ML17278A433
| ML17278A433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1985 |
| From: | Johnson P, Toth A, Waite R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17278A431 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-85-30, NUDOCS 8510090359 | |
| Download: ML17278A433 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1985030
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No:
Docket No:
50-397/85-30
50-397
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P. 0. Box 968
Richland,
Wa.
99352
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2
(WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington
I
,r
Inspection Conducted:,
Au'gust 3-31,
1985
Inspectors: ~A. 'D.
~R.
S.
Approved by
To
Se io'r Resident. Inspector
I.
~
I Lf
W i e,
esident Inspector
~ /O'~
Date Signed
gM
Date Signed
gW
Summary
P.
H. J
son, Chief,
Reactor
rojects Section
3
I
Date Signed
Ins ection on Au ust 3-31,
1985
(Re ort 50-397/85-30)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine,
unannounced
inspection
by the resident
inspectors
of control room operations,
engineered
safety feature
(ESF) status,
surveillance
program,
maintenance
program,
licensee
event reports,
special
inspection topics,
and licensee
action on previous inspection findings.
During this inspection,
Inspection Procedures
71707,
71710,
61726,
62703,
40700,
92701,
92702,
92700,
93702,
and
92705 were covered.
This inspection involved 139 inspection-hours
on site by two resident
inspectors,
including
7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> during backshift work activities.
Results:
In the eight areas
inspected,
one violation was identified (lack of
procedure
adherence
while adjusting suppression
pool level - paragraph 4.a).
90359
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DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
D. Mazur, Managing Director
J.
Shannon,
Deputy Managing Director
J. Martin, Assistant
Managing Director for Operations
- C. Powers, 'Plant',Manager,
- J. Baker, Assistant Plant
Manager,','.
Monopoli, Operation'al,Assurance
Manager
L.'arrold, Engineering 'Manager
G. Sorensen,
Regula'tory>Programs,Manager
R. Corcoran,
Operations, Manager
R. leardsley,'ssistant
Operations
Manager
K. Cowan, Technical Manager ~,,
J. Landon, Maintenance'anager
D. Peldman,,Plant
Quality, Assurance. Manager
J. Peters,
Administrative Mana'ger
P. Powell, L'icensing Manager
'
t
- Personnel in,attendance
at exit meeting
I
The inspectors
also interviewed various control room operators; shift
supervisors; shift managers;
and engineering,
quality assurance,
and
management
personnel relative to activities in progress
and records.
2.
General
The Senior Resident Inspector and/or the Resident
Inspector were on site
August 5-9,
12-16,
19-23 and 25-30.
Backshift inspections
were
conducted.
Several regional office and
NRC Headquarters
personnel visited the site
this month.
Related inspection activities are documented in other
inspection reports.
These included:
Radiation Specialist
(R. Cook) was onsite August 12-16.
A Radiation Specialist
(C. Sherman)
was onsite August 12-21.
The
NRR Prospect
Manager (J. Bradfute)
was onsite August 14-15.
An NRC Commissioner
(L.Zech and aide,
M. Clausen) visited the WNP-2
site on the afternoon of August 22.
The Region
V Public Affairs Officier (G. Cook) was onsite August 22.
The Region
V Administrator (J. Martin) was onsite August 23.
The Region V Reactor Projects
Branch Chief (A. Chaffee)
was onsite
August 29-30.
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The plant operated
at about
72% power, with
1 recirculation loop in
operation,
most of this report period.
4.
0 erations Verifications
The resident inspectors
reviewed the control room operator
and shift
manager log books
on a daily basis for this report period.
Reviews were
also
made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance
Report Log to
verify that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications
and
that the licensee
was actively pursuing corrections
to conditions listed
in either log.
Events involving unusual conditions of equipment were
discussed
with the control room personnel available at the time of the
review and evaluated for potential safety significance.
The licensee's
adherence
to Limiting Conditions for Operation
(LCO's), particularly
those dealing with ESP and
ESF electrical alignment,
were observed.
The
inspectors routinely took note of activated
on the control
panels
and ascertained
that the control room licensed personnel
on duty
at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator
and its
significance.
The inspectors
observed
access
control, control room
manning, operability of nuclear instruments,
and availability of on site
and offsite electrical, power.
