ML17308A080
| ML17308A080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1983 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17308A081 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-***, TASK-RR LSO5-83-08-031, LSO5-83-8-31, NUDOCS 8309020418 | |
| Download: ML17308A080 (14) | |
Text
t August 22, 1983 Docket No. 50-244 LS05>>83oo 08-031.'r.
John E. tlaier, Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649
Dear ter. ttaier:
SUBJECT:
INTEGRATED PLANT SAFETY ASSESSt/IENT REPORT (IPSAR)
R. E.
GINNA NUCLEAR POl<ER PLANT SECTION 4.8, l<IND AND TORNADO LOADIttGS; SECTION 4.11, TORHADO MISSILES; SECTION 4.17.1, DESIGN CODES, DESIGN CRITERIA AND LOAD CONBIHATIONS Enclosed is the staff's safety evaluation of your proposed resolutions for the above IPSAR topics.
The integrated assessment of your plant (NUREG-0821) noted deficiencies in all three topics.
In response, you proposed to address all three topics in an integrated structural analysis and submitted your response via letters dated April 29, 1982 and April 22, 28, tray 19, 27, 1983.
As discussed in the enclosed evaluation, the staff generally finds your proposed methods acceptable.
However, the staff will require that a) you review certain aspects of your tornado analysis upon initiation of Phase 2 of your analysis, and b) you submit the evaluations specified in the SER upon their completion.
The results of this evaluation will be included in the supplement to the IPSAR for your facility.
Sincerely, o
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Origin81 s 1gne8 bp'.
83090204i8 830822 PDR ADOCK 05000244 p
Enclosure:
As stated gyog S ~~~~"
cc w/enclosure:
Dennis N. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch g5 Division of Licensing
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NRG FORM 318 tIO-80) NRCM 0240 OFFlClAL RECORD,COPY US0 PO: 1981-335.990
n, a
Mr. John E. Maier 2
CC Harry H. Voigt, Esquire
- LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. M.
.Suite 1100 Washington, D; C.
20036 Mr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood.ircle Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik
. Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 Mor ld Trade Center New York, New York 1004Z Resi dent !nspector R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U-S.
NRC'603 Lake Road
Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Albany.;- New York 12223 Or. Emmet A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comaission
~i~ngtggg O
Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U-S. Nuclear Regulatory Ceaaission Washington, G. C.
20566
--.=lie Thomas, E. Murley,
~
Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region'.
631 Park Avenue '
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 1QQ07 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,
Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20556 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road Mest
- Ontario, New York 14519 Jay Ounkl eberger New York State Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza
- Albany, New York 12223
Iq
R.
E.
GINNA IPSAR SECTIONS 4.8 WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS 4.11 TORNADO MISSILES 4.17.1 DESIGN CODES, DESIGN CRITERIA AND LOAD COMBINATIONS INTRODUCTI'ON The staff's final safety evaluations and licensee responses for the above, topics were issued on the dates indicated l,elow.
4.8 Topic III-2, Wind and Tornado Loadings 4.11 Topic III-4.A, Tornado Missiles 4.17.1 Topic III-7.B, Design
- Codes, Design Criteria and Load Combinations Staff SERs 1
April 21, 1982
= April 16.
1982 April 21, 1982 Licensee Respon'ses April 22, 1983 April 28, 1983 May 19, 1983 May 27, 1983 Since all three topics relate to structural matters, the licensee chose to address the issues raised in each topic in a two phased integrated structural analysis.
The purposes of the first phase are to define the tornado windspeeds to which upgrades will be made, demonstrate that there will exist a safe-shutdown path completely protected from tornado missiles, and to define general acceptance criteria.
The second phase will consist of perform'ing a detailed design to meet the parameters proposed in the first phase and will commence upon NRC staff approval of the first phase.
The first phase has been completed by the licensee and this evaluation addresses that
'phase only.
This evaluation will address the three topics separately even though the licensee addressed all three iri a unified manner so that there will be continuity from the method of presentation in the IPSAR (NUREG-0821, December 1982).
II.
EVAL'UATION A.
Wihd'nd 'Tornado 'L'oad'ings In performing the Phase I analysis, the licensee utilized the following load combinations:
a 75 mph windspeed and a 40 psf snow load occurring simultaneously
-and combined per ANSI A58.1; a tornado occurring with no accident or other enviornmental loads; and an extreme snow load of 100 psf.
The licensee attempted to define the costs associated with plant modifications necessary to achieve a safe hot shutdown'nd to proceed to cold shutdown, to protect the RCPB, main steam and feedwater lines, the spent fuel assemblies and to prevent accidents which will result in releases greater than 10 CFR Part 100 values for various tornado wind-speeds.
The various tornado windspeeds were converted to an annual exceedance probability by using the curves developed by the staff and presented in SEP Topic II-2.A, Severe Weather Phenomena.
h 4
4
Windspeeds associated with the exceedance probabilities from the staff's analysis are as follows:
103 mph 10 5
governed by straight wind) 132 mph 10 6
governed by tornado) 188 mph 10 7 (governed by tornado) 250 mph 10 (governed by tornado)
In perforo ing this scoping analysis, the licensee analyzed primary
- members, secondary
- members, connections and anchorages,
- siding, concrete masonry block walls and architectural items.
