ML17300B326
| ML17300B326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1999 |
| From: | Pellet J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Overbeck G ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| 50-528-99-18, 50-529-99-18, 50-530-99-18, NUDOCS 9909170024 | |
| Download: ML17300B326 (83) | |
Text
Distribution Sheet Distri73.txt j/~g/use Priority: Normal From: Elaine Walker Action Recipients:
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Item: ADAMS Document Library: ML ADAMS"HQNTAD01 ID'03677261
Subject:
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONINSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-528/99-1 8; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18 Page 1
II
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Docket: 05000528, Notes: STANDARDIZEDPLANT Docket: 05000529, Notes: Standardized plant.
Docket: 05000530, Notes: Standardized plant.
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Cy UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-6064 January 18, 2000 Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
SUBJECT:
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONINSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-528/99-18; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18
Dear Mr. Overbeck:
This letter refers to NRC Inspection Report 50-528/99-18; 50-529/9918; 50-530/99-18 that was mailed to you on January 14, 2000. Because of a distribution error, the report contains two page 3s. One page 3 begins with a "Summary of Plant Status," which refers to Palo Verde, this is the correct page.
The other page 3 needs to be removed, as it refers to a different site and inspection.
We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.
Sincerely, John L. Pellet, Chief
,Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.:
50-528; 50-529; 50-530 License Nos.: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 CC:
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800
- Rosemead, California 91770
I
Arizona Public Service Company Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Angela K. Krainik, Director Regulatory Affairs Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 John C. Horne, Vice President, Power Generation EI Paso Electric Company 2702 N. Third Street, Suite 3040 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.
General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills El Paso, Texas 79901 John W. Schumann, Los Angeles Department of Water 8 Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, ¹1206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Jarlath Curran Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, California 92672
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Arizona Public Service Company E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail notification of report issuance to the PV SRI and Site Secretary (JHM2, TLB4).
E-Mail notification of issuance of all documents to Nancy Holbrook (NBH).
bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Resident Inspector RIV File RITS Coordinator Branch Chief (DRP/D)
Senior Project Engineer (DRP/D)
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Item: ADAMSDocument Library: ML ADAMS"HQNTAD01 ID: 003677171
Subject:
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONINSPECTION REPORT NO. 60-528/99-18; 50-529/99-18; 60-530/99-1 8 Page 1
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Distri98.txt 00$
Docket: 05000528, Notes: STANDARDIZEDPLANT Docket: 05000529, Notes: Standardized plant.
Docket: 05000530, Notes: Standardized plant.
Page 2
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-6064 January 18, 2000 Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
SUBJECT:
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONINSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-528/99-18; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18
Dear Mr. Overbeck:
This letter refers to NRC Inspection Report 50-528/99-18; 50-529/9918; 50-530/99-18 that was mailed to you on January 14, 2000.
Because of a distribution error, the report contains two page 3s.
One page 3 begins with a "Summary of Plant Status," which refers to Palo Verde, this is the correct page.
The other page 3 needs to be removed, as it refers to a different site I
and inspection.
We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.
Sincerely, John I. Pellet, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.:
50-528; 50-529; 50-530 License Nos.: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 CC:
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 el Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800
- Rosemead, California 91770 g>(,V 7lt/
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Arizona Public Service Company Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Angela K. Krainik, Director Regulatory Affairs Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 John C. Horne, Vice President, Power Generation EI Paso Electric Company 2702 N. Third Street, Suite 3040 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.
General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills El Paso, Texas 79901 John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, ¹1206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Jarlath Curran Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, California 92672
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Arizona Public Service Company Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdate, Arizona 85251
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Arizona Public Service Company E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail notification of report issuance to the PV SRI and Site Secretary (JHM2, TLB4).
E-Mail notification of issuance of all documents to Nancy Holbrook (NBH).
bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Resident Inspector RIV File BITS Coordinator Branch Chief (DRP/D)
Senior Project Engineer (DRP/D)
DOCUMENT NAME: R:5 PNPV918lt1-lmb.wpd To receive co of document, indicate In box: "C" = Co without enclosures "E ~ Co with enclosures "N" = No co C:OB:DRS JLPellet/Imb OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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Distribution Sheet Distri93.txt Priority: Normal From: Stefanie Fountain Action Recipients:
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1 Not Found Not Found Internal Recipients:
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21 item: ADAMS Package Library: ML ADAMS"HQNTAD01 ID: 003676040
Subject:
General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice ofViolation Response Page 1
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R ADOCK 05000628 Q Distri93.txt Docket: 05000528; Notes: STANDARDlZEDPLANT Docket: 05000529, Notes: Standardized plant.
Docket: 06000530, Notes: Standardized plant.
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0 gO UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011-6064 January 14, 2000 Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
SUBJECT:
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONINSPECTION REPORT NO..50-528/99-18; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18
Dear Mr. Overbeck:
This refers to the inspection conducted on November 29 through December 3, 1999, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, facilities. In-office inspection of certain records requested by the inspectors was also performed in the weeks preceding the onsite portion of the inspection.
The results of this inspection were discussed with your staff telephonically on January 14, 2000. The purpose of the inspection was to review your facility's corrective action program,'using the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedure 40500.
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The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.
On the basis of the sample reviewed, your corrective action program was generally implemented with an appropriate threshold for identifying, classifying, and prioritizing adverse conditions. The corrective action program was found acceptable and your staff was considered aggressive and self-critical in identifying and resolving adverse conditions.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined one Severity Level IVviolation of NRC requirements occurred related to a failure to comply with procedures.
The violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The noncited violation is described in the subject inspection report.
If you contest the violation or severity level of the noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Arizona Public Service Company Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we willbe pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, John L. Pellet, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.:
50-528; 50-529; 50-530 License Nos.: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No.
50-528/99-18; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18 cc w/enclosure:
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800
- Rosemead, California 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Angela K. Krainik, Director
,Regulatory Affairs Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
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Arizona Public Service Company John C. Horne, Vice President, Power Generation El Paso Electric Company 2702 N. Third Street, Suite 3040 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.
General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills El Paso, Texas 79901 John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water 8 Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, 01206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Jarlath Curran Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, California 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
1
Arizona Public Service Company E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail notification of report issuance to the PV SRI and Site Secretary (JHM2, TLB4).
