ML17305A580
| ML17305A580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1990 |
| From: | Prendergast K, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17305A578 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-90-07, 50-528-90-7, 50-529-90-07, 50-529-90-7, 50-530-90-07, 50-530-90-7, NUDOCS 9003160160 | |
| Download: ML17305A580 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1990007
Text
U., S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos,
50-528/90-07,
50-529/90-07,
and 50-530/90-07
License
Nos.
and NPF-74
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service
Company
P.
O.
Box 52034
Phoenix,
85072-2034
Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Units 1,
2 and
3
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg,
Inspection dates:
January
29 - February 2,
1990
Inspector:
ren ergast
Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst
Approv'ed by:
U
s,
le
Emergen
Preparedness
and Radiological
Protection
Branch
ate
1gne
a e
sgne
~Summar:
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced
routine inspection of the Emergency
Preparedness
rogram
an
onsite follow-up of written reports of non-routine
events at power
reactor facilities.
Inspection
Procedures
92700
and 82701 were covered.
Results:
Overall, the licensee's
program is adequate
in the area of emergency
preparedness.
One apparent violation of NRC requirements
involving a failure
to classify the
December
30, 1989, transformer fire at Unit 3 as
an Unusual
Event was identified, Section
2.
900"-:l6016C>
500=26
PLIER
ADOCK C>..000-28
0
1.
Persons
Contacted
DETAILS
D. Crozier, Fire Protection Supervisor
M. Czarnylas,
Acting Deputy Chief
D. Smith, Unit 3 Shift Supervisor
B.
Rash,
Unit 2 Senior Technical Advisor
"H. Bieling, Manager,
Emergency
Planning
and Fire Protection
N. Willsey, Emergency
Planning Supervisor
T. Barsuk,
Lead Emergency
Planner
- D. Gouge,
Unit 3 Operations
Manager
- T. Bradish,
Compliance
Manager
"Denotes
personnel
attending 'the exit interview
2.
Onsite Follow-u
of Written
Re orts of Non Routine Events at Power
eac or
aci
1 les
On December
30, 1989, at approximately 1630, fires occurred in the
isophase
fan cubicle at the 140-foot level of the Unit 3 Turbine Building
and the "A" phase
The fire in the isophase
fan cubicle
was extinguished in two to three minutes
by Unit 3 auxiliary operators.
The response
to the fire in the main transformer
by fire protection
personnel
was carried out in a safe
and thorough manner,
and the fire was
ultimately extinguished at 0430, the following day.
The inspector
examined the licensee's
incident report No.3-3-89-037
and
had discussions
with control
room staff and members of the fire team
who responded
to the
fire. The following items were noted:
The Unit 3 Shift Log for December
30, 1989, contained the following
entries
regarding the fire:
1630 Main generator,
turbine trip, report of fire at Phase
"A" of iso"bus cooling surge capacitor.
Also report
of fire at Main Transformer "A".
1632 Report of fire being extinguished, fire protection
on
the scene.
Oil vapors reflashed,
A, fire
protection initiated deluge
and quenched fire.
The Fire Protection Supervisor's
statement,
which will be included
as
an
addendum to the licensee's
incident report,
was obtained
and noted to
contain the following:
On December
30,
1989, at 1636 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.22498e-4 months <br />, Fire Protection
was
notified of a fire at the Unit 3, 140'urbine,
via the
site notification and the emergency
telephone lines.
Enroute to Unit 3, Central
Alarm Station
(CAS) notified
me
by radio that the fire reported at the "A" phase
surge
arrester
on the 140'urbine
was out,per the operator
on
the scene.
Shortly thereafter,
CAS reported that main
transformer
MAN-X01A, plant south of the Turbine Building
was reported to have exploded
and that
smoke
was emitting
from the top.
Upon arrival, Fire Protection positioned,its'sic]
apparatus
plant east
and south of the main transformer.
Water supply was secured
via a hydrant and
command
was
established
at the attack truck.
I assumed
the position
as Incident Commander.
The fire team was sectioned into two (2) teams.
Lname
deleted]
was assigned
to the outside sector.
The interior
sector
was to perform a primary and secondary
(preliminary
and thorough)
search
and rescue,
and to confirm the fire
was out.
Size
up of the transformer
was performed
and the following
were visually observed:
Oil appeared
to have emitted from the transformer
and
was located throughout
an approximate 150'radius.
