ML17278A238

Proposed Tech Spec Reflecting Recent Changes in Surveillance Testing Re Use of Fuses as Overcurrent Protection Devices

ML17278A238
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	06/13/1985
From:	WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
Shared Package
ML17278A237	List: ML17278A236 ML17278A238
References
TAC-57993, TAC-63052, NUDOCS 8506260381
Download: ML17278A238 (10)

Text

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITIHG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.2 All primary containment penetration conductor overcurr ent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.4.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices-shown in Table 3.8.4.2-1 inoperable, declare the affected system or component inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION r ~

statement for the affected system and:

1. For 6. 9 kV circuit breakers, de-energize the 6. 9 kV circuit(s) by tripping the associated redundant circuit breaker(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />,gnd verify the redundant circuit breaker to be tripped at leastlgoce per 7 days thereafter.

2. For 480 voTtgcircuit breakers, remove the inoperable circuit breaker(s) from~ service, by removing the fuses within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and verify the~fuses associated with the inoperable breaker(s) to be removed at~+least once per 7 days thereafter.

Otherwise, be in at least>HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within theh following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

kb:~W

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to over-current devices in 6.9 kV circuits which have their redundant circuit breakers tripped or to 480 volt~circuits which have the fuses asso" ciated with the inoperable circuisti breaker removed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 8. 4. 2 Each of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.4.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. By verifying that the medium voltage, 6. 9 kV, circuit br eakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least lOX of the circuit breakers of each voltage level and performing:

a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, and b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and overcurrent control circuits function as designed.

c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10~ of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type -shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of. that type

,have been functionally tested.

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 8"21 8506260381 8506i3 PDR ADOCK 05000397 P PDR

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS Continued

2. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10Ã of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers.

Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300Ã of the pickup of the longtime delay trip element and 150K of the pickup of the short time delay trip element, and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band-width for that current specified by the manufacturer. The instantaneous element shall be tested by injecting a current equal to &OX of the pickup value of the element and verifying that the'circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no inten-tional time delay. Molded case~~cbcuit breaker testing shall also follow this procedure.except that generally no more than two trip elements, time delay>'and instantaneous, will be involved. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each ci,pcugt breaker found inoperable during these functional tests. ~ay additional representative sample of at least 10Ã of all .thegeircuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionilly tested until no more failures are found or all circuit+breakers of that type have been functionally tested>

each type~o fuse on a rotating basis. Each represe sve sam f fuses shall include at least 10~ of all es of that type. The tional test shall consist of on-destructive resistance measur test which de rates that the fuse meets its manufacturer s i eria. Fuses found inoper able during these functi OPERABLE fuses pri ,

t 'hall o resuming oper

' be replaced with For each fuse found inoper during these functional tes an additional repres ive sample of at least 10Ã of all fuses hat type .

be functionally tested until no more failures are

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each .cir cuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 3/4 8-22

~ 1 TABLE 3.8:4.2-1 PRIHARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES EQUI PMENT PRIMARY PROTECTION BACKUP PROTECTION 5900V Circuit Breakers

~ RRC-P-1A E-CB-RRA (Relay) E-CB-S5 (Relay) E-CB-t~2/5 (Relav)

RRC-P-18 E-CB-RRB (Relay) E-CB-S6 (Relav) E-CB-N2/6 (Relay)

b. 480VAC Fused Disconnects i

C-V-72A HC-7C 1.125AF t 258 RC V-728 MiC-8C 1.25AF MC-8C F RCC- 7A MC-7C 1.125AF h'C-7C 25AF CRA-FN- -2 t'iC-88 r&

' 110AF 1C-88 200AF RRC-V-678 hiC-8C 25AF MC- 90AF RRC-V-238 MC-SC 15AF H SC 25AF

. Rb.'CU-V-102 hiC-SC 5AF C-8C 25AF RHCU- V-106 HC-SC 3AF H C-SC 25AF RRC-V-23A C-SC 4,1AF h 1C-8C 25AF RMCU-V>>101 RMCU-V>>100 RCC-V-178 RCC-V-71C RCC-V-718 M

MC-p'c-7C HC-SC MC-8C MC-8C C 43A FA 1."25)F 1.25AF 1.25AF,.

MC-8C t 1C-SC hi C-8C H C-8C MC-8C

~

25AF 25AF 25AF 25AF 25AF CRA-FN-1A-2 HC-78 iOOAF @~i "iC-78 200AF CRA-FN-1A-1 MC- iC;78 200AF CRA-FN-2A-2 P -78 60A MC~78 90AF CRA-FN-2A-1 C-78 150AF MC-78 300AF HC-78 25AF M C-78 50AF CRA-FN-5A'RA-FN-4A HC.-78 15AF -78 50AF CRA-FN-5C HC-78 25AF t lc- 50AF

. CRA-FN-3A HC-78 25AF MC-78 50AF CRA-FN- -2 t"C-88 100AF M C-SB 200AF CRA-F '-18-1 t<C-88 100AF . MC-88 OAF CP, N-1C-1 HC-88 100AF 1C-88 20

".,A-Fil-28-1 HC-SB 15GAF MC-88 F,'00A h>>

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'I HiS-V-16 i".'iCU-V-1 HiC-88-A F~ed ~m

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125AC8 HiC-SB-A t1C-88 125ACB RHR Vc t'.C-88-A m+F'lC-88 I'iC-88 125 ACB RCiC-V-63 tiC-88-A tlC-88 125ACB oCr-1t-40 i4iC-88-A MiC-88 '125ACS

.-",I'.=.-V-:238 t'iC-88-A t~c-88 12= ACB riC .C- ii -/c tlC-88>>A t 1C-88 125ACB r ~

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EQUIPHEN7 PRIMARY. PROTECTION BACVUP PROTECTION CRA- HC-8B 25AF HC- OAF CRA-FN-3C HC-SB 25AF -SB 50AF CRA-FN-4B Yi- F HC-SB 25AF t'.S-V-1 C-SC-B 1AF -SC-B 25AF IRS-'! ac-SC-B 1AF HC F RHR-V-123A Y)C-SB-A ~%AF- HC-8B 125ACB f~ A

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE OEVICES Primary containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance.

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers cad-4usac provide)'ssurance of breaker ai4-A~ reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker. andM~

Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers ~W~

are grouped into repgesentative samples which are thorn tested on a rotating treat each group as a separate~type of breaker ar-~us-for surveillance purposes.

The bypassing of the Pm motor~opgeated valve thermal overload protection continuously or during accident condjtions ensures that the thermal over load protection will not prevent safety-,, elated valves from performing their function. The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the'bypassing of the thermal overload protection continuously and during accident conditions are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves,/~Revision 1, March 1977.

@~5 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 B. 3/4. 8-3

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