ML17263A444
| ML17263A444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1993 |
| From: | Bettenhausen L, Dantonio J, Meyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17263A443 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-93-19, NUDOCS 9311050085 | |
| Download: ML17263A444 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1993019
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
INSPECTION REPORT
DOCKET NO:
REPORT NO:
50-244
93-19
LICENSE NO:
.
LICENSEE:
Rochester
Gas and Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, N. Y. 14649-0001
FACILITY:
DATES:
INSPECTORS:
Ginna Nuclear Generating Station
September 20-24, 1993
t
J. -D'Antonio, Operations Engineer
P. Bissett, Senior Operations Engineer
G. Bryan, Contractor, COMEX
LEAD INSPECTOR:
'Antonio, Operations Engineer
PWR Section, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
/>- 1'
Date
REVIEWED BY:
enn W. Meyer, Chief
PWR Section, Operations B
h
Division of Reactor Safety
Da
APPROVED BY:
H. Bettenhausen,
Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Date
9311050085
931029
ADOCK 05000244
Q
INSPECTION SUMMARY:
An announced inspection was performed to evaluate the licensed operator requalification
program in accordance with Temporary Instruction (TQ 2515/117, and to determine the
status of training programs that were placed on probation by INPO for 180 days in 1991.
The inspectors determined that the requalification program was generally good.
The
examinations were prepared in accordance with the Examiners'tandards,
tested at an
appropriate level, and were graded fairly. The facility had programs to ensure appropriate
topics are incorporated into training.
The program was particularly strong in the high degree
of operations management
involvement in evaluating operators in the simulator, and in
operations department representation
in meetings for scheduling program content and
simulator usage.
Another strength was the tracking of and responsiveness
to trainee
feedback.
Despite these strengths,
the examination results were weak.
One of two crews and four of
seven individuals failed one or more portions of the examination.
These results also
indicated a weakness in remediation and ongoing evaluation of poorly performing individuals
in that two of the individuals who failed this examination had failed one or mory prior annual
examinations.
For those training programs formerly under INFO probation, the inspectors found no
particular strengths or weaknesses,
and concluded that corrective actions for these programs
had been adequate.
DETAILS
1.0
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
An NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/117, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Evaluation," has been developed because of proposed rulemaking that, would delete the
requirement for the NRC to examine each licensed operator for purposes of license renewal.
This TI evaluates the requalification program through observation of the administration of a
facility requalification examination, interviews with facilitypersonnel,
and reviews of
training procedures,
records, and materials.
The instruction does not specify quantitative
criteria by which a program is to be considered
satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
Instead,
weaknesses
are evaluated and followed up as deemed appropriate by the NRC.
2.0
REQUALIFICATIONPROGRAM AREAS INSPECTED
2.1
Simulator Examination
The inspectors considered
the simulator scenarios
to be good evaluation tools.
The
inspectors reviewed the scenarios administered for all 6 weeks of examination.
The scenario
sets for weeks
1 through 5 either met or exceeded
the quantitative criteria of the Examiners
Standards.
The set for week 6 met the criteria with the exception of the total number of
failures after entering emergency operating procedures;
one additional such failure was
needed to meet the criteria.
The facility stated that they would review these scenarios.
Another criterion was that each scenario have objectives.
The existing objectives appeared
to
be a "laundry list" requiring proper response
to individual scenario events and did not
indicate an overall evaluation goal for each scenario.
The facility stated that this was
because
they were developing scenarios
based on Westinghouse Owners'roup templates
and had not evolved this methodology to the point of having overall objectives.
Interviews
with facility evaluators indicated that the scenarios run during the week of this inspection did
have overall goals in that the events chosen were based on operational events at Palo Verde
and Crystal River.
H
The administration of simulator examinations was observed for one staff crew and one
operations crew.
Two scenarios were administered to each crew.
There were two SRO
positions in the control room:
the Shift Supervisor and the Control Room Foreman.
Crew
positions were rotated to ensure that each SRO was evaluated in an SRO position.
The
facility did not place each SRO in both positions for examination purposes;
however, this
was an acceptable practice.
The examinations began on time, and the individual scenarios
ran within a few minutes of the validated time.
No difficulties occurred with simulator
operation or exam conduct.
The inspectors observed that at the completion of each scenario,
the facility evaluators briefly
discussed their observations.
After each scenario set, a more complete discussion was held.
