ML17305B665
| ML17305B665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1991 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17305B663 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-91-21, 50-529-91-21, 50-530-91-21, NUDOCS 9108050047 | |
| Download: ML17305B665 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1991021
Text
Report Nos.:
Docket Nos.:
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-528/91-21,
50-529/91-21,
50-530/91-21
50-528,
50-529,
50-530
Licensee:
Inspection
Conducted:
June 3-12,
1991
Inspectors:
P.
H. Hadden,
Senior Fire Protection Engineer,
M. J.
Wagner
Reactor I spector,
RV
Approved by:
License
Nos.
Arizona Nuclear
Power Project
P.O.
Box 53999, Station
9012
Phoenix, Arizona
85072-2034
Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
(PVNGS) Units 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Mintersburg, Arizona
~Summar:
uey,
ngsneersng
ec )o
ae
s
e
Ins ection June 3-12
1991
(Re ort Nos. 50-528/91-21
50-529/91-21
Areas Ins ected:
One inspector
from the Office of Nuclear Reactor
egu
a son
an
one inspector
from Region
V conducted
an unannounced
inspection
to evaluate
the adequacy of the licensee's fire protection/prevention
program.
Inspection procedure
64704 was
used
as guidance during this inspection.
Results:
General
Conclusions
on Stren ths
and Weaknesses
Areas of Stren ths
Oedicated on-site fire department.
Fire watch program.
Areas
o'f Meaknesses:
a
Hot work permits for safe
shutdown plant areas
performed outside
containment
do not require the
same review and approval
as required for
hot work inside containment.
9108050047
910716
ADOCK 05000528
G
l
I
The provisions for identifying the thermalag fire barrier enclosures
required for Appendix
R and those required for Regulatory Guide 1.75
compliance
are confusing.
Si nificant Safet
chatters:
None
Summar
of Violations or Deviations:
One violation was identified for failure
o ma>nta>n
>re protec ion
eatures
required to protect safe
shutdown
capability.
0 en Items
Summar
Three
new items were opened.
Persons
Contacted
DETAILS
"R. Schaller, Assistant Plant Manager, Unit j.
- R. Flood; Plant Manager,
Unit 2
- R. Adney, Plant Manager,
Unit 3
"T. Braddish,
Compliance
Manager
- C. Russo,
equality Control Manager
"R. Fullmer, Manager,
equality Audits and Monitoring
- G. Overbeck, Director, Site Technical
Support
- M. webster,
Manager,
Component Specialty Engineering
"M. Raddoccia,
Manager,
System Nuclear Engineering
Department
"D. Crozier, Fire Department Supervisor
- F. Garrett,
Senior Consultinq Engineer,
Risk Management
"S. Burns, Project Manager,
Fare Protection
. "J. Austin, Fire Department
Deputy Chief
"M. Czarnylas,
Fire Department
Deputy Chief
"R. Fongemie,
Component
and Speciality Engineering Supervisor
- D. Neal
Fire Protection
Engineer
"D. Douglas,
equality Assurance
Analyst
"D. Webb, equality Assurance Auditor
"C. Belford, Fire Department
Compliance Coordinator
"R. Fountain,
equality Assurance Auditor
"R. Bouqnot, equality Assurance
Auditor
- R. Rouse,
Compliance Supervisor
- S.
Lopez,
System Engineer
"N. Minson,
System Engineering Supervisor
"P.
fin, Compliance
Engineer
"S. Kanter, Arizona Public Service Site Representative
"S. Draper,
Southern California Edison Site Representative
"K. Hall, El Paso Electric Site Representative
P. Caudsll, Director, Site Services
K. Clark, Licensing Engineer
R. Prabhakar,
Manager,
equality Engineerinq
H. Bieling, Manager,
Emergency Planning/Fsre
Department
E. Kleinsorg, Fire Protection
Engineer
M. Karbassian,
Supervisor,
Mechanical
Engineering
C. Foster,
Mechanical
Engineer
R.
Robb, Senior Mechanical
Engineer
B. Harrison, Senior Mechanical
Engineer
The inspectors
also interviewed other licensee
employees
during the course of
the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Meeting on June 7, 1991.
E
~
'
2.
Fire Protection/Prevention
Pro
ram (64704)
a.
