ML17284A656
| ML17284A656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1998 |
| From: | Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Parrish J WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9806150032 | |
| Download: ML17284A656 (21) | |
Text
CATEGORY 2 ~
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9806150032 DOC.DATE: 98/06/08 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACZL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFIL1ATZON WONG,H.J.
Region 4 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION PARRISH,J.V.
Washington Public Power Supply System
SUBJECT:
Advises of planned insp effort resulting from Washington plant performance review for period of 970924-980422.
Historical listing of plant issues considered to arrive at integrated view of licensee performance trends encl.
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TITLE: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report NOTES:
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, 23 ENCL 23
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZA ORIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011 8064 June 8, 1998 Mr. J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)
Chief Executive Officer Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 (WNP-2)
Dear Mr. Parrish:
On May 15, 1998, the NRC staff completed the semiannual Plant Performance Review (PPR) of WNP-2. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance.
The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources.
The PPR for WNP-2 involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period September 24, 1997, to April 22, 1998.
PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as input to the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) and Senior Management Meeting (SMM) reviews.
Overall safety performance remained steady.
Performance in the area of Operations demonstrated weakness in the operators understanding of plant transient response and post trip reviews.
Maintenance activities were generally good, with Engineering performance mixed.
While the corrective actions resulting from the reactor core isolation cooling system downgrade were performed in a thorough and comprehensive manner, the post trip reviews of the main steam line isolation event did not promptly identify operational problems with the reactor core isolation cooling system.
Also, weaknesses in vendor oversight resulted in the use of incorrect and non-conservative core operating limits. Performance in Plant Support has been generally good with the exception of weaknesses in the implementation of radiation protection programs.
Based on the results of this assessment, no change in inspection resources for review of your performance was warranted.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Washington Public Power Supply System.
The PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. is a general description of the PIM table labels.
This material will be 9806i50032 'M0608 PDR ADOCK 05000S'P7 9
Washington Public Power Supply System placed in the PDR as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the WNP-2 PPR review.
It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.
details our inspection plan for the next 8 months.
The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan.
Ifyou have any questions, please contact Howard Wong at 925-975-0296.
Since Howard J. Wong, Chi Project Branch E Division of reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-397 License Nos. NPF-21
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
'2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/enclosures:
Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council P.O. Box 43172 Olympia, Washington 98504-3172
~
Mr. Rodney L. Webring (Mail Drop PE08)
Vice President, Operations Support/PIO Washington Public. Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Greg O. Smith (Mail Drop 927M)
WNP-2 Plant General Manager Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968
Washington Public Power Supply System Mr. D. W. Coleman (Mail Drop PE20)
~
Manager, Regulatory Affairs Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Albert E. Mouncer (Mail Drop 396)
Chief Counsel Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Paul Inserra (Mail Drop PE20)
Manager, Licensing Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Perry D. Robinson, Esq.
Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502
Washington Public Power Supply System E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Maii report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
WCFO File Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RlV File DOCUMENT NAME: S:)PPRLTRLPPR98-01ttspprltr.wnp Toreceivecop ofdocument.fndfcatefnbox:"C""-Cop withoutencfosu es "E""-Cop withencfosures "N"-"Nocop RIV: '/E HJ o
06 D:D ATHowell 06/5/98 C:DRP/E D:DRP TPGwyn 06/ /98 HJW ng 06/ /98 OFFICIALRECORD PY
Washington Public Power upply System Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bccto DCDglEff) '~j bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
WCFO File DOCUMENT NAME: S:>PPRLTR>PPR98-01hpprltr.wnp To receive co of document, Indicate In box: "C" = Cop without enciosu es "E" = Copy with enciosures "N"= No copy RIV:C'/E HJ o
06 D:D D:DRP C:DRP/E ATHowell'PGwyn HJW ng 06/5/98 06/ /98 06/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD PY
L DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES ITEM 03/31/98 NCV IR 98-03 03/31/98 Negative IR 98-03 SELF OPS 1A 5B SC NRC OPS 1A 5A Inadequate selfMecking and peer checking resulted in an operator error that deenergized non-vital Bus SM-2 and started the Division IIIemergency diesel generator.
Operations personnel actions in response to the transient were appropriate and prompt. The licensee's root cause analysis and corrective actions effectively addressed the human performance concerns.
NCV-Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.
