ML17258A426

Forwards Draft Safety Evaluation of SEP Topic IX-5 Re Ventilation Sys,Based on Franklin Research Ctr Technical Evaluation Rept,TER-C5257-409.Potential Backflow Problem Found W/Auxiliary Bldg Sys

ML17258A426
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/31/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
Shared Package
ML17258A427	List: ML17258A426 ML17258A428
References
TASK-09-05, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-9-5, TASK-RR, TASK-TM LSO5-81-12-111, NUDOCS 8201110467
Download: ML17258A426 (11)

Text

<<g, December 31, 1981 Docket No. 50-244 LS05>>81-12-ill Nr. John E. Haier, Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8I Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 RKCQQ<QQ 4AQ F

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SUBJECT:

FOIQARDING DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT OH SEP TOPIC IX-5 VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR THE R. E.

GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Enclosed is a copy of a draft Safety Evaluation Report of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic IX-5, Ventilation Systems.

This evaluation is based on our contractor, The Franklin Research Center, Technical Evaluation Report (TER-C5257-409).

This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-244, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing ne>v facilities.

The ventilation systems for the Ginna Plant were found to be in conformance with current criter ia except for potential backflow problems associated with the auxiliary buildings system.

Please inform us if your as-built facility differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment within 30 days of rec4ipt of this letter.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility.

A determination of the need to actually implement modifications will be made dur ing the integrated assessment.

This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if IIRC criteria re1ating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

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Enclosures:

As stated Dennis Il. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.

5 Division of Licensing OFFICE Ih SUANAMEIp cc v)jencl See next DATEP

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NRC FOAM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RE COPY USGPO: 1981~5.960

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Docket No. 50-244 LS05 Mr. John E. Maier, Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

SUBJECT:

FORWARDING DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT OF SEP TOPIC IX-5 VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR THE R. E.

GINNA NUCLEAR POMER PLANT Enclosed fs a copy of a draft Technical Evaluation Report of Systematic Evaluation-Program Topic IX-5, Ventilation Systems.

This evaluation was per formed by our contractor, The Franklin Research Center.

This assessment compares your facility, as described fn Docket No. 50-244, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities.

Please inform us ff your as-built facility differs from the licensing basis assumed fn our assessment within 30 days of receipt of this letter.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility. Ilfth respect to the potentfal modifications outlined fn the conclusion of this report, a determination of the need to actually implement these changes will be made during the same integrated assessment.

This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment fs completed.

Sf neer ely,

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

See next page Dennis hf. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.

5 Dfvfsforfof Licensing OFFICE(I SURNAME/

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Mr. John E. Maier CC Harry H. Voigt, Esquire LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.

Suite 1100 Washington, D. C.

20036 Mr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade. Center New York, New York 10047 Resident Inspecto~

R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.

NRC 1503 Lake Road

Ontario, New York 14519 V

Director, Bureau of Nuclear Operations

.State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario.

107 Ridge Road West

Ontario, New York 14519 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

.Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission" Washington, D. C.

20555 l

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Herbert Grossman,, Esq.

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regu1atory Comaission Washington, D. C.

20555

TOPIC IX-5 SEP REVIEW VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR THE R.E.

GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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I INTRODUCTION To assure that the ventilation systems have the. capaNfty to provide.

a safe. environment for plant personnel and for engine&ed safety fea-....,;; ':'=;-'.:.'"..'

tures,.it is necessary to review the design'and operation.of these systems.

For example, the function of the spent fuel pool area vent-::'". ':-

ilation system is to provide ventilation in the spent fue1 pool':

equipnent areas, to permit personnel

access, and to contro1 airborne radioactivity in the area during normal operation, aaticipated opera-tional transients, and following postulated fuel hamHing accidents.

The'unction'of the engineered safety feature ventilation. system is to provide a suitable and controlled environment for engineered safety feature components following certain anticipated transients and design basis accidents.

'EYIEM CRITERIA

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W The current criteria and guidelines used 4o determine if the plant sys-

'ems meet the topic safety objective are those provided in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Sections 9;4.1, "Control Room Area VentHation Sys-tem", 9.4.2, "Spent Fuel Pool Area Yentilation Systea 9.4.3, "Auxili-

'ry And Radwaste Area Ventilation System",

9 4.4, "Tarhine Area Yentila-tion System" and 9.4.5,."Engineered Safety Feature Veatilation System" In determizing if plant design conforms to a safety objective, use is.

made, where possible, of applicable portions of previous staff reviews.'.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND'NTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed.vnder related topics.

'The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.

Each of the related topic reports contains the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.

I:I-2.A III-1 III-6 YI-4 VI-7.C. 1 VI-8 YII-3 IX-3:

IX-6 '.

XV-20 Severe Meatlier phenomena Classification of Structures, Components

.and Systems (Seismic and Quality)

Seismic Design Considerations Containment Isolption System Independence of Onsite Power Control Room Habitahility Systems Required for Safe Shutdown Station Service and Cooling Water Systems Fire Protection Radiological Consequences of Fuel Damaging Accidents (Inside and Outside Containment)

TNI III.D.3.4 Control Room Habitability

, USI-A24, QUALIFICATION OF CLASS IN SAFETY RELATED EQUXPNENT, r

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IV.

REVIEM GUI DELINES In determining which systems to evaluate under this topic, the staff used the definition of "systems important to safety" provided in Regulatory Guide 1.105.

The definition states that systems important to safety are those necessary to ensure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure

boundary, (2) the capability to shutdown the-reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, or (3) the capability to prevent, or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result,in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria".