Administrative Controls Procedure
Review
In the area of combustible material controls
and fire hazard
reduction,
the inspectors
reviewed procedure
Control of
Transient Combustibles,
Revision 1, Effective Date 7-13-90.,
The
inspectors
found that this procedure
placed controls over the
use of
ordinary combustibles,
and flammable/combustible
gases
and liquids.
The procedure restricts the use of non-fire retardent treated
wood
in safety related areas,
controls the use of transient ordinary
combustibles,
flammable/combustible
gases
and flammable/combustible
liquids by the use of a Transient
Combustible Control Permit (TCCP).
In addition, this procedure
requires the
use of Underwriters
Lab/Factory Hutual
(UL/FM) approved fire safety cans for handling of
flammable/combustible
liquids, flammable/combustible liquid storage
cabinets,
and trash/waste
cans for the collection of ordinary
combustible waste (i. e. rags).
The .inspectors,
noted that Section
3.6. 10 states that flammable/combustible
liquids in quantities
greater
than one gallon shall not be used in a safety related area
unless
monitored by the
TCCP.
This appears
to be inconsistent with
the guidance
provided in Section 3.6.5.5.
which requires
a
TCCP to
be issued for quantities of combustible/flammable
liquids exceeding
one cumulative gallon.
The inspectors
were concerned,
that as
a
result of misinterpretation,
Section 3.6.10 could allow cumulative
quantities
exceeding
one gallon of flammable liquid into a plant
area important to reactor safety without being reviewed under the
TCCP process.
The licensee
agreed that the intent of this section
~s not clear and agreed to clarify the requirement during a
subsequent
revision to this procedure.
In addition, the inspectors
verified that this procedure controlled the use of plastic sheeting
material
and used=plastic
sheeting materials which had fire
retardant properties.
The licensee,
for the selection of plastic
sheeting materials,
follows American Nuclear Insurers flammability
guidance,
which is an acceptable
practice.
In the area of ignition source/fire risk reduction,
the inspectors
reviewed Procedure
Hot Mork Authorization, Revision 1,
Effective Date 5-18-89.
This procedure
provides
an adequate
level
of control over hot work operations.
The inspectors
found that the
procedure
required combustibles
in the area of the 'hot work to be
moved at least
35 feet away from the operation or be properly
covered with fire retardant welding blankets.
Fire watches
are
appropriately
used whenever fire preventive
measures
can not be met.
In addition, the inspectors verified that the hot work permit is
valid for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
when the plant is in operational
modes I, II, or
III.
The inspectors
also reviewed procedure
14DP-OFPOl, Fire Match
Requirements,
Revision 0, Effective Date 9-8-89.
The inspectors
interviewed four fire watches
(three continuous
and one roving).
The inspectors
found fire watch personnel
to have
a sufficient level
of know1edqe with regard to what actions they are to perform in the
event of discovering
a potential fire condition.'n addition, the
inspectors
noted that fire watch personnel
had
a good understanding
of the fire protection
impairments in the area,
and were fully
familiar with the use of portable fire extinguishing equipment.
At
the time of this inspection,
the inspectors
were aware that the
licensee
was reviewing training records
as discussed
in Inspection
Report 50-528/91-19.
Surveillance
Procedures
The inspectors
reviewed procedure
Backup Fire
Pump
Installation,
Revision 0, Effective Date 5-6-89.
The purpose of
this procedure is to provide guidelines for the installation of the
backup fire pump (station fire truck) when one or more of the three
station fire pumps
becomes
Mhen the backup fire pump is
required,
the station fire truck is sent to the cooling tower intake
canal
and set
up for drafting operations.
The pump's four 2 1/2
inch discharge outlets are connected to the fire water main intake
connection
vsa four 2 1/2 inch fire hose lines where the
pump is
maintained in standby until directed to operate
by the shift fire
captain.
The inspectors
were concerned with the verification of
operability of the backup fire truck fire pump.
This procedure
does
not verify the operability of the fire pump on the fire truck (i.e.,
ability to draw a prime, )n order to develop required flow and
pressure) prior to being connected to the underground. fire main
system via the intake connection.
The licensee
agreed to revise the
procedure to address verification of fire pump operability.
In addition, the inspectors
reviewed procedures
14FT-OFPOl, Diesel
Driven Fire
Pumps Start
and
Run, Revision 2, Effective Date 5-15-90
and 14AC-OFP09,
C02 Fire Suppression
System Valve Position
~rification, Revision 1, Effective Date 10-24-90.