One instance was identified in which an operating crew did not demonstrate a conservative approach to equipment operation when a non-vital lighting panel, with an unidentified ground, was reenergized without an understanding ofthe source of the ground or a troubleshooting plan to identify the source.
03/17/98 Negative
'R 9845 03/17/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-05 03/17/98 Weakness IR 98-05 NRC OPS 5A 5B NRC OPS 1C 4C NRC OPS 1C 5C The initial event review was not fullyeffective in providing a comprehensive understanding of equipment problems, procedural weaknesses and operator performance issues.
The plant restart evaluation process was needed to fullyidentify the issues that were missed by the post scram review. This resulted in an iterative approach to identify, analyze and resolve each of the performance issues.
Aviolation ofTechnical Specification 5.4.1a and Regulatory Guide 1.33, with two examples of inadequate procedures, was identified for a Division II logic system functional test and the Division IIIemergency diesel generator restoration.
Temporary Change Notice TCN 98-113, made to Procedure TSP-DG2/LOCA-B501, Step 7.1.33, Substep a, to override the opening of the injection valve, was inadequate and resulted in low pressure coolant injection to the reactor vessel during the conduct of the March 12, 1998, logic system functional test.
Procedure PPM 2.7.3, High Pressure Core Spray Diesel, Revision 29, did not provide adequate direction for the shutdown ofthe high pressure core spray system.
The licensee's 10 CFR 55.59, Licensed Operator Requalification Program, did not address th make up of crew complement used in simulator training vs the control room and was considered a significant weakness in the licensed operator requalification training program.
03/17/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1B 1C A violation was identified for the failure to provide the one hour event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph (b)(1)(iv) for the valid high pressure coolant injection into the reactor vessel.
May 15, 1998 WNP-2
E AT DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES 03/17/98 Negative IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1B 3B 4B Although the licensee's actions prior to the main steam line isolation valve nitrogen supply line failure and overall response to the complex transient were appropriate, weaknesses with operators'nowledge, skills and abilities were identified involving recognition of the plant
- response, and verifying the appropriate engineered safety feature and emergency core cooling systems actuations.
Management oversight of the control room actions was not well focused on evolving plant conditions and assuring recovery actions were appropriately implemented.
Effective management control was not implemented for the procedure temporary change process and control of infrequently performed tests and surveillance.
Operator workarounds ~
appeared in significant areas involving vessel level and pressure control, temperature monitoring and forced circulation. Communication withinthe control room and with the NRC headquarters operations officerwas poor and did not ensure that key control room personnel were cognizant of the overall plant and systems.
03/17/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-05 LICENSEE OPS 1B 1C A violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a and Regulatory Guide 1.33 was identified for the failure to maintain the reactor vessel temperature and upper head pressure indications within the acceptable area ofthe temperature/pressure curve provided in Procedure OSP-RCS-
- C102, RPV Vessel Cooldown Surveillance, Revision 0, Attachment 9.1, MinimumVessel Metal Temperature VS Reactor Vessel Pressure.
02/19/98 NCV IR 97-20 02/19/98 Negative IR 97-20 02/09/98 VIO SL IV IR 97-13 02/19/98 Positive IR 97-20 SEI F OPS 3A NRC OPS 1A 1C NRC OPS 1A 3B NRC
OPS SA 5C Apersonnel error on the part of an equipment operator during the performance of clearance order activities resulted in the momentary deenergization of the Division II4160V vital bus and the loss of residual heat removal assist cooling of the spent fuel pool. Anoncited violation was identified for the failure to followprocedures (associated with this 1996 licensee event reporl).
Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.
The licensee's program to assure that corrective lenses for self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for operators requiring them was implemented successfully. However, procedural guidance for maintenance of the SCBA corrective lens program was considered weak, in that~
periodic inventories were not required and written expectations were not provided to operators on the need to have SCBA qualified lenses, regardless of the type of corrective lenses normally Used.
The professionalism ofthe control room operators and shiA management ownership of crew activities supported good operational performance over the inspection period. Operators were generally knowledgeable of plant and equipment status with several minor exceptions.
There was a failure to issue a problem evaluation request that would have promptly identified and provided corrective actions for the inadvertent start of a reactor recirculation pump. This item was considered to be an example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
May 15, 1998 WNP-2
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES ITEM 02/09/98 VIO SL IV IR 97-13 02/09/98 VIO SL IV IR 97-13 02/09/98 NCV IR 97-13 NRC OPS 3B 5C NRC OPS 4C 4B NRC OPS 5C 2A While corrective actions to resolve the material buildup problem in Valves FDR V-3 and FDR V-4 were effective, corrective actions to resolve a required reading problem were not. An example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,was identified for the failure to correct the required reading issue.
