ML17299A548

Forwards,For Review,Fsar Changes to Chapter 6.Changes State That During Normal Operation,Drain Lines from Refueling Cavity to Containment Floor Will Be Open W/Flanges Removed. Changes Will Be Included in Next FSAR Update

ML17299A548
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	08/29/1985
From:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ANPP-33291-EEVB, NUDOCS 8509030189
Download: ML17299A548 (34)

Text

REGULATORY'OiFORMATION DISTRIBUTION S~M (RIBS)

DOCKET 05000529 05000530

SUBJECT:

Forwardsgfor review~FSAR changes to Chapter 6+Changes -state-t during normal operationrdrain lines from refueling cavity to containment floor will be open w/flanges removed. Changes will be included in next FSAR update, DISTRIBUTION CODE:

8001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZEi TITLE! Licensing Submittal:

PSAR/FSAR Amdts' Related Correspondence ACCESSION NBR:8509030189 DOC ~ DATE: 85/08/29 NOTARIZED:

YES FACIL:STN-50 529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~

Unit 2i Arizona Publi STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Stationi Unit 3i Arizona Publi AUTH BYNAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VAN BRUNTiE.E ~

Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Ser v RECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIGHTON g G ~ N ~

Licensing Branch 3

,NOTEStStandardized

plant, Standardized plant.

05000529 05000530 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR/DL/ADL NRR LB3 LA INTERNAL; ACRS 41 ELD/HDS3 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 NRR ROEeM ~ L NRR/DE/CFB il NRR/DE/EQB 13 NRR/DE/MEB 18 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 NRR/DHFS/PSRB NRR/DSI/AEB 26 NRR/DSI/CPB 10 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16'RR/DSI/PSB19 NRR/DSI/RSB 23-RGNS EXTERNAL: 24X DMB/DSS (AMDTS)

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Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o. BOX 52034

~

PHOENIX, ARIZONA&072-2034 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch 3

Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 August 29, 1985 ANPP-33291-EEVB/JKO

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 2 and 3

Changes to PVNGS FSAR (Chapter 6)

Docket Nos. STN-50-529/530 File:

85-056-026 G.l.01.10

Dear Mr. Knighton:

Attached for your review on PVNGS Units 2 and 3 are FSAR changes to Chapter 6.

These changes involve:

(1) stating in the FSAR that, during normal operation, the drain lines from the refueling cavity to the containment floor will be open with flanges removed; (2) the installation of addi'tional non-metallic insulation inside containment; (3) change to the pressurization for the control room during a radiation emergency.

We feel these changes to be justified because:

(1) the refueling cavity drain lines do not have valves in them so, during power operation, the flanges are procedurally removed; (2) the addition of non-'metallic insulation inside containment will result in an estimated sump blockage o'f 45X, which is within the 50X limit referred to in Regulatory Guide 1.82, and wi'thin "the 95X sump blockage tested by use of a model; (3) the change to the control room pressurization requirements meets the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev.

2 an'd aligns the FSAR with the surveillance requirements as described in the PVNGS Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

For PVNGS Unit 1, safety reviews and evaluations have been completed for implementation of these changes in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 50.59.

The safety rev'iews and evaluations have determined. that there are no unreviewed safety questions involved with the changes.

These changes will be included in the next FSAR update.

8509030i89: 850829 PDR ADOCK 05000529 A 'DR

~

~

g.

W. Knighton Changes to PVGNS FSAR (Ch+t 6)

ANPP-33291 Page 2

Xf you have any questions concerning these

changes, please contact William Quinn of my'staff.

Very truly yours, E. E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Executive Vice President Project Director EEVB/MAJ/JKO/slh Attachment cc:

E.

A. Licitra M. Ley R. P.

Zimmerman A. C. Gehr

C

STATE OF ARIZONA

)

) ss.

COUNTY OF MARICOPA)

I, Edwin E.

Van Brunt, Jr.,

represent that I am Executive Vice President, Arizona Nuclear Power Project, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.,

Edwin E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Sworn to before me this day of 1985.