E-Mail notification of issuance of ail documents to Nancy Holbrook (NBH).
bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident Inspector DRP Director RIV File DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/D)
Senior Project Engineer (DRP/D)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
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E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail notification of report issuance to the PV SRI and Site Secretary (JHM2, TLB4).
E-Mail notification of issuance of all documents to Nancy Holbrook (NBH).
bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident Inspector DRP Director RIV File DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/D)
Senior Project Engineer (DRP/D)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
DOCUMENT NAME: R:5 PNpv918rp-tom.wpd To receive co of document, Indicate in box: "C" = Co without enclosures "E" = Co with enclosur
= No co RIV:SRE:
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION REGION IV Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-528; 50-529; 50-530 NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 50-528/99-1 8; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18 Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona November 29 through December 3, 1999 Thomas O. McKemon, Senior Reactor Engineer, Operations Branch Howard F. Bundy, Senior Reactor Engineer, Operations Branch Gary W. Johnston, Senior Reactor Engineer, Operations Branch Nancy Salgado, Resident Inspector, Project Branch D John L. Pellet, Chief, Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/99-18; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18 Three regional inspectors and a resident inspector performed a routine core inspection of the corrective action program implementation at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, from November 29 through December 3, 1999. The inspectors used NRC Inspection Procedure 40500 to evaluate the licensee's effectiveness in identifying, evaluating, resolving, and preventing problems that could affect safe plant operations.
The licensee maintained a low threshold for initiating corrective action documents.
Management and craft personnel shared a common understanding about program expectations, capabilities, and goals.
~Oerations
~
The team concluded that the licensee had an acceptable corrective action program with several good attributes and characteristics.
The licensee's staff was aggressive and highly self-critical in identifying adverse problems and implementing action plans for correction and to preclude recurrence.
The licensee's corrective action processes-provided adequate guidance for identifying, classifying, and prioritizing adverse conditions.
Licensee personnel were willingto initiate condition reports/disposition requests for any adverse or questionable conditions (Section 07.1).
The licensee's failure to followthe procedure governing design engineering routing design modifications to the nuclear training department for training impact reviews was a Severity Level IVviolation. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation (50-528;-529;-530/9918-01), consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 07.1).
11 Re ort Details Summa of Plant Status Allthree Palo Verde units operated at approximately full power during the entire inspection period.
I. 0 erations 07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Condition Re ortin Process and Corrective Actions a.
Ins ection Sco e 40500 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's programs intended to identify and correct problems discovered at the facility. The review focused on the following seven specific areas:
(1) the identification and reporting threshold for adverse conditions, (2) the setting of problem resolution priorities that were commensurate with operability and safety determinations, (3) program monitoring used by the licensee to assure continued program effectiveness, (4) program measurement or trending of adverse conditions, (5) the understanding of the program by all levels of station personnel, (6) the ability to identify and resolve repetitive problems, and (7) resolution of noncited violations.
The inspectors reviewed plant documents, interviewed management and working level personnel, and attended licensee meetings.
The inspectors reviewed, in varying detail, condition reports, listed in the attachment to this inspection report, to ascertain the effectiveness of the licensee actions in resolving and preventing issues that degraded the quality of safe plant operations.
The team selected areas in part on the basis of the risk significance of the system or components.
Systems included the high pressure safety injection system, emergency feedwater system, emergency diesel generator system, and the essential chilled water system.
The inspectors also reviewed condition reports for the disposition and evaluation of operability issues, as well as, the adequacy of the root cause analysis.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program interface with other lower-tier programs, such as procedure revisions and maintenance action items, that could result in corrective action. The inspectors monitored the performance of the licensee's condition report/disposition request (CRDR) review committee.
The inspectors reviewed quality assurance audits, self assessments, and licensee response to NRC and industry generic communications.
The inspectors also reviewed a sample of licensee event reports, listed in the attachment of this report, for compliance with 10 CFR 50.73 and for the effectiveness of licensee personnel in identifying, resolving, and preventing the occurrence of problems that affected safe plant operations.
O. Re ort Details Summa of Plant Status Both Units operated at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of this inspection.
I. 0 erations 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Initial Written Examination On December 10, 1999, the facility licensee proctored the administration of the written examination, approved by the chief examiner and Region IV supervision, to four applicants for reactor operator and four applicants for senior reactor operator licenses.
The licensee proposed grading for the written examinations and evaluated the results for question validityand generic weaknesses.
The examiners reviewed the licensee's results.
b.
Observations and Findin s Alleight applicants, four reactor operators, two instant senior operators and two senior operator upgrades, passed the written examination.
Written examination scores ranged from a low of 83 to a high of 97 with an average of 90.5 percent overall. The reactor operator applicants'cores ranged from 83 to 90 with an average of 87.75 percent.
The senior reactor operator applicants'cores ranged from 89 to 97 with an average of 93.25 percent.
Post-examination review by the licensee indicated no broad knowledge or performance weaknesses and the chief examiner's review supported this conclusion.
The licensee's post-examination review identified an error in the reactor operator answer key. The answer key listed for Question 82 distractor 'D's the correct answer when 'C'as the correct answer.
The answer key was changed and the examinations re-evaluated.
The licensee's post-examination comments are included in.
c.
Conclusions Alleight license applicants passed the written examination.
No broad knowledge or training weaknesses were identified as a result of the analysis and review of the questions.
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b.
Observations and Findin s b.1 Threshold of Re ortin The team noted that there were two processes for identifying, evaluating, and correcting conditions adverse to quality: (1) through a (CRDR); or (2) through a work request.
Procedure 90DP-OIP10, "Condition Reporting," Revision 8, provided instructions for initiating a CRDR for: (1) nonhardware conditions with the potential to adversely affect the safe operation of the plant; (2) hardware and nonhardware conditions with the potential to significantly impact safe operation of the plant; and (3) requests for technical evaluations.
The team noted that all CRDRs were required to be screened by the strategic assessment group to determine if enough information was available for the CRDR review committee to evaluate the CRDRs. A CRDR review committee, which was staffed by personnel from operations, maintenance, engineering, plant support, nuclear assurance, and regulatory affairs, met daily during normal work days. The CRDR review committee classified the type of CRDRs and assigned ownership, corrective action evaluations, and maintenance functional failure determinations to the appropriate organizations.
