ML17263A904
| ML17263A904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1995 |
| From: | Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17263A902 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-94-27, NUDOCS 9501180184 | |
| Download: ML17263A904 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1994027
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONISSION
REGION I
Inspection Report 50-244/94-27
License:
Facility:
Inspection:
Inspectors:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear
Power Plant
Rochester
Gas
and Electric Corporation
(RGSE)
November
22 through
December
31,
1994
T. A. Noslak, Senior Resident
Inspector,
Ginna
E. C.,Knutson,
Resident
Inspector,
Ginna
Approved by:
W.
.
L
rus
Ch f
Rea
or Projec
ection
3B
INSPECTION SCOPE
r i~
Date
Plant operations,
maintenance,
engineering,
plant support,
and safety
assessment/quality
verification.
950ii80i84 950ii0
ADOCK 05000244
8
Operations
INSPECTION EXECUTIVE SUNNARY
The plant operated
at full power (approximately
98 percent)
throughout this
period.
Naintenance
The inspector
assessed
licensee
procedures
-and practices
regarding the removal
of safety-related
equipment
from service for on-line scheduled
maintenance
to
be effective.
The practice of limiting such maintenance
to a single component
at
a time is conservative
and reduces
the possibility of conflict with other
maintenance activities;
degraded
equipment,
or plant operations.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
program to protect safety-related
systems
against the effects of extreme cold weather
and concluded that the
program is satisfactorily implemented,
well documented,
and conscientiously
monitored by knowledgeable
personnel.
Corrective maintenance
has
been
appropriately prioritized and has
been timely for identified deficiencies.
Engineering
Following a recent service water system modification to upgrade the C-service
water
pump discharge
an expansion joint between the
pump and the
check valve was stretched
beyond the manufacturer-specified
maximum allowable
length during reinstallation.
This condition led to partial material failure
that compromised the maximum pressure
retaining capability of the joint.
'lthough
the degraded
condition of the expansion joint was appropriately
evaluated
by the licensee,
the inspector
determined that the governing
procedure for installation of'he expansion joint lacked appropriate
acceptance
criteria to assure
proper installation.
This was
an apparent
violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions,
Procedures,
and Drawings."
Plant Support
Routine observations
in the areas of radiological controls, security,
and fire
protection indicated that these
programs
were effectively implemented.
Safety Assessment/guality
Verification
The Nuclear Safety
and Audit Review Board
(NSARB) was highly effective in
pursuing evaluation
and corrective action for recent
problems with pumps
and
pump motors in the safety injection, auxiliary feedwater,
and service water
systems
TABLE OF CONTENTS
.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0
OPERATIONS (71707)
1. 1
Operational
Experiences
.
.
1.2
Control of Operations
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.'.0
NAINTENANCE (62703,
61726)
2. 1
Preventive Naintenance
2. 1. 1 Routine Observations
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
2.2
2.3
2.4
Surveillance
Observations
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2.2. 1 Routine Observations
Evaluation of On-Line Naintenance
Cold Weather Preparations
(71714)
.
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
3.0
ENGINEERING (71707,
37551)
3. 1
C-Service Mater
Pump Expansion Joint
~
~
~
~
4.0
PLANT SUPPORT
(71750)
4. 1
Emergency
Preparedness
- Licensee Action On Previous
Inspection Findings
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4. 1. 1 (Closed) Violation (50-244/94-21-01)
Failure to
Perform quarterly Siren Growl Tests
.
.
.
.
.
.
4. 1.2 (Closed) Violation (50-244/94-21-02)
Failure to
NERP Changes to the
USNRC Region I Office
.
4.2
Radiological Controls
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4.2. 1 Routine Observations
4.3
Security
\\
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
4.3. 1 Routine Observations
4.4
Fire Protection
.
4.4. 1 Routine Observations
~
~
Submit
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
5.0
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/OUALITY VERIFICATION (71707)
5.1
Review of Cor recti ve Action For Recent
Pump
5.2
gA/gC Subcommittee
Neeting
5.3
Periodic Reports
6. 0
ADMINISTRATIVE
6. 1
Senior
NRC management
Site Visits
.
.
.
6.2
Enforcement
Conference
6.3
Backshift and Deep Backshift Inspection
6.4
Exit Neetings
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
~
~
~
~
~
Failures
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
1. 0
OPERATIONS (71707)
1.1
Operational
Experiences
DETAILS
The plant operated
at full power (approximately
98 percent)
throughout the
inspection period.
