ML17258A309
| ML17258A309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1981 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A310 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-06-01, TASK-6-1, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8111130582 | |
| Download: ML17258A309 (12) | |
Text
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///Sg/I fllESZ ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION 0
o 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN E.
MAIER VICE PRESIDENT TL'LEpHONC ARC* COOK >Id 546-2700 November 6, 1981
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~yg Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.
5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
SEP Topic VI-1, Organic Materials and Post.-Accident Chemistry R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Crutchfield:
As part of the "SEP Redirection," Rochester Gas and Electric committed to provide certain topic assessments to the NRC.
These would be based on "lead topic" assessments completed by the NRC.
Two enclosures are being submitted.
Enclosure 1 provides a topic assessment for the "post-accident chemistry" portion of SEP Topic VI-l, Organic Materials and Post-Accident. Chemistry.
Enclosure 2
provides responses to a letter from Vincent S.
Noonan to Gus C. Lainas, dated January 17, 1981, requesting information about the Ginna "Vinylcel" insulation.
The "organic materials" portion of this topic assessment, will, by agreement, be performed by the NRC, using this response.
Enclosure 2 includes as an attachment a Wyle Laboratory report "Analysis of the Decomposition Effects of Vinycel Insulation in a Design Basis Accident."
The conclusion is reached that no significant safety problem exists.
However, additional information on the effect of aqueous hydro-chloric acid on the Ginna Carbo Zinc ll/Phenoline 305 coating system would be useful.
RG&E is still pursuing any such available information.
Very truly yours, Enclosure ohn E. Maier T
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Enclosure 1:
Assessment for SEP Topic VI-l, "Post-Accident Chemistry," for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Unit. I Introduction Iow pH solutions that may be recirculated within the con-tainment after a Design Basis Accident.
(DBA) may accelerate chloride stress corrosion cracking and increase the volatility of dissolved iodines.
The objective of Topic VI-1 is to assure that appropriate methods are available to raise or maintain the pH of solutions expected to be recirculated within containment after a DBA.
Post Accident Chemistr An assessment of post accident c emxstry z.nc u es a
etermination of proper water chemistry in the containment spray during the injection phase following a DBA and an assessment that appropriate methods are avail-able to raise or maintain the pH of mixed solution in the containment sump.
II.
Review Criteria Post Accident Chemistr The design was reviewed with regar to Genera 'esign Criterion 14, "Rea'ctor Coolant Pressure Boundary" of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
This requires that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed and erected so as to have an extremely low prob-ability of abnormal leakage and gross rupture.
Also con-sidered in the review was General Design Criterion 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
This requires that systems be provided to reduce the concentration and quality of fission products released to the environment following a postulated accident.
III. Related Safet To ics The effectiveness of the iodine removal system is evaluated as part of Topic XV-19, for a spectrum of loss-of-coolant, accidents.
Topic VI-7.E reviews the ECCS in the recirculation mode to confirm the effectiveness of the ECCS.
IV.
Review Guidelines Post Accident Chemistr Guidance for the review of post acct ent c emxstry xs provided in Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and 6.5.2 of the Standard Review Plan.
Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 are related to assuring that. appropriate methods are available to raise or maintain the pH of the mixture of the containment
- spray, ECCS water, and chemical additives for reactivity control'and iodine fission product removal in
4
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the containment sump during the recirculation phase and to preclude long term corrosion problems after the accident.
Section 6.5.2 is related to providing proper water chemistry in the containment spray during the injection phase following a Design Basis Accident.
Evaluation The Containment Spray System, used both to reduce post-DBA containment pressure and to remove post-accident. fission products from the containment atmosphere (especially radio-active iodine), is automatically actuated by a high-high containment pressure signal.
The system draws borated water, maintained at 2000-2300 ppm boron, directly from the refueling water storage tank.
There is also
.a 30 w/o sodium hydroxide solution stored in a 5100 gallon storage tank.
Air operated valves will open to direct a total of 20-30 gpm NaOH to the spray system by means of eductors.
The valves have a two-minute delay timer, which would allow the operator to prevent NaOH addition ifit were not deemed necessary.
However, the Ginna Emergency Procedures have been modified, to prevent the operator from taking such preventive action.
The following range of parameters corresponding to the flows in each containment spray "train", were used to evaluate the upper and lower limits of pH in the containment spray following a design basis loss of coolant accident.
Minimum H
RWST:
16 0 gpm at 2300 ppm boron NaOH Tank:
10 gpm at 30 weight percent The resulting solution had a pH of 8.3.
RWST:
1200 gpm at 2000 ppm boron NaOH Tank:
15 gpm at 30 weight. percent The resulting solution had a pH of 9.1.