After per-forming the Phase I analysis, the licensee has proposed upgrading the plant to resist a 132 mph tornado.
The results of the licensee analysis are:
Windspeed 103 132 188 250 Cost of'tructural Upgrade X 10 10.6 21.3 45.2 70-8 The licensee has proposed a 132 mph tornado as a design basis tornado, but believes that the plant can withstand higher windspeeds for the following reasons:
l.
Actual yield values for A36 steel are higher than that used in the analysis.
Primary structural systems will be generally 'upgraded based on elastic behavior; in reality more energy can be absorbed and only result in permanent deformations rather than collapse.
3.
Full live loads were used in the analysis when in reality, they most likely will not be present.
4.
No credit has been taken for an unprotected system even though the equipment has some inherent resistance to loads; this implies that some system redundancy will most likely be present.
In conclusion, the licensee has proposed to:
1.
Hodify all primary steel framing to resist a 132 mph tornado and a 100 psf extreme snow load; 2.
Not modify secondary members except as necessary to prevent them from becoming potential missiles, and 3.
Protect safe shutdown equipment and other systems and components described in the submittal from tornado missiles.
The staff, with assistance from its contractor, the Franklin Research
- Center, has reviewed the analyses and proposed criteria presented by the licensee.
Enclosure 1 is the FRC Technical Evaluation Report which reviewed the licensee's Phase I report.
The shutdown methodology presented by the licensee is acceptable to the staff.
The structural analyses conducted by the licensee are reasonable as overall scoping analyses as input to a cost benefit analysis to determine an appropriate tornado windspeed for the structural upgrade program.
It is the staff's position that the licensee incorporate certain aspects into its detailed design during Phase 2 of the integrated structural analysis to address the matters raised in Enclosure 1.
These items are identified as Category 3 items in Table 1 (attached).
The staff concludes that the proposed criteria are acceptable, with the exception of the Category 3 items.
It is the staff's position that the Category 3 items must be justified and approved by the staff if these criteria are used during Phase II.
The staff has not approved the "second level of acceptance" criteria (see footnote e of Table 1).
The staff concludes that modifying the plant to resist a 132 mph tornado windspeed in the manner described will provide substantial additional protection for high wind and tornado effects.
This conclusion is based upon the licensee's commitment to a) achieve a
safe hot shutdown with one completely protected train of equipment and have the capability to proceed to cold shutdown, b) protect the reactor coolant pressure
- boundary, the main steam and fqedwater lines, the spent fuel assemblies, and c) prevent accidents which could result in releases greater than 10 CFR Part 100 values.
The conclusion is also based on the results of SEP Topic II-2.A, "Severe Weather Phenomena" in which the staff developed windspeed versus probability of exceedance curves.
A 132 mph tornado corresponds to an annual probability of exceedance of approximately 1 x 10 This value is low and based on estimated costs, it is not believed that the incremental cost associated with protecting the plant to a lower probability of exceedance windspeed is cost effective.
It is also the staff's position that the licensee provide procedures which require that all cranes be unloaded during a tornado watch since no crane loads were assumed to be present in the analysis.
Concrete masonry block walls have not been reviewed in this evaluation.
By letter dated April 28, 1983, the licensee proposed a list of block walls to be consigered safety-related consistent with the systems, structures and components the licensee proposes to protect.
Also, the licensee proposes to:
(1) upgrade an additional block wall on the southside of the auxiliary building to withstand flooding and (2) delete block walls whose failure impacts main steam safety and relief valves.
The staff has approved these additions and deletions in SERs dated August 19, 1983 and August 16, 1983.
The staff agrees with the structures, systems and components the licensee has proposed to protect and, therefore, agrees that these.
walls should be the walls defined as safety-related.
The ability of these walls to withstand the external loadings and load combina-tions defined in the Systematic Evaluation Program (site specific
- spectra, 132 mph tornado, 100 psf snow), will be reviewed as part of the resolution to IE Bulletin 80-11.
B ~
Tornado 'Nissiles The licensee has proposed to protect a shutdown train of equipment from tornado missiles.
This shutdown methodology is consistent with that described in item A above.
The li, ensee also intends to protect the reactor coolant pressure
- boundary, main steam and feedwater lines, spent fuel assemblies and to prevent accidents resulting in releases greater than part 100 values.
The licensee concludes that to do so will require modifications fo' the following items:
l.
Breaker between bus 18 and Diesel Generator 1B.
2.
Diesel Generator Building 1B roof and doors and discharge muffler.
3.
East wall of relay room.
4.
Exchange of power and control cables for the SBAFW system, or modify discharge piping.
5.
Safe shutdown monitoring instrumentation.
6.
Block walls above the spent fuel pool.
The staff has reviewed the shutdown methodology and finds it acceptable and, therefore, agrees with the above items requiring modification for tornado missile protection.
The licensee has stated that RWST and RNWT have been analyzed for torando missiles and found to be acceptable.