The inspectors
did not identify any concerns
and found these
procedures
to be
adequate.
Fire Bri ade Readiness
The inspectors
reviewed the content of the classroom instruction
provided to the fire brigade
by reviewing the following lesson plans
and course outlines:
NPF16-00-XP-001-00,
Revision Date ll/21/90, Confined Space
Drill;
NPL02-01-RC-001-00,
Revision Date 8/13/90, Ventilation;
NPL05-01-RC-001-00,
Revision Date 8/29/90, Mater Supply;
NPL10-01-RC-001-00,
Revision Date 8/17/90, Sprinklers;
NPL18-00-RC-001-00,
Revision Date 3/1/90, Fire Behavior;
NPF42-00-RC-001-00,
Revision Date 12/17/90,
Types of Fires
and
Hazards at
and
NPF46-00-RC-001-00,
Revision Date 12/17/90,
Elements that
Define the Plant Fire Protection
Program.
This review verified that the fire brigade
lesson plans were
properly structured
and organized.
However, the technical
content
of the lesson
plans
and outlines focused
on the generic principles
of fire fighting which are applied routinely to non-nuclear
applications.
The inspectors
discussed
with the licensee that
nuclear plant fire protection problems
and hazards,
such
as fire in
the electrical
switchgear
room, are unique and should
be discussed
in detail during various lessons.
The licensee
recognized
these
concerns
and indicated that they would resolve
them 8uring
subsequent
revisions to the lesson plans.
The inspectors
witnessed
an unannounced fire brigade drill.
The
scenario
was fault/explosion/fire in a piece of safety related
switchgear in the Unit 1 "B" switchgear
room on elevation
100-0 of
the control building.
The initiation of the drill was unique in
that the drill statement,
which identified the initial conditions of
the fire, was. given to the actual fire watch person performinq fire
watch duties in the "A" switchgear
room (Note - During the dn 11 the
fire watch who participated
was relived by another qualified fire
watch).
The fire watch reacted to the drill and promptly went to
the phone
a'nd notified the control
room via the emergency
number.
The fire watch then returned to the area adjacent to the entrance of
the "B" switchgear
room to await the arrival of the fire brigade.
Upon arrival of the brigade,
the fire watch reported the observed
fire conditions to the brigade captain.
During the drill the 'inspectors
evaluated
the fire brigade for
adequate
performance
in the following areas:
Protective clothing properly utilized;
Self contained breathing
apparatus
(SCBA) properly utilized;
Hose lines properly deployed
and utilized;
Entry into the fire room don'e properly;
Assessment
of fire brigade leaders direction, thoroughness,
accuracy,
and effectiveness
during the fire fighting effort;
Adequacy of radio communications with control
room;
Checking for fire extension;
Utilization of the fire fighting pre-plans/strategies;
Adequacy of smoke removal operations
performed by the fire
brigade;
and
Manual fire fighting equipment sufficient to properly and
efficiently perform the required fire fighting operations.
The inspectors
noted
good performance
by the fire watch who reported
the fire.
In addition, the inspectors
observed
good fire brigade
team work and good cooperation
and information exchange
between the
operations fire technical
advisor
and the fire brigade captain
(leader).
The inspectors
found security response
and control of the
areas
around the fire fighting activities to be effective and
efficient.
During the dri11,
communica
iona between the control
room and the fire scene was'ound
to be'ffective.
The inspectors
noted that the drill participants
played their designated
roles
effectively-and
responded
appropriately to drill artificialities.
However, the inspectors
observed
areas of the fire briqade's
performance
on which the licensee
needs to focus addit>onal
attention.
The inspectors
observed that the method for getting fire
fighting support equipment to the fire scene
could be improved.
Hu)tiple trips had to be
made
by one brigade
member in order to get
the required
equipment
on the scene.
Th>s appears
to be an
ineffective use of limited fire fighting resources.
In addition,
the inspectors
noted that the search
and rescue
techniques
were
basic
and more advance
techniques,
such
as personal lite line
techniques,
would improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of-this
operation.
The inspectors
expressed
concern regarding
communications
between the fire brigade
members in the fire room and
the fire brigade captain.
The radios currently used
by the brigade
do not use lapel type microphone/speakers
and the turnout coats
are
not equipped with radio pockets.