Gray and white smoke
was coming from the "A" main
transformer
and the quantity appeared light.
Security
was notified to evacuate
the area
and the
control
room was advised of the conditions observed.
I contacted
the control
room and advised
them that
we
needed to activate the ventilation exhaust
fans to remove
the
smoke in the Turbine Buildin~.
I also advised
them
that the fire was out at the 140
[sic] foot level.
At approximately
1648, I ordered
a fire technician to the
deluge valve to standby for foam activation to the deluge
system for the transformer.
- I advised the control
room
that
smoke
was coming from the transformer
and that
we
would be activating the deluge
system
and that we were
positioning
hand lines for safety.
I advised the control
room that oil was observed
on traHers,
vehicles,
and the
ground and requested
that [name deleted] of Environmental
Protection
be contacted.
I also requested
a front loader
and dirt to assist in diking the oil.
The deluge
system
was activated at approximately
1645 for
approximately
5 minutes with very little effect.
Smoke
from the transformer
was getting darker
and heavier.
I
advised the control
room that the fire within the
transformer
was getting worse
and that Fire Protection
would need to apply foam from the hand lines into the
transformer through
a blow out play [sic] holes
on the
side of the transformer.
)
1
[name deleted], Shift Supervisor
and
[name deleted],
Operations
Supervisor
were at the scene.
At approximately
1950 hours0.0226 days <br />0.542 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.41975e-4 months <br />, it was determined that the
hand lines were only effective in slowing down the fire
and that access
to the interior of the transformer would
have to be made.
Flames could still be seen within the
transformer through the cracks at the base
and blowout
holes.
I went to the control
room and spoke with the Shift
Supervisor
and
[name deleted].
They had contacted
a
transformer engineer,
who was enroute to
Electrical Maintenance
was to obtain prints to determine
if applying foam through the
manway
on top would be
beneficial
and would get to the fire inside.
I then requested
that Operations
hang
a clearance
and
spider grounds,
so that the firefighters could climb on
top of the transformer
and open the manway cover.
Operations
advised the clearance
would take several
hours.
Throughout the period,
foam was applied to suppress
the
fire and to ensure
the transformer
was kept cooled
down.
It was then decided to utilize the deluge
system
judiciously to control the fire and temperature.
Mater
applied to the transformer via the deluge
system
introduced water to the oil located at the bottom of the
transformer which caused
several
steam explosions.
On one
instance,
flammable vapors displaced
from the boil over
flashed
and
a large ball of fire emitted from the
transformer
and blackened
the fire walls.
The night shift fire team
came to aid of the incident.
The total fire protection personnel
on the scene
was
now
at 12 people.
At approximately
0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />,
the clearance
was completed
and fire protection
began attempting to remove the
manway
cover.
At approximately
0350 hours0.00405 days <br />0.0972 hours <br />5.787037e-4 weeks <br />1.33175e-4 months <br />,
the cover was
removed
and foam was applied to the core.
At 0430 hours0.00498 days <br />0.119 hours <br />7.109788e-4 weeks <br />1.63615e-4 months <br />, all
visible fire was out and the transformer
was cooled
down.
I declared
the fire out at 0430.
The
PVNGS Station
Log contained
the following comments
from the Unit 2
Senior Technical Advisor who responded
to the fire:
1630 Unit 3 turbine tripped due to faulted
Oiscussed
emergency classification with Unit 3 SS/STA.
No
classification
made
due to fire protection assessment
of
smoldering,
not burning.
Later went out to look from Turbine Building catwalk,
recommended.HUE
~
SS did not classify.
About 2100, the Fire Protection Supervisor stated that the
transformer
was burning; flames were visible from holes in the
transformer.
Discussed
same with the U-3 Plant Manager
and
Night Shift Supervisor.
No classification to be made.
Again,
discussed
with the Ul and
classification
was made."
The licensee's
Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedure,
(EPIP) 02, Revision
7, dated July 26, 1989,
was examined
and noted to contain the following
guidance
regarding the classification of a fire within the unit.
Section 3.2.6, defines "unit" as "the power block and all associated
support equipment
and structures."
Section 4.3.2,
requires
the classification of the event using the
appropriate
appendix.
Appendix B, Tab 4, "Fire And/Or Security Compromise",
requires
the
Notification of Unusual
Event,
(EPIP-03) for a "Fire within the unit
lasting longer than 10 minutes."