The failure to update the Final Safety Analysis Report fire protection sections was considered a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) (Section Vll. B.3 of the Enforcement Policy).
The corrective actions to resolve continuing failures of the motor-to-pump coupling on the ac standby lubricating oil pump were inadequate.
[Planned corrective actions were not implemented.] This inadequacy was considered to be an example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
02/09/98 Positive IR 97-13 LICENSEE OPS 3B 3A 02/09/98 Positive IR 97-13 LICENSEE OPS 5C Actions to address the occurrence of shorting electrical terminals during the performance of maintenance or surveillance activities were adequate and effective toward preventing a
'ecurrence of the events.
The corrective actions that addressed the inadvertent initiation of drywell to suppression chamber bypass flowwere appropriate for the circumstances and adequate to prevent a recurrence of the events.
01/15/98 VIO SL IV IR 97-18 NRC OPS 2A 1C A number of inspector identified deficiencies in the control of transient equipment indicated weak implementation ofthe licensee's program to prevent seismic interactions between the equipment and safety-related components.
Three examples of a violation of plant procedures were identified.
11/08/97 Positive IR 97-17 NRC OPS 1A 1C 3B Management involvement in the plant curtailment for maintenance on the reactor feedwater drive turbines (RFWDT) was notable for reemphasizing expectations and raising personnel sensitivity to a significant evolution. The operations staff also demonstrated conservative decision-making when maintenance on the first drive turbine was delayed while operability concerns viith the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system were addressed.
May 15, 1998 WNP-2
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES ITEM 03/31/98 Negative IR 9843 LICENSEE MAINT 2A Poor material condition of the plant service water system resulted in a leak that challenged the integrity ofthe control room envelope as water was able to penetrate through a concrete slab interface in the control room ceiling, a boundary credited by the licensee's flooding analysis.
The licensee is currently implementing an improvement plan that should adequately address the material condition deficiencies in the plant service water system.
03/31/98 VIO IR 98-03 SL IV 02/19/98 Positive IR 97-20 NRC MAINT 2B 3B NRC MAINT 3A 4B Licensee personnel improperly applied surveillance requirement 3.0.2 to program surveillances in the administrative section ofTechnical Specifications.
As a result, a 25 percent surveillance interval extension was inappropriately utilized for several technical programs.
Observed maintenance and surveillance activities were generally well coordinated and executed with appropriate craft supervision and system engineering participation.
02/19/98 NCV IR 97-20 SELF MAINT 3A The failure of maintenance personnel to read and adhere to the instructions on a caution tag prior to manipulating a breaker, resulted in the loss of the Division I 125VDC critical instrument power inverter and the initiation of several essential safety features and isolation of several containment isolation valves. The event occurred while the plant was defueled in Mode 5. A noncited violation was identified associated with this 1996 licensee event report. (Section VII.B.1. of the Enforcement Policy).
11/08/97 Positive IR 97-17 NRC MAINT 4B 4C 4A 01/15/98 Weakness IR 97-18 NRC MAINT 2B 2A The licensee's material condition inspection program was not fullyimplemented to maintain and assess those areas of the reactor building not routinely accessed by plant personnel.
As a result, a lower standard was established for these areas and equipment and housekeeping deficiencies were allowed to persist.
The licensee's troubleshooting and repair efforts associated with the reactor feedwater pumps were well planned and executed.
The efforts resulted in improved drive turbine performance while identifying potential design improvements to the turbine governor control oil system.
INay 15, 1998 WNP-2
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES ITEM 03/31/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-03 NRC ENG 4C 2B A number of deficiencies were identified in the implementation of the licensee's leakage surveillance and prevention program. Specifically, procedures for performing visual and integrated leakage inspections on the standby gas treatment system, the containment monitoring system, and the post accident sampling system, were inadequate in that they failed to identify all of the appropriate system components to be monitored 03/31/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC ENG 4B 5C In reviewing the testing requirements for the standby gas treatment system, the inspector identified the potential for the system floor drains to present a bypass pathway around the filters. In response to the inspector's concerns, the licensee took appropriate action to verify that the current leakage is acceptable, and to develop a long-term monitoring program for this potential unfiltered leakage path.
