/SAB/GAM/rv
Enclosure:
Errata Pages For GEOG Joint Applications Reports cc:
L. J. Callan K. E. Perkins B. E. Holian K. E. Johnston A. V. Godwin (ARRA)
ENCLOSURE ERRATA PAGES FOR GEOG JOINT APPLICATIONS REPORTS
I
Errata SIT Joint Applications Report, CE NPSD-994 6/29/95 Page 14, 6.3.2 Assessment oJ'At Power" Risk, Methodology: first paragraph:
after the second sentence ("The evaluation ofthe "at power" risk increment resulting from the extended SIT AOT was evaluated on a plant specific basis using the most current individual plant's Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) model.") the following sentence should have been inserted which reads:
I For consistency in comparison of results, Core Damage Frequencies (CDFs) presented represent internal events only, excluding internal floods.
Page 15, A paragraph should have been inserted at the end of the Methodology subsection and prior to the Calculation of Conditional CDF, Single and Yearly AOT Risk Contribun'ons suusection that reads:
The methodology used to calculate the above risk measures is presented below.
For plants with PSAs that were quantified using RISKMANmethodology, equivalent steps were taken to meet the intent of the ma'hodology presented below.
Page 25, Section 6.5.1, First Sentence:
should not include the words "non-risk related".
Sentence should read:
Section 7.4 of NUREG-1366 (Reference
- 1) provides the following justification for a specific AOT extension from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
~.
Page 28, Section 9.1, First paragraph, should not include sentences 2 through 4.
Paragraph should read:
The PSA results from each ofthe CE PWRs show that the increment in risk at power due to one inoperable SIT is small for all plants.
The major contributor to the differences i.i plant results for the SITs is the success criteria and frequency of a Large LOCA assumed in the PSA model.
The results indicate that there is a lower risk to the plant by remaining at power to perform corrective maintenance than to shut down the plant to repair the inoperable SIT.
Therefore, it is concluded that extending the AOT for one inoperable SIT from 1 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> would be risk beneficial.
Page 18, Table 6.3.2-1: The numerical values for "Increase in CDF, per year," for St. Lucie 1
and St. Lucie 2, should have been 2.0E-04 rather than 2.2E-04.
i'
Errata LPSI Joint Applications Report, CE NPSD-995 6/29/95 Page 1, Section 2.0, last sentence should read:
For the purposes of this report a LPSI train is defined as one pump, and associated flow paths and valves.
Page 5, Shutdown Cooling System, last paragraph, last sentence should read:
For most CE PWRs, the containment spray pump can be used in place of an inoperable LPSI pump for the function of shutdown cooling.
Page 12, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SG.P) Events, last paragraph, last sentence should read:
Most CE PWRs also have the ability to realign the containment spray pumps to provide RCS shutdown cooling capability.
Page 16, 6.3.2 Assessment of "AtPower" Risk, Methodology: first paragraph: after the second sentence ("The evaluation of the "at power" risk increment resulting from the extended LPSI System AOT was evaluated on a plant specific basis using the most current individual plant's Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) model for their respective baselines.")the following sentence should have been inserted which reads:
For consistency in comparison of results, Core Damage Frequencies (CDFs) presented represent internal events only, excluding internal floods.
Page 18, A paragraph should have been inserted at the end of the Methodology subsection and prior to the Calculation of Conditional CDF, Single and Yearly AOT Risk Contributions subsection that reads:
The methodology used to calculate the above risk measures is presented below.
For plants with PSAs that were quantified using RISKMANmethodology, equivalent steps were taken to meet the intent of the methodology presented below.
1 I
Changes to EDG Joint Applications Report~
CG hJPSD" 99f pa~
5'rvt'9 5 l.
Page 18, 6'.3.2 Assessment of "AtPower'isk, Methodology: first paragraph:
after the second sentence ("The evaluation ofthe "at power" risk increment resulting from the extended EDG AOT was evaluated on a plant specific basis using the most current individual plant's Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) model for their respective baselines.") the following sentence should have been inserted which reads:
For consistency in comparison of results, Core Damage Frequencies (CDFs) presented represent internal events only, excluding internal floods.
2.
Page 19, Increase in Core Damage Frequency definition: The terms "always available", and "perfect" should be "not out for Test or Maintenance (T/M)". Definition should read:
Increase in Core Damage Frequency (ICBM The increase in CDF represents the difference between the CCDF evaluated for one train of equipment ~nv Liii~l minus the CCDF evaluated foronetrainofequipmentn u f r rmain nance
/
. For theEDGs:
hCDF = Conditional CD'nc,
~<,> - Conditional CDF<~~~, >>ii 3.
where CDF = Core Damage Frequency (per year)
I Page 19, A paragraph should have been inserted at the end of the Methodology subsection and prior to the Calculation ofConditional CDF, Single and YearlyAOTRisk Contributions subsection that reads:
The methodology used to calculate the above risk measures.
is presented below.
For plants with PSAs that were quantified using RISKMANmethodology, equivalent steps were taken to meet the intent of the methodology presented below.
