ML17310B356
| ML17310B356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1994 |
| From: | Quay T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17310B357 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9406170264 | |
| Download: ML17310B356 (34) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMIVIISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 2055~001 ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ET AL.
DOCKET NO.
STN 50-528 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NO.
1 MENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.
77 License No.= NPF-41 2.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric
- Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated February 18,
- 1994, as supplemented by letter dated May 16,
- 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will.operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities-authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. 'NPF-41 is hereby amended to read as. follows:
94061702h4 940h07 PDR ADOCK 05000528, P
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)Qi IO
3.
(2) Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 77, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
This license amendment is effective as.of the date of issuance and must be fully implemented prior to startup from the next refueling outage.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-cg Theodore R.
quay,, Director Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
,Specifications Date of Issuance:
June 7,
1994
4l 1
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO.
77 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-41 DOCKET NO.
STN 50-528 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove 3/4 1-5 3/4 2-8 B 3/4 1-la Insert 3/4 1-5 3/4 2-8 B 3/4 1-la
0 a
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3. 1. 1.4 The Reactor Coolant 'System lowest operating loop temperature (T~)
shall be greater than or.equal to 545'F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 2¹.
ACTION:
With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature
'(T~) less than 545'F, 'restore T~, to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANOBY within the, next 15 minutes.
SURVEI L'LANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1. 1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T~) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 545'F:
a.
Within 15 minutes prior to.achieving reactor criticality, and b.
At least once per 30 minutes when the-reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System T~ is less than 552'f.
¹With K, greater
.than or equal to,1.0.
PALO VERDE UNIT 1 3/4 1-5
'AMENDMENT NO.~~ 77
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4. l. 2 BORATION SYSTEHS FLOW PATHS -
SHUTDOWN LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERA'TION 3.1.2.1 As-a minimum, one of the following boron injection, flow,paths st~all be OPERABLE:
a.
If only the spent fuel pool in Specification 3.1.2.5a.
is OP'ERABLE, a flow path from the spent fuel'o'ol 'via a gliavity feed conn'ection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant, System.
b.
If only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2'.Sb.
is OPERABLE, a flow path from the refueling water tar>k via either a charging
- pump, a h'igh pressure safety injection primp, oc a low pres-sure, safety infection pump to the Reactor Coolant, System.
APPLICABILITY:
HODES 5 and 6.
ACTION:
With none of the aboiie flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or tiositive reactivity changes.
SURVEILLANCE REt UIREHENTS
- 4. 1.2. 1 At lea. t one of the above requirhd tldw pat'hs shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by,verifyIin) that'ach valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic), in the flow'path 'that 'is'no'0, locked, sealed,.
or otherwise secured in position, is in its correCt position.
PALO VERDE - UNIT'1 3/4.1-6 AHENDHENT NO B9
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIHITS I
3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3. 2. 6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature (T ) shall be.within the Area of Acceptable Operation shown in Figure 3.2-1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1" and 2"t.
ACTION:
With the reactor coolant cold leg temperature exceeding its limit, restore the temperature to within its, limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or'be in HOT 'STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
"See Special Test.Exception '3.10.4'.
NWith K ff greater than or equal to 1 eff PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 2-7 AMENDMENT NO. 27, 69 I
0 REACTOR COOLANTCOI D LEG 'll'EMPlERATltlREvs. CORE-POWER LEVEL
,580 l
l V
t t
V T
575 570 565 560 555 C) p 550"
///~//i////i//i///i//48/
z//P'P///F'F'z/z/
/:,A,REA OF A(:OEPTAELEOPERATION
//////////~~/yfP//
/'g//////////////////////////
Ey68 552 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 I
105 CORE POWER LEVEL,% OF FIATED TIQERMIALPOWER FIGURE 3;2-1
-REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPlERATURE vs. CORE POVifER.LEVEL',
'PALO VERDE
, UNKNIT I 3/4 2 8 AIIIENDMENT NG.~ ""
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 1. 1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4. 1. 1.1 and 3 4. 1. 1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND K,
The function of SHUTDOWN MARGIN is to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical following a design basis accident or anticipated operational occurrence.