The inspectors
also
made regular tours of
accessible
areas
of the facility to assess
equipment conditions,
radiological controls,-'security,
safety
and adherence
to regulatory
requirements.
Between 7:30 8:00 a.m.
on August 23, the control room annunciators
were lighted'or supression
pool high/low level and
RHR pump
discharge
pressure
low. At 8:00 AM the inspector interviewed the
reactor operator
and obser'ved that the
RHR system loop
B was aligned
for draining of tlie 'suppresion.
pool to the radwaste
system via the
RHR pump discharge piping keep-gull pump.
The reactor operator
and
the Shift .Manager'stated
-that thi's alignment was the usual method of
lowering,,the,suppression
'pool lev'el to within required limits.
,(This >aBtion has been~taken
about
once per day due to a 1-gpm
unidentified,.source
of, water leakage into the suppression
pool).
The main
RHR loop
B pump was not operating during this process'.
The
reactor operator and,thj'Shift Support Supervisor stated
that
chemi,stry'amples
hah not been taken prior to the discharge
to
radyaste.
The -operator stated" that the actuation of the
RHR pump
discharge
low pressure
was normal since it was due to
d'epr'essurization
arising from'the letdown flow to radwaste;
he
demonstrated
that he could clear the alarm by throttling the letdown
valve such that letdown 'flow did not exceed
the capability of the
keep-full pump.
The operator
appeared
quite familiar with the
system
and its controls,
and he appeared
comfortable in responding
to the annunciators
by manipulating the system without reference
to
the governing annunciator
response
sheet
or system operating
procedure.
The annunciator
response
sheet
- 4.601.A12-2.3 refers to emergency
procedure
PPM 5.2.4,
Suppression
Pool Level Control, step 3.1 or 3.2
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to maintain suppression
pool level within desired limit.
The
applicable step 3.1 requires
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Request 'the HP/Chemist
sample
RHR Loop B.
Refer to
PPM 12.10.1,
Post Accident Sampling
and Analysis".
"c.
Confirm sample results prior to discharge."
In addition to the above,
the
RHR system operating procedure
PPM-2.4.2 includes
more detailed instructions in Section
E,
System Suppression
Pool Discharge
to
Radwaste".
These instructions similarly require "Step 3) Start
pump RHR-P-2B."
The operator apparently did not refer to the applicable procedures,
nor was he aware that the procedures
required sampling
and operation
of the
RHR system loop B main pump.
The failure to operate
the main pump allowed the letdown flow to
exceed
the makeup capability of the keep-full pump, permitted
a
reduction in the
RHR discharge line pressure,
and allowed a
potential or actual reduction in inventory in the discharge piping.
A reduction in inventory involves a void in the
RHR discharge line
and could result in water hammer
and associated
damage in the event
the
RHR pump should start
(such as in response
to ECCS low pressure
coolant injection initiation signals).
The
ECCS system design basis
does not include water hammer effects.
The failure to adhere to the two plant procedures is an apparent
violation, indicative of lack of knowledge of the content of those
procedures,
and
a tendency to react to the plant conditions without
reference
to the annunciator procedure
and the system operating
procedure.
(85-30-01)
A reactor trip occurred
on August
4 at 10:28 a.m.
The inspector
interviewed the shift personnel
on duty at the time, and examined
the reactor trip report
and associated
logs.
Design drawings
showed
that each level indicator is served
by an independent
reference leg.
It appears
that the pressure
pulse had transmitted
across
the
diaphragm of the Barton gage of one level transmitter
and affected
the variable leg of several other instruments,
including the
redundant level indicator.
The Plant Manager requested
that the technology department
perform a
thorough investigation of this matter to ascertain if the one safety
channel
could have affected the redundant
channels.
The inspector
interviewed the lead reviewer who concluded that such an effect was
possible
and did occur.
The licensee
plans to submit an information
notice to other licensees
regarding this experience,
in addition to
an LER to the NRC.
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The inspector
observed
operations
of the security central alarm
station, including staffing, demonstration
of personnel
accountability control,
and surveillance testing of the perimeter
monitoring system.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Surveillance
Pro ram Im lementation
The inspectors
ascertained
that surveillance of safety-related
systems
or
components
was being conducted in accordance
with license requirements.