03/17/98 Negative IR 98-05 NRC ENG 4B 4C SA The effectiveness ofthe system walkdowns was mixed. The licensee appropriately identified concerns with the containment instrument air system; however, concerns with the reactor core isolation cooling system performance and post operation condition were not promptly identified by walkdowns or plant data review.
03/17/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC ENG 4B 5B 4C The licensee effectively identified and corrected the cause of the main steam line isolation valve containment air supply line failure. Common cause failure of the other main steam line isolation valve instrument air lines was appropriately considered.
The licensee aggressively addressed concerns with the Division II logic system performance during the event and verified the Division II logic system functionality.
03/17/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-05 NRC ENG 4C 1C Aviolation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a and Regulatory Guide 1.33 was identified for changing the intent of the logic system test to allow low pressure coolant injection into the reactor vessel using the temporary change notice process.
02/19/98 NCV 02/19/98 NCV IR 97-20 LICENSEE ENG 4A IR 97-20 LICENSEE ENG 1C Licensee procedures for controlling the configuration of the 4160V vital switchgear breakers di~
not ensure that configurations would be consistent with the seismic qualification of the switchgear. Anoncited violation was identified associated with this 1996 licensee event report (section VII.B.1.of the Enforcement Policy).
Calibration and surveillance procedures for the rod block monitor system were found to be inadequate to ensure the rod block monitors were operable prior to exceeding 30 percent rated thermal power as required by Technical Specifications.
As a result, the system did not enforce rod blocks until power was approximately 33 percent. A noncited violation was identified associated with this 1997 licensee event report (Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy).
May 15, 1998 WNP-2
Al
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES ITEM 02/19/98 NCV 02/19/98 NCV IR 97-20 NRC ENG 4A 4C IR 97-20 LICENSEE ENG 4A In establishing the fiowswitch high flowisolation setpoint for the reactor water cleanup system blowdown line, engineering personnel did not adequately review the instrument loop design.
This resulted in the application of an improper conversion factor for the flowswitch and a nonconservative high flowisolation setpoint that exceeded the maximum allowable technical specification value. A noncited violation was identified associated with this 1997 licensee event report (Section VII.B.1 ofthe Enforcement Policy).
Three examples were identified in which the licensee had evaluated and implemented a change to the facility, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, but failed to update the~
report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). The licensee is implementing a broad review of the Final Safety Analysis Report to identify and correct any additional errors. A noncited violation was identified (Section VII.B.3of the Enforcement Policy).
02/09/98 EEI IR 97-13 NRC ENG 4A 4B 5A The reactor core isolation cooling system was downgraded from safety related to nonsafety related. While the system was found to be operable, it was also found to be nonconforming.
The reclassification plan and schedule for returning the reactor core isolation cooling system to safety related were thorough. As the result of these downgrade activities, six reactor core isolation cooling valves were not being tested.
The failure to test these valves was considered to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(f). The failure to obtain NRC approval prior to downgrading the system from safety related to nonsafety related was considered to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50.59 because it apparently involved an unreviewed safety question.
02/09/98 Positive IR 97-13 LICENSEE ENG 4B 4A An adequate evaluation ofthe March 3, 1996, residual heat removal system test results was performed that demonstrated that the results were within the design basis.
02/09/98 NCV IR 97-13 NRC ENG 4A 5C Multiple examples of Final Safety Analysis Report inaccuracies were identified. While no safety issues or operability issues were identified, these multiple examples were indicative of a failur~
to update the Final Safety Analysis Report.
However, the ongoing implementation of a Final Safety Analysis Report update program permitted the exercising of enforcement discretion in accordance with the revised enforcement policy.
02/09/98 Negative IR 97-13 NRC ENG SC 4B Engineering Directorate Manual 2.15 was properly implemented and actions were being taken to further control the number ofcalculation modification records for plant calculations; however, a self-assessment performed by the licensee did not identify ifthe outstanding calculation modification records potentially affected the technical content ofthe calculations.
02/09/98 Positive IR 97-13 NRC ENG 4C 5C 4A The lack of inclusion of the high pressure core spray service water loop in the corrosion program was appropriate considering the type of failure that occurred.
In addition, the inclusion of the high pressure core spray service water system in the wall thickness measurement program was considered to be a proactive approach toward eliminating any future problems.