C~

I l

My Commission '-Expires:

My Commission Expires April 6, 1987 Notary Public

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PVNGS FSAR CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2.1.1.2.2 Codes'and Standards.

Codes and standards applied to the design, fabrication, and erection of the containment and internal structures are given in table 3.2-1 and in section 3.8.1.2.

In each case, the codes and standards used are consistent. with the equipment safety function.

6.2.1.1.2.3 Protection A ainst External Pressure Loads.

The containment system is designed to maintain its structural and functional integrity during and after the most extreme loading conditions due to inadvertent operation of containment heat removal systems and other possible modes of plant operation (e.g.,

containment purging as listed in table 6.2.1-1) that could potentially result in significant external structural loadings.

The resulting pressures are lower than the design containment external pressure.

Details of this evaluation are provided in paragraph 6.2.1.1.3.6.

6.2.1.1.2.4 Potential 'Water Tra s Inside Containment.

The design of the.containment minimizes potential trapping of safety injectio'n and containment spray water which might t'therwise prevent return and subsequent recirculation via the

=----.

o containment emergency sump.

The reactor cavity and associate'd ventilation ducts are the only locati.'ons that trap significant quantities of water.

These locations are shown in fig-ures 1.2-4, 1.2-9, and 1.2-10.

As a result of a LOCA and subsequent.

safety injection system operation, the reactor cavity and the ventilation ducts that penetrate the lower portion of the cavity shield wall could fillwith water to an elevation of 98.8 feet (to a depth of approximately 36 feet above the reactor cavity floor).

At this elevation, water will overflow to the surrounding floor of the containment.

The quantity of water trapped by the cavity and ducts is approximately 136,000 gallons.

6.2.1-8

k

~ PVNGS FSAR CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Based on initial availability of 819,700 gallons from the re fueling water tank (max. capacity),

the contribution of"the RC3 inventory, and the four safety injection tank volumes, the resulting depth of water at the containment floor will be approximately 10 feet, 6 inches.

For net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations', initial availability of 458,740 gallons from the refueling water tank (minimum capacity),

the contribution of the RCS inventory

-(minus the volume to fillthe reactor cavity to a level of "98.8 feet.),

and four safety injection tank volumes yields a

minimum water level depth of approximately 4-1/2 feet 'above the containment floor..

The safety injection and containment spray pumps are locate'd "

in the auxiliary building and are placed low enough below containment emergency sump elevation to assure the availability of the following NPSH requirements for recirculation at 300F:

Head P~um 22 feet Containment spray 1

22 feet High pressure safety injection 19 'feet Low pressure safety injection During'ormal'plant operation, rains from the refueling canal

~ floor (elevation 98.5 feet and elevation 90.5 feet) to the containment floor (elevation 80 feet) are 4eeJ~

open to preclude trapping of water.

The drain line consists of wl'~ gA.

prexim 10 feet of 10-inch diameter piping.

Plugging of the drain line is prec u e water will be permanently contained by the refueling canal.

Since the expected maximum pumped fluid temperature will exceed

212F, NPSH for the safeguards pumps was calculated by assuming that the temperature of the pumped liquid is at.

saturation for the containment pressure, and that the vapor 6.2. 1-9

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PVNGS FSAR CONTAIN?MNT SYSTEMS PIP(+

Identification of the reflective)insulation and quantities used within the containment are listed in table 6.2.2-1.

The insulation is designed to be non-reactive under the following LOCA conditions:

Ambient temperature Relative humidity Air velocity Radiation Chemical Pressure 140 to 350F Saturated. steam/air mixture 0 to 300 ft/min 3.3 x 10 rads integrated dosage" Up to 4400 ppm boron, and 100 ppm Hydrazine solution pH 4-10 60 psig P~P~~+

Table 6.2.2-1 REFLECTI INSULATION USED WITHIN CONTAI?PKNT Nominal Pipe Dia (in.)

'Length (ft)

Use Attachment Method.

