ML17285A348
| ML17285A348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1989 |
| From: | Cicotte G, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A346 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-89-09, 50-397-89-9, NUDOCS 8904040170 | |
| Download: ML17285A348 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1989009
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
No. 50-397/89-09
License
No.
'Licensee:
Washington Public Power. Supply System
P.
0.
Box 968
Richland,
99352
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2
Inspection at:
WNP-2 site,
Benton County,.Washington
Inspection
Conducted:
Februar
-
198
Inspector:
Approved by:
G.
R. Cicotte, Radiation Specialist
C.P.
G.
P. Yuh, Chief
Emergency
Preparedness
and Radiological
Protection
Branch
3'-I't 4't
Date Signed
5-
6
Date Signed
~Summar:
Areas
Ins ected:
This was
a routine,
unannounced
inspection, by a regionally
based
inspector of exposure
control
and outage preparation,
open items, onsite
follow-up and tours of the facility.
Inspection
procedures
30703,
83750,
83729,
92701,
92702,
and 93702 were addressed.
Results:
Of the five areas
addressed,
no violations were identified in four
areas.
In one area,
a violation of 10 CFR 20.203
was identified, involving an
unposted radiation area
(paragraph
6).
The licensee
had experienced
apparently deliberate
damage to some portal contamination monitors within the
radiologically controlled area
(paragraph
2.E).
The licensee's
program
appeared
adequate
to meet its safety objectives,
although
a weakness
in
personnel
performance
in access
controls
was observed
(paragraph
6).
POR
Aoocp ~g0316
Qc~70go~~
9
05000397
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
"A.
L.
"C.
M.
"J.
W.
G.
D.
"L. L.
"T.
M.
A. I.
L. J.
"R.
G.
"J.
D.
D.
E.
G.
V.
D.
B.
S.
F.
"D.
R.
"L. A.
"S.
L.
Oxsen, Assistant
Managing Director, Operations
Powers,
Plant Manager
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
Bouchey, Director, Licensing and Assurance
Bradford, Health Physics
(HP) Supervisor
Brun, Plant guality Assurance
(gA) Engineer
Davis, Senior Radiochemist
Garvin,
Manager
Programs
and Audits
Graybeal,
Health Physics/Chemistry
Manager
Harmon,
Maintenance
Manager
Larson, Radiological
Programs/Instrument
Calibration Manager
Oldfield, Health Physicist
Ottley, Radiological
Assessments
Supervisor
Peters,
Plant Administration Manager
Pisarcik,
HP Support Supervisor
Pritchard,
HP Craft Supervisor
(HP/C)
Principal Plant Technical
Engineer
"Denotes
those present at the exit interview held on February
24,
1989
In addition to the individuals identified above,
the inspector
met and
held discussions
with other
members
of the licensee's
and
contractors'taff.
2.
Occu ational
Ex os'ure
837SO
and 83729
A.
Audits and
A
rasials
No reports of audits or surveillances
had been
issued
since the last
inspection of this area.
The licensee
was conducting
an audit and
some survei llances at the time of the inspection,
and
some
preliminary findings were discussed
with plant gA 'personnel.
No
major findings had
as yet resulted
from those activities.
B.
~Chan
ea
No major changes
in the licensee's facility had occurred since the
last inspection.
Procedural
changes,
affecting the conduct or
outage planning
and work preparation,
are discussed
below.
C.
Plannin
and Pre aration
Review of licensee
planning schedules
and discussion
ot outage
preparation
and staffing re~vealed that the license'e's
planned
maintenance
may be reduced in scope
from that originally planned.
Such
changes
may be
made in order to stay within the specified
outage duration.
Licensee staff personnel
stated that more than
300
Maintenance
Work Instructions
(MWIs) remain to be written for
Il iI
a
.
a
~
planned tasks.
In an effort to improve coordination of ALARA and
staff review with maintenance
planning activities, the licensee
had
initiated a procedure
deviation to procedure
PPM 1.7.3,
Maintenance
Work Instructions.