The licensee classified CRDRs as significant, potentially significant, adverse, or for review based on the following guidance:
Significant - The highest classification for conditions such as, severe or unusual plant transients, safety system malfunctions, or improper operation, and others.
Potentially Significant - An interim classification used when additional information was needed to determine CRDR classification.
Requested information was required within 14 days.
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Adverse - A condition which adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.
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Review - The least significant condition not considered to be an adverse condition to quality, but one that should be reviewed and dispositioned during the conduct of day-to-day work activities.
The team observed one CRDR review committee meeting and noted that the members were well-prepared.
The discussions were open and appropriately focused on problem resolution and plant safety.
Condition report/disposition review committee members had extensive working experience in their areas of expertise.
This contributed to critical and thorough reviews and accurate classification of the CRDRs.
0 For initiating work to repair degraded or nonconforming hardware conditions, Procedure 90DP-OIP10 required a work request to be written in accordance with Procedure 30DP-9WP01, 'Work Identification." Procedure 30DP-9WP02, 'Work Document Development and Control," Revision 23, specified guidance for processing work requests into work orders.
Procedure 30DP-9WP02 provided guidance in
determining if operability, dispositioning issues to other responsible departments (i.e.,
referred to as transportability), or root cause evaluations were warranted.
If the work request involved a transportability issue or required a root cause evaluation, the procedure required a CRDR be initiated.
During the inspection, the team reviewed over 200 CRDRs of approximately 3,000 CRDRs generated during the past year and found those reviewed to be properly categorized for significance, processed in a timely manner, and where appropriate, required root cause analyses had been performed. The team found that corrective actions for the reviewed CRDRs were appropriate.
For example, CRDR 390081 was written on May 10, 1999, to identify an essential air handling unit temperature control valve that failed to stroke during a preventive maintenance work order test. The shift manager declared the system inoperable, placed the component in quarantine status to preserve evidence for a possible event root cause failure analysis, and recommended the item be reviewed as a maintenance rule functional failure. Additional actions were taken to place the other train in service and perform an operability surveillance test on the other train diesel. Another example included an audit CRDR (99Q055) written on February 24, 1999, which identified a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation performed by unqualified personnel.
As corrective action to this CRDR, the licensee reperformed the evaluation, trained and qualified the involved individuals, revised subject procedures to add clearer guidance, and reviewed other work for which the individuals were involved. The inspectors concluded that in both of the above cases the licensee performed the appropriate corrective actions and implemented measures to preclude recurrence.
Priori of Resolution The inspectors reviewed over 200 CRDRs, deficiency work orders, self assessments, and departmental audits.
For the documents sampled, the licensee's staff effectively identified, characterized the adverse conditions, and included an assessment of the risk significance pertaining to continued safe operation of the plants. The licensee appropriately elevated problems through review levels and management (e.g., CRDR review committee) for resolution. The CRDR review committee classified problem significance and priorities were assessed and assigned, and where necessary root-cause analyses were performed by the assigned evaluator.
The CRDR review committee dispositioned CRDRs for operability determinations and for reportability concerns.
The licensee trended corrective actions to ascertain whether the problems had been resolved or whether repeat occurrences warranted expansion of the corrective action scope and possible review of root-causes.
For issues that had not been resolved to the satisfaction of interested individuals by the CRDR process, the licensee's differing professional opinion (DPO) process was available.
When a DPO was received, the department leader delivered it to the strategic analysis group for tracking and presentation at the senior management daily plant
'orning meeting.
The senior managers assigned actions to resolve the issue within 30 days.
The inspectors reviewed the DPO tracking log and noted that there were no DPOs with responses outstanding and only three DPOs had outstanding actions.
The inspectors noted that for DPO 98-04, "Safety Violations During Erection of Scaffolding Around Energized Transformers," extensive actions had been satisfactorily completed.
b.3 Effectiveness of Pro ram Offsite Safe Review Committee The inspectors reviewed the activities of the Offsite Safety Review Committee (OSRC) related to corrective action identification and resolution. The inspectors reviewed audit findings and interviewed senior management members on the OSRC. The OSRC maintained an oversight function on the activities related to measurement of corrective action program performance through periodic audits. The OSRC maintained a 3-year schedule of audits and periodically reviewed it to determine scope and priorities. The audits focused on significant issues.
The former OSRC chairman stated that the committee considered two areas as requiring close attention: commitment management and software quality assurance.
While these areas were of highest priority, the OSRC also included other areas; e.g.,
the post-accident sampling sy'tem, and long-standing problems in maintaining training and qualifications of personnel.
The OSRC also maintained a list of topics that identified potentially risk sensitive areas to maintain vigilance by plant staff; one example was the review of calculations.
Overall, the inspectors found that the OSRC maintained a clear focus on safety significant issues and ensured that corrective actions were being implemented to address the most significant areas.
In addition to interviews, the inspectors reviewed OSRC meeting minutes. The team noted a report made by the plant support subcommittee that identified four plant modifications, which had not been reviewed within the required 2 years for plant-specific simulator impact. The licensee initiated CRDR 9-8-0108 after a review of plant modifications in the training change and simulator configuration management systems.
The review identified 33 of 526 modifications that had an impact on the simulator. The review further indicated that 20 of the 33 modifications had been installed on the simulator. The inspectors noted that 4 modifications were not reviewed for training impact within the 2-year limitation of ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training."
The inspectors reviewed the four design modification work orders (DMWOs) in question and concluded none had a significant impact on operator training. The licensee had delayed installation of these modifications on the simulator due to a lack of staff expertise.
However, the inspectors noted that the modifications had been installed as of the date of this inspection.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's impact review process broke down between the routing from design engineering of the DMWOs to the training single point of contact in the nuclear training department.
At the time of this inspection, the licensee had not identified the root cause of the breakdown; whether the DMWOs were not routinely being sent to the nuclear training department single point of contact, or that the single point of contact was not adequately reviewing the DMWOs for inclusion into the simulator configuration management system.
No recoverable records existed that would indicate clearly where the breakdown occurred.