May 15, 1998 WNP-2
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES ITEM 01/15/98 Weakness IR 97-18 NRC ENG 4C 01/15/98 Negative IR 97-18 NRC ENG 4A 01/15/98 NCV IR 97-18 LICENSEE ENG 4A 5A Identified performance issues in the leakage surveillance and prevention program, regarding plant staff knowledge, program implementation, and procedural inconsistencies, were indicative ofweak management involvement and poor program maintenance.
However, these issues did not result in any significant safety concerns.
The licensee's use of an uncontrolled database during its power uprate implementation resulted in an affected design calculation for the ultimate heat sink being missed in the review process.
The existing revision of the calculation bounded the parameters of the power uprate.
The licensee identified that plant procedures for testing the automatic isolation function of reactor core isolation cooling were inadequate in that they did not verify the proper operation of the Division II isolation seal-in logic contact. A noncited violation was issued (Section VII.B.1.
of the Enforcement Policy).
10/01/97 Negative IR 97-11 10/01/97 Negative IR 97-11 NRC EN G 5A 5C NRC EN G 5A 5C The licensee's initial methodology used for confirmation of the ABB/CE correlation to predict the thermal behavior of Siemens fuel was deficient in that it could not detect absolute errors in the Siemens correlation, or in the application of the Siemens correlation to obtain the data matrix used for the development ofthe ABB/CE correlation.
The licensee operated Cycles 7-12 with incorrect and nonconservative core operating limit report (COLR) values for the OLMCPR. The OLMCPR was not calculated in accordance with NRC-approved topical reports referenced in Technical Specification 5.6.5.b. The licensee's staff determined that the corrected and more conservative OLMCPR was exceeded during each of the Cydes 7-12.
10/01/97'egative IR 97-11 NRC ENG 5C 5A 10/01/97 Positive IR 97-11 LICENSEE ENG 5A Aproposed facilitylicense amendment did not assure conservative limits for Cycle 13 operation and, thus, was not acceptable.
The licensee's fuel assembly examination and review of vendor information provided an adequate basis to conclude that significant fretting damage to fuel cladding, due to broken fuel~
assembly debris filtersprings, had not occurred.
I@ay 15, 1998 WNP-2
DATE TYPE SOURCE 03/31/98 VIO SL IV IR 9843 02/19/98 VIO IR 97-20 SL IV ID NRC NRC SFA TEMPLATE CODES PS 1C 3B 5B PS 5C 1C ITEM Ucensee corrective actions to address weaknesses in implementing the transient combustible control program have not been effective in addressing the root cause and precluding repeat noncompliances with procedural requirements.
The root cause of these nonmmpliances appeared to be a lack of understanding of fire protection requirements and inattentiveness to fire protection labeling on the part of plant personnel.
Corrective actions to address inadequate labeling of radioactive material containers have not been effective in preventing recurrence. as evidenced by several recent noncompliances identified by the inspectors and the licensee, and resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 20.1904(a).
Additionally, a lack of defined ownership of areas in the radwaste building contributed to poor radiological housekeeping practices on the 507 foot elevation.
02/19/98 Negative IR 97-20 SELF PS 1C 4B Engineering controls placed upon the traversing in~re probe drive C were insufficient in preventing movement of the probe during troubleshooting activities. The unexpected movement ofthe probe required personnel action to prevent the probe from withdrawing from its shielded location and into the area where the troubleshooting was being performed.
Based upon other barriers to personnel overexposure that were in place, and the immediate actions taken in response to the event, the likelihood of a significant overexposure was low.
02/19/98 Positive IR 97-20 NRC PS 5A 5B The licensee's analysis and root cause evaluation ofthe unexpected movement of the traversing in~re probe accurately characterized the event and identified a number of areas for improvement, including personnel level of knowledge of TIP system operation and level of involvement of radiation protection supervision in the ALARAplanning process for high radiological risk jobs.
01/15/98 VIO SL IV 01/15/98 NCV IR 97-18 NRC PS 1C 4B 5A IR 97-18 SELF PS 1C 5A Implementation ofthe licensee's program for monitoring and control of combustibles in the plant has been inconsistent in that 1) materials have been allowed to accumulate in limited access areas without being properly evaluated or tracked, and 2) inconsistencies in the licensee's combustible loading calculation, coupled with a relatively large backlog of modifications to the current revision of the calculation, reduced the value of the calculation as a tool in supporting plant modifications. This was considered a failure to followplant procedures.