There were no significant operational
events
or challenges
during the inspection period.
1.2
Control of Operations
Control
room staffing was
as required.
Operators
exercised
control over
access
to the control
room.
Shift supervisors
maintained authority over
activities
and provided detailed turnover briefings to relief crews.
Operators
adhered to approved
procedures
and were knowledgeable of off-normal
plant conditions.
The inspectors
reviewed control
room log books for
activities
and trends,
observed
recorder traces for abnormalities,
assessed
compliance with technical specifications,
and verified equipment availability
was consistent with the requirements
for existing plant conditions.
During
normal work hours
and on backshifts,
accessible
areas of the plant were
toured.
No operational
inadequacies
or concerns
were identified.
2. 0
NAINTENANCE (62703,
61726)
2. 1
Preventive Naintenance
2.1.1 Routine Observations
The inspector
observed
portions of maintenance activities to verify that
correct parts
and tools were utilized, applicable industry code
and technical
specification requirements
were satisfied,
adequate
measures
were in place to
ensure
personnel
safety
and prevent
damage to plant structures,
systems,
and
components,
and to ensure that equipment operability was verified upon
completion.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
~
"Service Mater
Pump "B" - Najor Pump Overhaul,"
performed in accordance
with Naintenance
Procedure
N-11.,10,
"Najor
Inspection of Service Mater Pump," revision 25, dated October
14,
1994.
The inspector
observed
the
pump removal
and noted
no obvious
material deficiencies.
The
pump was replaced with a rebuilt
spare;
the removed
pump will be rebuilt under
a separate
work
order
and maintained
as
a spare.
2.2
Surveillance Observations
2.2. 1 Routine Observations
Inspectors
observed
portions of surveillances
to verify proper calibration of
test instrumentation,
use of approved
procedures,
performance of work by
qualified personnel,
conformance to limiting conditions for operation
(LCOs),
and correct system restoration following testing.
The following surveillances
were observed:
Periodic Test (PT)-3g,
Pump quarterly Test," revision
17, effective date
December
15,
1994,
observed
December
19,
1994
PT-12. 1,
"Emergency Diesel
Generator A," revision 75, effective date
December
8,
1994, observed
December
20,
1994
PT-16M-T, "Auxiliary Feedwater
Turbine
Pump - Monthly," revision 8,
effective date
May 26,
1994,
observed
December
20,
1994
PT-12.2,
"Emergency Diesel
Generator 8," revision 80, effective date
December
8,
1994,
observed
December
21,
1994
The inspector
determined
through observing this testing that operations
and
test personnel
adhered to procedures,
corrective action was promptly initiated
if test results
and equipment operating
parameters
did not meet acceptance
criteria,
and redundant
equipment
was available for emergency operation.
2.3
Evaluation of On-Line Maintenance
The inspector
conducted
a review of licensee
procedures
and practices
regarding the removal of equipment
from service for on-line scheduled
maintenance.
The purpose of this inspection
was to determine the extent to
which the cumulative impact of maintenance activities
on overall plant safety
is considered
=in the planning
and performance of preventive maintenance.
In January
1994,
RGSE initiated the practice of voluntary removal of safety-
related
equipment
from service for conducting preventive maintenance
during
power operations; this initial effort was discussed
in inspection report 50-
244/94-01.
To examine the effect that such maintenance
would have
on overall
plant operating safety, the licensee
had first conducted
an evaluation of
probabilistic risk analysis
(PRA) data for candidate
equipment.
In overview,
the evaluation consisted of a comparison of the effects that on-line
maintenance
would have
on the individual probabilities that relate to
equipment reliability (that is, the overall probability that the specific
equipment would perform its design function during an accident).
The two
reliability factors that were examined
were equipment unavailability and
equipment failure.
On-line maintenance
would increase
equipment
unavailability.
The change in this probability was estimated
by adding the
allowed outage time (AOT) to the amount of time that the specific equipment is
expected to be out of service during the operating cycle (for example,
due,to
corrective maintenance
or testing),
based
on the plant's operating history.
No attempt
was
made to quantify the change that on-line maintenance
would
produce in the equipment failure probability, since the magnitude of this
effect will only become evident from future trends.
However, it was
reasonably
assumed that increased
maintenance availability would decrease
the
equipment failure probability.
Furthermore,
comparison of these
two factors
revealed that the equipment failure probability was significantly greater than
(on the order of a factor of 10 times) the equipment unavailability
probability.
Therefore,
even
a small
decrease
in the equipment failure
probability would outweigh the projected
increase
in the equipment
unavailability probability.
