ML17298B236

Responds to 840725 Request for Addl Info Re Isolation Devices Used within Reactor Protection Sys & Control Sys Failures Due to High Energy Line Breaks

ML17298B236
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	09/07/1984
From:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ANPP-30465-WFO, NUDOCS 8409120335
Download: ML17298B236 (48)

Text

REGULATOR>.

NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION S 1'EM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:840 FACIL:STN"50 '528 ST(4 50~529 STN~50 530 AUTH BYNAME VAN BRUNT,E;ED RECIP ~ NAME, KNIGHTONgGe 9120335 DOC e DATE: 8'/09/07 NOTARIZEDt YES Pal,o Verde Nuclear Station~

Unit ig Arizona Publi Palo Verde Nuclear Station~

Unit 2g Arizona Publi Palo Vel deNuclear Station~

Unit 3i Ar izona Publi

.AUTHOR AFFILIATION Arizona Public Service Co ~

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Licensing Branch 3

DOCKET 05000528 05000529 05000530

SUBJECT:

Responds to 800725 request for addi info re isolation devices used within reactor protection sys 8 control sys I

failures due to high energy line breaks.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

B001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR +

ENCL g'IZE:

TITLE; Licensing Submittal:

PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8, Related Correspondence NOTES:Standardized plant ~

Standardized plant.

Standardized plant.

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Arizona Public Service Company P.O. SOX 21666

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PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85036 September 7,

1984 ANPP-30465 WF0/NAJ Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Mr. George Knighton,. Chief Licensing Branch No.

3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2 and 3

Docket Nos. STN-50-528/529/530 File:

84-056-026'.1.01.10

Reference:

(1) Letter'rom G.

W. Knighton, NRC, to E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr.,

APS, dated July 25, 1984.

Subject:

Request for Information Concerning (a)

Isolation Devices Used Within The Reactor Protection

System, and (b)

Control System Failures Due To High Energy Line Breaks.

Dear Mr. Knighton:

Reference

,(1) requested specific information relating to the isolation devices used within the PVNGS Reactor Protection System (RPS) and information concerning control system failures due to High Energy Line Breaks (HELB).

Attachment A to this letter provides the information requested by the Staff pertaining to the isolation devices used within the RPS and Attachment B addresses the control system failures due to HELBs.

If you have any further questions on these subjects, please call me.

Very truly yours, E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVBJr/MAJ/sp Attachments cc:

E. A. Licitra A.

C.

Gehr R.

Zimmerman B. Stevens 8409120335 84090T PDR ADOCK 05000528 A 'DR I

(w/a)

(w/a)

(w/a)

(w/a)

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September 7,

1984 ANPP-30465 TFO/MAJ STATE OF ARIZONA

)

) ss.

COUNTY OF MARICOPA )

I, A.

Donald B.

Karner, represent that I am Assistant Vice President of Arizona Public Service

Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me for Edwin E.

Van Brunt, Jr.,

Vice President, Nuclear Production, on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority so to do, that I have read such document and know its

contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.

Donald B. Karner Sworn to before me this~ed dey of l984 Notary Public My Commission Expires:

f,"Ly GOmm/SSIen CXPIrCS I',Pr/i 6, '<067

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I ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFQ/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 1 of 18 Responses to NRC Questions Concerning Isolation Devices Used in the Reactor Protective System Amendment 12 to the Palo Verde FSAR includes a

revision to Section 7.2, "Reactor Protective System."

The information states that the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) system and Core Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC) will provide their outputs and a

number of their inputs to the Plant Monitoring System (PMS) which is considered to be nonsafety-related.

Fiber-optic data links are to be used for this interface.

The staff understands that this interface will be mono-directional (i.e.,

signals from the protection system CPCs to the PMS).

Paragraph 4.7.2 of IEEE 279-1971 permits the use of isolation devices to transmit signals from protection systems for use in nonsafety-related systems such as the PM'cceptance of the design interface described above will be predicated upon the satisfactory qualification of the electrical isolation devices that are to be used to maintain appropriate electrical independence.

'Information supplied to date is insufficient to determine whether the fiber-optic isolation devices are qualified for its application.

Therefore, please provide information to ensure that any electrical failure applied to the isolation device output will not

degrade, below an acceptable

level, the operation of the circuit connected to the input.

