ML17296B332

Forwards Requests for Addl Info Re Bechtel Cable Separation Study Necessary to Complete Fire Protection Review

ML17296B332
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	03/24/1981
From:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
References
NUDOCS 8104150634
Download: ML17296B332 (16)

Text

gg p,4 1981 Docket Nos.:

STN 50-528/529/530 Mr. E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Vice President - Nuclear Projects Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.

Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036

SUBJECT:

CABLE SEPARATION STUDY ggpy~p q,

9 During the Febrpary 25, 1981 meeting of the Fire Protection Review Board, Bechtel presented the work plan that will be used to perform the cable separation study required by NRC.

Since the results of this study were not available for discussion aththe February 25 Independent Design Review meeting, we will need the enclosed information for our fire protection review.

If you have any questions on this material, please contact us.

Sincerely, ggfggial Stgn8d bY

~~ Q TBdBSOO Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULA'RY COMMISStON WASHINGTON, D. C. 20JS" MAR 24 1981

'ocket Nos,: 'TN 50-528/529/530 Mr. E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr, Vice President - Nuclear Projects Arizona Public Service Company P.

0.

Box 21666

Phoenix, Arizona 85036

SUBJECT:

CABLE SEPARATION STUDY During the February 25, 1981 meeting of the Fire Protection Review Board, Bechtel presented the work plan that will be used to perform the cable separation study required by NRC, Since the results of ithis study were not available for discussion. at the February 25 Independent Design Review meeting, we will need the enclosed information for our fire protection review,

- If you have any questions on this material, please contact us, Sincerely, Enclosure; As stated Robert L, Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing

3 E

llr. E. E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Vic~ President

- Construction Projects Arizona f>uMic Service Company l'. O.

Box c'166>6 l'l>oenix, A> izona A5036 I

CC:

Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.

Snell 8 Wilmer 3100 Valley Center

Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Charles S. Pierson Assistant Attorney General 200 State Capitol 1700 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona 85007 David N. Barry, Esq.,

Senior Counsel Charles R. Kocl~er, Esq.,

Assi stant Counsel Southern Cali fornia Edison Company P.

O.

Box BOO

Rosemead, California 91770 Dr. Stanley L. Dolins Assistant Director Energy Programs (OEPAD)

Office of the Governor 1700 West Washington Executive Tower - Room 507

Phoenix, Arizona 85007 William Primm Assistant Attorney General Bataan Memorial Building Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503 Resident Inspector f>alo Verde/NPS LI.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0.

Box 21324 Phoenix, Arizona 85001 Ms. Patricia Lee Hourihan 6413 S. 26th Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85040

,r

ENCLOSURE FIRE PROTECTION REVIE'3 PPLO VERGE 1, 2 5 3

DOCKET NO.50-52S, 50-529 4 50-530 In accordance with section 9.5;1, Branch technical Position ASB 9.5-1, position C.4.a.(1) of NRC Standard Peview Plan and section III.G of new Appendix R :o 10 CFR Part 50, it is the staf,'s position that cab1ing for redundant safe shutdown systems should be separa ed by walls having a

hree-lour fire r ting or equivalent protection (see sec'ion III.G.2 of Appendix R).

That is, cab'.ing required for or associated with the primary method of shutdown, should be physically separated by tne equivalent of a three-hour rated fir barrier from cabling required for or associated with the redundant or alternate method of shutdown.

To assure that redundant shutdown cable systems and all other cable systems that are associated with the shutdown cable systems are separat d from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire ha=ard, we require the following information for each system needed to bring.he plant W

to a safe shutdown.

1.

Provide a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vi al support system equipment required to achieve and maintain ho. and/or cold shutdown.

For each equipment listed:

a.

Differentiate between equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and equipment required to achieve hand nzintain cold shutdown, b.

Define each equipment's location by fire.area, c.

Define each equipment's redundant, counterpart,

d.

Identify each equipment's essential cabling (instrumentation,

control, and power).

For each cable identified: (1) Describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and (2) Identify each fire area loca.ion where the cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for any redundant shutdown, system, and e.

List any problem areas identified by item l.d.(2) above that will be corrected in accordanc'e with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R

(i.e., alternate or dedicated shutdown'apability).

2.

Provide a table that lists -Class'E and Non-Class lE cables that are associated with the essential safe shutdown systems ident.ified in item 1

above.

For each cable listed:

Define the cables'ssociation to the safe shutdown system (common power source, common raceway, separation less thin R'egulatory Guide 1.75 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect shutdown systems, etc.),

b.

Describe each associated cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and c.

Identify each location where the associated cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system.

3-3.

Provide one of the following for each of the circuits identified in i'.c above:

(a)

The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, ground, or hot short of cables will not affect it' associated shutdown

system, (b)

Identify each circuit requiring.a solution in accordanc with section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or (c )

Identify each circuit meeting the requirements of section III.G.2 of Appendix R (i.e., three-hour wall, 20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression, or one-hour barrier with automa:ic fire suppression).

4.

To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following information be provided for the control room. If.credit is to be taken for an alternate or dedicated shutdown method for other fire areas

'(as identified by item l.e or 3.b above) in accordance with section III.G.3 of n w Appendix R

1 to 10 CFR Part 50, the following information will also be required for each of these plant areas.

a.

A table that lists all equipment including'nstrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the primary method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.

b.

A table that 1'ists:all'equipment ijcluding instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.

c.

Identify each alternate shutdown equipment listed in item 4.b above with essential cables (instrumentation,

control, and power) that are located in the fire area containi'ng the primary shutdown equipment.

For eac!1 equipmen. lis:ed provide one of the following:

(1)

Oetailed electrical schematic arawings that show the essential cables that are duplicated elsewhere and.are electrically isolated from the subject fire areas, or (2)

.The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will not affect the capability to achieve and. maintain hot or cold shutdown.

d.

provide a table that lists Class lE and Non-Class lE cables that are associated with the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of shutdown.

For each item listed, identify each associated cable located in the fire area containing the primary shutdown equipment.

For each cable so i<<nti

~ <<d provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open.

ground, or hot short) of the associated cable will not adversely affect the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of shutdown.

r 5.

The residual heat removal system is generally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure primary coolant system.

To preclude a

LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recom;.nna--

tions of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.

Thus, this interface most likely consists of two redundant and independert motor opera.ed valves wi:h diverse interlocks in accordance with Branch Technical Position ICSB 3.

These two motor operated valves and their 'associated cable may be subject to a

single fire hazard.

It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-low pressure system interface.

To assure that this in.er;ace and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require'the following information:

a.. Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate o> preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.

b.

Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination.

c.

Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by. less than a wall having a three-hour fire-rating from cables for the redundant device.

I' N@gg l9