From this, it was considered that on-line
maintenance
could reasonably
be expected to improve equipment reliability.
3
Beyond this initial PRA sensitivity analysis,
the licensee
has evaluated
some
specific equipment
as being unsuitable for on-line maintenance,
due to
significant risk contribution.
These
equipment include the emergency diesel
generators,
the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
pump,
and
some valves in
the safety injection and residual
heat removal
systems.
Additionally, the
licensee is in the process of performing an in-depth
PRA-based analysis of on-
line maintenance.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee
process
and procedures for scheduling
on-
line maintenance.
The process for entering into a limiting condition for
operation
(LCO) for the purpose of performing maintenance
on safety-related
equipment is described
in administrative procedures
A-52.4, "Control of
Limiting Conditions for Operating Equipment,"
and A-1603.0,
"Overview of the
Ginna Station
Work Control System."
Requirements
for such maintenance
include:
~
The maintenance
is planned,
scheduled,
and coordinated to insure system
outage time is minimized;
~
Concurrent activities
do not increase
the likelihood of a plant
The scope of work should not result in an outage time that exceeds
50
percent of the AOT; and
~
Components that provide redundant,
compensating,
or equivalent safety
functions must
be operable.
On-line maintenance
scheduling originates in a comparison of equipment
maintenance
requirements
to the projected schedule for routine performance
testing.
Equipment maintenance
is scheduled
to coincide with performance
testing,
which then serves
as acceptance
testing for the completed
maintenance.
Only one safety-related
component is scheduled for maintenance
at any given time.
Preparations
are progressed
through daily shop foreman
meetings to ensure that all requirements
have
been satisfied prior to
commencing the maintenance,
as well as to avoid conflicts that could arise
due
to concurrent or emergent
maintenance.
When the scheduler is satisfied that
all preparations
have
been completed,
and that the maintenance will not
conflict with the existing plant equipment configuration
and operating
conditions,
the work order is released.
The shift supervisor
has the final
responsibility for verifying that plant conditions will support the equipment
outage, prior to declaring the equipment inoperable
and authorizing work to
commence.
The inspector
examined the processes
that were in place to integrate
scheduled
maintenance activities with existing degraded/inoperable
equipment.
Along
with the processes
.discussed
above,
the licensee lists upcoming scheduled
maintenance
on safety-related
equipment
on the status
sheet
used at the daily
Morning Priorities Action Required
(NOPAR) meeting.
Discussions
at
NOPAR
meetings
have led to recognition of incompatibility between
scheduled
maintenance
and emergent
degraded
equipment.
The inspector
noted that review by the Plant Operations
Review Committee
(PORC)
was not required prior to safety-related
equipment being placed out of
service for planned maintenance.
Technical specification (TS) 6.5. 1.6.f
states that one of the responsibilities of the
PORC is to review facility
operations
to detect potential safety hazards.
With respect to inoperable
safety-related
equipment, this requirement is satisfied
by review of
documentation
prepared in accordance
with A-52.4, Attachment I; however, this
review does not occur until after the equipment
has
been returned to service.
While review of completed on-line maintenance
appears
to be in compliance with
TS,
PORC review prior to performing such maintenance
would provide additional
assurance
that proposed
maintenance
would not conflict with emergent plant
equipment conditions or plant operations.
The inspector
noted that
PORC has
historically been consulted prior to the conduct of significant on-line
maintenance.
In summary,.-the
inspector
assessed
licensee
procedures
and practices
regarding
the removal of safety-related
equipment
from service for on-line scheduled
maintenance
to be effective.
The practice of limiting such maintenance
to a
single component at
a time is conservative
and reduces
the possibility of
conflict with other maintenance activities,
degraded
equipment,
or plant
operations.
2.4
Cold Weather Preparations
(71714)
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
program to protect safety-related
systems
against the effects of extreme cold weather.
In preparation for the onset of freezing conditions, the licensee
completed
Naintenance
(N) procedure
N-1306. 1, "Ginna Station,
Naintenance
Oepartment,
Winterizing Inspection
Program," dated October 27,
1994.
Procedural
requirements
included:
~
Inspection of heat trace circuits and piping insulation in identified
plant areas
susceptible
to freezing;
~
Verification of anti-freeze protection for the Technical
Support Center
diesel,
the security diesel,
and the diesel fire pump;
and
~
Inspection of windows, ventilation supply/exhaust
vents,
and unit fan
heaters
in various plant and outbuilding areas.