4 Page 20: Second to the last paragraph, first sentence:
The word "never" should have been "not".
The sentence should read: The Conditional CDF giyen 1 EDG is not out for test or maintenance was obtained by setting the basic event probability for the failure mode for an EDG equal to 0.0, and requantifying the PSA cutsets.
5.
Page 23, Last Paragraph, fifth line, the baseline CDF value should be 1.54E-05 per year rather than 1.54E-06 per year.
6.
7.
Pages 24 - 26, Tables 6.3.2-1 through 6.3.2-3 should be replaced by attached pages.
This corrects a numerical value (Table 6.3.2-1, page 24, Waterford 3 Single AOT Risk, Proposed, 10 day should be 3.86E46 rather than 1.55E-06) as well as typographical errors.
Page 26, Last footnote should refer to page 23 not page 25.
8.
Page 31, Results, first sentence:
" Table 6.3.5-1" should be "Table'6.3.4.1-1".
9.
Page 32, "AtPower" Risk Assessm'ent, Last Paragraph, first sentence:
"Table 6.3.4-1" should be "Table 6.3.4.2-1".
10.
Page 33, Shutdown Risk Assessment, Last Sentence: "Table 6.3.4-2" should be "Table 6.3.4.2-2".
Page 35, First Paragraph, first sentence:
"Table 6.3.4-2" should be "Table 6.3.4.2-2".
Table 6.3.2-1 CEOG AOT CONDITIONALCDF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EDGs - Corrective Maintenance PARAMETER EDG Success Criteria Present AOT, days Proposed AOT, days ANO-2 1of2 7/10 Fort Calhoun 1of2 7/10 Maine Yankee 1 of2 7/10 Millstone 2
1 of2 7/10 Palisades 1of2 7/10 Palo Verde 1,2, &3 1of2 7/10 San Onofre 2&3 1 of2 7//to St. Lucie 1
1of2 7/10 St. Lucie 2
1 of2 7/10 Waterford 3
1 of2 7/10 Conditional CDF, per yr (1 EDG unavailable)
Conditional CDF, per yr (1 EDG not out for T/M)
Increase in CDF, per yr Single AOT Risk, Current 1.26E44 3.27E45 9.30E45 7.65E47 5.2&E45 1.15E-04 9.43E45 1.17E45 7.36E45 3.24E45 4.11E-05 4.14E45 6.19E45 7.&&E47 7.94E-07 5.09E47 1.64E44 5.00E45 1.14E44 2.19E46 2.43E44 5.92E45 5.9E45 4.58E45 2.69E45 2.1E45 1.97E44 3.23E45 3.8E45 1.62E46 2.65E47 3.1E47 6.3E-05 2.3E45 4.0E45 3.3E47 1.56E44 1.50E45 1.41E44
- 1. 16E46
'.;.Single".'AOT,:Risk;::,::::;,::.~$:::":.,7;,'day","-',"; '.:.';i'.:78E46
'":;.:2 55E46::
- -:.:7 88E47,
,"'i";:i3E46:,.
t'.70E;06;.;:
7 94E47.;'.i,:::,'".'19E4'6'".'-;:
..'".;2 19E46'i":,:
3.'12E46':.
3;7&E46".5;40E46,
- 6'19E47:;:
- ".:,';'85EOT,,
- i,'
- 7.'3847!.-", :::::~7.,7847)',-
';:;I';:1846'i:
,:2;70E46',;.;
- ,"
- >".,'3.;.:86E4'6 Downtime Frequency, per yr per diesel>>
0.63 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.8 0.63 2.5 2.5 2.5 Yearly AOT Risk, Cumnt, per yr/diesel>>>>
Yearly AOT Risk, Proposed, per yr/diesel>>>>
Actual Duration, hrs/event>>>>>>
Single AOT Risk (based on actual duration)
Yearly AOT Risk/yr/diesel' (based on actual duration)
>> Generic data =
per yr per diesel
>>'Value presented for worst case diesel
'>>>> Generic data = 24 hrs/event 4.78E47 1.12E46 15 1.61E47 1.97E46 1.98E46 1.27E-06 1.97E46 1.98E46
.2.97E-06 24 1.13E47 1.13E47 1.70E-07 2.82E47 2.84E-07 4.24E47 4.37E46 4.37E46 3.12E47 2.92E-06 1.66E47 7.8E-07 6.81E-06 3.87E47 1.8E46 23.8 5.40E47 8.78E48 1.0E47 9.72E47 5A&E48 2.6E47 8.2E47 1.9E46 1.1E47 2.7E47 2.90E46 6.76E46 24 3.86E47 9.66E47
=- Table 6.3.2-2 CEOG AOT CONDITIONALCDF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EDGs - Preventive Maintenance C
PARAMETER EDG Success Criteria Present AOT, days Proposed AOT, days ANO-2 1 of2 7/10 Fort Calhoun I of2 7/10 Maine Yankee I of2 7/10 Millstone 2
I of2 7/10 Palisades 1of2 7/10 Palo Verde 1,2,&3 I of2 7/10 San Onofre 2&3 1of2 7/10 St. Lucie I
1 of2 7/10 St. Lucie 2
1 of2 7/10 Waterford 3 I 1 of2 7/10 Conditional CDF, per yr (I EDG unavailable)
Conditional CDF, per yr (I EDG not out for T/M) 1.01E44 3.71E-05 3.27E45 1.17E-05 1.13E44 7.36E45 8.58FA5 1.57844 1.72E44 3.24E45 5.00E45 4.58FA5 5.41E45 2.69E45 4.1E45 4.7E45 6.76845 2.1E45 2.3E45 1.50E45 Increase in CDF, per yr Single AOT Risk, Current
- ,".",::~::.:.'".,";Single,'A'OT-'Rjsk,:":::::;::,"<p",:.';:;;.".7.dayj.::>~',,;:.-".j 6.86E45 2.54E45 5.64E47 4.87E47 NX':>>>>).y
<<51'i32FA65 g'4:87PAP>
~ t%
~
",:1';88FA6".."','i'6,'96847,"":.