As a minimum, please provide:

Detailed information (including drawings) to describe the physical implementation of the subject isolation devices into the reactor protection system design.

This should include specific information on the physical design and electrical characteristics of the isolation device itself.

0023K/0002K

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'ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFQ/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 2 of 18 APS

Response

The CPC/PMS Data Link System installed at Palo Verde Units 1, 2 and 3 is depicted in the figure on page 14.

The four CPCs and the two CEACs in the DNBR/LPD Calculator System communicate individually to the Plant Monitoring System (PMS).

The fiber optic modules at each end of the interface function as transducers; converting electrical signals to light pulses at the transmitting

end, a

CPC or a

CEAC, and converting the light pulses to electrical signals at the receiving

end, the PMS.

Each of the six interfaces is accomplished over two fiber optic cables (reference the attached Pirelli data sheet (type S125C1)).

The installed cable length varies with the channel involved but each is approximately 150 feet.

The construction of the optic cable is such that the cable contains no electricall conductive material.

The

cable, rather than the modules,'s the isolation medium.

From an electrical point of view, it is as if the fiber optic cable were not even present.

The relative permittivity or dielectric constant of a material is a

measure of the material's isolation capability.

The dielectric constant of a material is referenced relative to free space (a

vacuum) and is a

dimensionless number.

Dry air possesses a

dielectric constant of 1.00059.

Glass possesses a

dielectric constant in the range of 4.0 to 7. 0 depending upon the specific type (Reference 1).

The higher the dielectric constant, the greater the isolation that is provided.

Thus, fiber optic cables have an isolation capability that is 4 to 7 times greater than dry air.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75 recognizes six inches of air as sufficient isolation to meet separation

criteria, and a

150 foot length of fiber optic cable provides significantly more isolation than six inches of air.

t

ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP

, 30465 TFQ/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 3 of 18 The voltage breakdown rating of a typical fiber optic cable is on the order of 250 KV per meter (reference the attached data sheet from EOTEC Corp.

(page 15 and 16) on a

cable of similar construction).

One hundred and fifty feet of cable is approximately 3

46 meters which w'ould provide a voltage breakdown of 250 x 10 x

46

~ 1.1 x 10 volts.

The maximum credible fault for the DNBR/LPD 5

Calculator System is 480 VAC.

The maximum credible fault for the PMS is 580 VAC.

The isolation capability of the fiber optic cable is 'therefore orders of magnitude greater than any postulated maximum credible fault at either end of the CPC/PMS Data Link.

A fault at either end of the data link might destroy the module but will not propagate over the fiber optic cable.

I 8

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'ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFO/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 4 of 18 2.

A description of the specific testing or analyses performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application.

This description should include a

discussion of the system mock-up considered including elementary drawings where necessary to indicate the design configuration and how maximum credible faults (including continuous phase-to-phase short

circuits, phase-to-ground short

circuits, and the application of continuous external high voltages) and voltage transients were applied or considered.

Response

An analysis of the isolation characteristics of the data link is provided starting on page 5:

Attachment A tc'NPP-304-TPO/NAJ S ep timber 7,

19 84 Physical Xnstallat ion Page 5 of 18 PMS PMS DATA-LINK I

XCVR fiber optic cabin CPC CHANNEL A (typicaI) approx.

I50 ft I

C IRCUI T MODEL; f iber assembly dia (ec tric cons tant 4.O phototransistor Iight emitting diode EQUI VALENT C IRCUIT MODE L; CPC 4

300 4t.

air PMS FIGURE -I

1

ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFQ/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 6 of 18 Analysis Acceptance Criteria:

A.

Separation of 6" of air from R.G. 1.75 B.

Withstand maximum credible fault 1.

The interconnection of the protective channel to the plant monitoring system utilizes a non-conductive fiber optic cable.

dielectric constant voltage breakdown 4.0

~ 250 x 10 volts/meter 3

A.

cable length to PMS 150 ft or 46 meters Separation distance calculation:

D

=

150 ft. x dielectric constant 1

S dielectric constant 2

(reference 2)

D 150 x 2.0 ~ 300 ft. equivalent in air S

==

Conclusion:==

D is greater than 6 inches, theref ore s

Criterion A is met with a margin of greater than 100.

'ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFO/lfAJ September 7,

1984 Page 7 of 18 B.

Maximum credible fault calculation For a non-conductive

medium, the fault voltage must exceed the breakdown voltage for the fault to propagate.

breakdown voltage characteristics of cable 250 KV/meter withstand

?