Fire brigade
members,
in order to
communicate
and receive orders,
are currently required to hold the
portable radios
near their .heads in order to listen.
This type of
communication occupies
the use of one arm and hand to hold the radio
and lends itself to loss of the radio in low visibility areas.
Loss
of the radio occurs
when the radio is set
down in order to perform
fire fighting operations.
With the
use of lapel
microphones/speakers
along with a radio pocket
on the turnout coat,
use of the arm and hand is regained, fire fighting operations
can
continue
more effectively, and communications
can
be maintained with
the fire fighting forces
more efficiently.
In addition, the
inspectors
noted additional
communication
concerns.
Communications
distortion was noted between
brigade
member to brigade
member
and
brigade
member to radio microphone when'wearing se'If contained
eathing apparatus
(SCBA).
The
SCBA used
by the fire brigade
does
riot incorporate
voice amplification devices;
The inspectors
were
also concerned with the deployment of the fire attack
hose line.
The hose line was extended with the standpipe
pack at the point of
entry to the fire room.
Under these drill conditions,
the fire hose
line was not charged with water and
made this operation
and the
advancement
of the hose into the fire room possible.
However,
under
this hose configuration, if the hose line was charged with water,
the brigade would have
had great difficulty in advancing the hose
into'he fire room.
These observations
and concerns
regarding
communication, life line techniques,
hose line deployment,
and
movement of support equipment,
were received favorably by the
licensee.
The licensee
indicated that each concern would be
addressed
and corrective action taken
as warranted.
The inspectors
found the overall performance of the fire brigade to
the drill scenario to be satisfactory.
Plant Tour and Ins ection of Plant Fire Protection Features
The inspectors
toured the following 'plant areas:
fire pump house;
the Unit j. Auxiliary buHding, main steam structures
and the
radiological controlled area;
the Unit 2 turbine building, diesel
generators
A and B, control
room,
and the upper
and lower cable
spreading
rooms;
and Unit 3 turbine and control buildings.
0
I
0
During this tour the inspectors visually inspected
the fire
protection equipment/features
provided in these
areas
and the
adequacy of the licensee's fire prevention
program from a
performance
based perspective.
On these tours the inspectors
visually verified the following:
Transient combustibles
properly controlled;
Flammable
and combustible liquids, including hazardous
chemicals,
properly controlled;
-Melding, cutting, grinding, and open flame operations
controlled;
Housekeepinq
properly maintained;,
Fire detection
operable with no indications of system trouble;
Manual fire hose stations
and appear in good working
condition;
Portable fire extinguishers
Automatic suppression
systems
and in good material
condition; and
Fire barr>ers
(doors, penetration
seals, fire dampers)
and
cable
raceway
and equipment fire barriers operable.
The inspectors
observed
the following conditions (discussed
further in
subsequent
paragraphs):
The material
and housekeeping
conditions in the fire pump house
'ere
considered
to be below average.
In the Unit 3 turbine building, the directional water spray
nozzles for the turbine bearing fire suppression
system were
not properly aimed at the bearing assembly.
Thermal fire
detectors
over the main feedwater
pumps were not properly
.
aligned over the hazard.
In the Unit 1 "B" auxiliary feedwater
pump room,
raceway fire
barrier (thermolag) for train "A" auxiliary feedwater conduits
ARK 70 and 71 was breached..
In the Unit 1 Main steam support structure
on the 100'-0"
elevatioh,
the support for junction box 1EZCAEBKKJ11 was not
properly protected
by thermolag fire barrier material.
It was noted that, overall, the material condition of the fire
protection features
and the housekeeping
in the Unit 1
radiation controlled area
(RCA) and the cable spreading
areas
were above average
when compared to the features
provided and
the housekeeping
in the main steam support, turbine building,
and fire pump house structures.
In the Unit 1
RCA on the 120'-0" el,evation,
channel
"D"
electrical penetration
room, protecto wire thermal detector,
for cable tray lEZA1BNTXA, installation discrepancies
were
noted.
In Unit 1, channel
"D" electrical penetration
room, spare
embedded'onduits
lEZA2BDRK07 and
1EZA2BDRK09 located in the
east
2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire barrier-wall separating fire area
47B from
fire area
52D were not.provided with metal conduit plugs.
Thermolag fire barriers for Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75
compliance were'ot easily identifiable from those required for
Appendix
R compliance.
