ML17298B532
| ML17298B532 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ANPP-31195-WFQ, NUDOCS 8411260396 | |
| Download: ML17298B532 (9) | |
Text
REGULATOR'NFORMATION DISTRISUTION 8'EM (RIOR)
ACCE.SSION NBR;8411260396 DOC ~ DATE: 84/11/21 NOTARIZED! YES
.DOCKET' FACIL:STN 50 528 Palo Verde Nuclear Stations Unit" 1~ Arizona Publi'5000528 AUTHoNAME, AUTHOR AFFILIATION VAN'RUNTgE~ E'>
ArizonaI Public -Service'o
~
RECIP;NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIGHTONg Go Licensing Branch 3
SUBJECT>
Requests. schedular re) ief for implementation of design changes to meet fire protection commitments,Due.
to engineeringipr ocu'rementiconst 8 testing activitiesgmods delayed until 850401 'escription of changes
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Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No.
STN-50-528 Fire Protection Modifications and Compensatory Measures File:
84-056-026; G.1.01.10
Reference:
Letter from E.E.
Van Brunt, Jr.,
APS, to G.W. Knighton,
- NRC, (ANPP-31101),
dated November 13, 1984
Dear Mr. Knighton:
We have recently identified additional design changes which are necessary to assure fire protection commitments are met.
These changes were identified as a result of the revised control room fire spurious actuation
- analysis, provided by the referenced letter, and a reevaluation of our FSAR commitments.
Due to the engineering, procurement, construction, and testing activities associ ated with these modifications, it is necessary to request schedular relief for the implementation of these design
- changes, and propose interim compensatory measures.
The attachment describes the design changes and the proposed compensatory measures.
Please contact Mr. W.F. Quinn of my staff if you have any comments on this information.
EEVBJr/TFQ/no Attachment Very truly yours E. E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director cc:
E.A. Licitra w/a D.J. Kubicki w/a R.P.
Zimmerman w/a A.C. Gehr w/a 84ll2aOS9S 8411~~
PDR ADOCK 0500052S F
0
November 21, 1984 ANPP-31195 STATE OF ARIZONA
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) ss.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA)
I, Edwin E.
Van Brunt, Jr.,
represent that I am Vice President, Nuclear Production of Arizona Public Service
- Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its
- contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.
Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Sworn to "before me this~g~ll.
day of
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My Commtsslon Exptgq ~g 6 ~~>
1984.
Notary Public
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FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS AND COMPENSATORY MEASURES I.
SPURIOUS ACTUATION The following design change is needed to counteract the effects of a control room fire requiring evacuation and shutdown outside the control room with loss of offsite power
(.LOP).
This change was identified during the recently completed
- 10CFR50, Appendix R, control room fire spurious actuation analysis.
Due to the engineering, construction, testing and documentation time needed, this change is expected to be completed by April 1, 1985, before 5/ power i s exceeded In the interim, the smoke detection system for the control floor is operational and the control room is occupied at all times.
Portable fire extinguishers and a manual hose station are provided.
As an additional compensatory
- measure, an hourly fire watch will be established for the entire control floor area, 140'" elevation.
With the above compensatory
- measures, this design change can be completed by the above date with no adverse effect on plant safety.
o DCP 10M-DG-045, Operability of the Train B diesel generator is required to obtain safe shutdown in the event of a control room fire.
Due to control room spurious actuations, the diesel generator governor raise/lower control may be da'maged prior to operation of the diesel generator disconnect switch.
This change will provide a switch in the local diesel generator control panel that would allow the operator to simulate a
LOP which shifts the diesel to emergency mode.
In this
- mode, the damaged raise/lower control is bypassed.
II.
FIRE BARRIERS AND COMPONENT SEPARATION As a result of the reanalysis for 10CFR50, Appendix R, which was included in FSAR Amendment 13, two components are being relocated, separate fuses are being added for valve position, battery packs are being added to smoke detection
- panels, and one raceway is being rerouted.
As a compensatory
- measure, an hourly fire watch will be established in all safety-related fire areas affected by the changes in accordance with Technical Specification 3/4.7.12 until the changes are implemented.
These changes are expected to be completed by April 1, 1985, before exceeding 5/ power and, with the technical specification compensatory measures which will be taken, plant safety will not be adversely affected.
o DCP 10E-HA-039 In the event of a fire in the NSSS that results in a failure of a position switch on valve J-SGA-UV-134 or J-SGA-UV-138, the auxiliary feedwater pump room Train A air cooling unit may be disabled.
If the ACU does not start on auxiliary feedwater pump operation, the environmental qualification of the pump is not main-tained and the pump may fail, resulting in a loss of auxiliary feedwater flow.
This change will provide separate fuses for the valve position switches to ensure that the fire will not affect ACU operation.
o DCP 10J-SG-129 The NRC requires that the plant obtain hot shutdown without repair following a fire.
This requires that at least one ADV be operable.
This change will relocate two pressure transmitters to assure that, in the event of a NSSS fire, the ability to provide a nitrogen supply to open an ADV is not lost.
o DCP 10M-gK-014 In the event of a
- LOP, smoke detection panels servicing the spray pond pump house and portions of the 140'" elevation Auxiliary Building will lose power.
This change will provide 24-hour backup battery packs to these smoke detection panels in accordance with the commitment to have battery backup for safety-related fire zones.
o DCP 10E-RC-138 A postulated fire in Fire Zone 42C, Auxiliary Building east corridors at 100'" elevation, while the plant is in Node 4, 5 or 6 could disable the Train B shutdown cooling system as well as cause a
spurious closure of valve J-SIC-UV-653 resulting in the loss of the Train A LPSI pump.
This change will reroute the Train A LPSI pump circuitry out of the Train B zone.
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