The function of K~, is to maintain sufficient subcriticality to preclude inadvertent criticality following ejection of a single control element assembly (CEA).
During operation in MODES 1 and 2, with k, greater than or equal to 1.0, the transient insertion limits of Specification 3. 1.3.6 ensure that sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN is available.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN is the amount by which the core is subcritical, or would be subcritical immediately following a reactor trip, considering a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth CEA failing to insert.
Q, is a measure of the core's reactivity, considering a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth inserted CEA being ejected.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout the core life as a function of fuel depletion and reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature (T~).
The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T~ at no-load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and the resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.
In the analysis of this
- accident, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to control the reactivity transient and ensure that the fuel performance and offsite dose criteria are satisfied.
As (initial) T~ decreases, the potential RCS cooldown and the resulting reactivity transient are less severe an'd, therefore, the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN also decreases.
Below T~ of about 210 F, the inadvertent deboration event becomes limiting with respect to the SHUTDOWN MARGIN require-ments.
Below 210'F, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that sufficient time for operator actions exists between the initial indication of the deboration and the total loss of shutdown margin.
Accordingly, with at least one CEA partially or fully withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are based upon these limiting conditions.
Additional events.considered in establishing requirements on SHUTDOWN MARGIN that are not limiting with respect to the Specification limits are single CEA withdrawal and startup of an inactive reactor coolant pump.
K~, requirements vary with the amount of positive reactivity that would be introduced assuming the CEA with the highest inserted worth ejects from the core.
In the, analysis of the CEA ejection event, the K, requirement ensures that the radially averaged enthalpy acceptance criterion is satisfied, considering power redistribution effects.
Above T~ of 500'F, Doppler reactivity feedback is sufficient to preclude the need for a specific K~,
requirement.
With all CEAs fully inserted, K, and SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are equivalent in terms of minimum acceptable core boron concentration.
PALO VERDE UNIT 1 8'/4 1-1 AMENDMENT NO.
23
REACTIVITY CONTFlOL SY'STEMS 0
BASES SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND K~,
(continued)
Other technical specifications, that r'efe'rehce the Specifications on SHUT-DOWN MARGIN or K,, are: 3/4.1.2,,
BORATION,SYSTEMS,, 3/4.1.3, MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES, 3/4m 9.1, REFUELIhlG l3PERATiIONS-,BORON, CONCENTRATION, 3/4m 10. l.,
SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND K~, CEA WORTH lESTS,'r')d 3/4.10.9, SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND Krw, CEDHS TESTING 3/4. 1. 1. 3 MODEFNTOR TEMPERATURI= COEFFICIENT 'TC
'he limitations on moderato'r teiliperatiure cbefficient (HTC) are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in 'the accident and transient analysis remain valid, through each fuel cycle..
The surveillance requirements for-measurement of the HTC during each
-1t'uel cyc'le are adequate to confirm the HTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principallly tai the reduction in RCS bbron concentration associated with 'fuel burnup.
'The confirmation that the Nea5uIed'TC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coefficient wi'll be maintained within acceptable va'lues throughout each fuel cycle.
3/4.1.'l.'4 MINIMUM TEMPERA'TURE 1=OR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that. the neactob will riot be made criticai with the Reactor Coolant System cauld leg temperature less than 545 F.
This limita-tion is required 'to ensure (1) 'the moderator -tecum'perature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature'range, (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range,
)'3) a minimum Itethperaturh i' 'proVided'or Special Test Exception 3/4.1O.4and (4) the reactorive~ssel is above its minimLlm IRTNpy temperature.
- PALO'VERDE 'NIT 1
'B:3/4 I-la AMENDMENT NO.i~77
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0WI ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ET AL.
DOCKET NO.
STN 50-529 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NO.
2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.
63 License No.
NPF-51 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric
- Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Publ.ic Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated February 18,
- 1994, as supplemented by letter dated May 16,
- 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Part I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity, with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules,and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public,, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is. in-accordance with 10 CFR Part'1
'of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have.
been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-51 is hereby amended to read as fol-lows:
l~
0 I
C.
3.
