ML17277B701
| ML17277B701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1985 |
| From: | Johnson P, Qualls P, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17277B699 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-85-05, 50-397-85-5, IEIN-84-92, NUDOCS 8504100633 | |
| Download: ML17277B701 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1985005
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0%1ISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-397/85-05
Docket No.
50-397
License
No.
Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.
O. Box 968
Richland Washington
99352
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2
(WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site,
Benton County, Washington
Inspection
conducted:
February 4-8,
1985
Inspector:
Approved By:
P.
M. Quails,
Rea
or Inspe
T. Young Jr., Ch',
Eng
er
g Section
Date Signed
z-8-Ps
Date Signed
P.
H. Johnson,
Chz.ef
Reactor Projects
Section
3
Date
igned
Summary:
Ins ection on Februar
4-8
1985
(Re ort No. 50-397/85-05)
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced
inspection by a regional inspector of the
implementation of the
WNP-2 Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection program.
The
inspection involved 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> onsite by one
NRC inspector.
Results:
Of the areas
examined
two violations were identified (See
paragraphs
5 and 6).
6
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
tD
"-A.
K.
J J
B.
"D
""C.
d C
Eggen,
Senior Fire Protection Engineer
Jones,
Senior Fire Protection Engineer
Bleiler, Training Engineer
Bell, Manager of Industrial Safety and Fire Protection
Hahn, Shift Support Superintendent
Feldman,
Plant
Manager'artin,
Plant Manager
Van Hoff, Senior State Liaison
Powers, Assistant Plant Manager
-Indicates
those individuals attending
the exit interview on February 8,
1985.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Findin s
a
~
LER 83-002
(Closed)
The procedural
changes initiated to prevent air
binding and ensuring that FP-P-107 is in the auto
Mode appear
to
have been effective.
No further events
have occurred.
The item is
closed.
b.
LER 83-003
(Closed)
The fire damper replacement
and its acceptance
has
been
documented in SSER-4 paragraph 9.5.1.
This item is closed.
C.
IER 83-004
(Closed)
The power supply to the fire detection
instrumentation
was replaced
and the source of condensation
appears
to have been eliminated.
The item is closed.
d.
e.
LER 83-005
(Closed)
The inspector visually inspected
each of the
seals listed in the
LER to ensure proper installation.
'No
deficiencies
were found.
The item is closed.
i
IER 83-006
(Closed)
The fire d'oor has been replaced.
The item is
closed.
.3
LER 83-007
(Closed)
The fire hydrant has been repaired.
This item
is closed.
g
LER 83-008 (Closed)
The fire damper that was unable to
automatically close
has
been replaced.
This item is closed.
LER 83-009
(Closed) 'he fusible link has
been replaced
and the fire
This item is closed.
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-06)(Closed)
Fire Doors
The letter with
U. L. Approval of the fire doors
appeared
adequate.
This item is
closed.
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-11)(Closed)
PGCC Halon
S stem
The
PGCC
Halon systems
are all installed with testing satisfactorily
completed.
This item is closed.
k"
Ll
l
IJ t
k.
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-13)(Closed)
Fire Extin uisher Pro
ram
The
inspector
observed that the fire extinguishers
were distributed
and
installed in the proper wall mounted brackets.
This item is closed.
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-14)(Closed)
Fire Fi htin
E ui ment
The
inspector
examined the location of the fire brigade
equipment
cabinets in the unit.
They appeared
to be well distributed.
This
item is closed.
m.
n.
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-15)(Closed)
Fire Fi htin
E ui ment
The
hose stations
and hydrant hoses
are
now fully equipped per the
applicable
FSAR section.
This item is closed.
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-16)(Closed)
'Pre-Fire Plans
A copy of the
Pre-Fire Plans is now located in the control room.
This item is
closed.
0 ~
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-18)(Closed)
PGCC Floor
NRR reviewed the
floor material documentation
and accepted
the floor in SSER
4
Section 9.5.1.
This item is closed.
p.
0 en Item (50-397/83-50-01)
(Closed)
Dama
ed Fire Doors
The damaged
fire doors
have been repaired or replaced.
In an extensive
walkdown
of plant vital areas
the inspector
found no damaged fire doors'he
item is closed.
q.
0 en Item (50-397/83-50-03)(Closed)
In lant Hose Stations
The
inspector
observed that both inplant hose stations
have been
installed
and were operable at the time of the inspection.
The item
is closed.
0 en Item (50-397/83-50-06)(Closed)
Communications
The inspector
observed that the licensee
had moved
one of the radio repeaters
from
the communications
room into the control essential
HVAC room, which
is separated
from the communications
room by a three hour fire
barrier.
The item is closed.
s.
0 en Item (50-397/83-39-12)(0
en) Fire
Pum
Startin
Se uence
While
reviewing IER 84-96, the inspector noted that
a diesel fire pump had
burned
up because it started
and had the cooling water supply
isolated.
