ML17306B124

Summarizes 921110 Meeting W/Aps to Discuss Fire Protection Programs at Palo Verde.Forwards Viewgraphs & List of Attendees

ML17306B124
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/13/1992
From:	Trammell C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	NRC
References
NUDOCS 9211200281
Download: ML17306B124 (92)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIVIIVIISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 November 13, 1992 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 LICENSEE:

Arizona Public Service Company FACILITY:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station

SUMMARY

OF MEETING HELD ON NOVEMBER 10, 1992 TO DISCUSS FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAMS AT PALO VERDE On November 10, 1992, the NRC staff met with representatives of Arizona Public Service Company to discuss recent fire protection program improvements and efforts.

Persons attending the meeting are identified in Enclosure (1).

A copy of viewgraphs used at the meeting is shown in Enclosure (2).

The meeting was held pursuant to notice issued on October 27, 1992.

Highlights of the meeting are summarized below.

The licensee, Arizona Public Service Company (APS),

has underway a

10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Reconstitution Program to "enhance criteria, methodology, and assumptions in Appendix R support analysis such that it is written and organized to facilitate review by a person not involved in the evaluation."

The other objective of the reconstitution effort is to validate existing analyses given current regulatory issues.

The reconstitution program identified the need for some plant modifications, revisions to operator

actions, revisions to three previously approved deviations, and three new Appendix R deviation requests.

The details of these items are contained in Enclosure (2).

The second subject concerned APS'fforts towards resolution of the Fire Protection Justification for Continued Operation which was initiated July 20,

1990, when it was found that some of APS'ommitments regarding quality assurance for fire protection had not been fully implemented.

All efforts associated with this progrm will be completed by December 31, 1992.

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November 13, 1992 Arizona Public Service Company The balance of the meeting was devoted to a description of the Penetration Seal Project and a status report on Thermo-Lag fire barriers at Palo Verde.

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Viewgraphs cc w/enclosures:

See next page priginai Signed By:

Charles M. Trammell,,Senior Project Manager Project Directorate V

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION:

LDocket Fi3~e NRC 5 Local PDRs PDV Reading File TMurley/FHiraglia, 12G18 (w/o enclosure 2)

JPartlow, 12G18 (w/o enclosure 2)

JRoe (w/o enclosure 2)

HVirgilio (w/o enclosure 2)

TQuay (w/o enclosure 2)

CTrammell (w/o enclosure 2)

DFoster (w/o enclosure 2)

OGC, 15B18 (w/o enclosure 2)

EJordan, MNBB 3701

PHadden, 8D1 (w/o enclosure 2)

ACRS (10),

P315 JMitchell, 17G21 (w/o enclosure 2)

KPerkins, RV (w/o enclosure 2)

OFC NAME DATE PDV LA DFoster II 592 ammell:lh 9 92 PDV D TQuay t3/92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME:PVHTG.SUM

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Arizona Public Service Company The balance of the meeting was devoted to a description of the Penetration Seal Project and a status report on Thermo-Lag fire bar riers at Palo Verde.

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Viewgraphs cc w/enclosures:

See next page M.~v Charles M. Trammell, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate V

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde CC:

Nancy C. Loftin, Esq.

Corporate Secretary 8 Counsel Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.

Box 53999, Mail Station 9068 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999 James A. Beoletto, Esq.

Southern California Edison Company P. 0.

Box 800

Rosemead, California 91770 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission HC-03 Box 293-NR Buckeye, Arizona 85326 Regional Administrator, Region V

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. William A. Wright, Acting Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 111 South Third Avenue

Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Jack R.

Newman, Esq.

Newman

& Holtzinger, P.C.

1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1000 Washington, D.C.

20036 Curtis Hoskins Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Palo Verde Services 2025 N. 3rd Street, Suite 220

Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Roy P.

Lessey, Jr.,

Esq.

Bradley W. Jones, Esq.

Arkin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld El Paso Electric Company 1333 New Hampshire Ave., Suite 400 Washington, D.C.

