ML17297A508
| ML17297A508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1981 |
| From: | Kerrigan J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106220466 | |
| Download: ML17297A508 (14) | |
Text
JUN 4
>Ss~
Docket Nos.:
STN 50-528/529/530 APPLICANT:
Arizona Public Service Company FACILITY:
Palo Verde, Units 'l, 2, and 3
SUBJECT:
SUNDRY OF MEETING TO DISCUSS CONTROL ROON FIRE
~1 8 t981E U S 1E/CIEAE~
CDAIAIIfgION DESIGN CRITERIA A meeting was held in Bethesda, I/Iaryland on May 18, 1981 with representatives of the applicant to discuss control room fire protection.
The meeting attendees are listed in Enclosure l.
The design approach used by APS'to protect against a control room fire is summarized in Enclosure,,2.
The meeting discussions centered ar ound the need to have an alternate shutdown capability that is electrically and physically independent of the control room.
The applicant took the position that the damage caused by a control room fire would be limited because of the design approach used by APS.
The staff disagreed with this position.
The following points were also discussed:
I.)
the installation of metal partitions inside a cabinet to separate divisions is not sufficient because an exposure fire outside the cabinet could still affect both divisions; 2) alternate shutdown capability should be provided whenever adequate separation/protection cannot be provided between divisions.
Although Palo Verde has two cable spreading rooms, this does not preclude the potential need for alternate shutdown capability for other plant areas (e.g., control room);
3)
NRC staff members stated that a particular size and type of fire could not be defined based on the currently available data; 4) the criteria of Appendix R will be applied to the applicant's control room area; 5) any alternate shutdown capability which may be necessary can be a combination of manual procedures and hardware.
I EGIJULTORY BQi',KET HLE COPy Janis D. Kerrigan, Proj ect Manager Licensing Branch No.
3 Division of Licensing OFFICE)
SURNAME/
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0 UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 NN 4
1581 Docket Nos.:
STN 50-528/529/530 APPLICANt:
Arizona Public Service Company FACILITY:
Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING TO DISCUSS CONTROL ROOM FIRE DESIGN CRITERIA A meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland on May. 18,:1981 with representatives of the applicant to discuss control room fire protection, The meeting attendees are listed in Enclosure 1.
The design approach used by APS to protect against a control room fire is summarized in Enclosure 2.
The meeting discussions:centered around the need to have an alternate shutdown capability that is electrically and physical]y independent of the control
- room, The applicant took the position that the damage caused by-a control room fire would be limited because of the. design approach used by APS.
The staff disagreed with this position, The following points were also discussed:
1) the installation af metal partitions inside a cabinet to separate divisions is not sufficient because an exposure fire outside the cabinet could still affect both divisions; 2) alternate shutdown capability should be provided whenever adequate separation/protection cannot be provided between divisions, Although Palo Verde has two cable. spreading rooms, this does not preclude the potential need for alternate shutdown capability for. other plant areas (e.g,, control room);
3)
NRC staff members stated that a particular si,ze and type of fire could not
. be defined based on the currently available data; 4) the criteria of Appendix R'will be. applied to the app1icant's control room area; 5) any alternate shutdown capability which may be necessary can be a combination of manual procedures and hardware,
Enclosures:
As stated anis D,
Ke g~n, feet Manager Licensing Branch N
3 Division of Licensing cc:
See next page.
I r
Mr. E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
Vice President - Construction Pro)ects Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.
Box 21666
- Phoenix, Arizona 85036 CC:
Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Snell 8 Wilmer 3100 Valley Center
- Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Charles S. Pierson Assistant Attorney General 200 State Capitol 1700 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 David N. Barry, Esq.,
Senior Counsel Charles R. Kocher, Esq., Assistant Counsel Southern California Edison Company P. 0.
Box 800
- Rosemead, California 91770 Margaret Walker Deputy Director of Energy Programs Economic-Planning and Development Office 1700 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 William Primm Assistant Attorney General Bataan Memorial Building Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503 Resident Inspector Palo Verde/NPS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0.
Box 21324
ENCLOSURE 1
ATTENDEES NAME Janis Kerrigan V. Benaroya Greg Harrison R. L. Ferguson Dennis Keith John Allen Edwin E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
Fred B. Marsh Charles A. Bischoff P.
S.
Check W. V. Johnston Bill Heinmiller AFFILI'ATION NRC NRC/NRR/CMEB NRC/NRR/CMEB NRC/NRR Bechtel APS APS APS Snell 8 Wilmer/APS NRC NRC Bdchtel
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PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION CONTROL ROOM FIRE ENCLOSURE 2
The following design approach applies to typical current design projects with two cable spreading rooms.
1.
MINIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF A FIRE Historical evidence of fires that resulted in substantial control room damage indicated that such an event is of an extremely low probability.
This is consistent with NRC positions documented in NUREG 0138.
The following specific provisions apply to control rooms of nuclear power plants:
o Low level of combustible material o Low power level circuits only o Continuously staffed area o Limited access to control room area, panels and cabinets o Plant fire protection program Minimize design features that complicate plant maintenance and operations.
Emphasis will be placed on training and ad-ministrative procedures.
2.
MINXMXZE DAMAGE IF A FIRE SHOULD OCCUR o Low level of combustible material o R.G.
1.75 separation o Barriers or separate cabinets for each safety train every-where except main control panels o Fire and/or smoke detectors for safety related panels and cabinets including the main control panels o Fire/smoke detectors in control room area o Fire alarm system o Continuously staffed area o Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations available o Fire brigade training o Qualified fire seals and doors are provided at all control room penetrations 3.
MINIMIZE PROBABXLITY OF CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION o Low level of combustible material o Incipient fire detection o HVAC design basis provides for isolation from external fires and smoke removal from internal fires o Self contained breathing apparatus available o Short duration fire due to low level of combustibles o Fire training for operating personnel o Evacuation required only for temporary loss of habitability May 18, 1981
I
4.
MINIMIZE DURATION OF CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION PERIOD o HVAC removes combustion products and restores habitability o Fire fighting continues after evacuation of operators o 'Procedures exist to restore redundancy lost by fire,damage o Control panel circuit design utilizes normally open, momen-tary contacts whenever practical 5.
PROVIDE ABILITY TO OPERATE SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE OF THE CONTROL ROOM WITH ~LIMITED DAMAGE TO CONTROL ROOM o Remote shutdown panel o Local indicators, valve handwheels and local controls o Emergency procedures o Offsite power not required 1
o Maximize simplicity of circuitry (a'void complex transfer schemes that will reduce reliability) o Emergency support systems (lighting, communications, venti-lation) 6.
ABILXTY TO MXTIGATE THE EFFECTS OF DAMAGED CIRCUXTS XN MAIN CONTROL ROOM o Automatic control logic (external to the main control panel) will assure that important control functions are retained despite most circuit failures o R. G.
- 1. 75 separation minimizes probability of damage to cir-cuits of redundant equipment or systems and provides assurance that parallel control from the remote shutdown panel or automatic systems is possible.
o Worst case evacuation of control room is only until fire is controlled (short duration)*
o Repair or isolation of essential control panel circuits possible in short time following a limited fire
- The control room could be re-occupied if the fire is contained (even if not extinguished).
Additionally evacuation would not begin upon initiation of the fire.
These two facts would result in operator absence from the control room for significantly less time than the duration of the fire.
May 18, 1981