These observations
were generally complete and accurate,
and evaluated the operators fairly.
The evaluations were performed in accordance with the facility's Operator Training
Guidelines, which used forms similar to those in the NRC Examiner's Standards.
The
results of these evaluations were that the staff crew failed due to a missed critical task; two
members of this crew were also failed as individuals based on competencies
described on the
facility forms.
The missed critical task was to ensure reactor coolant pump {RCP) seal
cooling was isolated before restoring power following a loss of all AC power.
As a result of.
misreading a step in ECA-0.0, component cooling water pumps were not locked out and,
thus, automatically started when power was restored, resulting in a thermal shock to the RCP
seals.
The critical tasks were appropriate and were based on the Westinghouse
Owners'roup
templates from which the scenarios are developed.
I
The inspectors attended two critiques conducted by the facility evaluators with each crew.
One critique was held upon completion of the grading of the scenario set.
Crew performance
was discussed,
but pass/fail results were not given.
Later in the week, when all exam
sections were complete, a second critique was held.
The NRC noted a weakness in
evaluation in that the inspectors considered poor communications to be a contributing factor
to the missed critical task.
The crew was extremely quiet, making it impossible for crew
members to be aware of any order not specifically directed at them, and repeatbacks
or
verifications of communication were intermittent,
The NRC did not observe this aspect of
performance to be discussed until a member of the crew that failed, who did not himself fail
as an individual, questioned why he was faulted with the rest of the crew.
The facility
evaluators were surprised by this NRC comment because communications had been described
as a strength noted during initial licensing examinations administered the previous week.
The facility also stated they considered
the problem to be poor crew interaction, a broader
problem than just communication.
2.2
Seven job performance measures
(JPMs) were used during the examination.
The inspectors
judged these JPMs to be acceptable.
The JPMs were reviewed by the NRC using the
TI 2515/117, Appendix A, checklist and all applicable quality criteria were met.
None of
the JPMs were time critical and none were alternate path JPMs.
One of the JPMs had
alternate path options, but these options were not used during this examination.
In some
instances,
the facility identified as critical steps certain "verify" tasks that the NRC would
not have used as critical steps due to difficultyin evaluation.
This was acceptable
since it
resulted in the facility grading more stringently than the NRC on these tasks.
The inspectors observed the administration of the JPM examinations to all individuals. A
minor inconsistency was observed in administration of the in-plant JPMs in that some
operators stated that they would go to the control room for procedures
and keys, while other
operators simply asked the evaluator ifhe had these items.
Overall, the conduct of the JPM
examinations was well controlled and ran smoothly.
The results of the JPM examinations were that three individuals failed a control room JPM to"
perform immediate actions of E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and four individuals
failed an in-plant JPM to perform locally a section of a containment isolation procedure.
Two individuals who failed the control room JPM missed "verify" steps and would not have
been failed by the NRC.
One individual failed two JPMs, and thus this portion of the
examination.
This individual had also failed as an individual in the simulator examination.
The inspectors discussed
this performance deficiency with the facility. The facility stated
that the operators are trained on approximately 30 JPMs per year out of the 130 JPMs in
their bank and that this bank is available in the control room for self study.
There is no
requirement that such self-study be performed.
A possible reason for the difficultywith the
in-plant JPM is that the stated task was to operate all applicable valves in a specific area of
the plant, but the procedure used does not state exact locations for every component.
Nonetheless,
the inability of four of seven operators to locate the required components
indicated a training deficiency.
2.3
Written Examinations
Written examinations were reviewed for three of the six examination weeks.
The inspectors
found the examinations to be prepared in accordance with the facility sample plan, and
considered
the exam technical content and overall length to be good.
In most cases,
the
questions were appropriate for an open reference examination; however, some questions were
found in the examinations that were identified as "closed book" by the facility's coding
scheme,
which the NRC considered
to test at too low a level of knowledge.
These amounted
to approximately 3% of the questions reviewed.
Approximately 15% of the questions
appeared
to contain wording or distractor difficulties. These were discussed with the facility.
The results of the written examinations were two failures.
3.0
OBSERVATIONS OF TRAININGACTIVITIES
The inspectors observed two meetings related to requalifiication program activities and one
training class.
These activities were productive, and showed a strong interest and
involvement in training on the part, of operations management.
A license review board is a meeting in which facility training personnel determine remedial
action for individuals who fail examinations or quizzes.