In addition to witnessing
and verifying daily control panel instrument
checks,
the inspectors
observed portions of several detailed surveillance
tests
by operators
and instrument
and control technicians.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Monthl
Maintenance
Observation
Portions of selected
safety-related
systems
maintenance activities were
observed.
By direct observation
and review of records
the inspector
determined
whether
these activities were consistent with LCOs and that
the proper administrative controls
and tag-out procedures
were followed.
The inspector also reviewed the outstanding
gob orders to determine if
the licensee
was giving priority to safety related maintenance.
a ~
An increased
emphasis
was observed in daily planning and status
meetings
and results
achieved in the control room, to eliminate
nuisance
alarms.
All nuisance
alarms
appeared
to have
been eliminated at the
ECCS system
and nuclear process
control
panels.
About
15 nuisance
alarms
appeared
to remain on less
critical main panels,
mostly of the type where the alarms are
showing equipment which is out of service
(but which is normally
expected
to be out of service for the current operating conditions).
Additional licensee
emphasis
includes correction of secondary
nuisance
alarms,
and the status
of this effort is routinely
discussed
at the morning department
managers
meeting.
An effort to
clean
and repair the reactor building drain monitoring system
commenced at the end of the month.
b.
The inspector
examined recent revisions of the welding work and
inspection,procedures.
The procedures
includ'ed principal
installation" instructions directly quoted from the
ASME Code.
However, citation of these
requirements
does not in itself assure
that completed welding will be acceptable,
and two weaknesses
in
this regard were noticed:
Work procedure
MWP-6 part. 10.1 states
that
"Material that is
to be joined by welding shall be aligned
and retained in
position wi'th pigs, fixtures, clamps, jacks, tack welds, or
temporary, attachments."
This is as stated in the
ASME Code
Paragraph
NB-.'4231.
However,, the procedure
does not caution
against, nor restrict, cold sp'ring,
(such as might occur via
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extreme
us'e of jacks), which ASME NB-3672.8 implies should not
be allowe'd,without control.
Work procedure
MWP-6 part 14.3.2.5 states
that
"Upon completion
. of welding, the finished weld surface
should be dressed
as
appropriate
to remove spatter,
any rough bead sections,
surface
flaws, etc. 'his dressing shall not encroach
upon the minimum
wall thickness for pipe."
Determination of minimum wall
thickness is not, readily available to the welder.
Furthermore,
the welding'inspection procedure
MWP-ll does not require the
quality control, inspector to evaluate
surface dressing for
encroachment
on minimum wall,thickness.
The absence
of proper
guidance'n
"this area. resulted in need for extensive
rework
efforts during the',construction
of WNP-2, as described in NRC
inspection reports
and licensee
reports under
.1
I
The licensee, stated 'tPat'he
applicable procedures
would be revised
"-to address
the above
two 'specifXc items,
and results of the
construction'restart'program
would be reviewed by the welding
engineer to assess
any other provisions which may be of value for
incorporation onto the plant maintenance
welding procedures.
Upgrading of the welding procedures is a followup item., (85-30-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
En ineered Safet
Feature Verification
The inspector verified the operability of the Containment
Instrument Air
System by performing a walkdown of the accessible
portions of the system.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's
system lineup procedures
matched plant drawings
and the as built configuration,
and verified that
valves were in the proper position,
had power available,
and were locked
as appropriate.
The licensee's
procedures
were verified to be in
accordance
with the Technical Specifications
and the FSAR.
During the system walkdowns while the plant was at
72% power, the
inspector noted that various temporary structures
had been placed in the
reactor building in proximity to or above safety related instrument lines
and racks,
power control panels,
and valves.
The inspector reinspected
the plant with a licensee stress
engineer
on August 28,
and noted
scaffolding, with wooden planks partially nailed together
about
25 feet
above
ECCS injection valve RHR-V-42B; scaffolding above
and within 5 feet
horizontally of class
lE instrument racks at various elevations;
scaffolding above the hydrogen recombiner
equipment;
and scaffolding 25
feet above
and adjacent
to a small class
lE power panel.
