ML17284A794
| ML17284A794 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17284A793 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-98-21, NUDOCS 9811030099 | |
| Download: ML17284A794 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1998021
Text
ENCLOSURE
U.S.'UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
License No::
Report No.:
. Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspector(s):
Approved By:
50-397
50-39?/98-21
Washington Public Power Supply System
Washington Nuclear Project-2
Richland, Washington
August 30 through October 10, 1998
S. A. Boynton, Senior Resident Inspector
J. E. Spets, Resident Inspector
W. B. Jones, Senior Reactor Analyst
G. A. Pick, Acting Chief
Project Branch E
Division of Reactor Projects
ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
98ii0300'PV 'F81027
ADOCK 05000397
6'DR
0
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Washington Nuclear Project-2
NRC inspection Report 50-39?/98-21
This information covers a 6-week period of resident inspection with input from a senior reactor
analyst.
~Oerarione
During a walkdown of the service water supply to the System A residual heat removal
pump room cooler, the inspectors determined that the locking device to an isolation
valve was unattached, contraiy to plant procedures.
Since the valve was found in the
correct position, no safety impact would have resulted.
This failure to properly lock the
valve is a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action
(Section 02.1).
~En ineerin
~
The manual startup and shutdown of the reactor core isolation cooling system for level
control, following the March 1998 main steam isolation valve closure, challenged the
operators.
The proceduralized method to control reactor vessel level by diverting
reactor core isolation cooling flow through the test return line could not be accomplished
because of valve design deficiencies. The method used to maintain the reactor core
isolation cooling system test return line isolation valves decreased
the reliability of the
system and challenged the containment isolation function since the valves may not have
closed against high differential pressure.
Unresolved Item 50-397/98005-05, involving
exclusion of the reactor core isolation cooling test return line valves from the scope of
the maintenance
rule, was determined not to be a violation of NRC requirements
(Section M8.1).
Re ort Details
Summa
of Plant Status
The plant operated in Mode 1 at full power for the duration of the inspection period.
I
I. 0 erations
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1
En ineered Safe
Feature S stem Walkdowns
a.
lns ection Sco
e 71707
, The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following systems:
Standby Service Water System A
Emergency Diesel Generators (Division I, II, and III)
Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System A
Containment'Atmosphere
Control Systems A and B
b.
Observations and Findin s
The material condition of the systems was generally very good with some minor
deficiencies identified for the emergency diesel generators.
Those deficiencies were
brought to the attention of the control room supervisor for appropriate action,
Configuration of the systems was verified to be in conformance with Mode 1
requirements, with the exception that Valve SW-V-24A, standby service water isolation
valve to the Train A residual heat removai pump room cooler, was not locked as
required; however, the valve was in the correct position (open) with the locking chain
hanging from the m'anual handwheel.
Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance
Requirement 3.7.1.3 requires manual valves in the standby service water system to be
verified in their correct position every 31 days, unle'hey are locked, sealed, or
~
otherwise secured in their position. Procedure 1.3.29, "Locked Valve Checklist,"
Revision 29, requires Valve SW-V-24A to be locked open to satisfy TS 3.7.1.3.
Noting that Valve SW-V-24A was open, the inspectors determined that the actual safety
significance of the unlocked valve was low. A nonsafety-related flow switch associated
with service water flow to the room cooler provides annunciation in the control room
under low flow conditions.
Since operators routinely opera;e the standby service water
system, any low flow would have resulted in an alarm and alerted the control room
operators.
Thus, qualitatively, the risk significance was considered to be low. A
potential consequence
of the valve being mispositioned would be the inability to
maintain long-term operability of Residual Heat Removal System A because of high
pump room temperatures
following a design basis accident.
This finding was essentially identical to a poor valve locking practice documented in
NRC Inspection Report 50-397/97-12.
In the previous instance, the locking chain
remained attached to the valve handwheel and the manual adjustment knob, but a
significant amount of slack existed in the valve locking chain, which could have allowed
1
-2-
the locking chain to be unsecured.
The unlocked valve in this instance demonstrates
that there is an inherent vulnerability in the locking method for the emergency core
cooling system pump room cooler inlet isolation valves.