The licensee
stated that the change
was expected
to provide ear lier HP review,
once
MWIs are written,
so that
preparations
can
be complete
by the time the work package
is
completed.
A review of ALARA committee meetings
revealed that the procedurally
required monthly meetings
have
been held.
The
ALARA coordinator
and
other
HP staff attend
and provide input to outage
planning meetings.
The licensee,
at the time of the inspection,
was in the final
selection
process
for hiring contractor
HP personnel
for the outage..
The licensee
maintains sufficient radiation protection
equipment to
support outage
work.
Based
on discussions
with the Radiological
Assessments.
Supervisor,
the major limitation with respect
to
protective clothing supplies
was the availability of staging areas.
External
Ex osure Control
A review of several
radiation exposure
records
revealed that the
licensee
maintains individual exposures
and records
in accordance
with 10 CFR 20.101,
.102,
and .104.
A review of access
authorization
and Radiological
Work Permit
(RWP) records
revealed
that RWP¹2-89-00001,
maintained for general
access
not involving
radiological work to the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA), had
been signed
on January
3 and 4, 1989,
by approximately
one dozen
individuals who failed to include their unique identifying number
(Social Security
Number
(SSN)),
as required
by licensee
procedure
PPM 11.2.7.2,
Entr
Into
Conduct In
and Exit from Controlled
Areas, revision 5, dated 10/24/88.
The individuals
had attended
training for general
access
to the
RCA.
When the matter
was brought
to the attention of the licensee,
the
HP Craft Supervisor
stated
that the specific individuals involved would be counselled
and
requested
to comply with the procedure.
The HP/C Manager later
stated that
some of the individuals (none of whom had been
authorized
access
to radiation areas
or received training for
.
radiological work) had refused to do so on the basis of right-to-
privacy.
The licensee
had access
to and was able to supply the
missing information consistent with ANSI N13.6-1972,
American
National
Standard
Practice
for Occu ational
Radiation
Ex osure
Records
S stems
and Regulatory Guide 8.7,
Occu ational
Radiation
Ex osure
Records
S stems.
No other examples of information missing
from
RWPs for actual radiological work were observed.
Control of Radioactive Materials
and Contamination
Surve
s
and
~Monitorin
Representative
licensee
radiation
and contamination
surveys
were
reviewed.
Radiological status
boards
appeared
accurate with respect
to dose rates
and radiological postings
observed
in the plant.
In-plant portable monitoring equipment
and instrumentation
was
observed
to be in current calibration.
It was noted that one
portable continuous air monitor
(CAM), on the 467'levation of the
. Radwaste
Building (RWB), had not had the weekly source
check
performed.
When the licensee
was informed, the instrument
was
satisfactorily
checked
and the information was recorded
on the
attached
source
check tag.
The inspector
noted that the monitor is
required to be checked
each
day and each shift.
However the source
check is specified
as
a line item for review only on
a weekly basis.
Personnel
exiting the
RCA through the whole body portal frisking
units
(model
IPM-7) were observed.
Ho actions inconsistent with
personnel
and equipment release
instructions
were observed.
Discussion
on February
23,
1989, with licensee
HP staff revealed
that the model
IPM-8 whole body frisking monitors, installed
recently,
had been experiencing multiple failures, beginning
approximately at the start of February
1989.
The failures consisted
primarily of possibly deliberate
punctures
in the gas-flow
proportional detector
windows.
The location of much of the
damage
made accidental
contact unlikely.
Discussion with the licensee
by
the inspector,
a regional
safeguards
inspector,
and the senior
resident
inspector
(SRI), revealed
the following:
The monitors
had been installed
near
the entrances
to the
Control
Room, the
Radwaste
Control
Room, the 501'levation of
the Turbine Building (TB), and Chemistry offices.