The licensee took corrective actions to require that all of the DMWOs sent to the single point of contact were entered into the configuration management system.
Further, the DMWO database was monitored by the simulator group supervisor to assure that all DMWOs'were reviewed for impact on the simulator.
Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by procedures appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
Procedure 81DP-OEE10, "Plant Modifications," governed the process of reviews conducted for design modifications. Section 3.2.2.6 required the originator (project team leader) to "determine and document the modification impacts in the DMWO and notify the affected departments of required actions." Procedure 81-DPOCC26, "Impact Process," Revision 4, governed the processing of impact reviews and required the originator to identify to whom to send the DMWOfor impact review. A review of 526 plant modifications indicated that at least 20 DMWOs had not been routed to the nuclear training department for impact reviews when the reviews were required in the DMWO. The repeated failure to followthe procedure governing design engineering routing design modifications to the nuclear training division for training impact was a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation (50-528; -529; -530/9918-01) in accordance with Section VII.B.Iof the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is being tracked in the licensee's system as CRDR 9-8-0108.
Essential Chilled Water S stem A review of 10 CRDRs from the past year associated with the essential chilled water system indicated a significant portion involved human performance issues.
These issues included inadequate system knowledge, procedure adherence, work control, and inadequate procedures.
The CRDRs for the essential chilled water system identified different organizations and classifications of personnel in these human performance concerns.
For example, CRDR 46182 written March 31, 1999, involved technicians'rrors during testing of the Essential A chiller. The licensee identified this error as a human performance problem. The technicians had lifted an electrical lead that was common also to the high refrigerant discharge module, which caused the unexpected trip of the chiller. The inspectors determined that no pattern existed that could be ascribed to single or multiple failures or that indicated inadequate corrective actions.
No repetitive similar events occurred, which indicated that corrective actions were effective in preventing recurrence.
The inspectors noted that of the 20 deficiency maintenance work orders and corrective maintenance work orders reviewed, none revealed any issues that met the threshold requirements for a CRDR. The licensee generated the associated work orders principally for routine maintenance activities, with some in support of CRDR corrective actions.
Auxifia Feed Water Pum AFN-P01 The inspectors reviewed five CRDRs associated with Pump AFN-P01 from the past year. The CRDRs indicated that no substantive issues existed and the system was well maintained.
For example, CRDR 190164 written August 3, 1999, documented a missing nut on the discharge line deadweight support for Unit 1 Pump AFN-P01. The subsequent review conducted by design engineering determined that the missing nut did not affect the load carrying bolt, which remained capable of carrying the design load.
The other CRDRs involved administrative issues and incorrect data collection. A review of deficiency maintenance and corrective maintenance work orders associated with Pump AFN-P01 revealed no issues that met the threshold requirements for a CRDR.
The work orders were principally for routine maintenance activities.
Hi h Pressure Safe In'ection S stem Check valves The inspectors reviewed CRDRs generated by the licensee and associated status of corrective actions related to high pressure safety injection system issues as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-528;-529; -530/98-14. The inspectors verified that corrective actions had been fullyand effectively taken to preclude problem recurrence.
However, the inspectors could not identify why the corrective action process missed the opportunity to identify and correct the deficient conditions discussed in the aforementioned NRC inspection report. The inspectors agreed with earlier inspection findings that no sufficient testing quantitive acceptance criteria existed at the time to initiate the corrective action process.
Emer enc Diesel Generators The inspectors reviewed CRDRs associated with the emergency diesel generators.
The inspectors observed that the licensee appropriately classified, prioritized, and dispositioned the CRDRs. The licensee verified the effectiveness of corrective actions through reviews of subsequent component CRDRs and periodic departmental self assessments.
The inspectors reviewed followup documentation and verified that corrective actions had been fullyand effectively taken to preclude problem recurrence.
For example, CRDR 190097 was written on May 27, 1999, as a result of a Unit 1 "B" emergency diesel generator trip during a 5-minute cooldown run. The diesel tripped on "lube oil low pressure turbo" and "jacket water high temperature" annunciators.
The problem was referred to the instrument and controls shop for troubleshooting.
The shop determined that tubing associated with the jacket water high temperature trip system was leaking. The leak was repaired and the diesel retested satisfactorily. The diesel was not declared inoperable since the trip was a nonemergency mode trip and the diesel would have responded to emergency start signals.
Additionally, the condition was evaluated and not considered a maintenance rule functional failure.
Maintenance Rule Im lementation The inspectors reviewed 20 CRDRs, which required dispositioning for maintenance rule functional failure determinations.
The team determined that the functional failure determinations were appropriately assessed.
For example, CRDR 99Q113 written May 18, 1999, identified inconsistencies in scoping of the licensee's offsite power system with industry guidelines and the design and licensing basis.
The licensee dispostioned and completed actions in a timely manner.
The licensee corrected the problem condition and dispositioned the CRDR for document revisions and technical specification changes.
When necessary, the licensee routed CRDRs for operability
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concerns to operations and reportability concerns to the nuclear regulatory affairs department.
b.4 Pro ram Measurement Self Assessments The licensee used various methods of trending processes to measure and monitor facilityprograms, CRDR activity, and effectiveness of corrective actions. The nuclear assurance division compiled and issued trended data on a monthly basis with some of the data compared to established criteria to provide a measure of the corrective action program. The licensee's trended data reports included information on the number of initiated CRDRs, closed CRDRs, CRDRs greater than 180-days old, and the newest and oldest CRDRs. Other data was compiled and compared to ascertain and identify the more significant emergent issues during the past quarter.
The facilityused varied metrics to monitor the effectiveness of corrective actions.
One such measure was the nuclear assurance division's top 10 issues list. The licensee placed emergent issues on the list and color coded them red. Responsible departments developed action plans with success criteria and objectives.
The color code status changed when objectives were met. When the area's color code remained green for three consecutive months the licensee reviewed the issue for removal from the top 10 list. The inspectors also observed that the trended data reports included information on the number of initiated CRDRs, closed CRDRs, CRDR greater than 180-days old, and the newest and oldest CRDRs.
The licensee used multi-disciplined integrated self assessments by nuclear assurance and scheduled audits by the nuclear assurance division, and departmental self assessments to determine the health of facilityprograms.