20036 Mr. William F.

Conway Executive Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company Post Office Box 53999

Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999

NOVEMBER 10 1992 FIRE ROTECTION MEETING TWEEN RC STAFF AND ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY LIST OF ATTENDEES ENCLOSURE 1

NAME Charles Trammell Patrick Madden Mohammad Karbassian Frank Garrett Scot Koski Elizabeth Kleinsorg Nancy Turley Michael E. Powell ORGANIZATION NRC/NRR/PDV NRC/NRR/SPLB APS APS APS APS APS APS

Presentation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the P

r ir ""-:: o ec ion

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Agenda I. Introduction II. Appendix R Reconstitution 8 Deviations III. Penetration Seal Project IV. JCO Project Overview V. TSI Thermo-Lag Update

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Appendix R Reconstitution Objectives I. Enhance criteria, methodology, and assumptions in Appendix R support analysis such that it is. ~.

"Written and organized to facilitate review by a person not involved in the evaluation" (Generic Letter 86-1 0}

II. Validate existing analysis given current regulatory issues

Appendix R Reconstitution Tasks A. Reconstitute Safe Shutdown Equipment List B. Create SSD Logics C. Reconstitute SSD Cables D. Reconstitute Operational Considerations E. Verify III.G/III.LCompliance F. Document Manual Action Feasibility G. Reconstitute Common PWR Supply/Common Enclosure I-I. Revise Operator Actions I. Update Configuration Management Documents J. Update UFSAR

Appendix R Reconstitution Task "A" Task A. Reconstitute Safe Shutdown E ui ment List:

4 Create one list which contains all safe shutdown components and pertinent information Results:

13-MC-FP-31 5, 10CFR50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment List

I

'I 4

Appendix R Reconstitution Task "B" Task B. Create Safe Shutdown Lo ics:

@ Create success path logics which depict all safe shutdown components f Create a tool which willaid in the consistent application of systems interaction and reproducibility of results Results:

13-M-FPR-001 through 021, Safe Shutdown Logic and Safety Functional Diagrams

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Appendix R Reconstitution Task "C" Task C. Reconstitute Safe Shutdown Cables:

@ Document the circuit analysis of all safe shutdown circuits

@ Update the Cable and Raceway Tracking System Results:

13-EC-FP-004, 10CFR50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Cable Identification Analysis

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Appendix R Reconstitution Task "D" Task D. Reconstitute 0 erational Considerations:

P Consolidate APS calculations or analysis which estimate time frames in which operator actions should occur to prevent the plant from being placed in an unrecoverable condition Results:

13-EC-FP-004, 10CFR50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Cable Identification Analysis

Appendix R Reconstitution Task "E" Task E. Veri III.G/III.LCom liance:

P Provide one document that assesses the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown given a fire in any analysis area Results:

13-MC-FP-318, 10CFR50 Appendix R III.G/III.L Compliance Assessment

1

Appendix R Reconstitution Task "F" Task F. Document Manual Action Feasibilit:

@ Provide a document which assesses the feasibility of completing the manual actions identified in each analysis area Results:

13-MC-FP-316, 10CFR50 Appendix R Manual Action Feasibility

Appendix R Reconstitution Task "G" Task G. Reconstitute Common Power Su I /Common

Enclosure:

4 Currently being addressed under Electrical Engineering's Calculation Reconstitution effort Results, as necessary, will be included in the Appendix R Documentation

1 C

Appendix R Reconstitution Task "H" Task H. Revise 0 erator Actions:

@ Updating Pre-Fire Strategies Manual to provide revised actions

@ Revising Control Room fire procedure to reprioritize actions Results: Revision to 4XAO-XZZ44 Revision to Pre-Fire Strategies Manual

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Appendix R Reconstitution Task "I**

Task I. U date Confi uration Mana ement Documents:

4 Currently revising Configuration Management Program Documents to reflect FP Engineering Organization and new calculations and drawings

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Appendix R Reconstitution Task 'J" Task J. U date UFSAR:

fCurrently revising UFSAR to summarize APS compliance and reference new detailed analysis

