ML17308A205
| ML17308A205 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1986 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17216A453 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-86-02, 50-335-86-2, 50-389-86-01, 50-389-86-1, IEIN-85-084, IEIN-85-84, NUDOCS 8603210073 | |
| Download: ML17308A205 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1986002
Text
UNITEDSTATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
1 p,R REOIIC
<Gi'
A
Cl
P
~O ~
++*++
Report Nos.:
50-335/86-02
and 50-389/86-01
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
Docket NosrI
50-335
and 50-389
Facility Name:
St.
Lucie
1 and
2
License Nos.:
and NPF-16
Inspection
Conducted:
Januar
14
February
10,
1986
Inspectpps: &- L I
~ R.
V. Crlenjak,
Se ior Resident
Inspector
W.
C~
Qr H.
E. Bibb, Resident
Inspector
Approved by: +
~ S.
A. El rod, Secti on Chi ef
Division of Reactor Projects
Da
e Signed
4
Da
e
igned-
i~3 3a
Da e
ignedd
SVMMARY
Scope:
This
inspection
entailed
160
inspector-hours
onsite
in the
areas
of
Technical
Specification
compliance,
operator
performance,
overall
plant
operations,
quality
assurance
practices,
station
and
corporate
management
practices,
corrective
and
preventive
maintenance
activities,
site
security
procedures,
radiation control activities, surveillance activities
and Inspection
and Enforcement Information Notice (IEIN) review.
Results:
One deviation
was identified (paragraph
3).
86032i0073
86030>
ADOCK 05000335
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
K. Harris, St.
Lucie Site Vice President
D. A. Sager,
Plant Manager
- J.
H. Barrow, Operations
Superintendent
T. A. Diliard, Maintenance
Superintendent
- L. W. Pearce,
Operations
Supervisor
R. J . Frechette,
Chemi stry Supervisor
C.
G. Leppla, Instrumentation
and Control (I&C) Supervisor
P.
L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)
E. J . Wunderlich,
Reactor
Engineering
Supervisor (Acting)
H.
F. Buchanan,
Health Physics
Supervisor
G-.-Longhouse,
Security Supervisor
J.
Barrow, Fire Prevention
Coordinator
J. Scarola,
Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Electrical
C. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
N.
G.
Roos, Quality Control Supervisor
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security force members,
and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on February
7,
1986, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1 above.
The licensee did not identify
as
proprietary
any
of the
materials
provided
to
or
reviewed
by
the
inspectors
during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection
Findings
(CLOSED)
Unresol ved
Item
(UNR) 389/85-30-01
Reactor
Auxi 1 iary
Bui 1 ding
(RAB) VentilatMn
a%d Exterior Door Status.
On
November
15,
1985,
while
performing
a walkdown of the Unit 2
RAB, the inspector
noted that several
exterior doors were
open
and there existed,
through the
open
doors,
a flow
of air from inside to outside (i.e., building pressure
was positive).
The
RAB ventilation lineup is normally operated
such that air flow would be the
reverse
of that
described
above (i.e., building pressure
negative).
The
Unit 2 Final
Safety
Analysis
Report
(FSAR)
paragraphs
9.4
and
9.4.3.1
discuss
design criteria and objectives of the
RAB ventilation system.
Since
these
design criteria/objectives
could not
be
met with
RAB exterior doors
open
on
November
15,
1985,
this
UNR is closed
and is
now considered
a
deviation
from the Unit 2
FSAR,
DEV 389/86-01-01:
Improper
RAB Ventilation
and Exterior Door Status.
(CLOSED)
UNR 389/85-21-01
Anti-Reverse
Rotation
Pin Reportability.
The
anti-reverse
rotation device
(ARRD) on several
Unit 2 reactor coolant
pumps
(RCP)
were
found to
be degraded
during an inspection
by the licensee (ref.
IE Report 50-335,389/85-21).
The
licensee
determined
that this
degraded
condition
was
not reportable
because
the
AARD could still carry out its
intended function.
On December 2-6,
1985,
an inspection
was conducted
by
a
NRC RII inspector; it was concluded that this item was not reportable
under
50.73,
or Part
21 (ref. IE Report
50-335,389/85-31).
This
item is considered
closed.
4.
Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items
are matters
about which more information is required to
determine
whether
they
are
acceptable
or
may
involve
a violation
or
deviation.
A new unresolved
item is discussed
in paragraph
12.
During the
inspectson
period,
the inspectors
verified plant operations
in
compliance with selected
Technical Specification
(TS) requirements.