Periodically, the licensee performed followup audits to measure the effectiveness of past corrective actions and determine whether broader and more comprehensive corrective actions were necessary.
The inspectors reviewed several audits and self assessments listed in the attachment of this report. The inspectors observed that the audits and self-assessment objectives were clearly stated.
The licensee used a mix of talent and disciplines
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dependent upon the scope and level of oversight requested.
For example, the integrated self assessments typically contained a broad mix of talent and used industry peers as part of the assessment team.
Based on the audits and self-assessment findings, the inspectors concluded that the self assessment process was self critical, identified significant concerns for trending and resolution, and identified areas requiring broader corrective actions to resolve issues.
Condition Re ort/Dis osition Re uest Action Review Board The licensee recently inaugurated a CRDR action review board to review significant adverse CRDRs. The inspectors attended a meeting that reviewed CRDR 2-9-0202 and the root cause analysis for the failure of the Control Element Assembly Calculator 2 on Unit 2. The briefing by the root cause investigator noted the operating experience with the control element assembly calculator design, the root cause of the failure, and the determination of potential transportability. The discussion was informative and the action review board approved the corrective actions with the exception of replacement of the control element assembly calculators in each unit. It was noted by the corrective'ction review board chairman that the facilitywas committed to replacing the control element assembly calculators in the future, but the replacement was not a corrective action, as defined by the program. The replacement of the items in all three units was considered an improvement.
As a result, the licensee removed the item from the identified corrective actions.
Plant Review Board The inspectors discussed the plant review board activities with the board chairperson.
The discussion centered on corrective actions and the input of the plant review board to the offsite review committee with regard to plant performance.
The plant review board met monthly, or as required to review plant events.
From these meetings, the plant review board assessed plant events and developed corrective actions to address immediate concerns.
Corrective actions not previously identified were incorporated into existing CRDRs, placed into the work order process, or placed into deferred corrective action process in which items were scheduled for correction during the future planned outage.
Long-term corrective actions w'ere referred to the appropriate organizations for resolution. The inspectors determined that the plant review board served as a key player in developing corrective actions to events.
b.5 Pro ram Understandin Interviews with a dozen licensee personnel (i.e., craft personnel, first line supervisors and upper management) and reviews of recent audit results showed a good understanding by station personnel of the corrective action program and that personnel were willingto initiate CRDRs for adve'rse conditions.
The inspectors interviewed a number of key plant personnel (all levels) and reviewed background information supporting adverse condition reporting and resolution. The team also reviewed audit results pertaining to nuclear assurance reviews of station personnel corrective action program understanding.
The auditors interviewed 44 front-
0 line direct employees and 20 contract personnel in conjunction with this audit and concluded that all would raise safety concerns.
Most of the interviewees raised safety issues through their front line management, which was the preferred method.
In all instances, the staff was knowledgeable of the corrective action program, the different classifications for conditioning reporting, and associated levels of responsibilities for dispositioning CRDRs. The staff also knew under which conditions control room notification and review of CRDRs was required. The team considered the licensee's staff knowledgeable of the processes and willingto initiate action on issues that they believed were not resolved fullythrough the employee concerns program or DPO process.
b.6 Re etitive Problems The inspectors observed that the nuclear assurance division performed frequent data searches for similar adverse conditions. The licensee published quarterly emerging issues trend reports, which highlighted the issues to management.
The background documentation indicated an aggressiveness by the licensee to resolve repetitive problems.
In many instances, the licensee reevaluated the root cause of the problems to ascertain whether the scope of the corrective actions should be expanded.
In many cases, the licensee implemented followup audits to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions to preclude recurrence of problems.
While some singular repeat problem occurrences may have been of minor concern, the licensee elevated such issues in importance and exposure to higher management attention (e.g., training and qualification issues placed on the top 10 list). Additionally, the licensee reviewed problems for generic impacts to the plants, across system boundaries, and across departmental boundaries.
In cases of process errors, the licensee performed data base searches to verify whether prior repeat similar errors occurred and whether evaluation of process changes was needed.
b.7 Notice Of Violation/Noncited Violation Followu NRC inspections identified a total of 28 noncited violations in the period from October 1998 through December 1999. The inspectors reviewed the noncited violations listed in the attachment to determine if the violations were entered into the corrective action program and if they were resolved or being resolved in a timely manner commensurate with their significance.
The inspectors determined that the noncited violations were entered into the corrective action program and that the identified corrective actions adequately addressed the violations.
The inspectors identified that in most cases the provided packages for the CRDRs lacked some information and objective evidence that actions were completed.
Upon request the licensee was able to provide sufficient documentation to verify actions were complete.
As a result, the licensee initiated CRDR 111461 on November 19, 1999, to address these types of documentation quality issues and implemented the following as corrective actions to preclude recurrence:
Revised and incorporated clarification and documentation.
Develop and publish performance indicators for CRDR documentation quality.
Increased sampling of the adverse CRDR population and CRDRs owned by Nuclear Assurance.
More leader emphasis on review of CRDRs and feedback to the responsible individual.
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Refresher training for the quality assurance program and the corrective action process.
0 eratin Ex erience Review Procedure 65DP-OQQ01, "Industry Operating Experience Review," Revision 2, provided for screening and evaluation of industry operating experience information and actions to incorporate lessons learned from the industry into plant design, programs, or operating practices; The inspectors reviewed the industry operating experience database and associated screens of low impact documents and verified that no issues were screened out inappropriately. The licensee evaluated information categorized as high impact or.
potential high impact through the CRDR process.
The inspectors reviewed 12 industry operating experience CRDRs. The team determined that 3 CRDR evaluations were not completed within the 90-day expectation described in Procedure 65DP-OQQ01, Step 3.3.8. The licensee was aware of this issue because the industry operating experience coordinator trended completion timeliness for industry operating experience evaluations.
Current trending indicated that most evaluations were completed within the expectations of Pro'cedure 65DP-OQQ01.
C.
Conclusions.
c.1 The program provided acceptable thresholds to assure that events were identified, reported, screened for significance and maintenance rule program functional failures, evaluated for disposition, lower level events screened, and priorities and ownership assigned.
