ML17296B285
| ML17296B285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1981 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103170029 | |
| Download: ML17296B285 (14) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD SUITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA94596 RVw March,2, 1981 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 Arizona Public Service Company P. 0. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Attention: Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr. Vice President, Nuclear Projects Gentlemen: The enclosed circular is forwarded for your information. No wr itten response to this circular is required. If you have any questions related to this
- matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, R. H. Engelken Director
Enclosure:
l. IE Circular No. 81-03 2. List of IE Information Notice Recently Issued cc w/enclosures: F. ll. Hartley, APS
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SSINS No.: 6830 Accession No.: 8008220271 IEC 81-03 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 2, 1981 IE Circular No. 81-03: INOPERABLE SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Descri tion of Circumstances: On November 8, 1980, an earthquake occurred off the coast near Eureka, California. The earthquake was reported to have a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter Scale at the epicenter, approximately 25 to 75 miles from the Humboldt Bay,Power Plant facility. There were 12 separate seismic events above a plagnitude.of. 3.5 that occurred within 24 hours of the earthquake, the largest event, measuring 5.2. Reported damage to structures included several houses that, were moved off supporting posts, various chimneys that were knocked
- down, one highway overpass that collapsed, and unspecified damage that occurred at two.pulp mills.
There were three potentially different sources of plant response data: three sets of magnetic tape triaxial accelograph recorders; three sets of triaxial film recorders (passive device); and one set of triaxial response spectrum recorders (passive device). A review of the records from these instruments, indicated the following: the magnetic tape triaxiql recorders .did not produce useful records due to a degraded low-voltage power supply in the pecording system (previously scheduled for routine servicing one week after the earthquake); a buildup of dirt and dust appeared to make inoperable six of the nine film recorders (the readings from the other three are considered highly unreliable and were not obtained from the same set of triaxial recorders); the triaxial response spectrum recorder was the only instrument believed to produce reliable data. On January 24,
- 1980, an earthquake measuring 5.5 on the Richter Scale occurred about 10 miles north of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (near San Francisco, California).
Numerous aftershocks also occurred with one measuring 5.2 on January 26. The damage to civil structures was considered minor. Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant, located approximately 45 miles northeast of the earth-quake area, reported no physical
- damage, although plant personnel felt slight building motion.
Rancho Seco was shutdown for refueling during these earthquakes. During this
- period, the electrical seismic instrumentation system was inoperable b'ecause portions of the system were out for calibration.
For the other instruments, power was not being supplied due to electrical cable problems. Whether the seismic instrumentation would have activated or not is unclear because the U.S. Geological Survey equipment close to the site did,not trigger.. Records from a passive recorder showed peak accelerations from.3.,.to 1.5 g and O. 1 g
IEC 81-03 March 2, 1981 Page 2 of 3 for the January 24 and 26 events respectively, which are in excess of values which might be attributed to the seismic event. These indicationsare not believed to be accurate values since the recor'der was in an, area in.which it could be easily jarred by personnel. An earthquake measuring 3.6 to 4. 1 on the Richter Scale occurred about 15 miles from the Maine Yankee site on April 17, 1979. Personnel in the control. room felt the earthquake motion, but it was not felt by others inside the containment. An inspection of the strong-motion accelographs (Kinemetrics SHA-1) on 'April 19, 1979 revealed that one i nstrument was inoperable apparently because leakage of corrosive fumes from the rechargeable batteries destroyed the battery connection. Inspection of the seismic instruments on August 1, 1979 again revealed the corrosion problem as found before but occurring on both instruments. Based on this, a shorter inspection interval was initiated. Recent discussions with.'the. manufacturer's representative indicate that the battery corrosion problem appears to.be limited to the SHA-1 units because the SHA-2 and SHA-3 units have not exhibited a corrosion problem. Those faciliti'es that may have SMA-1 units include Turkey Point Unit 3, Pilgrim, Haine Yankee, Vermont Yankee, Point Beach.Unit 1,, Fort St. Vrain, and Browns Ferry Unit 1. The experiences at the Humboldt Bay, Ra'ncho
- Seco, and Maine Yankee
.facilities're of concern because, if a significant earthquake had occurred., important data relating to the plant response would not have been obtained. The experiences point out that (1) calibration or testing of the seismic instrumentation should not disable a major portion of the seismic instrumentation. system f'r long periods of time; (2) the necessity for periodic surveillance and calibratign of the entire seismic monitoring system; (3) the necessity to assess the adequacy of the surveillance/calibration interval; and (4) the necessity to detect those areas where accidental impact or high background vibrations may mask the actual seismic response. In addition, Licensee Event, Reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC have revealed various= problems relating to seismic instrumentation. The problems involVe not only the electrical time-history instrumentation, but also the passive peak qccelerati.on recorders. g description of the problems is enclosed. Note that the first problems identified in Attachement 1 could have prevented the recording of the plant seismic, response if a significant earthquake had occurred. The remainder are i,nstances of less significant malfunctions. The reouirements for seismic instrumentation are described in Appendix P to 10 CFR Part 100 and Regulatory Guide 1.12. The instrumentation serves to enable a prompt review of the actual seismic resoonse of plant features important to safety in comparison with that used as the design basis. This information can be used to determine whether a plant should be shutdown, or can continue to be safely operated, and to permi,t Oppropriate, timely action. If an earthquake were to occur near a nuclear facsli ty, the most useful information of the plant's response would be from the onsite seismic instrumentation. Evaluation of the plant response due to a seismic event
