ML17258A154
| ML17258A154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A155 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.B, TASK-3-5.B, TASK-RR LSO5-81-09-018, LSO5-81-9-18, NUDOCS 8109140113 | |
| Download: ML17258A154 (8) | |
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Docket No. 50-244 LS05-81 49-018 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 September 4,
1981 John E. Maier Yice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas
& Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649
Dear Mr. Maier:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC III-5.B, PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT R. E.
G INNA The staff evaluation of SEP Topic III-5.B was transmitted.to you on June 24, 1980.
This evaluation identified five staff positions for which an implementation schedule was requested.
Your response was provided in a letter dated August 7, 1980.
Each of the five positions, your responses and staff resolutions are discussed below.
Staff Position 1
Because high and moderate energy line breaks in the Screen House could damage the power supplies to all service water pumps, the licensee must provi de protection for these power supplies in accordance with Standard Review Plan 3.6. 1 consistent with the service water system modifications which must be performed in connection with other ongoing SEP reviews and the fire protection review.
Modifications to provide this protection can be acceptably delayed until the SEP integrated assessment of the plant provided that the diesel generator cooling method described, in the licensee's December 28, 1979 fire protection safe shutdown analysis, is tested to assure its timely availability and its capability to pr'ovide adequate cooling.
The results of this testing should"be submitted for NRC staff review.
Res onse to Staff Position 1
/
It is planned to conduct the alternative diesel generator cooling method test by June 1981.
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Resolution The alternate diesel generator cooling method depends on installation of hose connections to each diesel, generator.
These connections have not yet been installed.
As discussed in the June 1980 SER, protection should be provided for Buses 17 and 18 and associated cables.
Such modifications should be coordinated in the integrated assessment with Fire protection and other SEP topic concerns.
Staff Position 2
The licensee must provide the means to warn the control room operator that flooding conditions exist in the Intermediate Building sub-basement.
The licensee should provide the implementation schedule for this capa-bi1 ity.
Response
to Staff Position 2
Based on RG&E's review of this scenario, we find the proposed solution to be unnecessary.
Present routine walk-through inspections of the Intermediate Building would detect a pipe leak long before there were any danger of flooding safety-related equipment.
If the postulated leak occurred at a level above the sub-basement, leakage into the sub-basement via the floor drains would be obvious during the routine once-per-shift walk-throughs.
And even a large secondary side break'would result in only a 2-foot depth in the sub-basement.
If the leak were in the Service Mater piping located in the sub-basement of the Intermediate Building, there would be a significant time interval between the initiation of the crack and the flooding of safety-related equipment.
The I~termediate Building sub-basement has a volume of approximately 50,000 ft.
With a service water leak rate of about 585 gpm (as calculated on p.
13 of the NRC assessment), it would take over 10 1/2 hours to begin flooding the basement level. It does not seem conceivable that a sizeable leak rate such as this would not be detected, visibly or audibly by personnel during the walk-throughs, or by personnel monitori ng the control board (the 585 gpm leak would be a significant fraction -
10% - of the Service Water pump flow).
Resolution The staff has determined from discussions with the licensee during a site visit on June 2, 1981, that there are two sump pumps in the sub-basement.
Operation of the pumps is alarmed at the water treatment station.
A control room alarm is provided indicating that an alarm condition exists at the water treatment station.
As stated in the topic evaluation, even
W3&
if the basement elevation was flooded safe shutdown would not be prevented.
Based on this, and the other information provided
- above, the staff con-cludes that there are adequate means to warn of flooding conditions in the sub-basement and therefore, that no modifications are required.
Staff Position 3
~ ~
Based on our evaluation of Main Steam (MS) and Main Feed (MF) line breaks in the Turbine Building and Intermediate Building, the licensee should (1) proceed with the design and installation of jet impingement shielding in the Intermediate Building (as previously committed to by the licensee),
(2) provide protection from the effects of the failure of the Turbine Building/Intermediate Building cinder block wall for the MS atmospheric dump valves and assess the need for and provide protection as necessary for the MS safety valves.