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Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results 4 The reconstitution concluded that the original analysis was generally correct for "Active"safe shutdown components f The Reconstitution identified the need for:

~ Plant Modifications

~ Revisions to Operator Actions

~ Revisions to Approved Deviations

~ Request for New Deviations

I

Appendix R Reconstitution Plant Modifications Subject interim Actions Final Resolution Loss of RCP Seal In'ection:

Potential for loss of RCP Seal Cooling Revised Pre-Fire Strategies PCR to install a transfer causing seal damage which could result Manual Revised ZZ44 switch to operate NC in RCS leakage > available charging Containment isolation valve due to design basis fire (both inside or outside C.R.)

Loss of Essential HVAC:

Potential loss of Essential HVACto B Train DC equipment rooms during Control Room Fire scenario Lossof RCSSam lin:

Potential for a loss of power to a sampling valve required to obtain hourly RCS sample during a Control Room fire scenario Revised ZZ44 Calculation performed to demonstrate the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown per ZZ44 without sampling capability PCR to install remote/local switch PCR to provide dedicated power to sampling valve to ensure RCS sampling capability

Appendix R Reconstitution Plant Modifications Subject DG A8 8 Train Cables in Same Fire Area:

Interim Actions Final Resolution A&BTrain safe shutdown cables lo-cated in the DG stairway. Physical separation 30'orizontal and 30'ertical and by non-rated concrete barriers (floor and wall)

Loss of EW S stem Invento Potential for loss of EW system inven-tory due to spurious opening of EW MOVs {when in X-tied to NC system) during a Control Room Fire Fire Panel Control Circuit/Dam er Closure in 0 osite Train:

Control Circuits for the Control Bldg.

elev. 100'ire panels pass thru both trains. Afire in one train could result in loss of Essential HVACto the opposite train due to spurious damper closure Hourly fire watch established in DG stairway PCR to upgrade a fire door and rate existing non-rated barriers (wall and Hoor)

Revised ZZ44 to include operator actions to ensure closure of EW MOVs prior to establishing the EW/NC X-tie PCR to provide Emergency Lightingfor EW valves Established hourly roving fire PCR to reconfigure Fire watches.

inactivated the automatic Panel control circuits to function ofthe A-Train C02system provide train separation (Control Bldg.100'). Revised Pre-fire Strategies Manual to provide instructions to restore HVAC(material staged)

Appendix R Reconstitution Plant Modifications Subject Associated Circuits/Lack of Fuses:

The potential exists that non-safe shut-down (NSSD) "associated" cables that share a common power source with safe shutdown equipment, could cause a loss of power to the safe shutdown equipment ifa ground fault were to occur in an "un-fused" Ieg of the NSSD circuit Loss of Essential HVACto A-Train

~AF Pum:

A design basis fire in lNSSS Bldg.

could cause a loss of both the 8-Train AF pump and loss of Essential HVAC to tI>e A-Train AF pump room, thus disabling the pump which would be required to achieve safe shutdown Interim Actions Hourly fire watches were established for all potentially affected fire zones containing cables of both trains. Revising Pre-fire Strategies 8 ZZ44 to incorporate operator actions.

Hourly fire watch established in fire zone 74B (location of unprotected circuit)

Final Resolution PCR to install fuses in the "unfused" leg ofthe existing SSD and associated circuits, as necessary DCP to reconfigure the control circuitry for the Essential ACU to install the required additional fuse

Subject Appendix R Reconstitution Plant Modifications Interim Actions Final Resolution Diesel Generator Transfer Switch:

Depends on the existing set of fuses in',he affected circuit. Potential for loss of DG breaker control power due to fuse opening in the event of a fire Hourly fire watch established.

PCR to reconfigure DG ZZ44 is being revised breaker control circuit Manual Actions, New Deviations and Pending Revision to Previous Deviations:

Pending

Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results Revision to Operator Actions fCorrective Action documents generated for additional operator actions for alternative shutdown areas

g. Operator actions which changed for non-alternative shutdown areas were feasible

Appendix R Reconstitution Deviation Criteria k In accordance with GL 86-10, plant licensed to operate after January 1, 1979 which have committed to meet the requirements of Appendix R do not have to request exemptions.

