ML17277B480
| ML17277B480 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1984 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17277B479 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8408270506 | |
| Download: ML17277B480 (8) | |
Text
SAFETY EVALUATION NIINII~N.
N
-22 liPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT N0.2 D
CK N
5 -397 Introduction By letters dated January 20, February 8 and Hay 4, 1984, the licensee requested the following changes to the HNP-2 Technical Specifications.
(1)
Technical Specification Table 4.3.7.12-1:
Note 1 lists alarm functions for the intermediate noble gas activity monitor not applicable in the WNP-2 design.
Add note 7 to state that "for the Channel FUnctional Test on intermediate range noble gas activity monitors, demonstrate that
~ circuit failures or instrument controls when set in the OFF position produce control room alarm annunciation."
(2)
Technical. Specification Table 3.6.3-1, Primary Containment Isolation Valves:
Revise the closure times from 5 seconds to 15 seconds for 8 Reactor Recirculation Hydraulic Valves and Reactor Recirculation (Seal Injection) Valves RR-V-16 A, B.
The'increase of v'alve closure times to 15 seconds resul'ts in changes which are within the acceptable design criteria with respect to the system.
(3)
Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, A.
C. SourCes:
In the note.referred to in paragraph 4.8. 1.1.2.a, Items 4 and 5, change the word "only" to "at least" to allow the flexibilityto perform more than one cold start test of the diesel generator per 184 days as currently required.
(4)
Technical Specification 3/4.8.3, Onsite Power Distribution System:
Paragraph 3.8.3.2 b is modified to clarify that distribution panel DP-Sl-1F is the Division 1
125-VDC critical switch gear distribution panel and DP-S1-1D is the Division 1 remote shutdown distribution panel.
(5)
Technical Specification 3/4.9.2, Instrumentation:
In item b, change the words "audible indication" to "alarm."
(6)
Technical Specification 6.2.3, Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG):
tIodify paragraph 6.2.3.2 to include qualification of NSAG consistent with FSAR 5 SER.
In line 3 after the word "science" add the following:
or qualifications meeting ANS 3.1 Draft Revision, dated March 13,
- 1981, Section 4.2 or 4.4 or equivalent, as described in Section 4.1 Evaluation The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel alarm setpoints are set to ensure that specified release limits (established in accordance with the'ffsite dose calculation manual, ODCM) are not exceeded.
Table 4.3,7.12-1 (Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Honitoring'nstrumentation Surveillance Requirements) specifies that a quarterly channel functional test be performed for both the low range and the intermediate range noble gas activity monitors in the main plant (reactor building) release
- path, the turbine building ventilation exhaust, and th6 radwaste building ventilation 8408270506 840814 I7 PDR ADOCK 05000397 l
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exhaust.
One low range and one intermediate range monitor is provided for each of these gaseous effluent release paths.
Each of the monitors provides an input to an indicator located in the control room.
The normal measured activity level is near the low end of the low range indicator.
The intermediate range indicator should read downscale.
The operators rely on the high level alarm associated with the low range monitors to alert them of high activity levels in the gaseous effluent exhaust.
Following receipt of an alarm, the operator will take action, if appropriate, to ensure that the ODCt< release limits are not exceeded.
The licensee considers the high activity alarm associated with the intermediate range monitor to be a nuisance alram (i.e., it requires acknowledgement by the operators, but does not provide the operators with any new information since they are already aware of high gaseous effluent activity levels via the low range monitor alarm).
There are no isolation or actuation functions performed by the intermediate range monitors.
If the alarm associated with the low range monitor should fail, the licensee can detect a high activity level from the control room indicators., The -licensee is required by the Technical Specifications to perform a channel check of these indicators daily.
An abnormally high gaseous effluent activity level, as well as a
failed indicator, should be detected by the channel check.
A quarterly channel functional test, excluding verification of control room annunciati'on on indicated high activity levels, will still be required for the'intermediate range monitors.
The channel functional test will confirm that control room annunciation is received upon circuit failure and when the instrument contols are set in the "OFF" position.
quarterly channel functional tests, including verification that control room annunciation occurs on high activity levels, are required for the low range monitors.
If the noble gas activity monitor becomes inoperable, the Technical Specifications still permit effluent releases via the associated pathway for up to 30 days provided that grab samples are taken at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and analyzed for noble gas gamma emitters within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
These changes revise the containment isolation closure items, Table 3.6.3-1 of the Technical Specification, from 5 seconds to 15 seconds for 8 Reactor
.Recirculation Hydraulic Valves and Reactor Recirculation (Seal Injection) valves.
The licensee stated that the proposed changes will still provide adequate time for valve closure to limit the release of radioactivity from the containment.
According to the licensee, release of contaminants from failed fuel post-LOCA does not occur mechanistically until sometime on the order of a minute.
For a design basis accident, the FSAR analyses indicated that fuel uncovery does not occur for approximately 30 seconds and peak clad temperatures do not occur for approximately 120 seconds.
Therefore, the licensee concluded that the proposed maximum closure time of 15 seconds, for the valves identified earlier, will not result in an increase in the probability of releases from failed fuel.
The staff agrees with the licensee's analysis and concludes that since it is very unlikely to have fuel failure
, within the first 30 seconds following the onset of a LOCA, valve closure time of 15 seconds will assume no release of radioactivity from the containment.
I t'
1 The note referred to in paragraphs 4.8.1.1.2.a, 4 and,5 requires performance of a prelube function prior to DG testing.
This requirement may compromise plant safety if surveillance testing is required on a diesel generator due to another diesel generator. being inoperative.
Conduct of the prelube function would then increase the number of power supplies in an inoperable condition.
The licensee proposed to change the word "only" to "at least" to allow the flexibilityto perform more than one cold start test of the diesel generator per 184 days as currently required.
The proposed change has been reviewed and is acceptable.
In addition, the staff will also include this change in the BWR Standard Technical Specifications.
The proposed changes in Section 3.8.3.2.b.
1 provide clarification that distribution panel DP-Sl-1F is the Division 1
125-VDC critical switch gear distribution panel and DP-Sl-1D is the Division 1 remote shutdown distribution panel.
The proposed clarification is acceptable to the staff.
In Section 3.9.2.b.,
the words "audible indication" are changed to "alarm" for clarification purpose.
This change is acceptable to the staff.
The licensee has requested changes to the composition of the Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG), Section 6.2.3 of the WNP-2 Technical Specifications.
Section 6.2.3.2 states that each member of the NSAG shall have a bachelor'"
degree in engineering or related science and at least two years professional level experience in his field.
The licensee proposes to provide for alternate qualifications.
The alternate requirements are those meeting ANS
- 3. 1 Draft Revision, dated Narch 13, 1981, Section 4.2 or 4.4, or equivalent, as described in Section 4. 1.
The staff-has reviewed this proposed change and concludes that it meets the requirements for members of an independent engineering
- group, such as the NSAG, described in Section 13.4 of the Standard Review. Plan, NUREG-0800, and is, therefore, acceptable.
'nvironmental Consideration This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) this amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, creation of a new or
~ '
t
different accident from any previously evaluated, or a significant reduction in a safety margin and, therefore, does not involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public wil1 not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and-(3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
August 14, 1984
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