ML17299B098
| ML17299B098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1986 |
| From: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8603180238 | |
| Download: ML17299B098 (6) | |
Text
8603180238 8$041D PDR ADGCK 05000528 G
PDR MAR yg )gag Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. 0. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072 Attention:
Mr. E. E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Subject:
Investigation Conducted by the NRC Office of Investigation Case No.
5 5-04 This refers to a special investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigation of activities authorized by NRC License Number NPF-41, NRF-46.
This investigation, described in the enclosed Office of Investigation Report
- Summary, consisted of interviews of personnel and review of selected documents.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified within the scope of the investigation.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a),
a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this investigation, we will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, D;,R. Kirsch, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects r,
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Docket File:
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SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated to determine if there was falsification of
- records, the Filler Metal Control Logs (FMCL) and the Welding Surveillance Reports (WSR), by the Quality Control (QC) personnel of The Waldinger Corpora-tion (TWC), which is responsible for the installation of the heating, ventila-tion, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) located in Arizona.
On May 30,
- 1985, a former TWC employee initially contacted the NRC Resident Inspectors Office, PVNGS, by telephone which resulted in his being interviewed in person on June 25, 1985.
The former employee, who had been employed by TWC for several years, provided general hearsay information regarding the possible falsification of the aforementioned records which were required by TWC proce-dures.
He believed that QC supervisors reviewed the (existing)
WSRs and fabricated the necessary paperwork for welding survei llances, which were signed by QC inspectors for surveillances that were not conducted.
He indicated that TWC was required to conduct one welding surveillance per unit, per day (when welding was performed).
It should be noted that the individual raised several other issues and concerns which were separately addressed by.
RV.
On June 25, 1985, this investigation regarding falsification of records was opened by the Director, Office of Investigations (OI) Field Office, RV, USNRC, as a result of an Allegation Board Meeting held by Region V.
A review of the approved TWC procedures revealed that TWC was only required to conduct a "daily random surveillance" of welding activities which was to be recorded on a
WSR.
- Further, the issuance of filler metal for welding was required by their procedures to be recorded on the FMCL.
During this investigation, all of the 10 currently employed QC inspectors and the former Lead QC Inspector (a supervisor) 'were interviewed, as were two Quality Assurance (QA) engineers.
Only one of the QC inspectors advised that he also believed that welding surveillance reports were falsified, but he stated that he could not provide "concrete proof."
He explained that the Lead QC Inspector would compare the WSR's with the FMCLs, and thereby determine if a surveillance was missing.
The Lead QC Inspector then contacted the QC inspectors to whom he would.indicate that he needed the missing WSRs.
The QC inspector related that he had been personally asked for missing WSRs, however, in those instances, he simply indicated on a
WSR that no welding had been observed.
It was further pointed out that the Lead QC Inspector prepared and disseminated a form reflecting the date of missing WSRs which the inspectors were to submit.
The QC inspector also advised that he believed there was a
generic problem with TWC's welding surveillance program.
Factors contributing to the problem included:
the crafts issued their owr, filler metal; there were no "hold" points in the welding program; the crafts sometimes failed to notify the QC inspectors when welding was performed; and the inspectors were busy with other activities to insure the survei llances were conducted.
Thus, there were missing WSRs, or the reports were submitted several days after the actual surveillance which he considered questionable.
The remaining 9
QC inspectors testified under oath that they had never fabricated or falsified any type of documentation, and they had no knowledge of any such wrongdoing.
The two QA Case No. 5-85-046
engineers also advised under oath that they had no knowledge of fabricated or falsified documentation.
Also during the investigation, a review was conducted of the WSRs and the FMCLs for the, month of June, 1985, which was a suspect month for the possible fabrication of reports.
That review failed to support the concern of fab-ricated or falsified documents,
- however, several document deficiencies were identified, such as:
there were two FMCLs which contained incorrect or conflicting dates; one WSR did not contain the signature of the gA Supervisor (Lead) as required; and two WSRs indicated surveillances had been conducted, but there were no supporting FMCLs.
These matters have been referred to Region V for evaluation.
During his interview under oath, the former Lead gC Inspector advised that TWC procedures required a daily random surveillance of the welding, thus one surveillance a day.
He further explained that the TWC practice of conducting one surveillance per. day per unit to include the Fab Shop was the result of TWC "administrative direction."
The Lead
(}C Inspector acknowledged that periodically ther'e were missing WSRs, possibly misplaced or submitted to him late.
He testified that he prepared a "Welders Surveillance" form which was his "scoreboard" where he indicated the gC reports that were received and missing.
He stated that he subsequently received all of the WSRs which he had indicated as missing on the "Welders Surveillance form for the month of June, 1985.
He averred that he never asked or directed anyone to fabricate or falsify any documents.
He testified that he had never falsified a
- WSR, and that he had no knowled e of an one who had falsified an re uired documenta-i g
The preponderance of information/evidence developed by the OI investigation does not support the allegation of falsification of gC records.
Therefore, no further OI resources are to be used and this matter is closed.
Case No. 5-85-046
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