Typical
of these
were confirmation of compliance with the
TS for reactor
coolant
chemistry,
refueling
water
tank,
containment
pressure,
control
room
ventilation
and
AC and
DC electr ical sources.
The inspectors verified that
testing
was
performed
in
accordance
with
adequate
procedures,
test
instrumentation
was calibrated,
limiting conditions
for operation
(LCOs)
were
met,
removal
and
restoration
of
the
affected
components
were
accomplished,
test results
met requirements
and were reviewed by personnel
other
than
the individual directing the test,
and that
any deficiencies
identified
during
the
testing
were
properly
reviewed
and
resolved
by
appropriate
management
personnel.
The inspector
observed all aspects
of the following surveillance:
1-140005+ .Rev.
13
Reactor Protection
System
Periodic Logic Matrix
Test
Portions of the following surveillance
were also observed:
1-1630028,
Rev.
7 - New Fuel Handling Crane Operation
Plant Tours
The
inspectors
conducted
plant tours periodically during
the
inspection
interval
to verify that monitoring
equipment
was
recording
as required,
equipment
was
properly
tagged
operations
personnel
were
aware
of plant
conditions,
and plant houseke5ping
efforts were
adequate.
The inspectors
also
determined
that
appropriate
radiation
controls
were
properly
established,
critical clean
areas
were being controlled in accordance
with
procedures,
excess
equipment or material
was stored properly and combustible
material
and
debri s
were
di sposed
of expeditiously.
During tours
the
inspectors
looked
for
the
existence
of
unusual
fluid leaks,
piping
vibrations,
pipe
hanger
and
seismic restraint
settings,
various
valve
and
breaker positions,
equipment
caution
and danger
tags,
component
positions,
adequacy
of fire fighting equipment,
and instrumentation calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted
on backshifts.
The
inspectors
routinely
conducted
partial
walkdowns of
Emergency
Core
Cooling
Systems
(ECCS).
Valve,
breaker/switch
lineups
and
equipment.
conditions
were
randomly verified both locally and
in the control
room.
During the inspection
period,
the inspectors
conducted
a complete
walkdown
in the accessible
areas of the Unit
1 and
2 Component Cooling Mater Systems
(CCWS)
to verify that
the
lineups
were
in
accordance
with licensee
requirements
for operability
and
equipment
material
conditions
w'ere
satisfactory.
Additionally, flowpath verifications were
performed
on the
High Pressure
Safety Injection (HPSI)
system
and
(AFM) system.
Plant Operations
Review
The
inspectors
periodically
reviewed shift logs
and
operations
records,
including
data
sheets,
instrument
traces,
and
records
of
equipment
malfunctions.
This review included control
room logs
and auxiliary logs,
operating orders,
standing orders,
jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The
inspectors
routinely
observed
operator
alertness
and
demeanor
during
plant tours.
During routine operations,
operator
performance
and
response
actions
were
observed
and
evaluated.
The
inspectors
conducted
random
off-hours
inspections
during
the
reporting
interval
to
assure
that
operations.
and security
remained
at
an acceptable
level.
Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance
with approved
licensee
procedure."
The
inspectors
performed
an
in-depth
review of the
following safety-related
tagouts
(clearances):
1"1-109
1-2-2
1"2-15
2-2-13
2-1-17
18 Charging
Pump
A Boric Acid Makeup
Pump Discharge
MV-09-9 lA Auxiliary Feedwater to
2A Charging
Pump
Condensate
Storage
Tank Nitrogen Seal
On February 7,
1986, with reactor
power at approximately
100 percent,
Unit
1
tripped
during
performance
of
a
monthly Reactor
Protection
System
(RPS)
logic matrix test (OP-1-1400059).
All systems
functioned
as designed.
The
test is performed to verify proper operation
of the trip circuit breakers
(TCB) which interrupt
power ty the control
element
assemblies
(CEAs)
and
thereby trip the reactor.
-Th4 trip occurred
at the
step
in the procedure
which requires
TCBs
1
and
5 to
be
in the
tripped/open
position.
While
repositioning
the logic matrix relay selector
switch prior to TCBs
1 and
5
closing,
TCBs 4 and 8 opened
unexpectedly,
resulting in a loss of power to
the
CEA bus
and
the reactor trip.
The
cause
of the trip was traced
to
a
faulty matrix relay selector
switch which caused
a matrix relay to actuate
out of sequence,
opening
TCBs 4 and 8.
Additionally, it was discovered that
one relay
(AB4) had
a test coil with
a lower resistance
than
the others.
The faulty switch
and relay
were
both replaced.