Some of the
scaffolding had kick plates,
tied lightly with wire, which tended to hold
down the metal planks.
Other scaffolds
had no hold downs, although
horizontal slip prevention
tabs existed
on the bottom of most of the
scaffold planks
(personal safety design feature).
The anticipated
behaviour of the various scaffolds during a seismic event
was not readily
ascertainable,
although the existence
of the tabs
appeared
to provide
some protection against falling of metal planks.
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The inspector also noted various
gang boxes,
ladders,
welding equipment,
and
a portable vent-hose
rack
a few feet from various class
1E instrument
racks.
Housekeeping
procedure
1.3.19 required removal of temporary scaffolding
and return of tools
and equipment to assigned
storage locations at the
end of the job.
However, this has apparently
been interpreted by plant
personnel
such that items are left in the plant for recurring tasks with
indefinite end-points.
Also, plant policies
and procedures
did not appear
to require specific evaluations
and controls of scaffolding to assure
that such items, while in use,
do not compromise
the function of safety
related equipment under design basis
seismic conditions.
When questioned
on this matter at
a plan of the day meeting,
the Plant Manager
and
Engineering
Manager promptly committed to apply efforts to evaluate this
situation;
the inspector
subsequently
met with the assigned
engineer
and
toured the reactor building with his assistant.
At the monthly exit
meeting
on August 30, the Maintenance
Manager reported that hold-down
bars
had been installed onto existing scaffold planks
as
an interim
conservative
measure,
pending engineering evaluation of the seismic
capabilities of the scaffolds.
This is an unresolved
item (refer to paragraph
12).
(85-30-03)
gt
8.
Iicensee
Event Re orts
The inspector performed
an in-office review of the following Licensee
Event Reports
(LERs),'relative,'to timeliness,
adequacy of description,
generic implicati'ons,'lanned
corrective actions,
and adequacy of coding.
I
The resi;den6,inspe'ctors
reviewed selected
reports
and supporting
informtion on site to verify tha't'licensee
management
had reviewed the
events,
correcti've action had,been
taken,
no unreviewed safety questions
were, involved,
and
>> yi'olations, of regulations
or Technical Specification
conditions
ha'd been identified.
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LER-85-023-00,(Open)" - This item involved results of field inspections
which identified various electrical cable configurations which
appear'ed',,to
compromise
cabIe separation criteria.
The inspections
were
in.. r'esponse'to
questions
raised by the resident, inspector
regarding existence of 'cables in the cable spreading
room which had
been
abandoned in place after the preoperational
and startup test
program.
The licensee's
actions
appeared
to be an intensive
and
~ aggressive effort to identify and correct all initially questionable
items.
LER-85-023-01
(Open) - This revised
LER described
continued field
inspection
and design efforts which revealed that cable tray covers
were not installed, or were installed improperly,
on some trays.
During the May-June maintenance
outage,
covers were installed on
trays which were in high radiation areas,
where continued corrective
action could not be performed after the plant commenced
operation.
Installation corrective actions in other areas
had not been
completed
as of August 26, 1985.
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subject",LER stated that the 28 originally identified items,
as
well as all subsequently identified items (e.g.
cable tray cover
omissions),'ad
been plac'ed
on the fire w'atch tour until each
problem;is
rem'edied.
This was not entirely accurate.
Being placed
on the" fire'at'ch tour meant that an item was included
on
a list of
items to be checked each'our
to ascertain that no fire is in
progr'ess 'at the -item.
The fi.r'e watch tour list identified the item
and the building area
where it is located.
The tour itself involved
walking through the building area
where each item was located
and
looking 'for evidence of,fire.
The tour list was not revised to
include.."all-subsequently
identified items"; however,
most of such
items were in fact checked via the process
of tours through the
areas
to check 'items in close proximity which were already
on the
list.
The inspector interviewed the Operations
Manager,
who was
a member
of the Plant Operations
Committee meeting which reviewed
and
approved the
LER which stated that the fire watch tours
had been
supplemented.
He stated that he knew at the time of, the
POC meeting
that marked
up blueprints
had been generated
with the intent to
incorporate
these into the fire tour.
He had no reason to believe
that'his
had not been carried to the point of full implementation,
since the process
of adding items to the fire tour had been
exercised
many times associated
with the Appendix R review in
progress
since January
1984.