The inspectors observed this
meeting for an individual who had failed his annual examination the previous week.
Operations management
as well as training department personnel were present and
participated in determining a remedial program for this individual. The level of attention and
the actions to be taken showed a strong management commitment to upgrading poorly
performing individuals.
The inspectors reviewed minutes of previous board meetings and
concluded that the facility-was not exaggerating their actions for the benefit of the NRC
observers.
The inspectors observed a scheduling meeting in which future training activities and
coordination of training were discussed.
The Operations Manager was present at this
meeting, and changes
were made to simulator scheduling (increased time available for
operators by shuffling other activities) and lecture topics as a result of his input.
One training class was conducted following the examinations and was observed by an
inspector.
This class covered Emergency Operating Procedure Usage and recent industry
events.
The material was presented
in a format in which the instructor presented
the class
with a "what would you do in this situation" scenario, extracted responses,
and then
discussed
a topic or event.
This format was conductive to maintaining class attention.
4.0
TRAININGCOGENT, UPDATES, FEEDBACK
Training materials and procedures
were reviewed to determine ifthe facility incorporated
industry events, facility events, facility modifications, and trainee feedback into the training
and evaluation process.
The inspector concluded that the facility had taken corrective action
for a self-identified deficiency in ensuring that training was accomplished on minor
modifications.
The facility was overall very good in ensuring appropriate topics were
included in training.
The facility Nuclear Training Manual contained various forms for trainee feedback and
'nstructor
observation.
The examiners reviewed samples of these forms and verified that
they had been used.
The Licensed Operator Training Supervisor had reviewed these forms
and tracked resolution of comments in a PC database,
In interviews, both instructors and
trainees considered
the feedback process to work, and two trainees cited instances in which
they had been contacted with followup on a comment or had seen an exam question changed
in response
to their comments.
The inspectors noted that the written examination included questions concerning industry
events; for example a question related to rod control malfunctions at Salem.
The trainees
also cited instances in which they had been trained on plant events,
such as an improperly
paralleled diesel generator.
The trainees also stated they received training on industry
events.
One trainee stated that they received too much repetitious training on the Three Mile
Island, Chernobyl, and certain other events;
as an example of response to trainee feedback,
the instructor for the training session described in section 3.0 stated that the format of the
presentation
had been chosen in response
to previous similar comments on student feedback
forms.
Discussions were held with those individuals responsible for ensuring that plant modifications
are incorporated into training activities as appropriate.
Administrative plant procedure TR
5.5.1, "Tracking Plant Changes," provides the guidance, which responsible personnel follow
to ensure that appropriate reviews are done of all plant modifications.. From this review, a
determination is made as to whether or not training is deemed
necessary
to cover the
particular modification in question.
Attendance by a training representative
on a monthly
basis or more frequently, ifnecessary, of all modification group meetings ensures
that
training is kept abreast of modification progress and any changes that may occur in the
interim.
The inspectors found the control and subsequent
documentation of this process
to
be excellent.
Further discussions with several licensed operators indicated that the training
department adequately conducted formalized instruction on plant modifications.
5.0
ADMINISTRATIVECOMMlKÃTS
Examination security measures
exhibited during the conduct of this inspection to preclude
examination compromise were more than adequate.
Examination security measures
were
governed by procedures TR 4.6, "Test Administration and Security," and ATG 9.0,
"Examination Security."
These training department procedural'equirements
were strictly
adhered to during this examination,
as observed by the inspectors.
The inspectors reviewed the documentation
sheets completed by the facility evaluators and
noted that in some instances,
they did not adequately document individual performance
during the conduct of the simulator and/or job performance measures
portion of the
examination,
The inspectors informed the Ginna training representatives
that adequate
documentation
is necessary
to not only substantiate
a pass/fail decision, but also to indicate
areas in which additional training may be necessary
during subsequent
training cycles.
Ginna
training representatives
acknowledged the inspectors'oncern
and stated that they would
address
the issue and subsequently
make changes
as deemed necessary.
6.0
MAINTENANCE,HEALTHPHYSICS, CHEMISTRY TRAINING
6.1
Background
The National Nuclear Accrediting Board is a component of the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations gNPO) National Academy for Nuclear Training. In December
1991, INPO
conducted
an accreditation review that resulted in training programs for the following
personnel being placed on 180 day probation in May 1992.