(2) Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Pla'n The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 63,.and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
This license amendment is effective as of. the date of issuance and must be fully implemented prior to startup from the next refueling outage.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
June 7,
1994 Theodore R. quay, Director Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects II'I/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor, Regulation
Cl I
~
MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3. 1. 1.4
'The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T~)
shall be greater than or equal to 545 F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 28.,
ACTION:
With a 'Reactor Coolant System. operating loop temperature (T~) less than
.545'F, restore T
~ to within -its. limit.within 15"minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T~),shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 545'F:
a.
Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and b.
.At least once.per 30 minutes when the. reactor is.critical and the Reactor Coolant System T~ is less than 552'F.
With K,greater than, or equal to 1.0.
PALO VERDE UNIT 2 3/4 1-5 AMENDMENT N0..-39-, ~3
3/4. 1. 2 BORATION 3+Yfll3 FLOW PATHS -
SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERA1'ION 3.1.2.1
.As a minimum, one of the following bor'on'injection flow paths'sh'all be OPERABLE:
a.
If onlly the spent fuel pool in Speciflication. 3.1.2.5a.
is.OPERABLE, a flow pathl from the spent fuel pool via a gravity feed conndct$ oh and a charging pump to the Reactor'o'olant System.
- b. 'If onl'y 'the refueling water tank in Slpecification 3.1.2.5b.
is
'PERABLE, a flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pumpa high pressure safety injection pump, or a low pres-sure safety it)jection pump to thie Rea'ctor Coolant System.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6i.
ACTION:
With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations invOlving CORE ALTERATIONS o>r positive reactivity changes.
4.1.2.'1 At least one of the above required f'low paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31, days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow 'path'that is not lockedB sealedi, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
PALO VERDE.- UNIT 2 3/4 1-6 AMENDMENT NO. 55
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 1;1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4. 1. 1. 1 and 3/4. 1. 1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN and K,
The function of SHUTDOWN MARGIN is to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical following a design basis accident or.anticipated operational occur-rence.
The function of K~, is to maintain sufficient subcriticality to pre-clude inadvertent criticality following ejection of a single control element assembly (CEA).
During operation in MODES 1 and 2, with k, greater than or equal to 1.0, the transient insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6 ensure that sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN is available.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN is the amount by which the core is subcritical, or would be subcritical immediately following a reactor trip, considering a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth CEA failing to insert.
Q, is a measure of the core's reactivity, considering a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth inserted CEA being ejected.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout the core life as a func-tion of fuel depletion and reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature (T~~).
The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T~ at no-load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and the resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.
In the analysis of this
- accident, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to control the reactivity transient and ensure that the fuel performance and offsite dose criteria are satisfied.
As (initial) T~ decreases, the potential RCS cooldown and the resulting reactivity transient are less severe and, therefore, the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN also decreases.
Below T~ of about 210'F, the inadvertent deboration event becomes limiting with respect to the SHUTDOWN MARGIN require-ments.
Below 210'F, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that sufficient time
. for operator actions exists between the initial indication of the deboration and the total loss of shutdown margin.
Accordingly, with at least one CEA partially or fully withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are based upon these limiting-conditions.
Additional events considered in establishing requirements on SHUTDOWN MARGIN that are not limiting with respect to the Specification limits are single CEA withdrawal and startup of an inactive reactor coolant pump.
K~, requirements vary with the amount of positive reactivity that would be introduced assuming the CEA with the highest inserted worth ejects from the core.
In the analysis of the CEA ejection event, the K~, requirement ensures that the radially averaged enthalpy acceptance criterion is satisfied, considering power redistribution effects.
Above T~ of 500 F, Doppler reactivity feedback is sufficient to preclude the need for a specific K~,
requirement.
With all CEAs fully inserted, K, and SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are equivalent'in terms of minimum acceptable core boron concentration.
PALO VERDE UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-1 AMENDMENT NO.
13
0 REACTIVITY CONTFIOL SYSTEMS BASES SHUTDOWN MARGIN and K~, ~ciont,inued}
Other technical speciIFication's that reference the Specifications on SHUTDOWN 'MARGIN.or K., are:
3/4.1.2, BORATION SYSTEMS, 3/4.1.3, HOVABL'E',
CONTROL ASSEMBLIES, 3/49.1, REI.UELING,OPERATIONS-BORON CONCENTRATION, 3/4.10.1,.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND K->> CEA WORTH TESTS, and 3/4.16.9SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND 'K., CIEDMS 'TES'TING.