However, deviations from the requirements should be identified and justified

Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results Revision to Approved Deviations 4 Reconstitution credited all existing approved deviations Ir Existing deviations were validated in the field 5 Results indicate that original A/B separation justifications were correct.

However, the addition of spurious components affected the following deviations:

~ Fire Area I Deviation 5

~ Fire Area II Deviation 2

~ Fire Area XV Deviation 8

Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results Revision to Approved Deviations Gontrol Building Fire Area I Deviation 5:

Qescri tion:

The central wall of the dead space compartment between the AuxiliaryBuilding and the Control Building and is a Fire Area boundary common to Fire Area I (Zone 86A) and Fire Area II (Zone 86B) at elev. 74'hru 140'. The central wall is reinforced concrete construction with a nominal 6" seismic gap. A Deviation is requested from Section III G.2 of 10CFR50 Appendix R to the extent that it requries 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated barriers to separate redundant circuits.

Justification:

~ The central wall of the deadspace (86A & 86B) is reinforced concrete construction and has two 6" nominal seismic gaps covered by '/4" solid steel plates bolted to each side of a concrete wall

~ Zonal detection covers the predominant in situ combustibles on elev. 100'nd 120' Automatic deluge water spray covers the in situ combustibles on elev. 100'nd 120' The A/Btrain safe shutdown cable trays in zones 86A and 86B are each approximately 10 feet from the center wall with no intervening combustibles

~ The combustible loading for zones 86A and 86B is 140 and 350

~ The Fire Team response is expected within 10 minutes

Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results Revision to Approved Deviations Control Building Fire Area II Deviation 2:

Descri tion:

The east wall of Fire Zone 86B is a Fire Area boundary between Fire Area II and the Corridor Bldg.

The barrier contains a 6" nominal seismic gap which is covered with non-rated solid 18 gauge sheet metal flashing on either side of a reinforced concrete wall. A Deviation is requested from Section III6.2 of 10CFR50 Appendix R to the extent that it requires installation of a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier and an area wide suppression system. Control Fire Area II Justification:

~ The east wall of 86B is reinforced concrete construction stub with a 6 inch nominal seismic gap covered with 18 gauge sheet metal on each side

~ There is no safe shutdown equipment or cables located in the corridor building

~ Zonal detection covers the in situ combustibles in zone 86B at elev. 100'nd 120' Automatic deluge water spray covers the in situ combustibles on elev. 100'nd)20' The combustible loading for zone 86B is less than 350 minutes

~ Fire Team response is expected in less than 10 minutes

Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results Revision to Approved Deviations Fire Area XV Deviation 8:

k Credits spatial separation between Train A and 8 safe shutdown equipment k Addition of "N" Train and spurious components

- require clarification of approved deviation

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Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results New Deviations k Additional action in the Control Room 5 Parameters outside those expected for a normal loss of AC power h Improper application of Generic Letter 86-10, Questions 5.3.10 and 5.3.1

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Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results New Deviations k Additional action in the Control Room

~ The conservative bounding analysis done for the Control Room fire indicates the SGs may overfill in 1.5 minutes - assuming:

- MFVs remain @50/0 fl'owafter trip N-o "automatic control" via ESFAS b~ Justification:

~ Action in Control Room is on same panel as trip button

~ Action is followed-up outside the Control Room immediately

Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results New Deviations k Parameters outside those expected for a normal loss of AC power

~ Plant is not placed in an unrecoverable condition

~ Parameters are restored

Appendix R Reconstitution Reconstitution Results New Deviations 4 Improper application of Generic Letter 86-10, Questions 5.3.1 and 5.3.10

~ Power and control cables for redundant high/low pressure interface valves

Appendix R Reconstitution Long Term Compliance 4 Organizational effectiveness I Configuration control h Training

FP JCO Project Overview FPlQAG Program Implementation FP., QA-JCO':;:,:,"';-i..;:,,;=;~-.