28 14 12 16 710 290 60 280 540 160 290 Main steam Main feedwater Main feedwater Steam generator blowdown Safety injection Safety injection Shutdown cooling Quick release latches or expansion-type metal bands Quick release latches or expansion-type metal bands Quick release latches or expansion-type metal bands'uick release latches or expansion-type metal bands Quick release latches or expansion-type metal bands Quick release latches or expansion-type metal bands Quick rel'ease latches or expansion-type metal bands a.

4-in. thick insulation is assumed for all listed pipes.

6.2.2-6

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CONTAINKWT SyS TEMS Metallic, reflective-type insulation is attached to the piping and components as two half-segments with quick release latches or b expansion-type metal bands.

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Non-metallic insulation on non-reactor coolant piessure boundary components is limited to

~the~ormql chilled water system piping.

Non-metallic insula-Wab I SS

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is enclosed in stainless steel sheet and

~ade&to the component.

step~

6.2.2.3 Desi Evaluation A.

The CSS is designed to rapidly reduce the containment pressure and temperature following a LOCA or MSGR.

Figures 6.2.1-1 through 6.2.1-6 show the effect of containment spray in event of these accidents.

Plan and elevation.drawings of the containment showing expected spray coverage are provided in figures 6.5-4 through 6.5-9.

A discussion of containment sprayed volume and spray overlap is provided in section 6.5.2.2.

A discussion of the system's heat removal effectiveness is found in CESSAR. Appendix 6A, Section 2.1.2.

Performance testing of the spray nozzles has v'erified that they will function as predicted, in terms of flow

rate, spray angle, drop size spectrum and mean drop size as a function of the pressure drop across the nozzles.

A detailed description of the SPRACO nozzle parameters was submitted earlier to the NRC for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3, docket No. 50-382.

Analysis of the NPSH of the recirculation pumps in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.1 is provided in section 6.3 (the same analysis as for high pressure safety injection.(HPSI) pumps).

Pump. data.is tabulated in CESSAR Appendix 6A, Section 3.3.

December 1981 6.2.2-7 Amendment 7

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~ e PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 6A d.

Estimate what the effect of these insulation'articles would be on the operability and performance of all pumps used for recirculation cooling.

Address effects on pump seals and bearings.

RESPONSE

2.

3'.

CESSAR Section 16.4.5.2.b commits to inspection of the containment prior to establishing containment integrity.

CESSAR Section 16.4.5.2.c.2 commits to the inspection required by Regulatory Guide 1.82 (Rev.

0) Item 14.

Plant procedures will require an operator to check at least once per shift, ECCS performance during long term recirculation cooling using the ECCS.

These pro-cedures will provide specific guidance on recognition and mitigation of ECCS performance degradation during recirculation operation.

They will also include guidance to alert the operator to the symptoms of inadequate core cooling.

Amended section 6.3.1.4.H;2 refers to CESSAR Table 6.3.2-3 which provides a list of the instrumentation available to the operator to

'monitor ECCS performance.

4..

There are no high energy lines located in the vicinity of the emergency sumps which could interfere with the successful operation when required.

5.1 The PVNGS design meets the requirements of NRC Regu-latory Guide 1.82, Revision 0.

4P 5.2 Figure 6A-4 shows the location of the drain sump relative to the containment sump.

a5.3.a.

Figure 6A-5 provides the size of openings on the screens.

No flow blockage will occur beyond the screen as

,, all openings.are larger than the inimum screen size.

'.3.b.

The estimated blockage is ~/.

T e model tests were made for up to 95% blockag~+

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6A-38 December 1981

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~ 1 PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 6A 5.3.c(l)

Type 304, stainless steel 5.3.c(2)

Mirror and reflective insulation by Diamond Power Corporation and TRANSCO, respectively 5.3.c(3)

Attached by stainless steel buckles 5.3.c(4) 'nly mirror or reflective insulation is used in th containment except for 400 feet of fiberglass insulation use on 10-in., 8-in.,

and 6-in. chilled water pipe.

The fiberglass insulation is manufactured by the CERTAINTEE Company and is surrounded in every application by a stainless steel jacket.

5.3. c (5 )

The model test of the containment recirculation sump and screen included modeling various percentages of screen plugging and flow conditions.

