ML17305A684
| ML17305A684 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1990 |
| From: | James M. Levine ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 1-SR-90-001, 1-SR-90-1, NUDOCS 9004200523 | |
| Download: ML17305A684 (10) | |
Text
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DE Mvh 6 lwLiiv 8 6 I > I 5Pi REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIONQISTEM (RIDS) fACCESSION NBR:9004200523 DOC.DATE: 90/04/06 NOTARIZED: NO
, DOCKET
~ PACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZEVINEFJ.M.
Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Special rept:radiation monitor inoperable for greater than 72 h.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL r S>>E:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
05000528 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA PETERSON,S; INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DET/ESGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL EGStG STUART F V A LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT NOTES:
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A.rizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O, BOX 52034
~
PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00645-JML/TRB/SBJ April 6, 1990 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1 Docket No.
STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)
Special Report 1-SR-90-001 File 90-0 0-404 Attached please find Special Report 1-SR-90-001 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.8 ACTION 42(b) and 6.9.2.
This report discusses a radiation monitor inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Additionally, a copy of this report is being sent to the Regional Administrator.
If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, (Acting)
Compliance
- Manager, at (602) 393-2521.
Very truly yours, JML/TRB/SBJ/tlg Attachment CC:
(all w/attachment)
W. F.
Conway J.
B. Martin E.
E. Van Brunt, Jr.
T. L. Chan D. H.
Coe A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center cy00pp00523
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PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 Radiation Monitoring Unit Inoperable Greater Than 72 Hours License No. NPF-41 Docket No. 50-528 Special Report 1-SR-90-001 DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED A.
Initial Conditions:
On March 7, 1990 Palo Verde Unit 1 was in mode 5 with the reactor coolant system (RCS)(AB) at atmospheric pressure and approximately 90 degrees fahrenheit.
B.
Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):
Event Classification:
Special Report Submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 ACTION 42(b)
On March 7, 1990 at approximately 0546 MST, the fuel building normal ventilation (VG) and essential ventilation systems (VG) were taken out of service for a scheduled maintenance outage on fans and dampers (DMP).
This caused all fuel building ventilation exhaust flow to stop, thereby preventing the fuel building exhaust low range (RU-145)'and high range (RU-146) radiation monitors (IL)
'from obtaining a representative air sample.
The radiation monitors were therefore declared inoperable at approximately 0546 MST.
Technical Specification 3.3.3 '
requires RU-145 and RU-146 to be operable in Modes 1,2,3, and 4 or when there is irradiated fuel in the fuel storage pool. Since the effluent releases via the fuel building ventilation were stopped, alternate sampling of the release pathway was not necessary.
In order to monitor potential
- releases, particulate and iodine samples were taken during the duration of the maintenance.
Additionally, the fuel building doors on the 120 foot elevation to the auxiliary building were opened in order to maintain a negative pressure in the fuel building using the auxiliary building ventilation.
Technical Specification 3.9.12 requires the fuel building essential ventilation systems operable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the storage pool. If neither essential ventilation system is operable, all operations involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool must be suspended.
Therefore, in accordance with
t J
t
Special Report 1-SR-90-001 Page 2
TS 3.9.12(b), all activities in the fuel storage pool and over the fuel storage pool were suspended.
On March 10, 1990 at approximately 0546 MST, RU-146 had been inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Therefore, this report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 Action 42(b).
On April 1, 1990 at approximately 0208 MST the fuel building normal ventilation was returned to service.
At approximately 0345 MST on April 1,
- 1990, RU-145 and RU-146 were declared operable after completion of surveillance testing.
C.
Status of structures,
- systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:
Not applicable
- no structures, systems or components were inoperable at the start of the event which contributed to this event.
D.
Cause of each component or system failure, if known:
Not applicable
- there were no component or system failures.
E.
Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known:
Not applicable
- there were no component failures.
F.
For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also effected:
Not applicable
- there were no component failures with multiple functions.
For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service:
RU-145 and RU-146 were inoperable for approximately 24 days and 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.
H.
Method of discovery of each component of system failure or procedural error:
Not 'applicable
- there were no component or equipment failures.
I
Special Report 1-SR-90-001 Page 3
I.
Cause of Event:
RU-145 and RU-146 were inoperable because of the inability to sample refueling building ventilation exhaust since all fuel building ventilation had been taken out of service to perform scheduled maintenance.
J.
Safety System Response:
Not applicable
- No safety system actuated due to this event.
K.
Failed Component Information:
Not applicable
- there were no component failures.
II.
ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:
There were no safety consequence or implications resulting from this event.
No irradiated fuel was moved and air samples were taken to the monitor fuel building atmosphere for unusual radiological conditions.
No abnormal radiological conditions were identified during this event.
III.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Immediate The fuel building air was sampled for particulate and iodine during the ventilation outage.
The maintenance on the ventilation system was performed and the ventilation systems returned to service.
IV.
Previous Event There have been no previous events in which RU-145/146 were inoperable because the ventilation systems were inoperable.
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