In carrying out this procedure,
Preventive
Maintenance .(PN) Analysts
coordinated
the inspections,
documented
completion of the maintenance
work
orders resulting from the inspections,
and informed operations
supervision of
the findings and status of any outstanding
maintenance
items.
Fifteen work
orders
were generated,
prioritized,
and assigned to the appropriate
maintenance
shops for action.
Through in-plant tours, the inspector
concluded
that the outstanding
maintenance
items identified in H-1306. 1 are being
appropriately addressed.
In accordance
with administrative
(A) procedure A-54.4. 1, "Cold Weather
Walkdown Procedure,"
an inspection is routinely performed weekly by an
Auxiliary Operator
from November
1 through April 1.
This frequency
may be
increased
at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor
depending
on weather
conditions.
A-54.4. 1 identifies the plant areas
and specific equipment that
the operator verifies operable
(by step sign-off) to assure that area
temperatures
remain greater than 45 degrees
F.
In addition to performing
weekly dedicated
cold weather walkdowns, the operator records
temperatures
of
designated
thermometers
in potential cold areas
during routine tours once
each
shift.
Should temperatures fall below 45 degrees
F in these
areas,
the
operator is directed to notify plant management
for initiating corrective
action.
The inspector
independently
determined that the attributes of A-54.4. 1 were
satisfactorily addressed
and identified deficiencies,
such
as
an inoperable
space heater,
were appropriately reported to the Maintenance
Department for
action.
Cold weather
preparations
observed to be in place
by the inspector
included installation of temporary. plywood closures
over intermediate building
vent louvers located
on the east wall of the building, securing various
exhaust
fans with louvers closed,
and staging portable heaters
for expeditious
use.
Based
on this review, the inspector
concluded that the freeze protection
program is satisfactorily implemented,
well documented,
and conscientiously
monitored by knowledgeable
personnel.
Corrective maintenance
has
been
appropriately prioritized and has
been timely for identified deficiencies.
3.0
ENGINEERING (71707,
37551)
3. 1
C-Service Mater
Pump Expansion Joint
On September
20,
1994, the C-service water
(SW)
pump was declared
due to excessive
noise
and vibration.
Investigation revealed that the
pump
had undergone
a major mechanical failure.
Root cause evaluation
determined
that reverse rotation of the idle pump had contributed to the failure,
and
that the probable
cause of the reverse rotation was intermittent failure of
the discharge
check valve (4603) to fully close.
As a result, valve 4603 was
replaced with a new style check valve.
The
C-SW pump was returned to service
on October ll, 1994; further details are presented
in inspection reports
50-
244/94-22
and -25.
An elastomeric
expansion joint is installed in the 14-inch discharge line
between
each service water
pump and its associated
discharge
After completion of the
C-SW pump discharge
check valve replacement,
the
licensee
had noted that the expansion joint had developed external radial
splits in several
locations.
This condition was subs'equently
evaluated
by the
vendor (Garlock),
who determined
1) that the splits had tom through
some of
the fabric bias plies,
and therefore
compromised the maximum pressure
retaining capability of the expansion joint, and 2) that,
as installed,
the
expansion joint was stretched to twice its maximum allowable elongation.
In
an October 26,
1994 correspondence
to the licensee,
the vendor noted that
immediate failure did not appear to be a factor unless the expansion joint was
subject to excess
movement,
and recommended that the expansion joint be
inspected periodically and replaced
during the next scheduled
outage.
The
licensee
generated
a nonconformance
report
(NCR 94-128) to document the
deficiency and performed
a safety evaluation of the condition pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
From this evaluation,
the licensee
concluded that, subject to
frequent inspection
by auxiliary operators
and security force personnel,
the
C-SW pump expansion joint was acceptable for interim use until the
1995
refueling outage.
During a routine in-plant inspection
on December
13,
1994, the inspector first
became
aware of the degraded
condition of the
C-SM pump expansion joint.
The
inspector
was concerned that the adjustment of the four control units (metal
rods that connect the=flanged
ends of the expansion joint and serve to limit
its maximum elongation) might not be appropriate.
Specifically, following
installation of. the
new style discharge
on the A- and
B-SW pumps
during the
1994 refueling outage,
the associated
expansion joints were found
to be at their maximum elongation;
per the vendor's
recommendation,
the
lengths of the control units
had
been adjusted
(shortened to where the
retaining nuts were tight against the flanged ends) to prevent
any additional
elongation.