46 meters CPC Data Link XCVR 250 x10 volts/meter withstand 3

fault voltage ~ Vf For the non-conductive medium to be an acceptable

isolator, the withstand voltage V> must be greater than the maximum credible fault voltage Vf.

V

~ 250 x 10 V/M x 46 1.15 x 10 volts 3

7 W

The maximum credible fault voltage source 580 VAC This is equivalent to 580 x 1.2 VDC 696 volts A conservative assumption is to utilize 100% margin.

V 696 x 2 1392 f

Because the medium, is non-conductive, it is conservative to assume the entire fault voltage is applied to the isolator, ignoring any attenuation in the circuit components of the transmitting device.

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ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFg/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 8 of 18 Since the isolator is a single conductor, there is only one transmission mode.

V

~

1.15 x 10 volts 7

V

~ 1.392 x 10 volts 3

3 V

~ is greater than V

by a margin of 8.26 x 10 Therefore, Criterion B is met'and the isolator is qualified.

ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFQ/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 9 of 18 3.

Data to verify that the maximum credible faults and transient voltages considered were the maximum voltage/current to which the isolation device could be exposed, and define how the maximum values were determined.

APS

Response

The fault voltage potential of this isolator was constrained by the application of interface criteria.

Also, there does not exist any voltage in the plant greater than the isolator can withstand.

1'

'ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TPO/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 10 of 18 4.

Information to verify that the maximum credible faults and transient voltages were considered in both the transverse (line-to-line) and common (line-to-ground) modes.

Response

Line-to-line and line-to-ground transient voltage faults do not apply to a

single conductor non-conducting optical cable medium.

Refer to the response to question 2.

o

'ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFQ/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page ll of 18 5...

Data to define the pass/fail acceptance criteria.

APS ll

Response

The criteria' or pass/fail for the analysis were to have an equivalent separation distance greater than 6 inches of air (R.G.

1.75) and to have a'reakdown voltage greater than the maximum credible fault voltage.

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ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP 30465 TFO/MA~

September 7,

1984 Page 12 of 18 6.

Information to verify that the isolation device is classified as part of the protection system (i.e.,

verify that the device is safety-related; environmentally qualified in accordance vith 10 CFR 50.49, and seismically qualified).

Response

Qualification data for the modules and cable is provided in the DNBR/LPD System Environment Program documentation and is available for reviev at either C-E's Windsor facility or at APS offices.

4'

ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP -

30465 T.O/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 13 of 18 7.

Data to verify that the effects of electrostatic coupling and electromagnetic interference were considered.

Response

As described in the response to question 1,

the optical cables in use contain no electrically conductive material and function more effectively as an isolating dielectric than air.

Therefore, no electrostatic coupling is enabled by use of such cables.

Similarly, there are no electrical effects resulting from electromagnetic radiation in optical

cables, nor is the optical transmission (especially of digital communication in multimode fiber) affected by plant electromagnetic interference.

, 'Attachmant A tc ANPP- >04 TPQ~IIAJ September 7,

1904 Pape 14 of 13 I CHAN A CI'C

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~ ASLA CAAO DNBR/LPD CALCULATOR SYSTEM FIBER OPTIC INTERFACE CABLE ASSEMBLIES

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September',

1984 Pape 15 of, 18 High Voltage Performance

~~CORE k~'

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~ Braided Kevlar'or increased tensile and pulling strength

~ Tight tube construction for increased flexibility and handling capability

~ Operating temperature: -20'C to+80'C

~ Available in Simplex, High Strength Simplex, and Duplex Zip constructions

~ Fiber nominally proof tested at 50k psi. Available at proof test levels up to 200k psi

~ High radiation resistance

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~ EMI/RFI immunity

~ Easily terminated with ail connector devices Pa~

Number Simplex 434001 444001 454001 464001 NA 0.29 0.40 0.40 0.40 Attenuation at 820 nm (dB/km) 6 10 10 10 Core/Clad Diameter m

100/140 200/380 400/560 600/850 Cable Dia.

mm 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 Min. Bend Diameter Unloaded cm (in) 4.75 (1.90) 4.75 (1.90) 9.50 (3.75) 27.00 (10.0)

Maximum Pull Load Nt Lb 400 (90) 400 (90) 400 (90) 400 (90)