It appeared
to the inspector that the pump started out of
sequence
again.
The inspector will examine
LER 84-96 in detail and
fire pump starting
sequence
at
a later inspection.
The item is
open.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Procedures
The'nspector
reviewed the fire protection program
and surveillance
procedures
for the unit.
One potential weakness
was discovered.
Plant
procedures
and Technical Specification both say that the functional test
for a fire damper is
a visual inspection of the damper.
NFPA Code
90
recommends
that dampers
be checked annually by removing the link and
~
~
t
0
3;
actually ensuring that the damper will elope against air flow.
The
inspector
has determined that this discrepancy
has
been identified and
resolved at other operating plants.
This discrepancy will be resolved at
a later inspection
(50-397/85-05-01)
(Open).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Follow-u
of Audit Findin s
The licensee
had
an insurance fire protection audit in June
1984.
The
audit findings were apparently not resolved until January
1985 when the
insurance investigator
made another audit.
At the time of the
NRC
inspection,
the findings of
both insurance
audits were being resolved.
The licensee
gA annual audit 84-305 dated
September ll, 1984,
and
follow-up responses
were reviewed by the
NRC inspector.
The inspection
seemed
to have been followed up in a timely manner,
however,
(}FR 84-305,
(}FR 3 of 3, where corrective actions
were signed
as accepted
on
November 9,
1984, identified two problems
one of which appeared
to,be
a
violation (See paragraph
6 of this report).
The conditions reported
still existed at the time of the
NRC inspection.
The licensee
has
recently added another fire protection engineer to the staff to aid in
reviewing audit responses,
the effectiveness
of this additional staffing
will be examined at
a later inspection
(50-397/85-05-02)
(Open).
No violations or deviations
were identified.,
5.
Fire Bri ade Trainin
The inspector
reviewed the fire brigade training records.
The records
appeared
well organized.
It appeared
to the inspector that the system
requiring fire brigade
members
to make-up missed training wasn'
completely effective.
As
a result,
the following violation was
identified (50-397/85-05-03)
(Open):
1.
Licensee Technical Specification 6.8.1 states
in part:
"Written procedures
shall be established,
implemented,
and
maintained
covering the activities referenced
below:
g.
Fire protection program implementation.
Iicensee
procedure
1, Plant Procedures
Manual Chapter 1.3.10, Fire
Protection Program,
Section 1.3.10.6 Fire Bri ade Procedures
Section B.l states in part:
"Drills will be conducted at least four times per year per shift.
Each brigade
member must participate in at least
two of the four
drills each year."
Contrary to the above, at the time of the inspection,
the inspector
found two plant fire brigade
members
who had apparently not attended
the required drills.
I
\\
H
1
6.
Plant Tour
The inspector
conducted
an in-depth tour of the unit with the following
results.
a
~
Control of Transient
Combustibles
The inspector noted
an apparent
house
keeping violation concerning
control of combustibles
as specified below (50-397/85-05-04)
(Open):
Licensee Technical Specification 6.8.1 states in part:
"Written procedures
shall be established,
implemented,
and
maintained covering the activities referenced
below:
g.
Fire Protection Program'mplementation
Licensee procedure,
Plant Procedures
Manual
(PPM) Chapter (1.3.10,
Section 1.3.10.7,
Stora
e and Use of
Flammable or Combustible Material
rocedure,
states
in part:
"A.
Flammable or combustible materials,
combustible
and flammable
gases
and liquids, high efficiency particulate air and charcoal
filters, dry ion exchange resins,
or other combustible supplies
(in the main plant structures)
shall not be stored'in critical
plant areas
(see Attachment III)
B.
Storage of combustible materials shall be allowed only within
the marked boundaries
of designated
storage
areas
(see
Attachment IV).
D.
All waste,
debris,
scrap, oil spills, or other combustibles
resulting from the work activity,shall be removed
from the area
immediately following completion of the activity or at the end
of each work shift, whichever
comes first."
I
Attachment III to PPM 'Chapter 1.3.10 states
in part:
"Critical Plant Areas;
H
I.
Reactor Building in its Entirety.
II.
Diesel Generator Building in its Entirety."
J
Attachment IV to PPM 1,3.10 lists the following storage
areas;
"Storage Areas;
I.
General Services Building.
a)
b)
c)
d)
Machine shop
Machine shop basement
Electric shop
Instrument
shop
I
~
~
[t
ll
tj
0
II.
Radwaste
and Control Building
a
~
b.
c
~
437'or staging of material in and out of the
building
467'prinkling area
507'orth
end of filter demineralizer
removal area
III. Turbine Generator Building
a.
441'orth of condensers
b.
501'nly during major maintenance
periods
when
the reactor is in Mode 4 or 5
IV.
