ML17296B053

Forwards IE Circular 80-23, Potential Defects in Beloit Power Sys Emergency Generators. No Written Response Required

ML17296B053
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/31/1980
From:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
References
NUDOCS 8011170628
Download: ML17296B053 (12)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD SUITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA94596 October 31, 1980 Docket Nos.

50-528, 50-529, 50-530 Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.

Box 21666

Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Attention:

Mr.

E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Vice President, HucIear Projects Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Circular iso. 80-23 which requires consideration by you with regard to your nuclear power facility.

Should you have any questions regarding this circular or the actions recommended

therein, please contact this office.

Sincerely, R.

H. Engelken Director Enclosur es:

1.

IE Circular tIO. 80-23 2.

Recently Issued IE Circulars cc w/enclosures:

F.

H. Hartley, APS

f

UHITIED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

!!ASHIHGTO!l, D.

C.

20555 SSIHS Ho.: 6030 Accession Ho.:

8008220243 IEC 80-23 October 31, 1980 4

IE Circular Ho. 80-23:

POTEHTIAL DEFECTS IH BELOIT PO':!ER SYSTEMS EMERGENCY GFNERATORS BACKGROUND This circular addresses a potential deficiency involving the field leads of generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems.

,It is known that the subiect qenerators have been couoled with Fairbanks Morse diesel engines for use in nuclear power facilities; however, it is not known whether they have been couoled viith other diesel engines for such use.

Accordingly, the intent of this circular is to notify all nuclear power facilities of the potential defect and to assure that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if needed.

The Huclear Regulatory Commission was first informed of the potential defect by a phone call from llr. R.

H. Beadle of the Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of Colt Industries to Mr. D. ll. Hayes of Region III on September 19, 1980.

On September 20,

1980, a conference cali was held between the HRC Duty Officer, personnel from Prairie Island Nuclear Power Station, Mr. Beadle of Fairbanks Morse and Mr. C.

Evenson of Beloit Power Systems, the principal spokesman.

The purpose of this call was to describe an inspection method which Prairie Island personnel could use to examine the field lead assemblies of their oen-erators for the potential defect.

(1!e have since been informed by the Resident Inspector that the field lead assemblies of the Prairie Island generators did not have the suspected defects.)

In order to disseminate this information on a timely basis, the NRC Duty Officer at Bethesda called those operating facilities which he knew were using the suspect generators on September 20 and 21, 1980.

The information conveyed included a description of the potential defect and a description of the aforementioned inspection method.

The operating facilities called were:

FACILITY HO.

OF UNITS Calver Cliffs 1 and 2

Crystal River 3 Hatch 1 and 2

Duane Arnold Horth Anna 1 and 2

Millstone 1 and 2

Robinson 2

Prairie Island Vermont Yankee Peach Bottom 2 and 3

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2

t

IEC 8O-23 October 31, 1980 Page 2 of 3 These ohone calls were subseauentlv followed up with a Part 21 Report, dated September 22, 19SO from Nr. J..'!. I'oriarty, llanaqer, Utility Sales, Fairbanks Horse Enain Division.

Infor..ation conveyed in the Part 21 Report included the followina excernts:

"A Beloit Pn' Systems aenerator in commercial service at Sitka, Alaska lost its fi.d because a lead between the collector rinas and the field coils shorted to the rotor and burned in two pieces at the noint of the shor Subseauent examination of another aenerator of identical desian at the same installation showed frayed insulation at a clamp (same loca-tion as the burn through) which secures the lead to the rotor.

This unit was ooerating satisfactorily but if the insulation damaae were to progress the oossibilitv of aroundina the lead to the rotor exists."

"To determine if the nroblem miaht exist at other locations our chief eiectricai enaineer was sent to Provo,,Utah which has foul generators of identical desian.

He has reoorted by phone shat two of ihe four at Provo have frayea insuiation ar. the clamp but tham there was no indication of loss of field."

"Concurrent with our insoeczion ai Provo, Beloit Power Systems was asked to evaluate the cause of frayed insulation and also if any other generators might have the same problem.

Their verbal report to us is that the cause of (raying is poor workmanship in installation of the

'clamps and that there are ozner qenerators of identical desiqn in this area.

="sec'.ficaliy the eight 9 nerators shipped to Limerick (Philadelphia Elect. ic) are of t.ie identical design in the area where poor workmanship is known co have caused a problem."

"Our plan ls o inspect tne Limerick generators and repair any poor workmansh-'p whic',". may

'== found.

~eioit Power Systems also reports verbally that the design in.his area or 5 and 6 frame alternators has been similar or a

numb r of years and it is therefore possible that the problem may extend to operating units."

RECOl'1HENDED ACTIONS FOR llOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERHITS OR OPERATING LICENSES:

Determine whecher or not your facility uses emergency generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems, having frame sizes 5 or 6, as part of the ons>te emeraency power system; if not, you need not pursue this matter further.

2.

3.

If your;acility uses generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems you should inspect the connections between the collector rings and the field coils in the field lead assemblies of the generators for frayed insulation at the clamps and make needed repairs per the enclosed instruc-tion sheet,

"!nspection Procedures for Generator Field Leads".

The insnectinns should be completed as soon as practical and conducted within the constraints of the Technical Specifications.

If the inspection reveals the need for repair or dressing of the leads, said repair should be initiated at operatina facilities as soon as practicable after the need.has been determined but no later than ten (10) days thereafter, provided the unit is capable of performing its function a ~

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IEC 80-Z3 October 3I 1980 Page 3 of 3 without the repair.

Otherwise, the reoair should be initiated immediately after the need has been identified.

lleeded repair work should be coordinated with Beloit Power Systems as stated in the insoec-tion procedure.

4.

If the insoection reveals the need for repair or dressing of leads at facilities holding Construction

Permits, said repair should be initiated at the licensee's earliest convenience and coordinated with Beloit Power Systems.

Enclosure:

"Inspection Procedure for Generator Field Leads"

e l

RECE!iTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS IEC 30-23 October 31 1980 Circu ar tlo.

Sub. ect

'4- -n o>>

Issue Issued to 80-22 80-21 80-20 Confirmation of emnloyee oua 1 ifica tions Pegul ation of refuel inq crews Changes in Safe-Slab Tank Dimensions

-10/2/80 9/10/80 8/21/80 All holders of a power reactor OL or CP, architect-engineering companies and nuclear steam system suppliers All holders of a power reactor OL or CP All Part 50 and Part 70 fuel facility licensees 80-19 80-18 I'loncomoliance with license requirements for

...edical licensees 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations i'or changes to radioactive waste ireatmeni svstems 3/26/80 3/22/QO All medical licensees Al.l oower reactor facilities with an OL or CP 80-17 80-16 Fuel oin damage uue to water

,jet from baffle plate corner Operational dericiencies In Posemount

!'odel 510DU Trip Uni:s find t'odel 1152 Pressure Transmitters 7/23/80 6/27/80 All holders of PllR OLs and PWR CPs All power reactor faci 1 ities with an OL or a CP 80-15 80-14 80-13 80-12 Loss of Reactor Coo'iant Pump Cooling and, Hatural Circula-tion Cooldown Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Hater System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel Grid Strap Damage in

!lestinghouse Fuel Assemblies iJalve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key Hay Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis 6/20/80 6/24/80 5/18/80 5/14/80 All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP All holders of power and research reactor licenses (operating and construction permits),

and fuel cycle licensees All holders of reactor OLs and CPs All holders of reactor OLs and CPs

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