The Plant Manager
and Assistant Plant, Manager were, aware of the
existence of the problem, but not of many details,
as of about
two weeks prior to the inspection.
The security department
was not aware of the problem until
apprised
by the safeguards
inspector.
Licensee
HP staff stated that after the Operations
Department
was informed of the events,
no further
damage to the monitor at
the Control
Room was observed.
The location at which most of
the documented
events
occurred
was the
Radwaste
Control
Room.
The effect of punctures 'varied with the location and extent.
Small punctures
would result in only slightly reduced
counting
efficiency.
Large or numerous
punctures result in loss of
detection capability and/or continuous
alarm of the monitor.
The licensee's
efforts to address
the apparent
vandalism were
discussed
at the exit interview.
The licensee
stated that they were
still in a discovery
mode, that is, they were still gathering data
to determine
the extent
and nature of the problem.
The licensee
further stated that they believed the reason for the
damage
was
a
resistance
to change - that the fact that the monitors were
new
equipment
was the cause.
The SRI and the inspector
expressed
concerp that the matter
had riot been given th'e management
attention
it deserved,
considering
the potential for damage to other similar
equipment,
and that the matter
had not been brought to the attention
of NRC prior to this inspection.
The licensee
stated that the
matter
was already being addressed
by a group consisting of
operations,
HP,
and security personnel.
The
SRI asked
when that had
been initiated.
The Plant Manager
indicated the day of the exit
interview.
In response
to concerns
expressed
by
NRC regarding
an
apparent willingness to tolerate
the activity for a period without
aggressive
action,
the licensee
stated that they would not tolerate
abuse of equipment,
and that this would be expressly
conveyed to
plant personnel.
Regional
safeguards
personnel will follow up on this matter,
upon
receipt of a report to them from the licensee.
A flashing yellow light was observed at an opening in the turbine
shield wall on the 501'levation of the
TB (see Inspection
Report
(IR) 50-397/88-41).
The inspector
noted that
an enclosure
requested
in Technical
Evaluation
Request
(TER) 88-0412-0
had not been
constructed.
The inspector
requested
a copy of TER 88-0412-0,
a
review of which indicated that
no action
had been taken,
beyond the
original request
on November 10,
1988.
The licensee
stated that the
matter
was still being evaluated.
Further discussion with the
licensee
revealed that there
was
some disagreement
among licensee
st'aff members
as to whether the opening
was large
enough to make the
turbine area,
an area with whole body dose rates in excess
of 1000
mrem/hr, accessible.
The inspector
concluded that the area
was
accessible,
and again
reminded the licensee that the requirement of
Technical Specification
6. 12,
Hi
h Radiation Area, is to provide
locked enclosures
for areas
of greater
than
1000 mrem/hr, to prevent
unauthorized
entry.
The licensee's
efforts with respect
to TER
88-0412-0 will be examined in a subsequent
inspection
(50-397/89-09-01).
Overall, the licensee's
program appeared
capable of meeting its safety
objectives.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
50-397/88-28-01
Closed
This matter refers to licensee efforts to improve
CAM operability
(see
IRs 50-397/88-28
and 50-397/88-33).
The licensee
had been experiencing
difficulty in obtaining
a proper calibration check from the installed
source.
The licensee
determined that the requirements
for response
checks
were
such that the monitor need not be considered
under
many of the previously identified conditions, if minor changes
to
HP work
instructions
were
made.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee's
determination
was correct,
and noted that the changes
had
been
made.
No
CAMs were observed
to be inoperable at the time of the inspection.
This
matter is considered
closed.
50-397/88-41-01
0 en
This matter refers to a licensee
commitment to evaluate
airborne
radioactivity and extremity dose monitoring, during radioactive resin
handling (see
IR 50-397/88-41).
At the time of the inspection,
the
licensee
had initiated an evaluation of airborne radioactivity monitoring
during all radiological work.
The licensee
had not initiated evaluation
of extremity dose monitoring.