Specifically, the use of the
manual adjustment knobs on the motor operators as anchor points has not assured
locking of the valves, in that a small amount of slack in the locking chain allows for the
chain to be readily removed.
The failure to properly lock Valve SW-V-24A in
accordance
with Procedure 1.3.29 constitutes a violation of minor significance and is
not subject to formal enforcement action.
The licensee did not identify any cause for the unattached locking chain; however, since
the valve was found in the correct position and since flow had continued to the room
cooler, the licensee did not suspect tampering.
To prevent recurrence, the anchor point
of the locking chains on each of the emergency core cooling system pump room cooler
service water isolation valves was moved to the valve yoke. The corrective action was
found to be appropriate to address the concern.
~ C.
Conclusions
During a walkdown of the service water supply to the System A residual heat removal
pump room cooler, the inspectors determined that the locking device to an isolation
valve was unattached contrary to plant procedures.
Since the valve was found in the
correct position, no safety impact would have resulted.
This failure to properly lock the
valve is a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1
Closed
Violation 50-397/96327-01013:
operational mode change with equipment
I
On June 2, 1996, operators entered Mode 2 with a train of the control room 'emergency
filtration syster;
'., superable.
The licensee relied provisions contained in the ACTIONS
section of a Limiting Condition for Operation when entering Mode 2. Entry into a Mode
while relying upon provisions in the ACTIONS section violated TS 3.0.4. The corrective
actions consisted of discussing the event with operating crews and modifying specific
procedures controlling mode changes to require an electronic global Iog search for
mode change restrictions.
The inspectors reviewed the training attendance
log and subject training and found that
the target audience and subject training presented were adequate for the issues.
The
inspectors also reviewed Procedure 1.3.40, "Outage Mode Change or Refueling Activity
Readiness
Evaluation," Revision 11; and Procedure 3.1.2, "Reactor Plant Startup,"
Revision 43, and found that steps were added to require an electronic global log'search
for mode change restrictions.
The inspectors also reviewed several other plant
procedures to determine if similar changes were required.
The inspectors did not
identify any other procedures requiring similar changes.
-3-
Closed
Violation 50-397/96327-01023:
various surveillances inappropriately deferred
until after mode change
In June 1996 on three separate occasions, operators failed to meet TS surveillance
requirements required for the mode entered.
Specifically, the TS surveillance
requirements not met were associated with: (1) turbine throttle valve closure, (2) rod
block monitor channel checks, and (3} average powe
~ange monitor downscale rod
block channel functional test and fixed neutron flux upscale trips. The corrective actions
included:
(1) consisted of training for operations, licensing, and compliance personnel;
(2) voiding an inaccurate TS interpretation; (3) reviewing other TS interpretations for
inaccuracies; (4) assessing
generic impacts; and (5) performing plant modifications.
The inspectors noted that, when the license implemented the Improved TS, the scope of
some corrective actions changed.
The inspectors reviewed training attendance
records
and training information and found that the target audience and subject training
presented were adequate for the issues.
The inspectors found that the licensee voided
TS'Interpretation 94-06, which had provided an inaccurate interpretation of TS and that
the licensee had identified and voided several other TS interpretations that were no
longer needed.
The inspectors reviewed the assessment
of generic impacts and
considered the assessment
thorough as demonstrated
by the items reviewed and the
resulting. type and number of required surveillance procedure changes.
The inspectors
also found the Technical Evaluation Request 96-0177-0, Equivalent Change Evaluation
TER 96-0177, and screening for licensing basis change were adequate for the
corrective action design changes.
Closed
Violation 50-397/96327-01033:
inadequate startup procedures
On June 12, 1996, the licensee changed modes without testing of the containment
function of specific reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC} valves.
The corrective actions
consisted of discussing the event with operations crews, clarifying startup procedure
requirements regarding RCIC testing, establishing a iield in the maintenanc,.ork order
software to display mode change restrictions which apply to a work order, and
establishing an administrator position for outage-associated
equipment testing.
The inspectors reviewed the training attendance
log and subject training and found that
the target audience and subject training presented were. adequate for the issues.