It=vijiiationprotect,";,.'.!--,

FP,Open'.item's'froni::;;"!'Ii'i'NRC:sttbrnlttal'~::,"'.

Enjliteering sttldies,for

'.cain jiltirice.v%'f1th';.FP.-'QA JCO Evaluation completed with follow<n action req d?

YES I',CIos'ure'do'iiintentatlori<

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jndeperiderit,QA:,'-:

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.;~i.-';,,"r'i, indicates activity Were actions req'd to gain compliance NO with implementing QA Program reqmnt's?

YES Technical issues:

~ FP Support Manager Scope NO Are recommen-dations/actions required to liftJCO

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YES Program

.0'evet0p"8,'.detailed/;;.j;-.':

jiiipjententition'plan',t'oachieve,:QA P,iagrsin';,

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,t:oiiijIlete,'th'i.,'."defined Resolve issues by December 31, 1992

JCO Project Overview Items Requiring Closure Prior to Lifting of the JCO I. Installation Verification of the RCP Lube Oil Collection System II. Inspection of the Radiant Energy Shield III. Verification of the PM on Powerblock Lightning Protection System IV. Resolution of Fire Damper Closure Under AirFlow (IN-89-52)

V. Enhancement of the Design Review Process per the QA Assessment Report Vl. Enhancement of the FT Program per the QA Assessment Report

Penetration Seal Project Objectives I. Verification and Consolidation of Design Basis II~ Verification of As-built III~ Development of User Friendly Design Documents

Penetration Seal Project I. Verification and Consolidation of Design Basis

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Penetration Seal Project I. Verification and Consolidation of Design Basis Internal Conduit Sealing Requirements 4 Developed criteria to determine the internal sealing requirements for:

1) Fire and Smoke & Hot Gas

2) Flooding

3) Differential Pressure

Penetration Seal Project I. Verification and Consolidation of Design Basis Internal Conduit Sealing Requirements Fire and Smoke & Hot Gas Criteria:

Conduit Qiameter Continuous Thru Room Terminates Terminates

<1'rom 1'< x <

3'arrier From Barrier Terminates Terminates 3'< x5< x

<10'rom Barrier From Barrier Terminates 10'romBarrier

<1 -1/2" 2

II 2" <8<4"

>4" NS NS NS NS SHG SHG SHG NS SHG SHG NS SHG Fio~odin Conduits which penetrate flood barriers below the postulated height of the flood, are open in the flooded room, and are not routed up and out of the flood prior to exiting the room are paths forthe escape of flood waters, Differential Pressure:

Conduits which penetrate a Barrier separating an are maintained at a pressure differential than an adjoining area are potential paths for the egress (or ingress) of airborne radiation

Penetration Seal Project I. Verification and Consolidation of Design Basis Typical Penetration Seal Details k Developed unique set of typical penetration details k Performed calculation that evaluated each typical penetration detail Evaluation included regulatory and industry guidance criteria

Penetration Seal Project II. Verification of As-Built 4 Performed Walkdown-

@ Evaluation performed on Walkdown data 6 Generated Corrective Action Documents

WMH029 K29 SIMS CIVIL/ARCH EQUIPMEHT

SUMMARY

10/28/92 14l37:04 EQ ID 1AZANB102-E B15-W BARRIE REC TYPE ECM STATUS OPS DESC CONCRETE BARRIER BTWN A-102 AND A-B15 UNIT 1 SYS ZA PRI SOURCE DOC AD 13-A-ZAD-201 COORD IDCATIOH SPEC MFR VEN SERIAL g

TECEE MANUAL REV NO MODEL MFR/MODEL DATA NOT FOUND MODEL ENG A CONSTRUCTION TYPE ENG B T}SICKNESS ENG C FIRE RATING ENG D RADIATION REQMHTS ENG E -P ACROSS BARRIER ENG F SECURITY BARRIER ENG G FLOOD HEIGE1T (FT)

ENG H

EEELB REQMHT'S (PSIG)