Special efforts were not made to
verify implementation.
Neither the facts nor the reporting history
of this item suggest that the mis-statement
was willfulon the part
of the licensee.
The licensee
plans to issue
an LER revision to
document this error and update the status of corrective
actions'he
failure to conduct fire tours
was not in this case
a violation
of technical specifications.
As the
LER notes,
none of the cable
trays involved Appendix R safe
shutdown capabilities; it is only the
Appendix R tray assemblies
which Technical Specifications
address
and require to be covered by hourly fire tours when fire barriers
are compromised.
The fire tours were in addition to fire detection
and suppression
systems in the cable tray areas.
The,licensee's
quality assurance
organization researched
the
original installation documentation for cable trays,
reviewed these
relative to FSAR referenced Electrical Separation Criteria
(ESC)
implementation,
and concluded that the Bechtel inspection personnel
who performed the final field verifications did not fully understand
the criteria document to which they had been trained
and were
working.
The inspector advised the licensee that perceived
inadequacy of the
ESC document or in training of field inspectors
introduces
questions relative to previously accepted
resolutions of
cable separation
issues,
such
as identified in prior construction
deficiency reports
submitted under
Evaluation of
such matters is an unresolved item.
(85-30-04)
LER-85-030-00
(Closed) - Reactor Protection
System Actuation - This event
involved reduction of reactor water level via inadvertant draining
through residual heat removal system suction lines to the
suppression
pool,
and through the control rod drive scram discharge
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volume to the radwaste
system; this occurred while the plant was
shut down.
NRC xesident inspectors
reviewed the circumstances
of
this event shortly after its occurrence,
as
documented in inspection
'"
report 85-19,
As described in the,LER, procedures
have been
modified and permanent
red caution plates
have been installed at
appropriate valve controls in the control room and at the remote
shutdown panel.
XER-85-031-00
(Closed) - Reactor Protection
System Actuation - This event
involved operations
personnel failure to reset
a half-scram in the
protection system logic, prior to continuing surveillance testing
involving the second half of the scram logic;
The licensee's
corrective. action was to revise procedures
to require that monitors
be placed into bypass
mode prior to movement during surveillance
testing.
The inspector
observed that such procedures
include
step-by-step
signoff by technicians
performing the work.
LER-85-038-00
(Closed) - Missing Valve Actuator Seismic Stiffener Plate -
.
This event involved a finding of plastic cover plates
over access
openings of certain valve actuators.
Each actuator
should have had
a metal .stiffener,'plate
on one side,
and
a transparent platic cover
plate on'he'~revels'e,side.
The inspector verified the corrected
conditio% 'on valve CAC-3A, and observed
acceptable
configurations
for standby
gas treatment
and control room air intake
operators'ER-85-049-00
(Closed)
- Surveillance Testing During Single Loop
Operation -This event involved inability to complete surveillance
',of core pre'ssuxe
drop noise",,as
required.
The inspector
examined the
";terminal and computer input program and interviewed two shift
ejgxneers regarding'echanics'f
setting the computer to accumulate
accessary,
data'.~'Aft'er approval of a'technical, specification
change
- -,whi,ch<,allowed,increas'ed
power Ie'v'els with one recirculation loop,
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"; the', shift'ngineer.'revised
~the data accumulation
pro'gram to obtain
~~time independent
valued of var'ious'lant parameters prior to the power
increaqe.', During'his~proces's
he inadvertantly and unknowingly
"deleted
the. ezi:s6ing accumulation point for core pressure
drop.
- , (The mechanics of program revisions
make this quite possible,
since
,the data po'int, +~'odify
pnd +add'eys
are adjacent to each other on
,the'console,and
"th'e~,computes; display behaves identically for both
,functions).'he
program was",then run to obtain baseline 'data for
'"later-comparison with.,values obtained after
a power increase.
The
omission was discovered
when the later data
was taken within the
required 8-hours after the power increase,
and attempts
made to
compare the values to the baseline
data.
The omission was
due to per'sonal error and,failure to provide
careful checking of the revised
computer program.
This particular
mode of data gathering
appears
to be unique relative to requirements
of the Technical Specifications.