The inspector
reminded the licensee of
their commitment.
This matter will remain
open pending review of the
licensee's
evaluations.
50-397/88-41-04
Closed)
This matter refers to a licensee
commitment to evaluate
placement of
digital dose integrating dosimeters
relative to other dosimetry (see
IR
50-397/88-41).
The licensee
had not been able to determine
the identity
of the
HP Technician
(HPT) that had ordered
a worker's digital dosimeter
placed in his back pocket while his other dosimetry
was
on his chest.
The licensee
stated,
however, that under the described
conditions,
such
placement
was incorrect and not in accordance
with licensee
procedures.
The licensee
further stated that the
HP staff had been
informed of the
matter
and of the importance of dosimetry placement.
HPTs with whom the
matter
was discussed,
and
who would be expected
to check dosimetry
placement for workers,
were fami liar with the requirements
and procedure.
This matter is considered
closed.
Followu
on Items of Noncom liance/Deviations
92702
50-397/88-36-03
0 en
This matter refers to a failure to properly post
a radiation area
on the
422'levation of the Reactor
Building (RB) (see
IR 50-397/88-36).
The licensee's
timely response
committed to inclusion of a review of the
matter in annual radiological refresher training.
Discussion with the
resident
inspector,
who had just completed
annual retraining,
revealed
that this had
been accomplished.
The licensee
had also committed to a
review of radiological
occurrence
reports
(ROR), which was verified to
have
been
completed.
Action to address
the concerns
raised
by the
ROR
review had been initiated but not completed.
The effectiveness
of the
licensee's
actions in preventing recurrence
is addressed
in paragraph
6,
below.
This matter will remai n open pendi ng evaluation of the
effectiveness
of corrective action.
50-397/88-41-02
Closed
This matter refers
to a fai lure to take all the required
samples
of
atmosphere,
pursuant to Technical Specification
(TS)
4. 11.2. 1.2, Table 4. 11-2 (see
IRs 50-397/88-26
and 50-397/88-41).
The
actions to which the licensee
had committed in their response
were
verified to have
been accomplished,
and the appropriate
procedure
revisions to
PPMs 2.3. 1, Primar
Containment Ventin
Pur in
and
~lnertin
, 7.4. 11.2. 1.2. 1, Primer
Containment
Pur
e
Sam lin
and
~Anal sis,
and 7.0.0, Shift and Dail
Instrument
Checks
Modes
1
2
3),
had been incorporated
by the date indicated
by the licensee.
Although
-the licensee's
response
was received at the Document Control
Desk in a
timely manner,
the copy to the Region
V Administrator had not been
received.
The licensee
immediately supplied
a copy upon request
by the
inspector
on February
16,
1989.
The licensee
stated that the Region
V
copy,
and others,
had been distributed
and prepared for mailing.
Why it
was not received at the Region could not be determined.
This matter is
considered
closed.
50-397/88-41-03
0 en
This matter refers to an unauthorized
high radiation area entry (see
IR
50-397/88-41).
The licensee's
timely response
(see
item 50-397/88-41-02,
preceding)
committed to greater control over
work.
Training for managers
and supervisors
of non-HP departments,
in
order to train personnel
on access
controls,
was being developed at the
time of the inspection.
The scope of the training appeared
to address
the major concerns
of access
controls,
compliance,
safety,
and
radiological warnings.
The licensee
had committed to completion of the
training by the start of the next maintenance
and refueling outage,
scheduled
for mid-April, 1989.
The individuals that
had
made the
unauthorized
entry had been retrained
on access
controls for high
radiation areas.
This matter will remain
open pending completion of the
committed training and evaluation of the training effectiveness.
5.
Onsite Followu
of Events at 0 eratin
Power Reactors
(93702
50-397/02-04-89
Closed
This matter refers to a mechanical
failure and subsequent
leakage
and
rad'ioactive spill from the post accident
sampling system
(PASS),
discovered
by the licensee
on February 4,
1989.