ENG J DESIGN PRESS DESIGN TEMP HEIGHT ASSOC BARRIER EQID ASSOC FIRE ZONE 42D/NONE REINFORCED CONCRETE 24" BUT < 36" APPENDIX A 2 EARS NONE EEA YES

0. 00 FT

0. 00 PSIG ENV IHT ENV EXT OPERATING PRESS OPERATING TEMP ASSOC PIPE TAG MP 3

QUALITY CLASS Q

SEISMIC CAT 1

ASME CODE N

Q FUNCTIONAL MODE P Q FUNCTION 08 08 EQ CATEGORY EQ ZONE

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WMH029 N29 SIMS CIVIL/ARCH EQUIPMENT

SUMMARY

10/28/92 14: 27 EQ ID 1AZYD323 001 OPS DESC PENETR PRX SOURCE DOC AD 01-A-ZYD-323 SEALXX REC TYPE ECM STATUS UHIT 1 SYS ZJ COORD HR QUALITY CLASS QAG SEISMIC CAT 3

ASME CODE N

Q FUNCTIONAL MODE P Q FUNCTION 18 EQ CATEGORY N

EQ ZONE 4

ENG A PENETRATION TYPE CORE DRILLED ENG B FIRE RATING APPENDIX A 3 HRS ENG C-CONDUIT SEAL BARRIER NA ENG D CONDUIT SEAL SUFFIX NA ENG E RADIATION NOT APPLICABLE ENG F -P AND SECURITY NA ENG G FLOOD (FT) 00000 FT ENG H HELB (PSXG) 0.0 PSIG EHV IHT X ENG Z.PEN SXZE (DIA OR HXW 2

IN EHV EXT F DESEON PRESS NA, NA OPERATING PRESS Nh NA DESIGN TEMP NA NA OPERATING TEMP NA DEGF WEICHT 'A'SSOC PIPE TAG SEE NAMEPLATE / WMN011 ASSOC BARRIER EQXD 1AZJN8109-E 1.14-W BARRIE ASSOC FIM ZONE 6B/5B LOCATION SERIAL SPEC TECH MANUAL NA REV NO MFR MODEL MFR/MODEL DATA HOT FOUND VEN Z100 XSX-XCMS (FOR FP SYSTEM Q MODEL CFS-1 / HA

Penetration Seal Project ill. Development of User Friendly Design Documents Station Information Mana ement S stem SIMS:

1} Originated EQIDs for each penetration 2} Originated EQIDs for Barrier designation 4 Desi n and Confi uration Documents:

1) Engineering Procedure

2) Revision of Penetration Location Drawings

3) Revision of Engineering Specification

4) Revision of Maintenance Procedure 5} Revision of Surveillance Procedures

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TSI Thermo-Lag 4 Bulletin 92-01 Response Participation in industry effort 0

PVNGS specific installation strengths

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Typical Scoring and Grooving Layout Unistrut CONCRETE Concrete Fastener Typical Thermo-lag Compound Washer Conduit Stress Skin 330-69 Thermo-lag 330-1 Panel D = Depth of penetration

his is for iliustration purposes only.

Typical Box Construction One Seam WB HB WB HB HB = Height of Box WB = Width of Box Thermo-lag Stress Skin C$ 4

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%" (Typical)

HB WB

Typical, Band Installation Stainless Steel Band

-OR-Stainless Steel Tie Stress Skin (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inner, 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> inner & outer)

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g7i'Nlr 330-1 Trowel Grade Fill In Thermo-lag 330-1 Panel S

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L = Unsupported barrier span S = Spacing requirements 12 in. maximum PVNGS 8 in. maximum typical t

= Barrier panel thickness This is for illustration purposes only.

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Typical Conduit Enclosure 3-Hour Box 4p4ig 1/2" 1/ II 1/2" Note: Alldimensions are approximate

Typical Conduit Enclosure 1-Hour Box aswaPw'i' svsiwcsw'siv'i<ieawsÃvF' siva'i'i4ii g/ II

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