ISAAC Technician
Electrical Maintenance Personnel
Mechanical Maintenance Personnel
Radiological Protection Technician
Chemistry Technician
Ginna completed corrective action for the problems noted by INPO and the above programs
were removed from probation in November 1992.
6.2
Inspection Activities
The NRC performed elements of NUREG-1220, "Training Review Criteria and Procedures,"
in order to determine ifany problems were still apparent in these areas.
This inspection
process involves review of training records, interviews with technicians,
trainees,
and
supervisors,
and observation of work activities. Ifthese reviews and observations
indicated a
'problem, a further review of Systems Approach to Training (SAT) program elements would
be performed.
6.3
Findings
The inspector concluded that, after corrective actions, management oversight of training was
significantly improved and excellent overall. A Nuclear Training Management Committee
was established in mid-1993. It consists of the plant manager,
three Vice Presidents,
and
several others, and meets quarterly to consider training content, feedback, summaries,
and
other matters.
A Training Oversight Committee was also established
to provide oversight
and ensure communication between line managers
and training.
The inspector observed a total of,six work activities and training activities.
Seven
individuals were interviewed using the NUREG-1220 protocols.
Students and workers had
excellent attitudes and communicated freely with the inspector.
Allpersonnel interviewed
had enthusiastic opinions of the upgrade of the quality, range, and depth of maintenance
training.
No performance problems or trends were noted in the observations,
and no
additional SAT element evaluation appeared
necessary.
The inspector attempted to determine iftraining had been increased or accelerated
for the
I&C Special Projects, HP, and Chemistry work groups.
It was not possible to make such a
determination due to the nature of the recordkeeping.
Three licensee event reports were spot checked by the inspector for training corrective action
followup. In all instances,
a lesson plan or procedure had been developed
as required.
Overall, the facility appeared
to have taken effective corrective action for the deficiencies
that resulted in probationary status for these programs.
Thorough management
oversight has
been put in place.
7.0
EXITMEETING
An exit meeting was conducted on September 24, 1993.
The NRC stated that operations
management involvement in training was a strength, discussed
the inspection observations,
and stated that no readily apparerit reason for the poor overall performance of the examinees
had been uncovered.
The facility was asked to provide'an analysis of the examination results
and the planned remedial action for those individuals who failed.
The facility agreed to
provide the requested
analysis and remedial action.
In a telephone discussion subsequent
to
this exit meeting, the facility agreed to make a presentation in Region I on this topic on
October 26, 1993.
8.0
MEETING TO DISCUSS WEAKREQUALIFlCATIONEXAMINATION
RESULTS
On October 26, 1993, Ginna staff met with NRC staff members in King of Prussia, PA, to
review the examination results and root causes of performance problems.
Attachment 2
identifies the participants.
Attachment 3 contains the slides used by Rochester
Gas and
Electric (RG&E) personnel.
Poor time validation and an inappropriate level of questions
were root causes for written examination failures,
No specific root causes were given for the
operating examination failures.
The diagnoses of individual weaknesses
and remediation
plans were presented
and found acceptable.
Overall lessons learned and resulting
improvements to the training program for licensed operator requalification were discussed..
RG&E also discussed
their proposals to resolve NRC comments 'on emergency operating
procedures
{EOPs) which were made following an initial license examination conducted at
Ginna Station the week of September
13, 1993.
The proposals had not been through the
Ginna validation process.
Questioning by NRC staff identified some problems with these
proposals.
RG&E committed to further review before making the proposed
changes to
EOPs.
Attachments:
I.
Persons
Contacted
2.
Attendance at the October 26, 1993, Meeting
3.
Presentation
Slides from Meeting
10
ATTACHMENT1
Persons
Contacted
Roch
er Gas and Electric
- Robert C. Mecredy
- Terry White
- Frank Maciuska
- Steven T. Adams
- Gary D. Meier
- Robert A. Carroll
- Andrew J. Harhay
- Jim Knorr
~ Joseph A. Widay
- Dan Hudnut
Richard A. Marchionda
Vice President,
Ginna Nuclear Production
Operations Manager
Supervisor-License Training
Superintendent,
Support Services
Dept. Manager, Production Division Training
Manager, Operations and Technical Training
Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry
Supervisor, Maintenance,
Chem,
8c HP Training
Plant Manager - Ginna
Supervisor - Simulator Training
Superintendent,
Ginna Production
- Joseph M. D'Antonio
- Paul Bissett
- Gordon Bryan
Glenn Meyer
- Tom Moslak
. Operations Engineer
Senior Operations Engineer
NRC contractor (COMEX)
PWR Section Chief, Operations Branch, DRS,
Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at exit meeting.