The maximum screen l

plugging tested was 95 percent.

The model test report describes in detail various test parameters.

The report information has been submitted to the NRC as part og the Containment Systems Independent Design Review submitted under PVNGS transmittal letter ANPP-18147, dated June 4, 1981.

'This model test report has shown that

'a vortex breaking cage needs to be installed at the suction

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pipe.

This change will be implemented.

No other changes in piping or structures are required.

The combination of this testi:ng and the analytical calculations for head loss of piping outside the model's

scope, prove that there is adequate NPSH at the safety injection pumps.

5.3.d The fiberglass insulation is not located near any postulated high energy line breaks (HELB) which will require

o. the use of the emergency sumps.

Therefore the fiberglass insulation will not be subject to the resulting affects of a HELB.(i.e. pipe whip or jet impingement).

Your response to Item II.K.3.17 of NUREG 0737 is not complete.

Provide a comm'itment that you will establish a program prior to December l981'A-39 Amendment 7

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The model test of the containment recirculation

.sump and screen included modeling various percentages of screen plugging and flow conditions.

The maximum screen plugging tested was 95 percent.

The model test report, describes in detail various test parameters.

The report 4

information has been submitted to the NRC as part of the 4

Containment Systems Independent Design Review submitted under PVNGS transmittal letter ANPP-18147, dated

~'

June 4, 1981.'his model test report has shown that a

vortex breaking cage needs to be installed at the suction s

pipe.

This change will be implemented.

No other changes in piping or structures are required.

The combination of this testing and the analytical calculations for head loss of piping outside the model's

scope, prove that there is 1

adequate NPSH at the s'afety injection pumps.

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, HABITABILITYSYSTEMS Table 6.4-1 ESSENTIAL CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT COMPONENT DESCRIPTION (Two Units Per Control Building)

High Efficiency 'Filter Flowrate, std ft /min Quantity (banks)

HEPA filter Flowrate, std ft /min 3

Efficiency, 0.3 micron, Quantity (banks)

Carbon adsorber

Flowrate, std ft /min Bed depth, in.

Efficiency, organic and elemental iodine, Quantity (banks)

Cooling coil Quantity Fan

Flowrate, std ft /min 3

Quantity 28,600 1

28,600 99.97 28,600 2

95 28,600 1

air duct, is. improbable due to the following design arrange-ments and considerations:

A.

The control room is at the 140-foot elevation.

'C There are no piping penetrations

.into the building above the 140-fuot ele ation.

The control

~ 8-inch room. is maintained a 1/4-'h NG pressure above atmospheric to prevent infiltration of air.

The volume of the control room and other space protected by the habitability system is 1.6 X 10 ft The outside air supply.of 1000 ft /min will ensure pressuri-zation of the area in excess of 1/

'h NG so that I/a in~i 6.4-10'

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HABITABI? ITY SYSTEMS tron Toxic gases are not stored or used onsite in quantities suffi-cient to necessitate control room protection, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.78.

The analysis of potential offsite sources for toxic gases is presented in section 2.2.3.

6.4.4 DESIGN EVATUATIONS 6.4.4.1 Radiolo ical Protection'he effects of potential radiological accidents are analyzed in chapter 15.

The radiological protection afforded operators in the event of an accident is described in sections 6.4.2, 11.5, 12.3.2, 12.3.3, and 12.3.4.

6.4.4.2 Toxic Gas Protec 6.4.4.3 Im lementation of Desi n Bases These evaluations are listed to correspond with the design bases of section 6.4.1.

A.. Safety Evaluation One Control zoom habitability system components discussed in section 6.4.2.2.2 are arranged in redundant safety-related ventilation trains, as shown in figure 9.4-1.

The location of components and ducting within the control room envelope ensures an adequate supply of filtered air to all areas requiring access.

B.

Safety Evaluation Two By using chilled water cooling coils and duct heaters, the control room essential air conditioning system maintains the temperature between 70F and 80F and the relative humidity below 50%.

The control room pressure is mai'ntained at leas inch WG above Amendment 8

6.4-18 March 1982

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