ML17258A398
| ML17258A398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1981 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-09-01, TASK-9-1, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8112290257 | |
| Download: ML17258A398 (12) | |
Text
A REGULA'TORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS fEM A'GCE'SSION NBR:8112290257 DOC.DATE: 81/12/23 NOTARIZED:
FAOIL:50 '244 Robert Emmet 'Ginna Nuclear PlantP Uniit lg IRoc
'AUTH,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MAIERPJ ~ E.
Rochester Gas 8 AElectric Corps iRGC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFIL'I ATION ORUTCHF IELD P D ~
Operating Reactons Branch 5
SUBJECT:
Forwards, response to NRC 811124 draf t safety eval
, for 'SEP >Topic IX 1P fuel sstorage
~ Evaluation should revised tto address new -fuel storage or basis for such reiver DISTRIBUTION 'CODE:
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t ZZ~I'srZZ IIZ iuzeru 8Z, ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN F..
MAILER Vice Preeklent TCLCPHONC AecA coac 7le 546.2700 December 23, 1981 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.
5 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
SEP Topic IX-1, Fuel Storage R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 eeeEiVae OEGgsggee It i Mar mWaurss St jp
Dear Mr. Crutchfield:
This letter is in response to the draft Safety Evaluation for SEP Topic IX-1, which was transmitted by your letter dated November 24, 1981.
The evaluation concluded that the spent fuel pool cooling systems and the spent fuel storage racks were acceptable when compared to current criteria.
The evaluation also concluded that the spent. fuel pool was acceptable when compared to current criteria on the basis that SEP Topic III-6, Seismic Design Considerations, had reached an overall conclusion that the plant structures were adeguate.
The spent fuel pool structural capability was reviewed by the NRC Staff in conjunction with spent. fuel pool modifications and was approved in Amendment, ll to the Ginna license issued November 15, 1976.
We suggest that this reference be added to support the Staff's conclusions regarding the Ginna spent fuel pool.
The topic definition for SEP Topic IK-l, issued by letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut dated March 7, 1978, indicates that both new and spent fuel storage facilities are to be reviewed.
Since your evaluation does not address new fuel storage, we suggest that, the draft Safety Evaluation be, revised to address new fuel storage or that the',basis. for deleting,a review of new fuel storage facilities be identified..
RG&E submitted an informal response on July 5, 1979 to a set of questions telecopied to RG&E on June 6,
1979.
This correspondence is being provided as an attachment to this letter.
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December 23, 1981 Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield SHEET NO.
The assessment for topic IX-3, Station Service and Cooling Water Systems, stated in the conclusion that "If the findings of Topic -IX-1 necessitate any additional review of the Service Water System, it will be addressed in the integrated assessment.
for the facility."
Since no such findings were made during the review of IX-1, this assessment should include a statement concluding that no additional review of the Service Water System with regard to the interface with the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System is reguired.
This statement can then be used to appropriately modify Section VII of Topic IX-3.
Very truly yours, Attachment
E f
ATTACHMENT 7/5/79 SEP To ic XI-'1, "Fuel Stora e"
How is the K ff verified?
How often is it verified?
eff is identical to the original design of the spent fuel storage racks center-to-center spacing of 21 inches, provided to maintain K ff <0.90, even if the storage eff facility were filled with unborated water.
This information is provided in Section 9.5 of the FSAR (see 9.F 1 and Table 9.5-1)
~
Since new fuel is stored dry, K
is much less eff than 0.90.
Note that this arrangement meets substantially more conservative criteria for sub-criticality than those required by the SRP 9.1.1, i.e.,'
ff
< 0.95.
For these
- reasons, K ff does not need to be verified eff in the new fuel storage area.
What features can be used to detect a criticality in the new fuel storage area?
Are there alarms associated with these features?
sub-criticality even if the new fuel storage area were filled with unborated water, there are no features provided specifically to detect criticality in the new fuel storage area.
There is an area radiation monitor above the spent fuel pool, located about.
25 feet from the new fuel storage area.
There is an area
radiation monitor above the spent fuel pool, located about 25 feet from the new fuel storage area.
The purpose of this monitor is to detect, abnormalities in the spent fuel area during refueling.
This detector would activate an alarm in the control room at 25 mr/hr.
This monitor would thus detect criticality in the new fuel storage area,'ven though this function is not its intended purpose.
Ne note in passing that SRP9.1.1 makes no mention of criticality measurements,
- monitors, etc. in the new fuel storage area.,
What. features prevent flooding of the new fuel storage racks?
new fuel would remain subcritical (K ff
< 0.90) even eff when flooded with unborated water.
There is thus no pressing need to protect this facility from flooding.
However, the chance of flooding the new fuel assemblies is very low.
There are very few fluid lines in the vicinity of the new fuel area.
These are small; low energy, building steam heating and condensate return lines, and some liquid waste lines.
These are located
- above, but to the side, of the new fuel storage area.
The top of the new fuel storage area is covered by locked steel plates.
Any water above the new fuel area could at most slowly drip into the area.
There is a drain to accommodate any such leakage in the new fuel enclosure.
Also, the floor is slightly
r IIl
>1)l I
3 sloped to one side, where there is a locked door (with some small clearance from the floor).
Outside the locked door is another floor drain.
Another consideration minimizing the possibility of flooding is the fact that the new fuel storage area is located on the operating floor of the auxiliary building.
Any external flooding would have to fill the two complete lower floors before threatening the new fuel storage area.
Furthermore, the new fuel assemblies are stored about a foot above the auxiliary building floor.
Another administrative precaution is the practice of opening a hole in the bottom of the protective plastic bags in which the new fuel assemblies are transported.
This will ensure that water could not accumulate within the bags.
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