Also replaced
were
two
other matrix relay selector
switches that
showed slight indications of wear.
The plant is considering
an evaluation of the switch design
and
a possible
design
change
which would replace
the
switches with ones
of
a different
design.
The unit was returned to service the
same
day.
Technical Specification
Compliance
Ouring this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with LCOs
and
the results
of selected
surveillance
tests.
These verifications "were
accomplished
by direct observation
of monitoring
instrumentation,
valve
positions,
switch positions,
and review of completed
logs
and records.
The
licensee's
compliance with
LCO action
statements
was
reviewed
on selected
occurrences
as they happened.
Maintenance
Observation
Station
maintenance
activities
on
selected
safety-related
systems
and
components
were observed/reviewed
to ascertain
that they were conducted
in
accordance
with requirements.
The following items
were
considered
during
this
review:
LCOs
were
met, activities were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures,
functional testing
and/or calibrations
were
performed prior to
returning
components
or
systems
to service,
quality control
records
were
maintained, activities were
accomplished
by qualified personnel,
parts
and
materials
used
were
properly certified,
and radiological
controls
were
implemented
as
required.
Work requests
were
reviewed
to determine
the
status
of outstanding
jobs
and to
assure
that priority was
assigned
to
safety-related
equipment.
The inspectors
observed
portions of the following
maintenance activities (Plant Work Orders):
3027 -
1C Charging
Pump
3028
Pressurizer
Code Safety Valve Nozzle
3031 -
Valve 1100E Bonnet
3034 -
1A Boric Acid Makeup
Pump Seal
1l
10.
Review of Nonroutine Events
Reported
by the Licensee
The following Licensee
Event
Reports
(LERs)
were
reviewed for potential
generic
impact,
to detect
trends,
and
to
determine
whether
corrective
actions
appeared
appropriate,
Events
which were reported
immediately were
also reviewed
as they occurred 'to determine that
TSs were being met and that
the public health
and safety
were properly considered.
The following LERs
are
considered
closed;
an in-depth
review was
performed
on the asterisked
LERs.
Unit 1
85-08
-
Tardy Surveillance
of Main
Steam
Isolation
Valves
Due to
Personnel
Error
"85-09
-
Defective Procedure
Leads to Lift Rig Failure
85-10
Control
Room Ceiling
Support
Structure
Outside Its
Design
Basis
Oue to Design Error
"85-11
-
Engineered
Safeguards
Actuations
Due to Loose
Fuse
Unit 2
"85-09
-
Manual Reactor Trip - Reactor Coolant
Pump High Vibration
Physical
Protection
12.
The inspectors
verified by observation
and interviews during the reporting
interval that
measures
taken
to assure
the
physical
protection
of the
facility
met
current
requirements.
Areas
inspected
included
the
organization
of the security force,
the establishment
and
maintenance
of
gates,
doors
and isolation
zones
in the proper conditions,
proper
access
controls
and badging,
and adherence
to procedures.
IE Information Notice (IEIN) Review
The inspectors
have continued
to review the licensee's
actions in response
to IEIN 85-84.
The licensee
has indicated,
as reported in the last monthly
resident report (ref.
IE Report
Nos. 50-335,389/85-36),
that the installed
main steam isolation valve (MSIV) air accumulators
are of sufficient volume
to ensure
MSIV closure.
The
NRC, Region II has recently questioned
licensee
practices
in performing testing of air operated/aided
automatic valves which
are required to function ("fail safe")
under
loss
of air/actuator
power
conditions.
Most air
systems
are
designed
with air accumulators
which
ensure
valve operations
when the
normal air system/supply
is lost.
the
licensee
has
performed
testing
as
required
by the
TS to
ensure
valve
"C
<s
operability.
Additional testing is performed periodically under the plant's
inservice.
testing
(IST)
program
as
required
by
and
the
applicable
ASME Boiler and
Pressure
Vessel
(BPV)
Codes.
One point
in
question deals with required testing of fail safe valves.
The MSIYs may be
considered
part of this category
and
as
such
may require testing with the
instrument air supply,
as welf,as electric power,
removed.
The licensee
has
hot interpreted
the
removal. of instrument air while fail safe testing
the
MSIVs as
a requirement
due to the valves'esign
and function.
Until the
NRC
Region II IST/ASME
Code
special i sts
complete
an
inspection
of
the
current
licensee
practices
for testing fail safe valves, this item will be
tracked
as
an Unresolved
Item (335/86-02-01,
389/86-01-'02),
Removing Air
While Testing "Fail Safe" Valves.
P'