0 c.2 The program ensured that problems were appropriately prioritized for resolution commensurate with safety. The CRDR review committee reviewed CRDRs on a daily basis and classified the issues as significant, adverse, review, or potentially significant, and dispositioned the CRDRs.
c.3 The offsite review committee, plant review board, action review board, and nuclear assurance division effectively addressed plant and organizational performance, and assessed the adequacy of corrective actions.
One noncited violation was identified for procedural noncompliances related to impact reviews of design modifications on training and simulator configuration.
e c.4 The licensee also used varied corrective action program metrics to measure and monitor the program. Trend reports published monthly and quarterly, along with status, of more important issues kept managers current as to emerging problems and the staff's progress in resolving adverse conditions.
c.5 Allpersonnel interviewed by the inspectors demonstrated a clear understanding of the functions of the various components of the corrective action program.
c.6 The corrective action program identified repetitive problems to assure appropriate reviews were performed and actions taken to preclude recurrence.
c.7 The licensee placed appropriate priorityon resolving noncited violations.
V. Mana ement Meetln s X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors discussed the progress of the inspection on a daily basis and presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on December 2, 1999, and telephonically on January 14, 2000. The licensee's representatives acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee staff and management whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee S. Coapock, Nuclear Engineering, Technical Assistant to Vice President D. Edmunds, Nuclear Training Division, Delegated Director R. Fullmer, Director, Nuclear Assurance Division F. Garrett, Energy System, Department Leader R. Hazelwood, Regulatory Affairs Engineer M. Hypsie, Nuclear Assurance Division, Section Lead B. Ide, Vice President, Nuclear Production A. Krainik, Director, Regulatory Affairs D. Marks, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, Section Leader J. McGath, Maintenance, Senior Advisor G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President Nuclear W. Potter, Nuclear Training Department, Simulator Section Leader T. Radtke, Maintenance Director J. Scott, Chemistry Director D. Smith, Director, Operations M. Sontag, Nuclear Assurance Division, Division Lead E. Sterling, Nuclear Assurance Division, Division Leader J. Steward, Radiation Protection Director S. Terrigino, Strategic Committee, Site Representative M. Winsor, Nuclear Engineering Director NRC J. Moorman, Senior Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED 0 ened and Closed 50-528; -529;
-530/9918-01 NCV Failure to followprocedure (Section 07.b.3)
e DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures Reviewed 65DP-OQQ01, "Industry Operating Experience Review," Revision 2 90DP-OIP06, Reactor Trip Investigation, Revision 6 Procedure 30DP-OWM15, Fix lt Now (FIN) Multi-DisciplineTeam, Revision 0 Procedure 40DP-9OP15, Operator Work Arounds and Discrepancy Tracking, Revision 11 Procedure 82DP-OPP01, Out of Tolerance Program Controls, Revision 4 Procedure 73IG-9SE003, System Walkdown, Revision 0 Procedure 90DP-OIP-10, Condition Reporting, Revision 8 Procedure 81DP-ODC13, Deficiency Work Order, Revision 11 90DP-OIP10, Condition Reporting, Revision 8 90DP-OIP09, Differing Professional Opinions, Revision 4 Procedure 12DP-OMC29, Warehouse Discrepancy Notice, Revision 9 Procedure 30DP-9MP01, Conduct of Maintenance, Revision 27 PG-120, PVNGS Self Assessment, Revision 0 Procedure 73DP-OZZ03, Revision 10, System and Maintenance Engineering CRDRs CRDR 111461, "CRDR Documentation Quality Issues," November 19, 1999 CRDR 9-9-Q113, "Offisite Power Supply Maintenance Rule Scoping Issues,".'May 18, 1999 CRDR 9-8-0108, "Simulator Design Modification Work Orders Not Reviewed for training Impact," February 18, 1999 CRDR 9-9-Q055, "10 CFR 50;59 Evaluations Performed by Unqualified Personnel,"