Two separate
problems
~
were identified by the licensee.
On February
3, 1989, during the conduct
of a drill, the licensee
attempted to obtain
atmosphere
sample.
The sample return
pump failed.
The licensee
declared
the atmosphere
monitor, which uses
the
same
sample
process
stream,
pursuant to TS 3.3.7.5
and item ¹24 of Table 3.3.7.5-1.
The
licensee's
preplanned
alternate
method of monitoring the parameter
would,
Evaluation,
Revision 5, dated 2-7-89.
The inspector verified that the
procedure,
and Revision 4, which was in effect at the time of the
equipment failure, could accomplish
the intended safety function.
On
February
16,
1989,
the licensee
reported the inoperability in a timely
manner,
in accordance
with Action 81 of TS Table 3.3.7.5-1.
The licensee
stated that repair parts
were
on order and that,
when the system
was
repaired,
a fai lure mode analysis
would be addressed
in a supplemental
report.
The licensee further stated that the
pump would be repaired
as
soon
as possible
and estimated
a completion date of April-May, 1989.
That portion of the matter will be examined
should the supplemental
report raise
NRC concern.
The second
problem was related,
in that
a primary coolant
sample
was
obtained
as part of the drill.
The licensee
stated that all valves were
restored to their normal position at the completion of the sampling.
The
next day, February 4, 1989, the licensee
discovered water on the
441'levation
of the
RWB, in the hallway between
the
RB and the Diesel
Generator Building.
The licensee
found up to 300,000 disintegrations
per
minute per 100
cm~ (dpm/100
cm~) of contamination
on the 441'nd
467'levations,
and
up to 600,000
dpm/100
cm~ in the
room on the
487'levation
of the
RWB.
The licensee
isolated the approximately
300
ml/minute leak,
decontaminated
and released
the contaminated
areas,
and
conducted
an evaluation of the event.
Subsequent
evaluation
and repairs
resulted in restoration of the capability to sample
both pathways of the
primary coolant
status
for the monitor,
829
of TS Table 3.3.7.5-1.
The licensee
determined that two
solenoid-operated
valves (the inboard
and outboard containment isolation
valves for the sample point at jet pump 810$
and the air-operated
sample isolation valve,
had all leaked, resulting in reactor coolant
pressure
being applied to a pressure
transducer.
The licensee
concluded
that the transducer
was not essential
to operation of the
PASS,
as
pressure
readings
could be obtained
elsewhere,
and modified the system to
remove the leakage point.
The system engineer
stated that repairs
and
evaluation of the cause of the valve leakage
would be conducted
when the
valves
become accessible
during the next scheduled
outage.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee's
actions
were adequate
to assure
the
continued primary coolant sampling/monitoring capability of the
PASS.
This matter is considered
closed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Facilit
Tours
83750
Tours of the
TB were conducted.
Independent
radiation
surveys
were performed with an Eberline ion chamber
survey instrument
model
R0-2, serial
8008985, calibrated
2-8-89 and
due for calibration
5-8-89.
New fuel inspection activities were observed.
The 606'levation of the
RB appeared
crowded during the operation,
due in part to the amount of
material
staged
thereon
and the size of posted
contaminated
areas.
Mhile
touring the 441'rack
bay,
the inspector
observed
a rope hanging
from
the open
hatchway
above.
The rope was attached
to a
new fuel transport
box, which was suspended
from the 606'ueling floor, directly above the
hatchway.
No signs indicated that loads were suspended
over the hatchway
and
no one was observed to be holdi'ng the rope, which was later
determined to be the tag line.
When the matter was brought to the
attention of the Director of Licensing and Assurance,
who was observing
new fuel inspection activities,
he stated that the matter would be
examined.
The licensee later stated that it had
been
concluded
that. ii
was inconsistent with their industrial safety rules to leave the
441'rea
unposted
as
a hazard,
and that future activity would be conducted
with the appropriate
war nings posted
and necessary
taglines
attended.