Circulating Mater Pump House
V.
TMU Pumphouse
VI.
Reactor Building
Decontamination
area 501'nd 606'efuel floor only
during major maintenance
periods
when the reactor is in
Mode 4 or 5.
Contrary to the above, at the time of the inspection,
the inspector
found:
1)
In the Diesel Generator Building, Room D113, under
some
Division B Diesel Generator
cables,
about
6000 lbs of Class
A
combustibles
including 40 cardboard
boxes with a large roll of
plastic inside,
a wood pallet of cardboard
boxes containing
masking tape,
rubber gloves
and aerosol
cans.
2)
In the Reactor Building on each level there were four large
open cabinets
each filled with Class
A combustibles,
consisting
of anti-contamination clothing, rubber boots,
gloves,
tape
and
plastic each having taped to the cabinet
a large sheet of
"Flame-Retardant Plastic which in some
cases
was not covering
the front of the cabinet,
but was thrown over the top.
3)
An apparently untreated
wood bench
was being used
on the
501'evel
of the Reactor Building.
4)
On the 47'evel of the Reactor Building was
a roll of plastic
still in its brown paper wrapping and
a plywood box of
untreated
wood with respirators in it.
5)
Several plastic bags of unattended
trash were observed
on the
422'levation of the Reactor Building.
In addition, the inspector
was also concerned with the following
housekeeping
items:
1.)
In the diesel generator
rooms
and under the diesel generators,
the licensee
uses white oil absorbant
pads to soak
up lube oil
I
- f
2.)
leaks.
The licensee
personnel
stated that" these
pads
are flame
resistent.
It is unclear to the inspector that is still true
when the pad is soaked with lube oil.
The oil retained in the
pad may still burn and as the pads
are spread in a carpet-like
manner under the diesel engines
a postulated fire could spread
throughout the room.
Other Region V facilities do not use
similar pads but instead
clean
up leakage
and keep the systems
as leak-free
as possible.
This item will be examined at
a
later inspection
(50-397/85-05-05)
(Open).
W
Aerosol cans containing non-combustible
cleaning solvents
were
in all areas of the plant unattended.
Aerosol cans, in the
event of a fire, explode.
The resultant
exposions
can injure
fire fighting personnel,
damage
equipment
and spread
the fire.
The usual
means of controlling this is to procedurally require
that when not in use that the cans
be stored in metal gang
boxes.
This item will be examined at
a later inspection
(50-397/85-05-06)
(Open).
3 '
At several locations inside of the reactor building, the
inspector
observed pressurized
nitrogen gas bottles tied, with
rope, to handrails.
These were not the permanently installed
bottles required for the hydraulic control units.
The licensee
fire hazards
analysis,
which is part of their FSAR, specifies
the proper storage
area for these bottles,
since, if the
bottles get ruptured in a fire, they can cause very severe
damage.
The licensee identified these bottles in a monthly
inspection
on January
19,
1985.
The follow-up actions to
prevent improper storage will be examined in a later inspection
(50-397/85-05-07)
(Open).
The problems mentioned in this paragraph
did not appear to the
inspector to be
a cleanliness
problem.
In general,
the plant was
very clean,
the problems
appeared
rather to result from a lack of
awareness
by plant personnel
concerning the possible effects of a
fire in a plant vital area
combined with storage of unauthorized
materials.
As
a result, plant workers
who may have been
unaware of
PPM 1.3.10 requirements
brought the combustible materials into the
vital areas
and left them there for convience to aid in
accomplishing their work in a timely manner.
b.
Fire Fi htin
E ui ment
The fire fighting equipment
and fire suppression
systems
appeared
to
be in good condition, well maintained
and in adequate
supply.
However, the marking of fire equipment storage
lockers could be
improved.
On level 487'f the radwaste building outside of the
chemistry laboratory,
the locker marked Fire Brigade equipment
was
empty.
Two lockers beside it, which were lock wired, and was
supposed
to contain the equipment,
were unmarked.
Emergency fire
fighting equipment,
especially if stored in lockers should be
clearly marked (50-397/85-05-08)
(Open).
1
1
I(
0
c.
Fire Doors
The Technical Specification fire doors separating
the redundant
safe
shutdown systems
appeared
to be operable
and well maintained.
d.
Seals
The inspector
examined
a large
number of fire barrier penetration
seals
and found no discrepancies.
7.
Ins ection of Fire
Pum
The inspector
observed
the inspection by the licensee of a fire pump as
requested in Information Notice 84-92.
The inspectors
and licensee
appeared
to have
done
an excellent job.
Possible indications of a crack
were observed
because
the inspectors
performed
an additional inspection
after the initial dye penetrant test specified in the Information Notice
was negative.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
Exit Interview
An exit meeting
was held with members of the plant staff on February 8,
1985.
The items listed in this report were discussed
at that time.
J
~1