The licensee
was responsive
to the conditions identified in the fire pump
house.
The licensee
s actions, prior to the completion of this
inspection,
included steam cleaning of piping and the
pump rooms,
removing fuel oil contaminated
water from the diked areas
under the
outside fuel oil tanks,
and initiating efforts to paint the fire
protection piping in the rooms.
During the walkdown of the Unit 3 turbine building, the inspectors
noted
fire protection system configuration control concerns
associated
with the
water spray nozzles protecting the turbine bearings
and the thermal fire
detectors
installed over the main feedwater
pumps.
The water spray
nozzles
were not properly aimed at the bearing assemblies.
The
inspectors
noted that the misaligned configuration could affect the fire
control
and suppression
efficiency of the system.
The inspectors
also
noted that the thermal detectors for the main feedwater
pumps were not
properly aligned over the hazard.
The detector
probe
and heat collector
were not in a position which would provide optimum response.
In the
judgement of the inspectors,
the detectors
would have responded
to a
fire, however,
a time delay would have
been associated
with the response.
The pensee
noted the inspectors
concerns
and indicated that they would
correct these conditions.
Future inspections will be conducted to assess
whether the licensee's
programs
are sufficiently complete in providing
details regarding the directional alignment of spray nozzles
and
detection
equipment.
This is identified as Followup Item
50-528/91-21-02.
The inspectors
performed
a walkdown of thermolag fire barrier assemblies
required for compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.
During this
walkdown the inspectors
noted in the Unit 1 "B" auxiliary feedwater
pump
room that the thermolag fire barrier protecting train "A'uxiliary
feedwater conduits
ARK 70 and 71 was breached.
The inspectors
requested
the licensee
to verify that this Appendix
R barrier impairment was noted
on the plant's Fire System Impairment
Log and that this impairment was
identified on the fire watch fire system
impairment log sheet.
The
licensee verified that this impairment was not identified in the plant
fire system
impairment log and was not identified as
an impairment
covered
by the current roving fire watch which was patrolling the "B"
pump room.
The licensee fire protection staff was
not aware of this impairment and the appropriate
compensatory
measures
for this specific impairment were not implemented.
The inspectors
reviewed Mork Request
(MR) 778204 which removed the thermolag fire
barrier material in order to remove
an
HVAC spool piece for a dapper
inspection.
According to procedure
14AC=9FP02, Fire Barrier Seal
and
Structural
Steel Fireproofing
Removal
and Reinstallation,. Section
3. 1.5
and 3. 1.6 requires that the work control groups
ensure that
an approved
r
0
Fire Barrier Seal
Removal
Request
(FBSRR) is included in the
WR, and the
work group notify fire protection of the fire barrier breach.
The
inspectors verified that
a
FBSRR was not included in the
MR and fire
protection
was not notified as required
by the procedure.
The work
associated
with this request
was,completed
on October 31,
1990.
On
November 7, 1990, the licensee
issued
MR 779210 to reinstall the
thermolag fire barrier material
on the affected conduits.
.At the time of
the inspection, this
WR had not been scheduled to be worked.
As a result
of this condition the licensee
issued Material Nonconformance
Report
(NNCR) 91-FP-2044.
Palo Verde Unit 1 Operating
License
NPF-41, License
Condition
C (7), Fire Protection
Program,
requires the licensee to
implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire
protection.
The approved fire protection program, including the
requirements
of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c., was not
maintained.
Redundant
systems
required for safe
shutdown were not
adequately
protected against fire in the train "B" auxiliary feedwater
pump room.
Failure to maintain fire protection features
required to
rotect safe
shutdown capability is identified as
an apparent violation
0-528/91-21-01.
During the tour of the Unit 1 main steam support structure
(HSSS) the
inspectors,
in conjunction with the licensee,
identified a support for
electrical junction box lEZCAEBKKJll that was not protected in accordance
with UFSAR Section 9.B.2. 12.1. c, Deviation 6 (Page 9B.2-331).
This
section requires that intervening steel
which comes in physical contact
with the protected
raceway shall
be protected with thermolag
for a
distance of 8 inches
from the point of contact with the raceway to
provide the protection envelope
needed to meet the required fire rating.
As a result of this condition the licensee
issued
NNCR 91-FP-2046
and
fir6 impairment 1-91-126.