The
inspectors also reviewed Procedure 3.1.2, "Reactor Plant Startup," Revision 43, and
found that the testing requirements for RCIC were clarified. Duiing the review of the
method used to identify and track work items that impact the ability to change modes,
the inspectors noted that the corrective action originally specified was no longer
implemented.
Subsequently,
the inspectors found that the licensee had implemented an
adequate process for tracking work items that impact the ability to change modes.
Specifically, the licensee used a "Technical Specification Inoperable
Equipment/LCO/RFO Status Log" that contains an entry titled "Mode Change Allowed:
Yes
No
." The log was used to track all inoperable equipment and mode change
restrictions and was required to be reviewed by operations personnel prior to mode
change.
-4-
The inspectors found that the licensee did not establish measures
to ensure that a
postmaintenance/surveillance
administrator position would be established for
outage-associated
equipment testing as committed to in Letter 602-96-250.
However,
despite the fact that measures were not in. place to establish an administrator position,
the inspectors found upon review of licensee procedures that sufficient requirements are
in place to ensure that required postmaintenance
testing and surveillances are
performed prior to change in mode.
The two instances where the licensee failed to fullyimplement or appropriately change
regulatory commitments in accordance
with Procedure SWP-LIC-01, "Regulatory
Commitment Change Process," Revision 0, indicated a weakness
in the regulatory
commitment tracking system and commitment change process.
08.4
Closed
Violations 50-397/96327-01043 and -01053: missed recirculation loop flow
mismatch surveillance and missed average power range monitor channel check
surveillance
On June 13 and 14, 1996, the licensee, while in Mode 2, failed to verify at least once per
24-hour period that recirculation loop flow mismatch was within limits. Similarly on
June 21 and 23, 1996, the licensee, while in Mode 1, failed to perform required daily,.
average power range monitor channel checks.
The corrective actions for both violations
consisted of discussing the event with operating crews, modifying surveillance and
startup procedures, and reviewing other surveillance procedures to determine if similar
problems existed.
08.5
The inspectors reviewed the training attendance
log and subject training and found that
the target audience and subject training were adequate for the issues.
The inspectors
reviewed Procedure OSP-RRC-D701, "Jet Pump Operability and Recirculation. Loop
Flow Mismatch," Re'vision 2; Procedure 3.1.2, "Reactor Plant Startup," Revision 43; and
Procedure OSP-INST-H101, "Shift and Daily Instrument Checks (Modes 1, 2, and 3),"
Revision 11. The inspectors found that the procedure changes clarified the TS '.
requirements, added steps to perform required surveillances, clarified when
surveillances were to be performed, and improved the method of verification. The
inspectors noted that the procedure changes should ensure that the missed
surveillances are now captured by procedure.
In addition, the inspectors found that'the
licensee's review of other operations surveillance procedures for similar problems
resulted in proposed procedure changes.
I
Closed
Licensee Event Re ort LER 50-397/98-002-00:
reactorscram andtransient
because of failed closed main steam isolation valve
The licensee performance and regulatory compliance aspects of the subject report are
adequately documented in NRC inspection Report 50-397/98-05.
-5-
08.6
Closed
LER 50-397/98-003-00:
reactor scram while shut down because
of low reactor
water level.
The licensee performance and regulatory compliance aspects of the subject report are
adequately documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/98-05.
08.7.
Closed
LER 50-397/98-011-00:
emergency core cooling system pump room flooding
because of fire protection system pipe break.
The licensee performance and regulatory compliance aspects of the subject report are
adequately documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/98-20.
II. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1
General Comments
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 61726 62707
The following maintenance and surveillances were observed and/or reviewed:
Procedure 10.24.32, "PM Cal/Test - Rosemount DP Transmitters," Revision 9
(residual heat removal heat exchanger service water flow)
Procedure OSP-ELEC-M703, "HPCS Diesel Generator Monthly Operability
Test," Revision 4
Procedure ICP-CRD-X901, "HCU Scram Accumulator Pressure
Low/Leak
Detection - CFT/CC," Revision 0
Procedure MSP-SGT-8102, "Standby Gas Treatment System Unit B HEPA Filter
Test," Revision 2..
a.