The, licensee
has not, established
procedures
to require documented
checking of this item and considers
that further corrective action is not necessary.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
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9.
Licensee Actions
On Previous
NRC Ins ection Findin s
The inspectors
reviewed records,
interviewed personnel,
and inspected
plant conditions relative to licensee
actions
on previously identified
inspection findings:
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(Closed) Followup Item (83-39-07) - Diesel generator
room doors not
self-closing.
These fixe doors meet the criteria of 10CFR50,
Appendix R, III.N.t. which states
"Fire doors shall be kept closed
and electrically supervised at
a continously manned location" and
therefore
appear to meet
NRC requirements.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Followup Item (83-39-04)-
delineated.
The inspector
reviewed
Protection Program",
and it appears
and responsiblities
are
now clearly
Fire watch authority not
licensee
procedure
1.3.10, "Fire
that the 'Fire Watch authority
specified.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation (84-09-01) - Containment
access
was
made through
an airlock with a broken mechanical interlock.
The licensee
described 'actions in letters to NRC dated July 12,
1984 and August
24,
1984 in'reply to NRC letters
dated
June
13 and July 25.
NRC
inspection reports
84-23 and 84-31 identified the licensee's
resolution of this matter, including
a commitment to clarify the
applicable Technical Specifications.
The Technical Specification
revision has'" been issued by NRC to accept the licensee's
proposed
method of 'airlock entry control.
Plant procedures
incorporate the
approved revision.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation (84-13-"02) -'perations staff changed
the scope
of a'clearance
o'rder,
and performed the change in status of the
equipment, without pri'or xe-review and documented
approval by the
Shi,ft Manager.
The licensee views on this matter were documented in
letters to NRC dated July 26 and November 21,
1984.
Prior NRC
followup of this, matter
was documented in inspection reports
84-19
and 84-31
and in a 1ette'r to WPPSS
dated August 24,
1984.
The
corrective action included xevision of the governing procedure to
require'ha't,
the Shift Hanager
be given the opportunity to review
and document his approval'of clearance
order additions and/or
deletions
made subsequent
to his initial approval of the clearance
order.
This item is closed.
e.
(Open) Followup Item (85-05-07) - Pressurized
gas bottles were being
stored in the reactor building, secured
only by ropes.
This item
was again brought to licensee
management attention during July,
as
documented in NRC inspection report 85-22 (paragraph 4.d).
During
the week of August, 19 the inspector
observed
a pressurized
bottle secured
to a handrail via a single rope at elevation 522 of
the reactor building, in the vicinity of the control rod drive
hydraulic control units.
The item was
removed after the inspector
brought. it to the attention of the Plant Manager
on August 23.
Effective policies
and procedures
to address
this matter have not
yet been demonstrated.
This remains
open.
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10.
Alle ation - Control of Weldin ,Material (RV-85-A-054)
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The inspecto'r r'eceiyed'n
an'onymous
message
on his dictaphone
on August
', 21,'985,, relatingto melding material control.
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'The caller'- st'ate'd that at elevation 548 of the reactor building,
where Bechtel, gas 9orking on the fuel pool cooling system
modification, welding 'ro'd had been left haphazardly overnight.
The
'aller said that he-thought this was
a violation of NRC
requirements.
Im lied Si nificance to Desi n/Construction/0 eration
Welding mater'ials control programs
are required by NRC regulations.
Such programs
assure
that, coated electrodes
are properly protected
from moisture
and that coated
and uncoated
electrodes
are stored in
such manner that material identity is not lost, thereby assisting
welders in avoiding errors in selection
and use of material in
Incorrect material incorporated into a weld could lead to
inadequate
strength
and failure of the weld.
Such failures in the
fuel pool cooling system would not result in loss of fuel pool water
inventory, but could result in loss of cooling system function.
The
water loss would be collected by building drain systems
and detected
by drain monitoring systems;
alternate
temporary pool cooling
provisions would need be implemented.
Poor control of welding
material would not necessarily
lead to welders'se
of unidentified,
incorrect, or unacceptable
material.
Assessment
of Safet
Si nificance
The inspector interviewed
a
WPPSS welding quality control inspector
and reviewed the welding control and inspection program, including
applicable
requirements
of plant procedures
regarding weld material
control.