Bandwidth MHz-km) 100 20 15 10'uper Strength Simplex 434003 444003 454003 464003 0.29 0.40 0.40 0.40 6

10 10

'10 1 00/1 40 200/380 400/560 600/850 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.75 (1.90) 4.75 (1.90) 9.50 (3.75) 27.00 (10.0) 666 (150) 666 (150) 666 (150) 666 (150) 100 20 15 10 Duplex (zip) 434002 444002 0.29

" 0.40

,6

'10 1 00/1 40 200/380 3.0x7.0, 3.0x7.0 4.75 (1.90) 4.75 (1.90) 600 (135) 600 (135) 100 20 Allparameters are nominal.

Note: Tested at 250KV/meter in accordance with'lectrical requirements for 100R series non-conductive hydraulic hose outlined in Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) specification J343 report number ET83-208-P. Report on simplex cable 444001 available upon request.

EOTec ~ilr~

Corporation 420 Frontage Road ~ West Haven, Connecticut 06516 ~ (203) 934-7961 afllil'

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Attachment A to ANPP-30465 TFO/MAJ Page 16 of 18 O

P S Y C A OPTICAL SYSTEMS CABLE GLASS FIBER AND CABLE Pofyurethaee jacket for abrasion resistance.

rug-gedness.

and flame retar-dancy. Recommended temperature range:

-40'C to 90'C S80C1 an d C2 S1 00C1 and C2 S1 00RC1 and C2 S1 25 C1 and C2 Kevlar lor increased tensile strength Flexible jacket for fiber prOleCtiOn Double buffer coat for reduced losses and improved strength APPLICATIONS Glass on glass. fow loss optical communiCatiOn hber.

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~

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Single and dual channel cables are standard designs, available for rapid delivery in lengths up to 2 km. Multiple channel constructions are also available. Special designs can be provided for critical high-temperature applications, hybrid con-structions combining electrical and optical wires.

For other particular requirements, consult the factory.

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~ Phone (203i 265 5533

~ tWXl'7t0 476 0764

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DATAStfE'ET: 8005 Aetachmaat A to ANPP-30463 4l'0/llrhr Sepeeinber 7, /ABLE DESIGNATION Page 17 of.

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FIBER OPTICAL AND DIMENSIONAL C HARACTER ISTI CS CABLE IDENTIFICATION PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS Maximum Allenualion (db/k/n I 850nm)

S80 S100 S100R S125 Catalog Part Number

'Fiber Core/Clad Diameter (mm)

Number of Channels Cable Cable Dimension Weight (mm)

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Numerical Ape/tv/e 99'/0 Intensity 95% Intensity

, ~ I'24 c

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0,080/O.i 25 3.0 4 5x7.5 8.0 31.0 Maximum Acceplance Cone Angle Bandwidth (MHzkm) 35'0.20 35'0-45 35'0.20 SCDN-St 00CT SC0.O.S100C2 SCDN.ST 25CT 0:100/0.140 0.100/0.140 0.125/0.200 3.0 4.5x7.5 3.0 8.0 31.0 8.0 Core Diamele/ (mm)

Fiber Diameter (mm) 0.080 0,100 0,125 ~.004 0.140 ~.004 0.125 0.200 ~.006 SCDQ.ST 25C2 0.125/0.200 SCDA.SI OORC I 0.100/0.140 4.5x7.5 3.0 31.0 8.0 Bufle/ed Dia. (mm)

(nomina I)

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1

'ATTACHMENT A TO ANPP - 30465 TF )/HAJ September 7,

1984 Page 18 of 18 References l.

"Electronic Engineer's Reference Book 5th Edition",

edited by F.

Mazda; Published by Butterworth 6 Co., Ltd.; London'983; Section 13.1.

2.

"Handbook of Chemistry and Physics",

40th

Edition, Chemical Rubber Publishing Co.,

1959.

1,

,r

'ATTACHMENT B TO ANPP 30465 TFQ/~fAJ September 7,

1984 Page 1 of 6

Responses to NRC Questions Concerning Control System Failures Due to d

High Energy Line Breaks (HELBs)

The staff requests that the following specific information be provided:

Detailed elementary drawings and electrical schematics to show the interaction of the Reactor Regulating System (RRS) and Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) output signals with the Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS).

