ML17300A903
| ML17300A903 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1987 |
| From: | Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 161-00272-JGH-R, 161-272-JGH-R, TAC-65290, NUDOCS 8706170510 | |
| Download: ML17300A903 (14) | |
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REQULAT Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 8706170510 DOC. DATE:
= 87/06/08 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET 8 FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Stations Unit ii Arizona Pub li 05000528 STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station.
Unit 2i Arizona Pub 1 i 05000529'TN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Stations Unit 3i Arizona Pub li 05000530 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HAYNES'. Q.
Arizona Nuclear Power Prospect (formerly Arizona Public Serv REC IP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards response to NRC questions re temp dependent shutdown margini per 870508 meeting in Bethesda'D. Info clarifies definition of Kn-1 5 ensures that bases for Tech Spec changes reflected clarification.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A001D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE:
OR Submittal:
General Distribution NOTES: Standardized plant. M. Davisi NRR: iCg.
Standard i zed p lant. M. Davis'RR: 1Cg.
Standardized plant. M. Davis'RR: 1Cg.
05000528 05000529 05000530 REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA LICITRAiE COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD DAVIS' COPIES LTTR ENCL 5
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INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/DEBT/ADE NRR/DOEA/TSB OQC/HDS1 EXTERNAL:
EGStG BRUSKEu S NRC PDR NOTES:
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1 ARM/DAF/LFMB NRR/DEST/ADS ILRB REQ FILE LPDR NSIC 01 1
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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 26 ENCL 23
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Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o. BOX 52034 o
PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 June 8, 1987 161-00272-JGH/RAB
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2 and 3
Docket Nos.
STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)
STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)
STN 50-530 (License NO. NPF-65)
Summary of Meeting Concerning Various Technical Specification Amendment Requests and Submittal of Requested Information File:
References:
1)
Letter to USNRC from J.
G.
Haynes (ANPP), dated May 10, 1987 (161-00204-JGH/DAL).
Subject:
Proposed Emergency Technical Specification Change
Secondary System Liquid Waste Discharges to Onsite Evaporation Pond 2)
Letter to USNRC from J.
G.
Haynes (ANPP) dated May 6, 1987 (161-00201-JGH/JRP).
Subject:
Technical Specification Change to LCO Section 3.03.
3)
Letter to USNRC from J.
G.
Haynes (ANPP),
dated May 4, 1987 (161-00182-JGH/JRP).
Subject:
Proposed Technical Specification Change Variable Overpower Trip Function.
4)
Letter from J.
G.
Haynes (ANPP) to G.
W. Knighton (USNRC) dated January 23, 1987 (PP39798).
Subject:
Technical Specification Amendment Sections 1.0, 2.2, 3/4.1, 3/4.3, 3/4.10.
5)
Letter to USNRC from J.
G.
Haynes (ANPP),
dated April 23, 1987 (161-00167-JGH/PGN).
Subject:
Revision to Technical Specification Amendment Sections 1.0, 2.2, 3/4.1, 3/4.3, 3/4.10.
A meeting was held in the NRC offices in Bethesda, Maryland on May 8, 1987, at the request of
- ANPP, to discuss proposed changes to several Technical Specifications.
ANPP has recently submitted several requests for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS), references
'1 through 5, and believed that a
meeting with the staff to answer any questions would aid the
- review, since some are complicated and others require expedient review.
87OSX70510 870608 PDR
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control Desk Summary of Meeting Concerning Various Technical Specification Amendment Requests and Submittal of Requested Information Page 2
ANPP presented information concerning all of the topics to the staff and answered various questions.
References 4 and 5 which concern the development of shutdown margin specifications based on RCS temperature are quite complicated and present some previously unreviewed methodology.
As a result of the discussions with the staff, ANPP agreed to clarify the definition of K
1 and ensure that the bases reflected this clarification.
ANPP also agreed to provide a
safety analysis for the requested test exception, specification 3.10.9, and to add clarification in the bases for it.
Attachment A to this letter contains the requested information.
Attachment B
is a list of meeting attendees.
If you have any questions, please contact R. A. Bernier at (602) 371-4295.
Very truly yours, J.
G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/RAB/dim cc:
- 0. M. De Michele E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
G.
W. Knighton E. A. Licitra R. P.
Zimmerman J.
B. Martin A. C. Gehr
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Attachment to 161-00272 Attachment A
Responses to Questions Concerning Temperature Dependent Shutdown Margin l
V
1.
The definition of K 1 should be changed to read:
n-1 K
is the K effective calculated considering the actual CEA configura-Q-l tz.on and assuming the fully or partially inserted full-length CEA of the highest inserted worth is fully withdrawn.
2.
The proposed Special Test Exemption 3.10.9 shall be deemed to constitute a
significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas.
a ~ Vill operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change involve a signficant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response
No The proposed special test exemption would allow testing of CEA movement.
The potential therefore exists for a rod withdrawal type accident.
- However, the restrictions of the special test exemption are such that nuclear criticality is impossible without gross violation of the restrictions.
The reduction of protective system setpoints ensures that the consequences of uncontrolled CEA withdrawal are bounded by the existing analysis of record.
Other accidents are unaffected by the CEA testing since the reactivity introduced by the rod movement is offset by the equivalent of a stuck rod.
The stuck rod reactivity is explicitly accounted for in the accident evaluations and is in excess of the required shutdown reactivity.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
b.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change create the possiblity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No Although the proposed change will result in modification to the operating procedures and plant operation in the shutdown modes when the testing is performed, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since safe conditions are maintained by the proposed change.
c ~ Villoperation of the facility in accordance with the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response
No Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change may reduce a safety margin;
- however, unsafe conditions are precluded because excess subcritical margin is included in the definition for SHUTDOWN MARGIN and K
such that limited movement of a single CEA for testing purposes canno( lead to inadvertent criticality.
The reduction of the logarithmic power level-high trip setpoint provides an increased margin of safety.
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Based on the above Safety Evaluation, it is concluded that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public, will not be endangered by the proposed changes and (2) this action 'will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impacts of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Environmental Statement.
3.
The basis for Special Test Exception 3/4.10.9 should be changed to read as follows:
This special test exception allows the performance of control element drive mechanism tests prior to startup, without the operator having to be concerned as to whether Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2 is applicable as CEA movement is tested.
Both of these specifications require excess subcritical margin which will preclude inadvertent criticality during the test.
4.
Xn the BASES for Sections 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 (p. 83/4 l-l) the last sentence of the second paragraph should be changed to read:
K is a measure of the core's reactivity, considering the actual CEA c8niiguration and a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth inserted CEA being ejected.
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Attachment to 161-00272 ATTACHMENT B MEETING ATTENDEES FOR MEETING HELD IN BETHESDA, MARYLAND ON MAY 8, 1987 Manny Licitra Ed Branagan
'illard Wohl Don Fieno Robert Giardina Larry Kopp Charles Nichols Leon Brown Jerry Sowers Richard Bernier USNRC USNRC USNRC USNRC USNRC USNRC USNRC ANPP ANPP ANPP
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