Section 4. 1. 1 states,
" If a conflict or uncertainty exists,
the
more conservative
implementing action
EPIP should be initiated when
classifying the event."
Based
upon the above documentation
and discussions
with response
personnel,
the inspector
concluded that Fire Protection
Personnel
responded
to a fire in the Unit 3 main transformer
on December
30, 1989,
from 1630 to 0430 the next morning.
The discussions
with the Shift
Supervisor
and the Operations
Manager indicated the. Shift Supervisor
made
the decision not to declare
the transformer fire as
an unusual
event
based
upon
a report from the Operations
Manager.
The Operations
Manager
had returned
from the transformer area
and reported there
was
smoke, but
no flames present.
The Operations
Manager also stated that upper level
management
and their public information personnel
had been notified.
The
Shift Supervisor also offered the speculation that the smoking
transformer
was not near any safety-related
equipment
and there did not
appear to be any potential for more equipment to be damaged.
Following the event,
the licensee
performed
an investigation utilizing
members of plant staff with expertise in engineering, electrical,
and
operations.
The investigation
was under the direction of plant
management.
Incident Investigation Report
No. 3-3-89-037 described
the
conclusions
of this investigation.
The report identified seven
issues
requiring further action.
Issue
No. 3, "There was confusion about the
criteria for a fire to require the. declaration of an NUE," dealt with the
classification of the event.
The report stated that the Shift Supervisor
consulted plant management
on the classification of the event, that there
were
no flames at the transformer except during re-flash,
and that the
housing
was smoldering.
Also, at least
one interviewee did not consider
the transformer
a part. of the unit.
Based
on the conclusions
described
in the report, the licensee will be clarifying what constitutes
a fire
requiring
a declaration of an unusual
event
and will develop
a consistent
definition of a fire.
The inspector
made the following observations:
the report did not conclude the fire should
have
been classified
as
an
unusual
event;
the report incorrectly stated that emergency
planning was
included in the discussions
resulting in the decision not to classify the
event,
(which, according to the Manager of Emergency Planning,
was not
the case);
and the report did not contain
a written statement
from the
Fire Protection Supervisor,
who was the Incident Commander responsible
for extinguishing the fire.
Based
upon
a review of their implementing procedures
and information from
fire protection personnel, it appears
the licensee
had ample information
to recognize
and classify the fire as
an unusual
event.
The failure to
implement their classification procedure
and declare
an unusual
event
on
December
30,
1989, is an apparent violation of NRC requirements
(90-07-01).
3.
0 erational
Status of the
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Pro
ram (82701)
A.
Emergency Facilities,
Equipment,
Instrumentation,
and Supplies
Section
7 of the Emergency
Plan describes
the licensee's
emergency
facilities and equipment.
EPIP-38,
"Emergency
Equipment
and
Supplies,"
describes
the location and contents of the licensee's
emergency kits and provides
measures
to insure the kits are
maintained in state of operability.
I
An inspection of the licensee's
emergency
response facilities was
conducted to verify that essential
emergency facilities and
equipment
are maintained
as described
by the above
documents.
The
inspection included: verifying instrument calibration dates
and
operability; the availability of updated
copies of the emergency
plan and implementing procedures;
and the maintenance
of the
emergency
response facilities.
The Unit 3 Control
Room and
Satellite Technical
Support Center,
the Technical
Support Center
(TSC), the Emergency Operations
Center,
and the licensee's
field
monitorinq kits were examined.
The inspection determined,
for the
areas visited, that equipment
was operable
and within its
calibration period and that facilities visited were maintained in a
state of readiness
as required by the EPIP.
The findings in this area indicate the licensee
has
a good program
for maintaining its emergency facilities and equipment.
No
violations were identified.
B.
Emer enc
Res
onse Trainin
To determine
the licensee
has established
an adequate
emergency
response
training program in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(15)
and
EPIPs were examined,
a sampling of
training records
and drill reports
were reviewed,
and discussions
were held with individuals responsible for the implementation of the
training program.
The following items were noted:
Records of training for individuals,
who could become the Emergency
Coordinator during an emergency,
indicated the Emergency
Plan
Training required
by Administrative Procedure
Revision
0, dated
November 1, 1989,
was accomplished.
Records
were also
available
documenting the licensee's
tracking list for maintaining
training and bimonthly reviews of the emergency
response
staffing
list.