This should clearly show the interface of the SBCS Automatic Withdrawal Prohibit (AWP) signal with CEDMCS which is to be used to block the RRS demand for withdrawal of control element assemblies (CEAs).

The drawings should be highlighted and/or annotated as necessary for clarity.

Response

The event scenario of concern is the failure of the SBCS such that a

quick open signal is generated in combination with the RRS generating a

CEA withdrawal signal during a

steam line break inside the containment building.

This scenario is being reviewed because of the potential increase in positive reactivity insertion above that reported in the PVNGS FSAR and the impact on the consequences.

The following discussion explains why the combined actions of the SBCS and RRS need not be considered since an AWP signal will block a CEA withdrawal signal from the

RRS, or terminate an automatic withdrawal if the withdrawal is already in progress.

Enclosure (A),

Page 6', is the CEDMCS Group Raise/Lower Logic Diagram.

The SBCS generates an AWP signal whenever a

SBCS demand for opening the turbine bypass valves exists.

This signal is generated for both the quick open and the modulate open signals.

The AWP signal is sent to the CEDMCS (Input "D" on Enclosure (A)).

1'

'ATTACHMENT B TO ANPP 30465 TPQ/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 2 of 6

The RRS may generate an Automatic Raise (AR) signal due to a normal or faulted input.

This signal is sent to the CEDHCS (input "A" on Enclosure (A)).

The RRS generates other signals which do not impact this discussion since they do not result in the uncontrolled withdrawal of CEAs.

The CEDHCS also receives a Hanual Raise (MR) signal from the CEDHCS control panel in the control room.

This signal is given when the operator requests rod withdrawal.

There is no HR signal for this discussion since no operator action is assumed.

There are other input signals to the

CEDMCS, however, these signals do not impact the RRS/SBCS interlock.

If an AWP is generated and the RRS is requesting CEA withdrawal then the inputs to the CEDMCS will have the following values; A ~ "1",

D "0",

and HR

~

"0" (no operator action).

Tracing these inputs through the CEDMCS logic diagram (Enclosure (A))

yields the following:

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Since the AWP signal, input D, is "0", the output of NAND gate "W" will be 1, regardless of the value of inputs B and C.

The output of NAND gate "X" will be 1 since the MR input is "0" regardless of the value of the other input to the gate.

The output of Exclusive OR gate "Y" will be "0" since both of its inputs will be "0".

Both of the NAND gate outputs have been inverted by the amplifier/inverters.

The output of NAND gate "Z" will be 1, since the output of the Exclusive OR gate is "0", regardless of the other inputs to the NAND gate.

Penally, the output of the CEDHCS logic is "0" for the "control group raise" portion of the diagram.

The "control group lower" portion is not of interest since CEA withdrawal is the malfunction of concern.

'ATTACHMENT B TO ANPP 30465 TFO/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 3 of 6

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that in the presence of both an automatic raise signal from the RRS and an AWP signal from the SBCS, there will be no "control group raise" signal from the CEDMCS.

As a matter of interest, the override of the RRS request occurs in what has been labeled NAND gate "W" of the attached diagram.

'ATTACHMENT B TO ANPP 30465 TFO/MAJ September 7,

1984 Page 4 of 6

2.

Information to verify that, should the RRS demand for withdrawal signal exist, a subsequent SBCS AWP signal will block the RRS demand signal and will result in the discontinuation of CEA withdrawal.

Drawings to be provided as part of item 1 above should clearly show this.

Again, please highlight and/or annotate where necessary.

APS

Response

The response to question (1) applies to a CEA withdrawal in progress when'n AWP signal is generated. 'he logic is not latched.

When signal "D" is zero, the automatic withdrawal will be terminated.

ATTACHMENT B TO ANPP 30465 TFQ/NAJ September 7,

1984 Page 5 of 6 3.

Clarify the statement (Reference

2) that "The SBCS generates an AWP signal whenever a

SBCS demand for opening the turbine bypass valves exists..."

as it relates to the quick opening signal (i.e., will any open command signal Nodulation Node, Quick Open Mode give AWP or just the Quick Open Node signal).

APS

Response

For the SBCS malfunctions, only the quick open is of concern.

The SBCS will generate an AWP signal in both the Quick Open Mode and Modulation Node.

r Attachment 3 to ANPP-30465 TE~/~

September 7,

1984 04 gv)

Enclosure A

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