11
AITACHMENT2
Attendance at October 26, 1993, Meeting.
Rochester
Gas and Electric
Robert Carroll
Frank Maciuska
Richard Marchionda
Gary Meier
Terry White
- Joseph Widay
Manager, Operations and Technical Training
Supervisor, Operator Licensing
Superintendent,
Ginna Production
Manager, Production
Operations Manager
Plant Manager
Lee Bettenhausen
Paul Bissett
Joseph D'Antonio
, James Linville
William Maier
Glenn Meyer
- Thomas Moslak
Chief, Operations Branch
Senior Operations Engineer
Operations Engineer
Chief, Projects Branch 3
Operations Engineer
Chief, PWR Section
Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna
- by telephone
ATTACHNENT 3
NRC.MEETING ON
OCTOBER 26, 1993
AGENDA
I) IN'IRODUCTION&
OPENING COMMENT
2) REQUAL EXAMRESULTS
3) ROOT CAUSES OF FAjlLUIIES
4) PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS
5) EOP COlVQCENT RESOLU'rION
6) OPERATIONS PROSPECTD'E
7) DISCUSSION
R. MARCHIONDA10
F. MACIUSKA15
B. CAIWOLL 10
B. CAkWOLL 10
T. WHITE
10
SENIOR REACTOR
OPERATORS
shift
SENIOR REACTOR
OPERATORS
staff
REACTOR
OPERATORS
shift
REACTOR
OP ERATORS (staff
TOTALS
OP ERATIONS
CREWS
STAFF
CREWS
1993 ANNUALHEN
TOTAL
NO.
PASSING
STUDENTS
FAILURES
FAILURES
15
3
10
71
0
7
2
100
0
1'
33
82
1
PASSING
100
100
INDWIDUAL
SIM
PASSING
FAILURES
0
100
0
100
0
100
0
100
1
67
PASSING
OVERALL
FAILURES
71
0
78.79
OVERALLSIMULATOR
CREW FAILURES
SHIFT.RO REMEDIATION
(>)
~
jjK[CEDIATELYREMOVED FROM SHIFT
~
EXAMREVIEW WITHASSIGNED INSTRUCTOR
~
. LICENSE REVIEW BOAIU)
~
PROGRAM INCLUDED:
Review of EOP Background
~ Test Taking Strategies
~
DIAGNOSTIC EXAM
~
RETEST COMPLETE (PASS)
SHEFT SRO REMEDIATION
(C)
~
IMMEDIATELYREMOVED FROM SHIRT
~
EXAMREVjlEW, WITHASSIGNED INSTRUCTOR
~
LICENSE REVIEW BOAIU)
~
PROGRAM SET UP TO INCLUDE
~ EOP Overview'
EPIP Background
~ Exam Taking Techniques
~ Procedure Familiarity
~ Elementary Reading
~ LER's/Industry Events
~
DIAGNOSTIC WRIT'.IXNEXAM
~ Reviewed Areas Missed
~
PARTICIPATED IN LEARNING STIES BA%lNTORY
(LT)
J
~ 'AKEUP EXAMNOT SCHEDULED
~
REMEDIALPROGRAM PROPOSED
STAFF SRO REMEDIATION
(A)
REMOVED FROM LICENSED DVI."IES
EXAMREVIEW WITHASSIGNED INSTRUCTOR
LICENSE REVIEW BOARD
PROGRAM
SET
UP
TO
COVER
KNOWLEDGE
WEAjV'ASSES
REMOVED FROM STA
RETEST COMPLET (PASS)
SHIFT SRO REMEDIATION
(8)
~
IMMEDIATELYREMOVED FROM SEIIFT
DISQUALIFIEDAS SS
~
LICENSE REVIEW BOAIU).