February 24, 1999 CRDR 46182, "Technicians Lifted Wrong lead During Troubleshooting," May 31, 1999 CRDR 190097, "Unit 1 EDG B Trip During Cooldown Run," May 27-1999 CRDR 190164, "Missing Nut on Unit 1 AFN-P01 Discharge Line Deadweight Support," August 3, 1999 CRDR 390081, "Unit 3 Essential AirHandling Unit Temperature Control Valve Failed to Stroke,"
May 10, 1999 CRDR 290202, "Unit 2 Control element Assembly Calculator Failure," February 14, 1999
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1' Other CRDRs reviewed:
CRDR 04802 CRDR 11436 CRDR 34477 CRDR 34545 CRDR 34549 CRDR 34627 CRDR 34662 CRDR 34684 CRDR 34914 CRDR 34927 CRDR 34927 CRDR 34945 CRDR 35486 CRDR 36148 CRDR 36367 CRDR 36453 CRDR 36791 CRDR 36881 CRDR 36901 CRDR 36901 CRDR 46064 CRDR 46167 CRDR 46210 CRDR 53878
, CRDR 53979 CRDR 54220 CRDR 62172
'RDR 62228 CRDR 95665 CRDR 95698 CRDR 95712 CRDR 95818 CRDR 95971 CRDR 96350 CRDR 98122 CRDR 99702 CRDR 99862 CRDR 100062 CRDR 100282 CRDR 100306 CRDR 100828 CRDR 100886 CRDR 101627 CRDR 101883 CRDR 102443 CRDR 102702 CRDR 104802 CRDR 104822 CRDR 105082 CRDR 105185 CRDR 105204 CRDR 105342 CRDR 105802 CRDR 105883 CRDR 106404 CRDR 109932 CRDR 110824 CRDR 110828 CRDR 110837 CRDR 110860 CRDR 111428 CRDR 111443 CRDR 111445 CRDR 111461 CRDR 111531 CRDR 111533 CRDR 111578 CRDR 111584 CRDR 111590 CRDR 111596 CRDR 111598 CRDR 111599 CRDR 111601 CRDR 111609 CRDR 111610 CRDR 111675 CRDR 290115 CRDR 9-6-Q244 CRDR 9-8-Q047 CRDR 9-8-Q047 CRDR 9-8-Q063 CRDR 9-8-Q125 CRDR 9-8-Q148 CRDR 9-8-Q217 CRDR 9-8-Q217 CRDR 9-8-Q217 CRDR 9-8-Q239 CRDR 9-8-Q255 CRDR 9-8-Q265 CRDR 9-8-348 CRDR 9-8-Q352 CRDR 9-8-Q356 CRDR 9-8Q-358 CRDR 9-8-Q359 CRDR 9-9-Q008 CRDR 9-9-Q025 CRDR 9-9-Q032 CRDR 9-9-Q048 CRDR 9-9-Q055 CRDR 9-9-Q107 CRDR 9-9-Q107 CRDR 9-9-Q129 CRDR 9-9-Q141 CRDR 9-9-Q166 CRDR 9-9-Q171 CRDR 9-9-Q181 CRDR 9-9-Q185 CRDR 9-9-Q189 CRDR 9-9-Q190 CRDR 9-9-Q190 CRDR 9-9-Q200 CRDR 9-9-Q204 CRDR 9-9-Q204 CRDR 9-9-Q223 CRDR 9-9-Q245 CRDR 1-4-0049 CRDR 1-6-0236 CRDR 1-8-0044 CRDR 1-8-0044 CRDR 1-8-0397 CRDR 1-8-0501 CRDR 1-8-0522 CRDR 1-9-0006 CRDR 1-9-0012 CRDR 1-9-0019 CRDR 1-9-0026 CRDR 1-9-0030 CRDR 1-9-0030 CRDR 1-9-0062 CRDR 1-9-0062 CRDR 1-9-0062 CRDR 1-9-0125 CRDR 2-0-0102 CRDR 2-7-0383 CRDR 2-7-0383 CRDR 2-7-0383 CRDR 2-8-0080 CRDR 2-8-0080 CRDR 2-8-0198 CR DR 2-8-0281 CRDR 2-8-0286 CRDR 2-8-0286 CRDR 2-8-0286 CRDR 2-9-0019 CRDR 2-9-0019 CRDR 2-9-0019 CRDR 2-9-0048 CRDR 2-9-0061 CRDR 2-9-0093 CRDR 2-9-0102 CRDR 2-9-0102 CRDR 2-9-0102 CRDR 2-9-0154 CRDR 2-9-0175 CRDR 2-9-0202 CRDR 3-8-0116 CRDR 3-8-0116
'CRDR 3-8-0311
'CRDR 3-8-0337 CRDR 3-8-0396 CRDR 3-9-0017 CRDR 3-9-0026 CRDR 3-9-0026 CRDR 3-9-0065 CRDR 9-0-0591 CRDR 9-8-0893 CRDR 9-8-0893 CRDR 9-8-0931 CRDR 9-8-0931 CRDR 9-8-0931 CRDR 9-8-0966 CRDR 9-8-0966 CRDR 9-8-1 055 CRDR 9-8-1180 CR DR 9-8-1212 CRDR 9-8-1672 CRDR 9-8-1697 CRDR 9-8-1783 CRDR 9-8-1856 CRDR 9-8-1856 CRDR 9-8-1856 CRDR 9-8-1856 CRDR 9-8-1866 CRDR 9-9-0014
CRDR 9-9-0015 CRDR 9-9-0020 CRDR 9-9-0048 CRDR 9-9-0058 CRDR 9-9-0071 CRDR 9-9-0141 CRDR 9-9-0152 CRDR 9-9-0194 CRDR 9-9-0205 CRDR 9-9-0226 CRDR 9-9-0251 CRDR 9-9-0266 CRDR 9-9-0287 CRDR 9-9-0295 CRDR 9-9-0295 CRDR 9-9-0303 CRDR 9-9-0327 CRDR 9-9-0337 CRDR 9-9-0341 CRDR 9-9-0373 CRDR 9-9-0403 CRDR 9-9-0405 CRDR 9-9-0408 CRDR 9-9-0438
. CRDR 9-9-0443 CRDR 9-9-0443 CRDR 9-9-0443 CRDR 9-9-0484 CRDR 9-9-0486 CRDR 9-9-0507 CRDR 9-9-0544 CRDR 9-9-0547 CRDR 9-9-0548 CRDR 9-9-0568 CRDR 9-9-0624 CRDR 9-9-0625 CRDR 9-9-0639 CRDR 9-9-0662 CRDR 9-9-0665 CRDR 9-9-0699 CRDR 9-9-0730 CRDR 9-9-0735 CRDR 9-9-0736 CRDR 9-9-0763 CRDR 9-9-0771 CRDR 9-9-0788 CRDR 9-9-0925 CRDR 2-9-00202 Noncited Violations 50-528,529,530/99-04-02 50-528,529,530/99-04-03 50-528,529,530/99-04-05 50-528,529,530/99-08-01 50-528,529,530/99-12-02 Failure to correct deficient condition for all turbine-driven AFW pumps governors.
Missing/loose bolts on EDG air start headers due to insufficient design basis information irrinstructions/procedures.
Installation of nonsafety-related circuit breakers into MCC cubicles affects two HPSI valves.
Drawings not maintained to reflect actual plant configuration.
Violation of TS 5.4.1 with two examples of a failure to follow lubrication program procedures.
50-528,529,530/98-10-01 Installation of improper component due to design error.
50-528,529,530/98-10-03 Inadequate design control for replacement of EDG cooling water line flexible joints.
