ML17305A997

Special Rept 2-SR-89-010:on 891201,post-accident Sampling Sys Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Probably Caused by Leak Booster Pump Seals.Replacement Booster Pump Installed & Clogged Valve Replaced

ML17305A997
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	08/09/1990
From:	James M. Levine ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
2-SR-89-010, 2-SR-89-10, NUDOCS 9008130263
Download: ML17305A997 (6)

Text

ACCELERATED DI"RIBUTION DEMONSTWTION SYSTEM SD-939'4 REGULATORY XNFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RXDS)

ACCESSXON NBR: 9008130263 DOC. DATE: 90/08/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVXNE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILXATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Special Rept 2-SR-89-010:on 891201,PASS inoperable for more 7 days. Caused by leaking booster pump seals. 'han D

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TXTLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),

QIncident ENCL SIZE:

Rpt, etc. S NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D PETERSON,S. 1 1 TRAMMELL,C. 1 .1 D

INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 ,1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRg~ T SPLB8D1 '1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 EG 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 GN FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL 'G&G BRYCE g J H ~ 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHYgG ~ A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 D

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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK ROOi~l Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMliNATEYOUR NAME FROivl DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUlvlENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPXES REQUIRED: LTTR 36 ENCL 36

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P,O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00684-JML-TRB-RKR JAMES M. LEVINE August 9, 1990 VICE PRESIDENT hUCI.EAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-37 Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)

Special Report 2-SR-89-010 ile 90-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 2 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System inoperable for greater than seven days. This supplement is submitted to provide the cause of failure.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours, JML/TRB/RKR/dmn Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)

J. B. Martin D. H. Coe C. M. Trammell A. C. Gehr A. H-. Gutterman

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Post Accident Sampling System Inoperable for Greater Than 7 Days License No. NPF-51 Supplement 2 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 Initial Condition On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 2 with the reactor coolant system (RCS)(AB) at approximately 2241 psia and 565 degrees Fahrenheit. Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 requires the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)(IP) to be operable when in Modes 1, 2, or 3. TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 requires PASS to be restored to an operable status within 7 days or initiate the Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program (PASP) and prepare and submit a special report.

Descri tion Of Event At approximately 1400 MST on November 5, 1989, PASS was declared inoperable in order to perform scheduled preventive maintenance and surveillance tests. At this time Unit 2 was in Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN). On November 24, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Unit 2 entered Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY). TS permits Mode changes with PASS inoperable. During the maintenance and testing, several equipment problems were identified.

PASP was initiated on November 24, 1989 at approximately 0740 MST.

On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, the 7 day limit for TS 3.3.3. 1 ACTION 28 was exceeded.

Cause of Event After completion of the scheduled preventive maintenance activities it was determined that the PASS booster pump seals were leaking. Troubleshooting determined that the PASS booster pump discharge check valve was allowing leakage that pressurized the pump to a pressure above the 150 psig seal rating. The leaking check valve was replaced and a new PASS booster pump has been installed. The probable cause of the check valve leakage was foreign material on the valve seat. The valve was not disassembled due to ALARA concerns, therefore the exact cause could not be determined.

At approximately 1730 MST on February 7, 1990 while performing post maintenance testing to return PASS to service, the sample bomb could not be depressurized prior to taking a Reactor Coolant System gas sample. Troubleshooting determined that the inability to depressurize the sample bomb was due to a clogged valve. The clogged valve was replaced.

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NRC Document Control Desk Special Report 2-SR-89-010-02 Page 2 Corrective Action The scheduled preventive maintenance was completed. The leaking check valve was replaced. A replacement booster pump was installed. The clogged valve preventing depressurization of the sample bomb was replaced. The recommendations developed after determining the causes of the check valve leakage and the clogged valve are being evaluated to determine the appropriate course of action. The evaluation is expected to be completed by September 14, 1990. A schedule will then be developed for implementing any actions based upon the results of the evaluation.

PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 1725 MST on July 10, 1990 after Unit 2 entered Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY) during startup from the refueling outage. Unit 2 shutdown for the refueling outage on February 23, 1990.

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