I)
WRITTEN FAJILURE
2)
o
PROGRAM SET UP TO REVjlEW WEAKAjREAS
~ EOP Overview
~ EOP Background
~ EPIP
~ Exam Taking Techniques
~ Diagnostic Sim Exam as Foreman
~ Placed in SS Initial Program (LT)
~
DIAGNOSTIC WRITTENEXAM
- Reviewed areas missed
~
PARTICIPATED IN LEARNING S'HKES IN'VENTORY
(LT)
~
RETEST COMPLETE
D AS CRF ONLY
SHIP'T SRO REMEDIATION
(D)
REMOVED FROM LICENSED DUI'IES
1
EXAMREVjlEWWITHASSIGNED INSTRUCTOR
LICENSE REVIEW BOARlD
PROGIUAl
SET
UP
TO
COVER
KNOWLEDGE
WEAKNESSES
~ ER/INST.3
~ Exam Taking Techniques
~ LER's
~ EOP Background Documents
~ P-12 procedure (Electrical System)
DIAGNOSTIC WRITTENEXAM
- Reviewed Areas Missed
PARTICIPATED IN LEARNIIWG STlKES IN'VENTORY
(LT)
RETEST COMPLETE
STAFF SRO REMEDIATION
(E)
~
REVIEWED CRITICALSTEPS OF JPMs MISSED
~
LICENSE REVIKWBOAIH)
~
PROGRAM% INCLUDES:
- Review of JPM Test Techniques
- OJT on TASKs missed
- Retake JPM's
~
RETEST ON 5 RA26)ONLYSELECTED JPMs
~
COMPLETION DATE 11/30/93
STAFF CREW FAjlLUlRE
REMOVED FROM LICENSED DIES
LICENSE REVIKWBOAZH)
- Review of Procedure Critical Task Missed
- Team Work Skills Tranung
- Practice Scenarios
- Retest by 11/30/93
DIAGNOSTIC EXAM
REQUESTED BY REVIEW BOAKD
BROAD SAMPLE OF KNOWLEDGEAT APPROPRIATE
LICENSE LEVEL
SHOULD
FOLLOW
- GUjH)ELPKS
OF
ES401
AM)
NLjIWG/BR0122
USED MOST RECENT NRC EXAMS
LEARMlVGSTYLES II.'ATENTORY
ASSOCIATE OF LEAI&lINGDEVELOPMENT CE&lTR AT
ROCHESTER INSTI'IV'.IXOF TECHNOLOGY
BATTERY
OF
INSTRUMENTS
TO
DETERMINE
PERSONALITY STlKE
INTERVIEWS ABOUTJOB/EXAM PROCESS
RECOMMENDATIONS OF STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE
BENEFIT OF
G PROGRAM
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
~
PAKSTIGATOR SELECTION
- Familiar with SAT Process
- Experience at other facilities
- Objective
- No Ownership
- Familiar with Plant and Simulator
~
RCA Process
- Test Analysis
- Interviews
- Root Cause Determination
- Recommendations
QUESTION 1:
IS TIIERE A ROOT CAUSE FOR T)f9< "SRO"
WRITTENEXAINlWATIONFAjlLURES ON THE
1993
LICENSED
OPERATOR
REQUALIFICATIONEXAM?
DETERMINATION: YES
ROOT CAUSE(S):
Static Simulator exam completion time longer
than allowed due to probable inaccurate time
validation.
PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS
~
VIPROVE VALIDATIONPROCESS
REFERENCE MATERIALAVAjKABILITY
DETEKKIINATION:,YES
ROOT CAUSE(S):
RO LICENSE HOLDERS TOOK AN EXAM
II'.BANDED FOR
AN SRO
LEVEL OF
KNOWLEDGE.
QUESTION 2:
IS TIIERE A ROOT CAUSE FOR TIIE "RO"
1VIRITTENEXAMINATIONFAILBRES ON
TIN'993
LICENSED
OPERATOR
REQUALIFICATIONEXAM?
PROGRAIN E'MPROVEMENTS
~
REACTOR OPERATOR SPECIFIC ANNUALEXAM
~
IMPROVE WRITTENEXAMSTRUCTURE
- Arrangement of questions
, - Consistent question format
PROGRAM DIPROVEMENTS TO
FAILS]RES
ZE REPEAT
~
LOWER TkIIRESHOLD FOR INTERVEN'HON
~
'EVELOP A DIAGNOSTIC EXAMINSTRUMENT
-Identify general areas of Weakness
- Identify "AtRisk" Individuals
~
BENCHMAjRSZNG
~
INCREASE
o
INDIVIDUAL
G llllHE(1 CYCLE)
G PROGRAMS (AS NEEDED)