Procedure
MWP-6 requires that welders return welding rod
to the materials
issuance
center at the end of each workshift.
The
inspector inspected
the work areas
at elevation 548 and elsewhere in
the reactor building at 4:30
pm after the daily workshift had ended.
No discrepancies
in welding material. control were found.
Particularly at the elvation 548 fuel pool modification work area,
it was apparent that the work area
was orderly and generally cleaner
than the inspector
had observed
during previous general plant tours.
Xf a welding material control problem had existed prior to this
time, it was subsequently
corrected.
There
was evidence of limited,
work, by few welders, with little variety of materials, in the area
in question.
There appeared
to be little probability of erroneous
material use,
even if materials
had not been rigorously controlled
in the area.
Conclusion
The allegation
was not substantiated,
although it may possibly have
been factual.
There
was
no evidence that safety related
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construction or operation
was
compromised or that general or
specific
NRC requirements
were violated.
This allegation is closed.
Subsequent
to the inspection,
the inspector advised the
quality assurance
organization of the allegation.
The quality
assurance
manager stated that
WPPSS quality control inspectors
would
be alerted to particularly include end-of-workshift. control of
welding materials in their routine surveillance activities.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
S ecial Ins ection To ic - Plant 0 erations
Committee Activites
The inspector
completed
a special review of Plant Operations
Committee
(POC) activities this period, including attendance
at four meetings,
review of four documents
aproved by the
POC, review of the minutes of
several meetings,
and interview of POC members
and supporting licensee
staff personnel.
Plant procedure
1.5.1 appeared
to implement the
provisions of,Technical Specification 6.5.1,
and the
POC activities
appeared
to be'conducted
in accordance
with these
douments.
The
POC meets
about weekly, in addition to its members attending daily
plan of the day sessions.
The membership
maintains daily cognizance of
plant status
and problems, in addition to various presentations
of
quality and safety m'atters
by, the Nuclear Safety Assurance
Group, site
(}uality Assurance
group,
and the corporate Operational
Assurance
group.
For purposes
of review of ope'rations
to identify potential safety
hazards,
there
appeared
to be
some
room for additional reflective
consideration'f plant/equipment/personnel
performance.
Various
initiatives were, under, consideration to compile trending data for
,equipmen't performance',
and 'other operational
aspects
for review by
management
such
as the
POC.
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POC members in many cases rely upon their staffs to perform reviews of
plant,pr'ocedures.
The thoroughness
of the review appears
to be
a
function of the available time of the reviewer weighed against other work
activities.
Where, the author'as
not resolved all comments,
there is the
opportunity,
and the inspector,observed
cases,
where the procedure is
deferred to
a future meeting.
'The 'inspector
noted that one procedure
(7.4.4.3.2.2)
had been submitted to the
POC for action,
whereas
the
document contained
many errors
and inadequacies.
In another
case
the
inspector noted that one
POC member did not issue
a package of procedures
to his staff for review until the day before the scheduled
POC meeting,
affording little opportunity for review and resolution of comments prior
to the meeting.
The inspector
concluded that in such cases
the
POC did
not assure
thorough staff review of matters
scheduled
to be considered
by
the
POC.
The need for staff attention to detail has been recognized by
the licensee
management
and discussed in various forums onsite.
The
POC meetings
attended
by the inspector
were conducted quite formally,
including presentations
by staff members,
and were subject to rigorous
attention to administrative detail.
The panel appeared inquisitive and
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freely requested
additional',information.
The Chairman routinely
demonstrated
conce'rn for probing of root causes
of problems.
Action
items were assigned,
and periodically scheduled for review of status.
No 'violations or deviations
were identified.
12
Unresolved
Xtem'
An unresolved
item is
'a matter about which additional information is
needed to determine whether 'the matter is
a violation, a,deviation,
or an
acceptable
activity'.
An unresolved item is discussed in paragraph
7 of
.this report.
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13.
Mana ement Meetin
The inspectors
met with the Plant Manager approximately weekly during
this period to discuss
inspection finding status.
On August 30, the
senior resident inspector
met with the Plant Manager
and members of his
staff to discuss
the inspection findings during this period.
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