The installation of additional jet impingement shielding for the MS bypass valves and associated piping is not necessary since the bypass valves are not required for safe shutdown or pipe break mitigation.
A proposal to accommodate item (2) above should be submitted for staff review.
Res onse to Staff Position 3
Protection from the effects of the Turbine Building/Intermediate Building cinder block wall failure on the atmospheric dump valves and main steam safety valves will be integrated into the modification program resulting from RGKE's review of IAE Bulletin 80-11, "Masonry Mall Design."
Our initial response to this bulletin is contained in a July 7, 1980 letter from L. D. Mhite, Jr.
(RGSE) to Mr. Boyce H. Grier (NRC Region I Director).
Resolution Additional information in response to I8E Bulletin 80-11 was submitted by the licensee on November 4, 1980 and January 30, 1981.
The SEP review of these
~ letters has revealed that pipe break loads were not included in this evaluation of masonry wall design.
Furthermore, since the evaluation against original design criteria showed that the walls would satisfy their intended function, no assessment of effects of cinder block wall failure has been provided. Therefore, the licensee should comply with item 2 above.
Staff Position 4
Since certain moderate energy line breaks (MELB) in the mechanical equipment room could result in flooding both battery rooms, the licensee must provide protection from the effects of these postulated MELB's in accordance with the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan 3.6.1.
The licensee should provide a schedule for the implementation of this position.
Res onse to Staff Position 4
It is presently planned to separate the battery rooms from the mechanical equipment room, where the source of a Service Water leakage exists, by replacing the doorway with a watertight wall.
This modification should be coaqleted by June 1981.
Resolution The modification will be completed shortly.
The licensee also plans to install at the same time a means of removing water from the mechanical equipment room into the turbine building.
The staff concludes that these modifications will adequately mitigate the effects of these postulated MELB's.
Staff Position 5
To preclude adverse environmental conditions resulting from a heating steam or CVCS letdown break in the Auxiliary Building, the licensee must'analyze the adequacy of once-per-shift inspections to prevent the formation of the adverse environment or to provide some other acceptable means of preventing'he existence of the adverse environment.
The results of this analysis (with a comnitment to provide the required protection, if necessary) should be submitted for NRC staff review.
Res onse to Staff Position 5
RGSE is performing an evaluation to determine the effects of a CVCS letdown or steam heating line break in the Auxiliary Building in the vicinity of safety-related equipment.
The results of this study and proposed modifica-tions, will be submitted to the NRC for review in January 1981.
Pending the resolution of any noted concerns, present once-per-shift, inspections, together with the procedures available for isolation of the steam heating line, should provide adequate protection against the effects of significant adverse environment damaging safety-related equipment.
Resolution The environmental effects of these breaks on safety-related equipment are being addressed as part of Unresolved Safety Issues (USI) "gualifi'cation of Class lE Equipment".
Per the Comnission's Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980, all safety-related electrical equipment must be, qualified for the ad-verse environments they would experience by June 30,1982.
Therefore, this item will not be further addressed under Topic III-5.B.
The staff now considers this SEP topic to be completed except for comple-tion of the commitments discussed above and of modifications necessary to protect equipment in the screen house and Turbine Building/Intermediate Bui1 ding.
Enclosed is the revised evaluation which will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility.
This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
As stated Operating Reactors Branch No.
5 Division of Licensing cc w/enclosure:
See next page
Mr. John E. Maier CC Harry H. Voigt, Esquire
- LeBoeuf, Lamb, Lei by and MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.
W.
Suite 1100 Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Jeffrey Cohen New York State Energy Office Swan Street Building Core 1,
Second Floor Empire State Plaza
- Albany, New York 12223 Director, Technical Development Programs State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza
- Albany, New York 12223 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road West
- Ontario, New York 14519 Mr. Thomas B. Cochran Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
1725 I Street, N.
W.
Suite 600 Washington, D. C.
20006 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:
EI S COORDINATOR 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,
Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Zomnission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr.
Emmeth A.'uebke-Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coranission Washington, D. C.
20555 Resident Inspector R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.
NRC 1503 Lake Road
- Ontario, New York 14519
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