Records
were also reviewed documenting
emergency
response
training in 1989 for members of the Public Information Staff.
This
training included individuals who would staff the Forward
News
Center,
the Joint Emergency
News Center,
Rumor Control,
and was
considered satisfactory.
Discussions
were held with individuals,
who would activate the Forward
News Center,
and the individuals were
aware of their responsibilities
and the procedures
they would use
for an emergency.
Records of a Medical
Emergency Drill, conducted
September
13, 1989,
were observed.
The records
documented
the objectives of the drill,
the method of verification for the objectives,
a critique of the
drill activities,
and recommendations
for improvement.
The drill
was considered
successful
in meeting its objectives,
providing
effective training,
and providing management
with areas for
improvement.
Records of a time study activation drill, conducted
December
14,
1989,
were also observed,
documenting the licensee's
capabilities to
activate their emergency
response facilities during off-hours with
key individuals within the 60 minutes specified in the
This drill was also considered
successful.
'icensee
performance
in this program area
appears fully
satisfactory.
The licensee
appears
to have established
a good
program to document
and maintain their Emergency
Response
Training
Program.
No violations of NRC requirements
were identified in this
program area.
Licensee Audits
The licensee's
internal audit to meet the requirements
was performed by members of the Site equality Assurance
Program. 'udit No.89-017 was conducted July 10-21,
1989,
and the
report was transmitted to appropriate
members of plant management
on
August 31,
1989.
The audit was examined
and noted to include
evaluations
of the interface with state
and local government,
licensee drills and exercises,
the EPIPs,
and follow-up of areas
identified during last year's
10 CFR 50.54(t) audit.
The portion of
the audit that dealt with State
and local agencies
was transmitted
to appropriate
agencies
by letters,
dated August 18,
1989.
There were
no deficiencies identified in the audit.
The audit scope
contained
the areas
described in 10 CFR 50.54(t),
however,
the audit depth
was minimal.
As an example,
an
NRC concern
regarding interim protective
measures
for problems with the site
public system
was audited.
The audit referenced
a letter describing
compensatory
measures
for the
27 areas identified for enhancement,
but no attempt
was
made to examine or document the adequacy
or
completion of the compensatory
measures.
Although the audit was
considered
to meet the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.54(t),
improvement
to the depth of the audit was discussed
during the
NRC exit.
The findings in this program area
appear to indicate declining
performance
since the previous evaluation.
D.
Or anization
and
Mana ement Control
To verify changes
to the licensee's
emergency organization
have
been
incorporated into the EPIPs,
discussions
were held with emergency
planning personnel
and the Emergency
Plan and implementing
procedures-
were examined.
The following items were noted:
The emergency
planning group has hired two new individuals.
The
new individuals have
a background in health physics
and
reactor operations
and will be involved in the licensee's
ambitious drill and exercise
program.
E
The licensee
has established
two new positions in their
management
organization.
The
new positions include the Vice
President,
Engineering
and Construction,
and the Vice
President,
Nuclear Safety
and Licensing,
and are intended to
strengthen
the depth
and experience
currently available in the
organization.
The licensee
has
a
new Director of Site Services,
who has the
responsibility for emergency planning.
The
new director was
reported to be fully supportive of emergency
planning
and also
responsible
in-part for the acquisition of a new computer in
the
EOF to aid in the timeliness of dose projection.
An examination of the
EPIPs verified that the Emergency
Plan
and implementing procedures
have
been revised to included the
new individuals into the Emergency
Response
Organization.
Emergency
response
training was also noted to have
been
completed or scheduled
to be completed in the near future.
Licensee
performance
in this program area
appears fully
satisfactory.
No violations of NRC requirements
were identified.
4.
Exit Interview
An exit interview to discuss
the preliminary
NRC findings was held on
February 2, 1990.
Licensee
personnel
present at this meeting are
identified in Section
1 of this report.
During this meeting,
the
licensee
was informed of the inspector's
concerns
regarding the
classification of the December
30, 1989,
event
and that further
discussions
with NRC management
were planned.
Subsequent
to this
meeting,
the inspector
informed the Manager of Emergency
Planning, that
based
upon these
discussions,
the failure to declare
an unusual
event for
the transformer fire was
an apparent violation of NRC requirements
for
fai ling to implement the Emergency
Plan.
Other items discussed
during
this meeting are described
in Sections
2 and
3 of this report.
t
I
~