In general,
housekeeping
had deteriorated slightly since the last
inspection, with some exceptions.
The 606'levation of the
RB and the
437'levation of the
RWB both appeared
to have
much additional material
stored in those locations.
Several
long-standing material deficiencies,
identified by the licensee
on ventilation equipment,
were observed.
The
licensee
stated that, in response
to
NRC concerns,
additional resources
in the technical staff had been assigned,
resulting in identification of
many
new deficiencies.
The licensee
further stated that corrective
maintenance
was ongoing in an effort to reduce the backlog of
deficiencies.
The inspector
concluded that the deficiency tag dates
were
consistent with those
statements.
8
While conducting
a tour with a resident
inspector
on the 522'levation
of the
RB on February
23,
1989, at approximately
2: 00 p. m.,
PST,
a rope
was observed
hanging
down from a wall corner
such that an attached
sign,
reading "radiation area,"
was facing the floor and could not be read.
Whole body radiation
dose rates
in the area
beyond the rope,
near
the
hydraulic control units
(HCU), measured
from 3 to 20 mrem/hr.
The
licensee
was informed and the radiation area posting
was restored.
Other
approaches
to the area
were posted,
"Caution-Radiation Area...."
"Personnel
monitoring," states,
in part:
'Radiation area'eans
any area,
accessible
to personnel,
in which
there exists radiation, ... at such levels that
a major portion of
the body could receive in any one hour a dose in excess
of 5
mi 1 1 irem,
"Caution signs,
labels,
signals
and controls,"
states,
in par t:
"(b) Radiation areas.
Each radiation area shall
be conspicuously
posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution
symbol
and
the words:
"Caution ....
"Radiation Area"
Of nine individuals with whom access
controls were discussed,
three were
not fully aware of posting requirements
and their individual
responsibilities.
Those three individuals had attended training which
addresses
the subject of personal
responsibility.
The matter
w'as discussed
with the
HP/C Manager
and at the exit interview
(paragraph
7).
The HP/C manager
stated that
he had toured the area
on
the morning of February
23,
1989,
and that the posting
had
been place at
that time.
The inspector
expressed
concern that inadequate
posti ngs
and
access
controls
had been
an ongoing problem (see
IRs 50-397/88-41,
50-397/88-36,
50-397/88-22,
and 50-397/87-14),
and that corrective
actions might not be considered fully effective, that affirmative efforts
to improve worker performance
were necessary
to solve the problem of
personnel
failing to observe radiological work rules.
The HP/C Manager
responded
that efforts to address
the problem were ongoing (see
paragraph
4, above).
The licensee reiterated their ongoing efforts to address
compliance with
radiological work rules, at the exit interview.
The inspector
reminded
the licensee that efforts, to the time of the inspection,
did not appear
to be effective.
The lack of a radiation area posting at a radiation
area
appeared
to be
a violation of 10 CFR 20.203 (50-397/89-09-02).
No other
examples
of personnel
violating radiological
wor k rules were
observed.
Observed portable monitoring equipment
was in current
calibration
and
had all procedurally required routine checks
indicated,
with the exception of the
CAM noted in paragraph
2.E,
above.
In general,
the licensee's
program appeared
adequate
to meet its safety
objectives.
No other violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met wit/ those individuals, denoted
in paragraph
1, at the
conclusion of the inspection
on February
24,
1989.
The scope
and
findings of the inspection
were summarized.
The licensee
acknowledged
the apparent violation noted in paragraph
6.
The inspector
and the
expressed
concern regarding the lack of definitive action to address
the
portal monitor abuse
problem noted in paragraph
2. E.
The licensee
responded
that they considered
themselves
to be in the "discovery mode,"
but that they would give the matter sufficient management
attention to
correct the problem,
and would not tolerate deliberate
damage
to plant
equipment.
il