This definition was used to determine which systems or portions of systems were""essentia7"

'ystems or portions of systems which perform functions important.to safety were considered to be essential.

V. 'VALUATNN.

The systems revfewed unde@ the topic ape the Control goom gaea genti-lation System, Spent Fuel Pool Area Yentflation System, Auxiliary and Radwaste Area Ventilation System, Turbine Area Ventilation Systaa, and Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation System.

A.

Control Room Area Ventilation S stem The function of the Control Room Area Ventflatfon System (CRNSl js.

to provide a controlled environment for the comfort and saf'eely of control room personnel

'and to 'assure the operabi1ity of control room componen'ts during normal operating, anticipated operational trans-ient and design basis accident conditions.

As a result of TNI this system is being reviewed generically (TNI Item III.0.3.4, Control Room Habitability) to assure comp1iance with Criterion 19, "Control Room" of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants",

to 10 CFR Part 50.

Therefore the CRAVS was not r eviewed under this topic.

B.

S ent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation S stem The function of the Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation System (SFPAVS) is to maintain ventilation in the spent fuel pool equipment areas, to. permit personnel

access, and to control airborne radioactivity in the area during normal operation, anticipated operational transi-

ents, and following postulated fuel handling accidents.

Based'n the Franklin Research Center (FRC) review of the SFPAVS and the licensee's fuel handling accident analysis, we determined that the system is-non-essential as defined in Section IV.

r' 1 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary'is defined in 10 CFR Part 50 5 50.2 (v).

C.

Auxiliar B'uil'din and Radwaste Area Ventilation S stag This system provides clean, filtered, tempered air to a11 regions of the operating floor of the auxiliary building, including the spent fuel pool and decontamination pit areas.

The system exhausts air from all regions of the auxiliary building and its specific equipment rooms and work areas by means of four separate exhaust subsystems, in

'ddition to providing exhaust for the service building and intermediate building.

Other-than the spent fuel pool and decontamination pit area, which has a dedicated air supply and exhaust path within this system, the auxiliary building supply air is directed to the open work areas

'f the main operating floor from which a ma'd'or portion of the venti-lating air makes its way down 'to the intermediate and basement levels of the auxiliary building by means of stairwe11s and other floor open-ings.

Based on the FRC review this system was found to he-in-conformance with current criteria (see Secti9n II) with the exception of a potential back flow problem, Current criteria mjuires that the c'apability exist to direct ventilation air frow areas of low radio-..

activity to areas of progressively higher radioactivity.

In general, the ventilation of the auxiliary bui1ding-appears to be adequate and does promote the flow of air from areas of low radio-activity potential to areas of. higher radioactivity potential.

How-

ever, two conditions exist that could possibly violate that requirement, both of which occur with the-main exhaust fans stet down when offsite power is not available and the plant is 'operating

'on emergency diesel

-'ower.

The first condition is one in which exhaust air, with.a higher radio-activity potential, could leak into the intermediate building housing the controlled access area.

With the main exhaust fans shut down, the positive pressur e created on the input side of the HEPA filter could cause exhaust leakage into the intermediate building if there is insufficient partial vacuum created by the p1ant vent stack.

The second possibility could occur under the same main exhaust fan'hutdown conditions with the plant vent stack providing insufficient partial Vacuum on the system.

With four separate exhaust subsystems

'.discharging to a

common point at the HEPA filter input. it is possible that the flow-pressure characteristics of the fans could be sufficiently mismatched to produce backflow through an operating fan (isolation dampers open) and thus introduce higher radioactive exhaust to an area of generally lower radioactivity potential'.

0.

Turbine Buildin Ventilation S stem The turbine building, while not requiring an HYAC system, uses roof vent fans, wall vent fans, windows, and unit heaters for ventilation and temperature control.

The fans are not supplied by emergency diesel-generated

power, and loss of these fans would not be critical to a safe shutdown.

The turbine building does not house s'ystems required for safe

'hutdown.

Although it is the source. for venti1ation air to other rooms that do contain safety-related

systems, revisions are currently being made to the plant to provide outside air ducts to these systems.

En ineered Safet Features Ventilation S stems The engineered safety features ventilation systems include those ventilating and cooling systems that service equipment required following an accident or needed to assure a safe shutdown of the plant.

Equipment and/or areas serviced by these ventilating and.

cooling systems include the following:

.; engineered safeguard equipment

~, safety injection system containment spray system

-, hydrogen recombiner

'elay'oom battery rooms

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~ auxiliary and emergency systems

'diesel generator rooms.

The ventilation systems that service the above. listed equipment and associated

areas, were found to be in conformance with current criteria, based on the FRC Review, with one exception, the ventilation and cool'ing systems for the residual heat removal and component cooling water loops.

FRC concern is that the residual heat removal system could be susceptible to a single failure.

Consider a major pump seal leak or a through the wall crack in the residual heat removal system coolant pipe in the pump pit, would produce a hot, highly humid atmosphere.

This environment may produce failures in one or both residual heat removal pump motors in the pit to render the residual heat removal system inoperative.

While this is a valid concern, we feel that the proper place for resolution is the gualification Review.

Furthermore, the staff has already considered the effect of loss of all RHR cooling in Topic V-10.B and concluded that acceptable alternative cooling methods exist.

VI.

CONCLUSION The. ventilation systems for the Ginna Plant were found to be in conform-

. ance with current criteria for this topic except for the potential back flow problem associated with auxiliary building system (see Section V.C).

The licensee should evaluate the likelyhood and consequences of this backf1 ow.