3.94FA5 7.56E47
~%'..;S 5.",SP;r~<:j~
jg.'568474 OI',08FA6;:;:.,,:
"k""'.<"'.a'v"'. ',.1~46846,"..
gj.p~
',;3';468"9'6:;;:
j2,i93846R 5.34FA5 1.07E44 1.26E44 4.39E47 2.05E46 1.04E46
~I':,02846"-'-2,05846$
"',"2:42FA6":
2.72E45 2.24FA7
- .:;"::,5,22FA7.;.;
'-.;;::,7 45847!-:.:.
2.0FA5 2.4FA5 5.26E45 1.6E47 2.0E47 4.32E-07 Sy"+::.:. 0:g
.""..018'46::;-:
- "
- 3'.8FA7
- .
- "'.::,::.;;:.4 6847,
- .6;6847.-"."..
.;"'::;:;S!4FA7,,""":.':
- ":-.'..1'44846'--:
Downtime Frequency, per yr>>
Yearly AOT Risk, Current, per yr/diesel>>>>
2.0 2.8 1.13E-06 1.36FA6 2.8 2.12E46 2.8 40 3.0 1.23E46 8.21E46 3.11E46 2.79E47 2.8 2.8 2.8 4.6E47 5.5E47 1.21E46 Yearly AOT Risk, Proposed, per yr/diesel'>>
2.63E46 1.36E46 2.12E46 2.87846 8.21E46 7.26E46 6.52E47 1.1846 1.3E46 2.82846 Proposed Downtime hrs/train/yr>>>>>>
Actual Duration hrs/event"'>>
96 57 175 63 51 48 53 114.75 240 86 240 86 140 50, Single AOT Risk (based on actual duration)
Yearly AOT Risk/yr/diesel>>>>
(based on actual duration) 7.52E47 1.66E47 1.50846 4.64E47 2.81E47 3.14E47 5.86E47 7.68E47 8.78E47 2.35E46 2.31E-6 2.85E47 3.568-07 2.0E47 2.4E47 3.00E47 5.5FA7 6.6E47 8.41E47
>> Generic data = 2.8 per yr per diesel
>>>>Values presented are for worst case diesel
>>>>>> Duration (hrs/event) = Proposed Downtime (hrs/yr)/Frequency (events/yr)
>>>>>>>> Generic data = 220 hrs/yr/diesel 25
Table 6.3.2-3 CEOG PROPOSED AVERAGE CDFs PARAMETER EDG Success Criteria Present AOT, days-ANO-2 1 of2 Fort Calhoun 1of2 Maine Yankee 1 of2 Millstone 2
1 of2 Palisades 1of2 Palo Verde 1,2, &,3 I of2 San Onofre 2&3 1 of2 St. Lucie 1
1 of2 St. Lucie 2
I of2 Waterford 3
I of2 Proposed AOT, days 7/10 7/10 7/10 7/10 7/10 7/10
'/10 7/10 7/10 7/10 Proposed Downtime, hrs/yr 219 220 235 168 220 220 264 Average CDF (base), per yr Proposed Average CDF 3.28E45 3.50E45" 1.18E-05 7.40E45 3.41E-05 1.27E45" 7.45E45 3.50E45 5.15E45 5.28E45 4 74E45 2 74E45 2 14E45 4.85E45 2.86E45 2.2E45 2.35E45 2.4E45 1.54E45 1.75E45 Change factor from baseline CDF 1.07"'1.05) 1.08"'1.02) 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 I 14444k (1.078)
~ Generic data ~ 220 hrs/yr/diesel
~~ The proposed Average CDF presented here is based on using the full AOT whereas the baseline IPE Average CDF was based on actual plant data which had very little PM on line (see Table 5.2-1).
~~~ The Numbers in parenthesis represent
% change from baseline IPE ifthe baseline IPE was evaluated over the full AOT.
~'~~ See page 25 for discussion of results