3/4. 1. 1.3 HODEFNTOR TEMPERATURE COEF'FICIE'NT 'TC The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are pro-vided to ensure that the assumptions used lin thle alccident and the. transient analysis remain validi through each fuel cycle., The surveil.lance requirements for measurement of the HTC during each fuel-cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value -since "this coefficient changes sloWly d0e Prihcipally to the reduction in 'RCS boron concentration, associated with fuel-burnup.
The confirmation that the measured HTC value is Withih its limit proviides assurances that the coefficient will be maintaihed within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.
3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE I=OR CRITICALIlY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant.System cold 'leg temperature less than 545 F.
This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed, temperature. range, (2) the protective instrumentation is within.its normal operating range, (3) a mlinimuln temperature is provided fori Special Test -Exception 3/4.10.4, and.(4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum 'RTNTo.temper'ature.
PALO VERDE UNIT 2 B 3/4 I'-laI AMENDMENTINDE ~63
~
~
il 0
0 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO.
63 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-51 I
DOCKET NO.
STN 50-529 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by 'amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove 3/4 1-5 B 3/4 1-la Insert 3/4 1-5 B 3/4 1-la
il 0
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0001 ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ET AL DOCKET NO.
STN 50-530 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NO.
3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 49 License No.
NPF-74 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El'Paso Electric
- Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated February 18,
- 1994, as supplemented by letter dated May 16,
- 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:
il C
'h 2'I
3.
(2) Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 49, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license'conditions.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 45 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
June 7,
1994 Theodore R. quay, Director Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
0
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO. 49 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-74 DOCKET NO.
STN 50-530 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove 3/4 1-5 3/4 2-8 B 3/4 1-la Insert 3/4 1-5 3/4 2-8 B 3/4 1-la
0
~
I I
~h C,I
'I
'I V
MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1;4 The Reactor Coolant'System lowest operating loop temperature (T~)
shall be greater than or equal to 545'F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 2¹.
ACTION:
With a Reactor Coolant System opera'ting loop temperature (T~) less than 545'F, restore T~ to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.
SURVEILLANCE 'RE UIREMENTS
- 4. 1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T~) shall 'be determined to be greater than or equal to.545'F:
a.
'Within 15 minutes prior'o achieving reactor criticality, and b.
At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and -the Reactor Coolant System T~ is less than,552'F.
¹With K, greater than or equal to 1.0.
e PALO VERDE UNIT 3
.3/4 1-5 AMENDMENT NO.~, ~4g
3/4. 1.2 BORATION SYSTEHS FLOW PATHS -
SHUTDOWN ii LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one, o'f the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
a.
If only the spent
',fuel pool in Spe'cifichtion 3.1.2.5a.
is OPERNLE, a flow path from the spent fuel pool via a gravity. feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.
.b.
If only the refuel'ing water tank ih Spedifichtion 3.1.2.5b.
is
- OPERABLE, a flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging
- pump, a h'igh pressure.safety injection'ump, or a low pres-sure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System.
APPLICABILITY:
HODES 5 and Gl.
ACTION:
.With none of the above flow paths OPLRABLE, suspend a111 operations i'nvolving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactiv'ity changes.
SURVEILLANCE REt UIREHENTS 4.1.'2. 1 At lea. t one of the above requir6d fldw paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at lea. t once per 3]L days by verifying that'ach valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic',I in the flow'path 'that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its CorreCt position.
PALO VERDE -- UNIT.3 3/4 1-6 AHENDHENT NO. 42
~,
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature (T ) shall be within the Area of Acceptable Operation shown in Figure 3.2-1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1* and 2"t.
ACTION:
With the 'reactor coolant cold leg temperature: exceeding its limit, restore the temperature to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.2.6 The reactor coolant cold 'leg temperature shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
"See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.