IEC 81-03 Harch 2, 1981 Page 3 of 3 and evaluation of continued operation of the facility would be difficultwithout accurate and reliable data. Based on the above discussion, the following action is recommended. Recommended Action for Holders of'0'eratin 'L'icenses and Construction Permits: It is recommended that holders of operating licenses and construction permits review for applicability the specific items presented in the "Description of Circumstances" and the enclosure to the Circular. It is further.recommended that the surveillance testing and calibration programs for the seismic instru-mentation system be reviewed and revised as necessary to detect and prevent the malfunctions described herein and to limit the potential for having or making the entire seismic monitoring system (active and passive components) inoperable during all plant modes of operation. No written response to this Circular is required. If you require additional information regarding these matters, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office. Attachments: 1. Seismic Instrumentation Na]functions 2. Recently Issued IE Circulars
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Attachment 1 IEC 81-03 March 2, 1981 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTIONS PLANT LER NUMBER/ DOCUMENTATION EVENT DESCRIPTION Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 78-028 75-56 76-j.g 76-50 77-13 79-111 Magnetic tape recorder (Teledyne Geotech Model MTS-100} was found inoperable during surveillance test; replaced with new instrument One channel .was found during surveillance testing to have a severe amplifier balance shift; the amplifier board was replaced Novable masses on the peak recording accelerometers were against the stops; the units were replaced; initiated shortened surveillance interval Cassette tape (Kine-metrics) on monitoring system was found stick-ing during,surveillance testing; the sticking tape was replaced Spurious activation of sei smi c trigger; unit was replaced Excessive noise in recorded tape prevented reading of accelerometer traces during surveillance test (Teledyne-geotech Model 37200); part of problem was due to one lead of PC input line on playback monitor was not connected
IEC 81-03 March 2, 1981 PLANT LER NUMBER/ DOCUMENTATION EVENT DESCRIPTION Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Letter from Georgia Power to NRC dated 6/25/80 One channel of the Triaxial Time-History Accelerometer (Kinemetrics) had shifted its sensiti-vity by 47/ and natural frequency by 1 2/0 Humboldt Bay Power Plant Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant NRC Reconnaissance Report dated j/19/81 Inspection Report 50-309/79-11 Magnetic tape time-history accelerometers (TERA Technology} were found inoperable due to a degraded low voltage power supply; 6 of 9 film recorders (TERA Technology) were inoperable because of dirt and dust buildup Corrosion of connec-tions to the batteries on Kinemetrics SMA-1 units made the units inoperable; increased 'esting frequency initiated Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Inspection Report 50-312/80-.03 Seismic monitoring instrumentation was inoperable due to calibration and power supply problems with electrical cable; passive accelerometers placed in area susceptible to impacts by passing traffic i:4
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IEC 81-03 March 2, 1981 PLANT LER NUMBER/ DOCUMENTATION EVENT DESCRIPTION Less Si gnificant Occurrences-Beaver Valley Power Station 76-53 78-040 Control room seismic alarm indicated spuriously due to mi sal igned reed switches; the recording scribes on the Engdahl response spec-trum recorders remained operable; the reed switches were adjusted Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 77-79 78-060 78-118 78-002 The motor on the seismic tape playback unit (Kinemetrics Model No. SMP-1) was found, sticking; the motor was replaced Alarms from the (Engdahl) response spectrum recorders indicated spuriously on four separate occasions A defective recording plate was found in the spectrum recorder; the plates were replaced
Attachment 2 IEC 81-03 March 2, 1981 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular No. 81-02 81-01 80-25 80-24 80-23 80-22 80-21 80-20 80-19 80-18 Sub ect Performance of NRC-Licensed Individuals While on Duty Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated Case Histories of Radiography Events AECL Teletherapy Unit Malfunction Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency Generators Confirmation of Employee qualifications Regulation of Refueling Crews Changes in Safe-Slab Tank Dimensions Noncompliance with License Requirements for Medical Licensees 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems Date of Issue 2/9/81 1/23/81 .12/5/80 12/2/80, 10/31/80 j.o/2/80 9/10/80 8/21/80 8/26/80 8/22/80 Issued to All power reactor facilities (research 5 test) with an OL or CP All power reactor facilities with ~ an OL or CP . All radiography licensees All teletherapy licensees All.power reactor facilities with QLor aCP All holders of a power reactor .OL or CP architect-engineering companies and nuclear steam system suppliers All holders of a power reactor OL or CP All Part 50 and Part 70 fuel facility'icensees All medical licensees All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP OL = Operating Licenses CP = Construction Permit}}