Following completion of the
same modification for the
C-SM pump,
however, the lengths of the control units were apparently set per the vendor's
standard
procedure;
that is, their lengths
were set to be slightly longer than
the expansion joint, such that they would allow the joint to stretch to its
designed
maximum length before the retaining nuts would be tight against the
When questioned
by the inspector regarding this inconsistency,
the
licensee
responded
that the vendor
had not included adjusting the
C-SM pump
expansion joint control units in their recommendations
for interim use.
When
subsequently
contacted
by the licensee
regarding this issue,
the vendor
recommended that the control units
be adjusted to prevent additional
elongation.
In reviewing
NCR 94-128, the inspector
became
aware of the overextended
condition of the
C-SW pump expansion joint.
The inspector
was concerned that
the pressure
retaining capability of the expansion joint was degraded,
in that
service water is a safety-related
system.
The inspector
reviewed the
licensee
s interim use justification and
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.
The
inspector noted that, although the
SW system is a seismic category
1 system,
the effect of the degraded
expansion joint on the existing structural
analysis
had not been considered
in the safety evaluation.
The licensee
subsequently
reviewed the seismic'analysis
of the affected portion of the service water
system
and verified that the pipe stresses
would remain acceptable
with the
control units adjusted to prevent further elongation of the joint.
Additionally, the vendor stated that movement of the expansion joint with the
control units
as originally adjusted
would not be anticipated to result in
immediate catastrophic failure.
Given this additional information, the
inspector considered
the licensee's
interim use justification to have
been
adequate.
The inspector
reviewed station modification procedure
SN-5284B.2,
"C-Service
Water
Pump Check Valve 4603 Nodification."
The inspectot
noted that this
procedure
contained
no requirement to measure
distance
between flange faces
on
the
SM pump discharge
and the check valve prior to installation of the
expansion joint.
Expansion joint installation was directed to be accomplished
per maintenance
procedure
N-37. 130,
"Disassembly
and Reassembly of Pipe Flange
Connections,"
which does not address limits on elongation.
Failure to address
requirements
for acceptable
installation of the expansion joint is an apparent
violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions,
Procedures,
and Drawings," which states,
in part:
"Instructions,
procedures,
or drawings
shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for
determining that important activities have
been satisfactorily accomplished."
(50-244/94-27-01)
On December
28,
1994,
a new, correctly sized expansion joint was installed in
the
C-SM pump discharge
piping.
As a result of issues identified during
review of the degraded
condition of the
C-SW pump discharge
expansion joint,
the licensee
commenced
a review of the existing application of the remaining
three
SM pump discharge
expansion joints. 'his investigation
was in progress
at the close of the inspection period.
4.0
PUST
SUPPORT (71750)
4. 1
Emergency
Preparedness
Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings
4. 1. 1 (Closed) Violation (50-244/94-21-01)
Failure to Perform quarterly Siren
Growl Tests
The inspector
reviewed the adequacy of the licensee's
response
following
identification that siren growl tests
were not performed during the period
Narch 2,
1994 through-October
5,
1994
as required
by the Nuclear
Emergency
Response
Plan
(NERP).
The subject tests
were successfully
performed
on all
96
on October 7,
1994.
To better establish clear accountability to verify
that time-related
program requirements
are being met, the licensee
designated
the Corporate
Nuclear Emergency Planner to schedule
and verify completion of
all required tests
and inspections.
In carrying out this responsibility, the
Planner will submit
an emergency
preparedness
planning schedule
and tracking
list to the corporate
"Emergency Planning Milestone Committee" monthly,
verifying that all key scheduled tests
and inspections
have
been completed
as
required.
Through this review, the inspector
concluded that the licensee's
actions
were comprehensive
to adequately
address this finding.
This item is
closed.
4.1.2 (Closed) Violation (50-244/94-21-02)
Failure to Submit NERP Changes to
the
USNRC Region I Office
The inspector
reviewed licensee
actions regarding
a failure to submit
NERP
changes to NRC Region I office as required.
Copies of the current revision
(Revision
14) were submitted to regional office on October 6,
1994.
RGSE
placed the
NERP on
a controlled user distribution and the
RGSE Document
Control Department
has assigned
user
numbers to the Region I Office to assure
that future revisions
are properly distributed to all concerned
organizations.
Through this review, the inspector
concluded that the licensee's
actions
were
prompt and adequate
in addressing this matter.
This item is closed.