NWith K ff greater than or equal to '1 eff PALO VERDE - UNIT 3
- '3/4 '2-7 AMENDMENT NO. 42
~
0 REACTOR COOl&lN COLD LEG TEMPEFIATUFlE >vs. CORE POWEIR LE0EL' 5&0 575 570 D
565 560 g
555 Cl
~o 550 V
545 566
////~/gyes//i/</gay/yy~i~/////yi///////Fyp///////~i///
PSRATION >/g 55m'.
l 3
M I
1IO 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 COFlE IPOWER LE'VEL,% OF RA1 ED TIHERlVIALPOWER F)GURE 3.2-1 REACTOR COOLANITCOl D LEG TEMPER'ATURE vs+ CORE POWER LEVELS PALO VERDE UNIT"3 3/4 2-8 AMENDMENT N0.-4~49
'I 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4;1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4. 1. 1. 1 and 3/4. 1. 1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN and K,,
The function of SHUTDOWN MARGIN is to ensure that the reactor remains subcriti cal following a design basis accident or anticipated operational occur-rence.
The function of K., is to maintain sufficient subcriticality to pre-clude inadvertent criticality following ejection of a single control element assembly (CEA).
During operation in MODES 1 and 2, with k~ greater than or equal to 1.0, the transient insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6 ensure that sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN is available.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN is the amount by which the core is subcritical, or would be subcritical immediately following a reactor trip, considering a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth CEA failing to insert.
K., is a
measure of the core's reactivity, considering a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth inserted CEA being ejected.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout the core life as a func-tion of fuel depletion and reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature (T
).
The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T~ at no-load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and the resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.
In the analysis of this
- accident, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to control the reactivity transient and ensure that the fuel performance and offsite dose criteria are satisfied.
As (initial) T~ decreases, the potential RCS cooldown and the resulting reactivity transient are less severe and, therefore, the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN also decreases.
Below T~ of about 210'F, the inadvertent deboration event becomes limiting with respect to the SHUTDOWN MARGIN require-ments.
Below 210'F, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that sufficient time for operator actions exists between the initial indication of the deboration and the total loss of shutdown margin.
Accordingly, with at least one CEA partially or fully withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are based upon these limiting conditions.
Additional events considered in establishing requirements on SHUTDOWN MARGIN that are not limiting with respect to the Specification limits are single CEA withdrawal and startup of an inactive reactor coolant pump.
K., requirements vary with the amount of positive reactivity that would be introduced assuming the CEA with the highest inserted worth ejects from the core.
In the analysis of the CEA ejection event, the K, requirement ensures that the radially averaged enthalpy acceptance criterion is satisfied, considering power redistribution effects.
Above T~ of 500'F, Doppler reactivity feedback is sufficient to preclude the need for a specific K
requirement.
With all CEAs fully inserted,,+,
and SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are equivalent in terms of minimum acceptable core boron concentration.
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 B 3/4 1-1 AMENDMENT NO. 2
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 0
BASES SHUTDOWN MARGIN AhlD K~, (continued)
Other technical specifications that reference the Specifications on SHUT-DOWN MARGIN or IKN., are:
3/4.1.2, BORATIOff SYSl;EMj, 3/4.1;3, MOVABLE CONTROL
.ASSEMBLIES, 3/4.9.1, REFUELING OPERATIONS-BORON CONCENlRATION, 3/4.10.1, SHUT-DOWN MARGIN AND K., CEA WORTH TESTS, and 3/4.10.9, SflUTDOWN MARGIN AND K, CEDMS TESTING.
3/4.1.1.3, MODEIRATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT, MTC'he limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the
- a. sumptions used in the accidept and transient analysis remain valid through each fuel cycle.
The survei'llance requirements fo' measurement of the MTC durin!3 each fuel cycle aire adequate to.confirm the MTC value, since this coefficient changes slowIly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.
The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coeffi-cient will be maintaIined within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.
3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY
'his speci fication ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with.
the Reactor Coolant System, cold.leg tempe) ature less than 545 F.
This'imita-'
tion is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coeffici ent is within its analyzed temperature
- range, (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) a minimum temperature is provided for Special
'est Exception 3/4.10.4, aind (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RTN>>
temperature.
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 B 3/4 1-la
.AMENDMENT NO.-& 49