Based on the low wind-
- speeds, the staff concludes that the results obtained by the licensee are reasonable.
The staff will require that the licensee submit the analysis that is being performed to determine the damage that will result to the steam and feedwater lines due to failure of nearby block walls.
The staff will require that the licensee
- submit, upon completion, the damage analysis study currently being conducted to determine the effects of a utility pole entering the spent fuel pool.
C.
Desigh 'Codes,Design'Cr'fterii
'Co'ad"Combinations The staff SER, dated April 21, 1982, on this topic noted code changes which could significantly reduce margins of safety at the Ginna plant.
Also in that SER, the staff identified loads which have increased and load combinations which contained new loads or loads which have increased in magnitude.
The licensee responded to the AISC code changes via letter dated May 19, 1983.
The licensee stated that any upgrades as a result of their structural program would be performed in accordance with current cod~.s or other NRC approved criteria.
The concrete code changes noted were addressed by the licensee via letter dated May 27, 1983.
Load and load combination changes were also addressed in those submittals.
The staff,- with assistance from its contractor, the Franklin Research
- Center, has reviewed the submittals provided by the licensee.
The results of this review are presented in detail in Enclosure 2.
i The licensee has adequately addressed the open items.
The items were resolved either by demonstrating adequacy through analysis, committing to modifications, or a commitment to review these items during the second phase of the structural upgrade program and modify the structure as necessary to meet the criteria proposed in Phase I of that program and discussed in Section A of this SER.
The licensee has committed to modify the diesel generator building to resolve the issue of shear walls used as primary load-carrying members.
This is the only hardware modification thus far committed to by the licensee to specifically resolve a code change concern.
No code comparison of masonry design was undertaken;
- however, the staff will require that masonry wall modifications meet the loads accepted in SEP and the Ax load combinations.
These are left as open issues in Enclosure 2.
The adequacy of these walls to withstand the SEP accepted loads (i.e.,
132 mph tornado, 100 psf snow, site specific spectra)- in Ax load combinations will be reviewed outside of SEP as part of the resolution to IE Bulletin 80-11.
In reviewing the adequacy of these walls, only the loads corresponding to the specific wall function should be used in determining wall adequacy.
For example, the block wall used to resist flooding must resist hydro-static loads but not seismic or tornado since the only function of the wall is to prevent water from entering the building and tornado or seismic loads are not possible to occur simultaneously with floods.
III..
CONCLOSIONS The staff concludes that a 132 mph tornado has a low probability of exceedance, that structural margins exist beyond 132 mph tornado load and, therefore, a design basis tornado of 132 mph is acceptable to the staff.
The staff concludes that the criteria for the Phase II structural upgrade analysis including design codes, loads and load combinations are acceptable except as noted in Sertion II.A above.
~
I a
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Tab1e 1
Review Item:
dfective'ocnado'cuadings Mmosphmic Pressure.
Change Mind. Ve1ocitY Eeessure Wind-berne Missilea-RxuchucaL. Goadings Diffei:entiaL Pressure Zaad.
Effective StrucCuraL Pressuces'.
Designtoads'(>)
Shi a1ding.
Daack Combinations;.
~tzucturaL AnaLYsis; and Hodelinp Main-Shcuatucal Prame Gecgzence of. pailure Secon~
Members:
Rook Decfeing:
MetaL. Siding. System 5tr,uctur a3. Acceptance Miteria.
S tee1. Components.'
~
~
X(e)
Coact eta Component
Table: l. (Cont.)
Revt.ev I~'onnections BaoC ouch Architectural,. Qetails Cahl.e TunneL Control. Building A~iary BuiJ.~y QiesM Generator Building a
The situs oC each.
imam is. defined as. X,, 2,. 3', or 4, as foLLaws:
J X. ~ The revi~ ihaa is in confoananca with: the accepted. criter iao, review irma,- is, hr ceafocmance with the accepted, crieria,. but the conclusions. are Lhaihack Ca a: ~indspeed. of.. X32 mph 3 ~ The revim item M ad M caaCocmance with the accepted criteria, but:
RQaR has: made,a. ccamaitment. to correct/reexamine this item: in the finaL anally sis 4: ~ The r~~ iten'a no< in confonaance with the accepted cr '
remains'. an. open; issue, e
cri eria and watchee is r
- b TmpkemenCation.
oC; a procedure for uzLLo'adinq. the: cranes dur'o do ma Tha. cost, ance strength. conclusions based: on the. gre3.aninary ana1ysis j.
q aLbt However,. the f~ review ~~ recgzixe some. consideration.,
oF this. topic d
Sindspeeck strength: ratings for neqativa gressurea to ba specified. for cUMferentiaL pressure loads e-The 'Second: DaveL oC'cceptacme criteria. viLLre<pa 'urth re before. they are:- approved Tha mason@
hkock. walls- (s~ Sections 3.4.4 and 3.S.Z.of-this report) have.
no@ been: included; in; the: revi~ suuuaery iinca tha groposed anaLysis and. revie~
criteria are still. being; reviewed. generically.y..