4.2
Radiological Controls
4.2.1 Routine Observations
The inspectors periodically confirmed that radiation work permits were
effectively implemented,
dosimetry was correctly., worn in controlled areas
and
dosimeter
readings
were accurately recorded,
access
was adequately controlled,
survey information was kept current,
and postings
and labeling were in compliance with regulatory requirements.
Through
observations
of ongoing activities
and discussions
with plant personnel,
the
inspectors
concluded that the licensee's
radiological controls were effective.
4.3
Security
4.3.1 Routine Observations
During this inspection period, the inspectors verified that x-ray machines
and
metal
and explosive detectors
were operable,
protected
area
and vital area
barriers
were well maintained,
personnel
were properly badged for unescorted
or escorted
access,
and compensatory
measures
were implemented
when necessary.
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
4.4
Fire Protection
4.4. 1 Routine Observations
The inspectors
periodically verified the adequacy of combustible material
controls
and storage
in safety-related
areas of the plant, monitored transient
fire loads, verified the operability of fire detection
and suppression
systems,
assessed
the condition of fire barriers,
and verified the adequacy of
required compensatory
measures.
No discrepancies
were noted.
5.0
SAFETY ASSESSNENT/EQUALITY VERIFICATION (71707)
5. 1
Review of Corrective Action For Recent
Pump Failures
In August 1994, the Nuclear Safety
and Audit Review Board
(NSARB) tasked site
management
with reviewing recent
problems with pumps
and
pump motors in the
safety injection, auxiliary feedwater,
and service water systems,
and
developing
an action plan to address
the resultant operational,
maintenance,
and design issues.
On November 29,
1994, site management
presented
results of
this review in a teleconference
meeting with the
NSARB.
Through attendance
of
this meeting,
the inspector determined that site management's
investigation
had been extensive
and thorough.
Responses
from the
NSARB were incisive and
critical, and led to development of several
more action items for site
management.
The inspector
concluded that the
NSARB was highly effective in
fulfillingits independent
oversight function in this matter.
5.2
QA/QC Subcomaittee
Meeting
On December
19,
1994, the inspector
attended
a meeting of the Quality
Assurance/Quality
Control
(QA/QC) Subcommittee of the
NSARB.
The meeting,
chaired
by senior licensee
management,
addressed
the status,'indings,
and
trends identified in various audits, surveillance
programs,
arid corrective
action systems.
A summary of the Corrective Action Performance
Indicators
presented
to the subcommittee
showed
improvements. in overall site performance.
No new areas of concern were evident that required further detailed analysis
or warranted
increased
management
attention.
The status of various
open items
was discussed
in detail.
Through this attendance,
the inspector
concluded that senior licensee
management
was properly informed of factors affecting the quality of overall
plant performance
and material condition.
Issues
are thoroughly and candidly
discussed
with action items assigned to assure
a timely resolution of
unresolved
concerns.
Management
expectations
in addressing
issues
were
clearly stated.
5.3
Periodic Reports
Periodic reports
submitted
by the licensee
pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9. 1 were reviewed.
Inspectors verified that the reports contained
information required
by the
NRC, that test results
and/or supporting
information were consistent with design predictions
and performance
specifications,
and that reported information was accurate.
The following
reports were reviewed:
~
Monthly Operating Report for November
1994
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
6.0
ADMINISTRATIVE
6.1
Senior
NRC Management Site Visits
During this inspection period,
one senior
NRC manager visited Ginna Station.
On December
19-20,
1994,
Mr .
James
C. Linville, Chief of Reactor Projects
Branch 3, toured the. site
and met with senior licensee
management.
6.2
Enforcement Conference
On December
20,
1994,
an enforcement
conference
was held at the
USNRC Region I
office, to discuss
weaknesses
in the licensee
s fitness for duty testing
program.
Details are presented
in inspection report 50-244/94-28.
-6.3
Backshift and Deep Backshift Inspection
During this inspection period,
deep backshift inspections
were conducted
on
November
27 and December
18,
1994.
10
'.4
- Exit Meetings
At periodic intervals
and at the conclusion of the inspection,
meetings
were
held with senior station
management
to discuss
the scope
and findings of
inspections.
The exit meeting for inspection report 50-244/94-26
(Problem
resolution,
conducted
November
21 December
2,
1994)
was held by Mr. James
Stewart
on December
2,
1994.
The exit meeting for inspection report 50-
244/94-28 (Health'hysics,
conducted
December
19-22,
1994)
was held by Mr.
James
Noggle on December
22,
1994.
The exit meeting for the current resident
inspection report 50-244/94-27
was held on January
5,
1995.