Observations and Findin s
'I
~
The observed work activities were properly implemented in accordance with the
established instructions.
Where appropriate, operators properly entered and complied
with TS action statements.
A spot check of personnel qualifications found that
personnel implementing the maintenance activities were qualified. The inspectors also
reviewed operational logs associated with the SGT system testing and found that they
were inaccurate or not complete.
Following are several examples:
(1)
An October 7, 1998, 11:35 p.m. Iog entry indicates Fan SGT-FN-1B2 was
shutdown; however, there is not a previous entry for starting the fan.
-6-
(2)
An October 8 12:20 a.m. Iog entry indicates that Procedure MSP-SGT-B104 was
being performed when actually Procedure MSP-SGT-B102 was being
performed.
(3)
An October 8 2:08 a.m. Iog entry indicates Fan SGT-FN-1B2 was shutdown;
however, there is not a previous entry for starting the fan.
M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)
M8.1
Closed
Unresolved Item 50-397/98005-05:
condensate
storage tank return valves not
within scope of maintenance
rule
The NRC staff concluded that Valves RCIC-V-22 and RCIC-V-59 (RCIC test return line
valves) were not required to be within the scope of the maintenance
rule. This
conclusion was based on the licensee having implemented the actions identified with
Generic Letter 96-05, "Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related
Motor-Operated Valves." Specifically the RCIC system was declared inoperable
whenever Valves RCIC-V-22 and RCIC-V-59 were open. This is in recognition that the
valves were outside the scope of their Generic Letter 89-10, "Motor-Operated Valve
Testing and Surveillance," program.
The licensee stated that Valve RCIC-V-59 was not
designed to be able to open against system operating pressure.
Thus, when
establishing the test return flow path, operators are expected to open Valve RCIC-V-59
prior to opening Valve RCIC-V-22, which would expose it to system operating pressure.
During the March 1998 reactor scram, the licensee suspected
that Valve RCIC-V-22 had
been opened prior to opening Valve RCIC-V-59, which resulted in Valve RCIC-V-59
binding. Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 4, "Consideration of Valve Mispositioning in
Boiling Water Reactors," does not require establishing testing of valves for conditions
caused by operational errors from the control room.
However, the inspectors noted that the operation of the RCIC system during
the'arch
1998 eve'nt challenged the system reliability and the passive containment
isolation function of Valves RCIC-V-22 and RCIC-V-59. A study (AEOD/S97-02) of
RCIC system reliabilityfor the period 1987-1993 (conducted for the Reliability and Risk
Analysis Branch, Safety Programs Division, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of
Operational Data, U.S. NRC) identified that the failure probability of the RCIC system to
restart was twice that of the failure probability to initiallystart. The inspectors found that
the inability to establish recirculation flow through the test return line and subsequent
stai tup and shutdown of the system to control reactor vessel level unnecessarily
challenged the reliability of the RCIC system to support decay heat removal and short-
term cooling.
M8.2
Closed
Violations 50-397/97014-02
-03 and LER 50-397/97-009-00:
missed inservice
.
testing (IST) for Valve TIP-V-6, transversing incore probe purge check valve, and failure
to maintain containment penetration isolated with inoperable containment isolation valve
The violations and LER specifically addressed
the following issues:
(1) At the
completion of Refueling Outage R12 (July 4, 1997), surveillance testing in accordance
with the requirements of the IST program had not been performed on Valve TIP-V-6;
-7-
and (2) between July 18 and August12, 1997, while the unit was in Mode
1 with
Valve TIP-V-6 inoperable, the affected penetration was unisolated continuously and was
not under administrative controls as required by TS.
The corrective actions for Violation 50-397/97014-02 consisted of all associated
corrective actions identified in LER 50-397/97-009-00 in addition to several other
corrective actions. The licensee:
(1) modified the surveillance procedure for
Valve TIP-V-6 to clarify when local leak rate testing
results can be used, (2) reviewed
other IST procedures performed during the subject refueling outage to ensure all IST
program plan requirements were met, (3) tested Valve TIP-V-6 as required by TS
amendment,
(4) reviewed other IST procedures to determine if clarification of
acceptance
criteria was required, (5) trained control room personnel, and (6) modified
the startup checklist to include a step that requires the IST program lead's signature
verifying that all IST procedures, having a mode change impact, have been reviewed
prior to startup.