The inspectors
consider this'ssue
to be
licensee identified and will followup o'n their corrective actions during
a subsequent
NRC inspection.
In touring the Unit 1
RCA the inspectors
noted that overall the material
conditions of the fire protection features
and the housekeeping
was above
, average
when compared to the features
provided and the housekeeping
in
the main steam support, turbine building, and fire pump house structures.
On elevation 120'-0" of the
RCA, in the channel
"D" electrical
room, the inspectors,
in conjunction with the licensee,
identified that spare
embedded
conduits
(lEZA2BDRK07 and
1EZA2BDRK09)
were not provide with metal conduit plugs in accordance
with drawing
13-E-ZAC-050, Revision 24, Note 3.23.
The drawing requires that all
spare
embedded
conduits penetrating fire rated floors and walls be sealed
with metal plugs at both ends.
As a result of this condition the
licensee
issued
WCR 91-FP-2043.
The inspectors
consider this issue to
be licensee identified and will followup on their. corrective -actions
during a subsequent
NRC inspection.
In addition, during this tour, the inspectors
and the licensee identified
a configuration concern associated
with the protecto wire thermal
detector in cable tray 1EZAlBNTNA.
The detector
was noted hanging
outside of the cable tray and not installed in a criss-cross
fash>on
across
the cabling in the tray as required.
As a result of this
condition, the licensee
issued
MNCR 91-FP-2045.
The inspectors
consider
0
I
this issue to be licensee identified and will followup on their
corrective actions during a subsequent
NRC- inspection.
During the walkdowns
and inspection of the electrical
raceway fire
barrier enclosures
(thermolag) required for Appendix
R compliance,
there
was confusion in some plant areas
by the licensee
s staff, in identifying
the thermolag fire barrier enclosures
required for Appendix
R and those
required for RG 1.75 compliance.
Appendix
have
a
specified fire rating,
dependent
upon the period of resistance
to a
standard fire exposure,
of 1-hour or 3-hours
as applicable for fire
protection to ensure
safe
shutdown capability.
required for electrical
separation,
are not fire rated,
nor are the
barrier structures
required to be maintained at the
same quality level of
integrity as the Appendix
R barriers.
The inspectors
were concerned
from
a performance
based
inspection perspective that neither the licensee's
staff or NRC inspectors
could readily identify thermolag fire barrier
enclosures
required for Appendix
R compliance.
The inability to identify
these barriers,
through routine visual inspection techniques,
without
engineering
support documents,
decreases
the efficiency of identifying
fire barrier deficiencies
by plant personnel
not familiar with the
fire/safe
shutdown analysis.
Currently, without the in plant
identification of these barriers,
the safety significance of these
barriers
and the importance of there integrity ss not recognized
by
non-fire protection plant personnel.
The licensee
concurred with the
inspectors
finding and indicated that they would develop
a method to
field identify the Appendix
R barriers
and those required to meet
The verification method for field identification of Appendix
R
.
thermolag fir'e barriers
amd
RG 1.75 required thermolag barriers is
iden+fied
as Foll swop Item 50-528/91-21-03.
e.
Fire Protection
ualit
Assurance
3.
The inspectors verified that the required annual,
biennial
and triennial
audits of the fire protection program wer'e performed.
The annual audit
(Report
No.88-018)
was performed August 8, 1988 through August 29,
1988
by the equality Audits and Monitoring Department
(gAQl).
One of the five
team
members
was
a technical specialist in the area of fire protection.
Audit Report
No.89-018 documents
the biennial audit performed
by gAEA
during the period of August 7-31,
1989.
The biennial audit team was
composed of -eleven
team
members.
The triennial audit,
documented
in
Audit Report
No.90-016, consisted of five full time auditors
and four
part time auditors;
the audit was performed August 6, 1990 through
September
14,
1990.
The triennial included
an outside
independent fire
protection consultant
as required
by Technical Specifications Section 6.5.3.5(g).
These audits provided
a comprehensive
evaluation
and
assessment
of the performance
and effectiveness
of the implementation
of.
Exit Meetin
The inspectors
met with the licensee
management
representatives
denoted
in paragraph
1 on June 7, 1991.
The scope of the inspection
and the
findings as described
in this report were discussed.
Also documented
in
0
t
10
Section 2.e of this report are the findings of information reviewed in
the region
on June
12,
1991.