Licensee Event Re orts LER 98-006 LER 97-006 LER 97-005 LER 97-004 Audit Re orts Plant Assessment Team Report, March 25, 1997 Adequacy of CRDR Evaluations - 1999 Significant and Adverse CRDRs, dated October 8, 1999
Corrective Action Effectiveness - 1999 Significant CRDRs, dated October 8, 1999 Corrective Action Verifications - 1998 Significant and Adverse CRDR, dated January 8, 1999 Corrective Action Audit Report 99-016, dated June 19, 1999 Audit Report 98-015, Integrated issues Resolution Process, dated December 18, 1998 Audit Report 98-014, Maintenance Rule and Corrective Action, dated December 18, 1998 CRDR Initiation Self-Assessment, ID¹ 443-00473-M JS, dated June 24, 1999 Integrated Self-Assessment, Corrective Action Effectiveness, Actions from Training and Qualifications Audit 98-010, dated June 4, 1999 Integrated Self-Assessment, Corrective Action Effectiveness (CRDR Program), dated January 21, 1999 NAD Audit Report 98-015, Integrated Issues Resolution Process, December 18, 1999 Integrated Self-Assessment, Human Performance, dated July 13, 1999 Environmental Awareness Self Assessment, December 1998 CRDR Evaluation Review Process Self Assessment, January 7, 1999 Corrective Action Program Effective Integrated Self Assessment, January 26, 1999 Work Management Self Assessment,'ctober 14, 1998 NAD Evaluation Report 99-0450, September 22, 1999 Monthly Trend Report, December 1998 3" Quarter Trend Report 1998 4~ Quarter Trend Report 1998 1" Quarter Trend Report 1999 2~ Quarter Trend Report 1999 3" Quarter Trend Report 1999 locOs NAD Open DPO Log, dated November 12, 1999 NAD Closed DPO Log, dated November 30, 1999 Index of Closed DF Type Work Orders Index of Closed DF Type Work Orders Index of Open CM Type Work Orders
t Index of Closed CM Type Work Orders Other The NAD DPO and MITR Report for October 1999 DPO 98-04, Safety Violations During Erection of Scaffolding Around Energized Transformers (Closed), issued July 21, 1998 DPO 99-02, System Engineer Disagreement with Placement of the Unit 1.SA (ESFAS) System into Category (a)(1) Monitoring for Exceeding Performance Criteria Unavailability (Open),
issued June 9, 1999
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CATEGORY 2 REGULATORY ZNFORMATZON DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RZDS)
CCESSION NBR:9909170024 DOC.DATE: 99/09/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET I CIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 STN-50-530 Palo Verde, Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION PELLET,J.L.
Region 4
(Post 820201)
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION OVERBECK,G.R.
Arizona Public Service Co.
(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
SUBJECT:
Announces NRC C/A program insp at plant for wk of 991129.
Insp will evaluate effectiveness of activities for identifying, resolving R preventing.issues that degrade quality of plant operations.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: ~ General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Vio ation Response E
NOTES: STANDARDIZED PLANT
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Standardized plant.
Standardized plant.
G 05000528 05000529 0 05000530 R
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LPD4-2 PD COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME FIELDS,M COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 INTERNAL: ACRS DEDRO NRR/DIPM/IIPB NRR/DRIP/REXB OE RGN4 FILE 01.
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AEOD/
CENT NRR/DIPM/OLHP NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/RP 1
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EXTERNAL: LMITCO MARSHALL NRC PDR 1
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1 NOAC NUDOCS FULLTEXT 1
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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTETH TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)
ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 18 ENCL 18
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION REGION Iv 611 RYAN PLAZADRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011-8064 SEP 1 3 1999 Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-528/99-18; 50-529/99-18; 50-530/99-18
Dear Mr. Overbeck:
The purpose of this letter is to announce our Corrective Action Program Inspection at your Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3, reactor facilities. We have scheduled this inspection for the week of November 29, 1999. The designated inspection leader, Mr. Tom McKernon, of this office, has telephonically discussed the inspection plans in more detail with members of your staff.
The inspection willevaluate the effectiveness of your activities for identifying, resolving, and preventing issues that degrade the quality of plant operations or safety. The inspection willbe conducted using Inspection Procedure 40500, "Effectiveness of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, and Prevent Problems."
This inspection willinvolve a total of 4 NRC personnel.
The inspection team will require information about your corrective actions program and its implementation for its in-office preparation and inspection.
A description of the material that will be needed is enclosed.
MrTom McKernon has contacted your staff and arranged for specific material to be available to the team by November 1, 1999.
If you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact Mr. Tom McKernon at 817/860-81 53 or myself at 817/860-81 59.
Sincerely, John L. Pellet, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure:
As Stated Docket Nos.:
50-528; 50-529; 50-530 License Nos.: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 9909i70024 9909ia PDR ADOCK 05000528 6
Arizona Public Service Company CC:
Mr. Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800
- Rosemead, California 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey Y. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Angela K. Krainik, Director Regulatory Affairs Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 John C. Horne, Vice President, Power Generation El Paso Electric Company 2702 N. Third Street, Suite 3040 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.
General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills El Paso, Texas 79901 Mr. John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water 8 Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100
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Arizona Public Service Company Mr. David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, 01206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Mr. Jarlath Curran Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, California 92672 Mr. Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
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Arizona Public Service Company E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK) bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident Inspector DRP Director RIV File DRS Director RITS Coordiriator Branch Chief (DRP/D)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/D)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) r I
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c j IJ DOCUMENT NAME: R:5 PNPV918lt.tom.wpd To receive co of document, indicate Inbox:
C ~ Co without enclosures
'E = Co viith enclosures "N"~ No co RIV:SRE:OB TOMcKe mon/I 09/f99 C:OB JLPellet 09 99 OFFICIALRECORD COPY
ENCLOSURE Initial Material Re uested for the 40500 Ins ection
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Index of all corrective action documents {e.g., CR's, PIR's, and Cl's etc.) for the last 12 months.
Allcorrective action documents in response or related to plant transients, the equipment malfunctions that initiated them or that were previously written on the same equipment, for the last 12 months.
Allcorrective action documents related to external operating experience, especially vendor information not included in plant procedures and documents, for the last 12 months.
Atl major corrective action documents (i.e., those that subsume or roll-up one or more smaller issues), for the last 12 months.
Allcorrective action documents associated with:
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Maintenance rule implementation, preventable functional failures, and baseline inspection results;
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HPSI system check valves;
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Essential chilled water system;
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Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump; and Emergency diesel generators.
Allcorrective action documents associated with nonescalated, no response required, noncited violations for the last 12 months.
Allcorrective action program assessments for the last 12 months.
Allcorrective action program tracking and effectiveness internal reports or metrics, for the last 12 months.
Description of any informal systems, especially used by operations, for issues below the threshold of the formal corrective action system (e.g., CR's, PIR's and Cl's, etc.) and the content of those systems.
All procedures governing or applying to the corrective action program.
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