The inspectors noted that Procedure OSP-TIP/IST-R701, "TIP Valve Operability-
Refueling Shutdown," Revision 1, was modified to clarify when local leak rate test results
could be used for purposes of the surveillance.
The inspectors found that testing had
been completed in accordance with Procedure OSP-TIP/IST-R701 on March 13, 1998..
Based on the number of IST procedure performances reviewed by the licensee, the
inspectors concluded the licensee performed an appropriate review.
In addition, the
inspectors determined that the licensee
review of IST program plan procedures for
clarity was satisfactory, based on the identification and modification of ten IST
procedures that required clarification of requirements.
The inspectors reviewed training provided to control room personnel on IST program
issues during requalification Cycle 98-2 and found it to be adequate.
The training was
provided to "enable the control room staff's adequate
review of performed IST
procedures."
However, the inspectors did not find measures
established to ensure that
IST program training would be provided to control room personnel in the future. The
lack of continuous training does.not appear to be a significant problem because of the
implementation of other corrective actions.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 3.1.1, "Master Startup Checklist," Revision 24, and
found that the licensee modified the procedure to require the IST program lead's
signature after the lead had verified that all mode change requirements had been
completed related to IST.
The corrective actions for Violation 50-397/97014-03 consisted of an immediate
corrective action of isolating the subject penetration and a followup corrective action of
training licensing personnel on verbatim interpretation of TS. The inspectors found that
the penetration was isolated, as indicated, and that licensing personnel did receive
training on verbatim interpretation of TS. The corrective actions were appropriate for
the circumstances.
Closed
LER 50-397/97-007-00:
voluntary report of automatic start of emergency
diesel generators because of undervoltage condition
-8-
The licensee initiated this voluntary report when the Division I and II emergency diesel
generators automatically started because of a momentary bus undervoltage condition.
The root cause of the event was determined to be an internal fault in the Train C
circulating water pump motor. The internal fault momentarily dropped voltage on the
Division I and II 4160 Yac vital buses until the fault was cleared.
The emergency diesel
generator output breakers did not close as the buses continued to be powered from the
station startup transformer.
The corrective actions to address the failure of the
nonsafety-related circulating water pump were appropriate.
Closed
LER 50-397/98-00?-00:
inadvertent full scram and Division I emergency core
cooling safety injection
The licensee performance issues and regulatory compliance aspects of the subject
report are adequately captured in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/98-13.
M8.5
Closed
LER 50-397/98-008-00: 'inadvertent full scram during reactor pressure vessel
leak testing in Mode 4
The licensee performance issues and regulatory compliance aspects of the subject
report are adequately captured'in NRC inspection Report 50-397/98-13.
M8.6
Closed
LER 50-'397/98-009-00:
nuclear steam supply shutoff system, Groups 3 and 4.
isolations during testing
The licensee performance issues and regulatory compliance aspects of the subject
report are adequately captured in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/98-13.
III. En ineerin
EB
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903}
E8.1
Closed
LER 50-397/97-003-00:
notification of noncompliance with TS
The response time testing for reactor protection system, emergency core cooling
system, and containment isolation system instrumentation did not comply with TS. The
licensee concluded that the root cause of the TS violations was inadequate change
management for regulatory requirements.
Specifically, the licensee revised its
rr.ethodoiogy for performing response
time testing of instrument~tion using the
provisions of Licensing Topical Report NEDO-32291. The methodology in NEDO-32291
was approved by the NRC staff and provides for a more qualitative assessment
of
instrument loop response time compared to the traditional quantitative testing prescribed
by TS. However, in implementing the provisions of the NEDO report, the licensee failed
to request a change to the instrumentation TS. As a result, the approved TS continued
'o require quantitative testing of instrumentation loop response time.