The licensee's failure to test the control room facsimile machine contributed to an inoperable piece of emergency response equipment going undetected until itwas required to be used during an actual event. Anoncited violation was identified (Section VII.B.1. ofthe Enforcement Policy).
11/21/97 Negative IR 97-19 NRC PS 1C The radioactive material control program needed improved procedural guidance to ensure accountability of items conditionally released from the radiological controlled area.
Sealed radioactive sources were maintained and leak tested property May 15, 1998 WNP-2
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODES ITEM 11/21/97 VIO SL IV IR 97-19 NRC PS 1C Problems with high radiation area controls and radiological hazard evaluations were identified; however, exposure controls were adequate, overall. Aviolation of control of access to a high radiation area was identified (TS 5.7.2.a).
11/21/97 Weakness IR 97-19 11/21/97 Positive IR 97-19 11/21/97 VIO SL IV IR 97-19 11/21/97 Strength IR 97-19 11/08/97 Negative IR 97-17 11/08/97 Positive IR 97-17 11/21/97 Weakness IR 97-19 LER 97-037 NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC PS 5C PS 5A 5B PS 5A 5B PS 1C PS 3A 1C PS 1C 5C PS 1C Corrective actions by the radiation protection organization were slow and sometimes ineffective An excellent audit of the radiation protection program was conducted by the quality department.
The audit was comprehensive and effective in identifying areas of potential improvement Failure to evaluate radiological hazards associated with potential intakes of radioactive material was identified as a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a).
Improved guidance was needed in implementing procedures involving the evaluation of potential internal radiological hazards, radioactive materials control, personnel contamination events, and portable radiation instruments Significant improvement was made in reducing the number of personnel contamination events The unavailability of members of the emergency response organization, along with technical and training issues related to the use of the licensee's automatic notification system, have challenged the licensee in demonstrating its ability to staff the onsite emergency response facilities in accordance viiththe emergency plan. The licensee's short term corrective actions to address this concern appear appropriate.
As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)planning for several steam leak repair activities identified effective radiological controls and work practices.
May 15, 1998 WNP-2
Dare ape Sources ID Issue Description Cwies GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLELABELS Actual date ofan event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date ofoccurrence, the date the source of the information was issued (such as the LER date), or, for inspection reports, the last date ofthe inspection period.
The categorization of the issue - see the Type Item Code table.
SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINTfor Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.
Identification ofwho discovered issue: N for NRC; Lfor Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
Details ofthe issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.
Template Codes - see table.
'IO NCV DEV Positive Negative LER URI *~
Licensing MISC TYPE ITEM CODES Enforcement Action Letter with Civil Penalty Enforcement Discretion - No CivilPenalty Overall Strong Licensee Performance Overall Weak Licensee Performance Escalated Enforcement Item - Waiting Final NRC Action Violation Level I, II,III,or IV Non-Cited Violation Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC Individual Good Inspection Finding Individual Poor Inspection Finding Licensee Event Report to the.NRC Unresolved Item from Inspection Report Licensing Issue from NRR Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc.
TEMPLATECODES Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - Programs and Processes Material Condition: A-Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Human Performance: A-Work Performance; B-Knowledge, Skills, and AbilitiesI Training; C-Work Environment Engineering/Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C-Resolution NOTES:
EEls are apparent violations ofNRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement ofPolicy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
However, the NRC has not reached its Anal enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee willbe provided with an opportunity to either (I) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT2 IP - Inspection Procedure TI - Temporary Instruction Core Inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
INSPECTION TITLEI PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF INSPECTORS DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION/COMMENTS IP 83750 Occupational Exposure 6/1-5/98 Core Inspection IP 86750 Solid Radwaste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials 6/22-26/98 Core Inspection IP 84750 Environmental Monitoring IP 37001 50.59 IP 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 81700 Physical Security Program IP 64704 Fire Protection IP 93809 Safety System Engineering Inspection IP 82701 Operational Status of EP Program IP 82301 EP Exercise 6/29-7/3/98 6/29-7/3/98 7/6-10/98 7/20-24/98 7/13-17/98 7/13-17/98 7/13-17/98 7/27-8/1/98 7/20-24/98 9/14-1 8/98 Core Inspection Core Inspection Core Inspection Core Inspection Core Inspection Core Inspection Core Inspection Core Inspection IP 81110 Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation Tl-'130 Improved Technical Specifications 9/21-25/98 10/5-9/98 Periodic Inspection Temporary Instruction