The pH range of these solutions are comparable to the guideline values of SRP 6.1 and BTP MTEB 6-1 (pH should be greater than 7.0),
and the guideline values of SRP 6.5.2 (pH range should be 8.5-11.0).
The following range of parameters were used to evaluate the upper and lower limits of pH in the sump following a design basis loss of coolant accident:
Minimum H
RWST:
30,000 gal at 2300 ppm boron Boric Acid Tanks:
6000 gal at 20,000 ppm boron Reactor Coolant System:
46713 gal at 1000 ppm boron Accumulators:
2216 gal at 1800 ppm boron NaOH Tank:
4500 gal at 30 weight per cent
The resulting mixed sump solution had a pH of 9.0.
H RWST:
215,000 gal at 2000 ppm boron Boric Acid Tanks:
3000 gal at 20,000 ppm boron Reactor Coolant System:
46713 gal at 0 ppm boron Accumulators:
2268 gal at 1800 ppm boron NaOH Tank:
2700 gal at 30 weight per cent The resulting mixed sump solution had a pH of 10.3-The pH range of these solutions are comparable to the guideline values of SRP 6.1 and BTP MTEB 6-1 (pH should be greater than 7.0),
and 'the guideline values of SRP 6.5.2 (pH range should be 8.5-11.0).
Additional information relative to the use and effectiveness of the Ginna Containment Spray System is provided in the Ginna FSAR; Section 6.4.3; Appendix 6A, "Iodine Removal Effective Evaluation of the Containment Spray System";
Appendix 6C, "Design Intention Regarding the Slection of a Spray Additive"; and Appendix 6E, "Materials Compatability Review."
A review was made of the present.
Ginna Technical Specifi-cations.
The limiting conditions for operation, section 3.3.2, is very similar to Section 3.6.2.2 of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications.
These Ginna Technical Specifications are written in accordance with current regu-latory practice, and are thus considered acceptable.
The "Surveillance Requirements" of the Ginna Technical Specifications, section 4.5, provide for demonstration of operability of the containment spray system pumps, valves, and nozzles.
Table 4.1.2 of the Ginna Technical Specifi-cations provide for monthly testing of the spray additive tank solution concentration, as is provided in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, section 4.6.2.2.
The spray additive tank xs provided with both a local and a
main control board indication of level.
The level indicating alarm has a low level set point of 40%.
The spray additive flow rate is tested monthly.
- Thus, although these latter two items do not have Technical Specifications, provisions are in place to ensure proper operation.
The need to include additional requirements into the Technical Specifica-tions will be evaluated during the Ginna Integrated Assessment.
VI.
Conclusions Post Accident Chemistr On the basis of the above evalu-ate.on, we conc u e t at the R. E. Ginna Iodine Removal System meets the post. accident chemistry requirements of SRP 6.5.2 and GDC 41, SRP 6.1.1 (BTP MTEB 6-1),
SRP 6.1.2, and GDC 14 and is, therefore, acceptable.
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The need for an additional Technical Specification regarding surveillance requirements for the spray additive system will be determined during the Integrated Assessment.
VII.
References 1.
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Robert Emmett Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1, Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Volume 2, Chapter 6.
2.
R. E. Ginna Plant Technical Specifications.
3.
NUREG-0452, Standardized Technical Specifications for Westinghouse PWR's, June 15, 1978.
Enclosure 2:
Response
to January 17, 1981 Questions Regarding the R. E. Ginna Vinycel Insulation 1.
The total weight of insulating foam in the containment building.
Response
The2insulated area of containment is 36,181 ft, At a 4 lb/ft density and a
1~~" thickness, the total weight of Vinylcel is about 15,075 pounds.
2.
An estimate of the amounts of each gas, such as hydrogen, organic gases and hydrogen chloride, which would be pro-duced by radiation from the decomposition of the foam during a DBA.
Response
See attached "Analysis of the Decomposition Effects of Vinycel Insulation in a Design Basis Accident," by J..
F. Gleason, M. Bruce, and R.
Thame of Wyle Laboratories, September 28, 1981.
3.
Paths, if any, by which these gases might escape from the stainless steel boxes and enter the containment under accident conditions.
Response
For purposes of this analysis, it was assumed that all of the escaped gases resulting from Vinycel decomposition could escape.
The results of an analysis of the contribution of hydrogen and other gases generated from the foam to the amounts of combustible gases produced from other sources during a DBA.
Response
See attached report.
5.
The results of an analysis of the effect of the hydrogen chloride generated during a DBA, including corrosion of components in the containment building.
Response
See attached report.
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