Following the NRC.staff's identification of the discrepancy between the WNW-2 TS and
licensee implementation of the NEDO report, the licensee requested and received
approval for a Notice of Enforcement Discretion to allow continued plant operation while
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
D. Coleman, Regulatory Affairs Manager
F. Diya, System Engineering Manager
D. Giroux, System Engineering
V. Harris, Assistant Maintenance Manager
P. Inserra, Licensing Manager
S. Oxenford, Operations Manager
G. Smith, Plant General Manager
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551:
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92901:
IP 92902:
IP 92903:
Closed
Onsite Engineering
Surveillance Observations
Maintenance Observations
Plant Operations
Plant Support
Followup - Operations
Followup - Maintenance
Followup - Engineering
.ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
50-397/96327-01013
(r'El 96019-01)
50-397/96327-01023
(EEI 96019-02)
50-397/96327-01033
(EEI 96019-03)
50-397/96327-01043
(EEI 96019-04)
50-397/96327-01053
(EEI 96019-05)
50-397/97138-01013
(EEI 96022-01)
'IO
operational mode change made with equipment inoperable
(Section 08.1)
various surveillances inappropriately deferred until after
mode change (Section 08.2)
inadequate startup procedures (Section 08.3)
missed recirculation loop flow mismatch surveillance
(Section 08.4)
YIO
missed average power range monitor channel check
surveillance (Section 08.4)
failure to perform reactor protection system response time
testing in accordance with TS (Section E8.3)
50-397/97138-01023
(EEI 96022-02)
50-397/97138-01033
(EEI 96022-03)
50-397/97138-01043
(EEI 96022-04)
50-397/97014-02
50-397/97014-03
50-397/97-003-00
50-397/97-004-00
50-397/97-004-01
-2-
failure to perform isolation system response
time testing in
accordance
with TS (Section E8.3)
failure to perform emergency core cooling system
response time testing in accordance with TS
(Section E8.3)
failure to obtain NRC approval for elimination of TS
requirement (Section E8.3)
failure to perform inservice testing of Valve TIP-V-6
(Section M8.2)
failure to maintain containment penetration isolated with
inoperable containment isolation valve (Section M8.2)
LER
notification of noncompliance with TS (Section E8.1)
LER
TS-required manual scram resulting from an indication of
eritry into Region A of the power-to-flow map
(Section E8.2)
LER
TS-required manual scram resulting from an indication of
entry into Region A of the power-to-flow map
(Section E8.2)
50-397/97-00 7-00
LER
voluntary report of automatic start of emergency diesel
generators because of an undervoltage condition,
(Section M8.3)
50-39?/9?-009-00,
LER
missedinservice testi
~g for Valve TIP-V-6(Se~"..;> M8.2)
50-397/98-002-00
50-397/98-003-00
50-397/98-007-00
50-397/98-008-00
50-397/98-009-00
LER
reactor scram and transient because of failed closed main
steam isolation valve (Section 08.5)
LER
reactor scram while shut down because of vessel low level
(Section 08.6)
LER
inadvertent full scram and Division I emergency
core'ooling
system injection (Section M8.4)
LER
inadvertent full scram during reactor pressure vessel leak
testing in Mode 4 (Section M8.5)
LER
nuclear steam supply shutoff system, Groups 3 and 4
isolations during testing (Section M8.6)
50-397/98-011-00
50/397/98005-05
-3-
LER
emergency core cooling system pump room flooding
because of fire protection system pipe'break
(Section 08.7}
condensate
storage tank return valves not within scope of
maintenance
rule (Section M8.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
.CAR
. FSAR
LER
NRC
RCIG
TS
WNW-2
Code of Federal Regulations
Final Safety Analysis Report
inservice testing
licensee event report
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Public Document Room
reactor core isdlation cooling
standby gas treatment
Technical Specifications
violation
Washington Nuclear Project-2
SITE COVERAGE FOR Rl COUNTERPART MEETING - NOVEMBER 17-19, 1998
SITE
CALL
PY
WAT3
WC
WNP-2
COYERAGE
Russ B 'ater
Howard Bund
Bill McNeill
Paula Gofdber
Paul Ga e
CliffClark
Claude Johnson
Dennis Schaefer
John Whittemore
Mike Run an
Rebecca Nease
Lee Ellershaw
Chuck Paulk