ML17257A517

Forwards Draft Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation Sys. Items Re Location of Both Isolation Valves Outside Containment & Use of Simple Check Valve as Isolation Valve Outside Containment Appear to Contradict Regulations

ML17257A517
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/27/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
References
TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR LSO5-81-07-081, LSO5-81-7-81, NUDOCS 8108050383
Download: ML17257A517 (58)

Text

Ju1y 27, 1981 Docket Ho. 50-244 LS05 07-o81 Mt. John E. Maier, Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 81 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

Dear Mr. Maier:

'cfK. h" suG051981' 8

SUBJECT:

FORWARDING DRAFT EYALUATIOH REPORT OF SEP TOPIC YI-4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM FOR THE R.

E.

GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Enclosed is= a copy of our draft evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System.

This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-244 with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities.

Please inform us if your as-built facility differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment.

In addition, I would like to draw your attention to two of the more significant issaes contained in conclusion.

located of both isolation valves outside containment and use of a simple check as an isolation valve outside containment.

Both of these items appear to contradict the explicit wording of the regulations and no other acceptable defined basis could be determined from the info@nation provided.

To enable us to perform our assessment of the deviations identified in this report, we will need the defined basis upon which the specific isolation configurations at the Palisades Plant were judged to be accept-able by you.

Please provide this information as a part of your comments on this report.

SiOS0503S3 810727 PDR ADOCK 05000244 P

PDR 7/Zf/81 7/1)/8 Comments are required within 30 days of receipt of this letter so that they may be included in our final report.

This evaluation wil'f be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your fac$ 11ty unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your'acility.

This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility

<1JI design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this subject e

dified

. pf before the integrated assessment is completed.

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Docket No. 50-244 LS05 Nr. John E. Naker, Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Dea} Nr. Naier:

SUBJECT:

FORWARDING DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT OF SEP TOPIC VI-4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM FOR THE R.

E.

GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Enclosed is a copy of our draft evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System.

This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-244 with the cr iteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities.

Please inform us ifyour as-built facility differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment.

In addition, I would like to draw your attention to two of the more significant issues contained in the conclusion, the location of both isolation valves outside containment and use of a simple check valve as an isolation valve outside containment.

Both of these items appear to contradict the explicit wording of the regulations and no other acceptable defined basis could be determined from the information pro-v'Ided.

To enable us Co perform our assessment of the deviations identified in this report, we will need the defined basis ppon which the specific isolation configurations at the Ginna Plant were judged to be accept-able by you.

Please provide this information as a part of your comments on this report.

Comments are required within 30 days of receipt of this letter so that they may be included in our final report.

This evaluation will be a

basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility.

This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Sincerely, ORBS'5:DL:C AD:SA:DL DCrutchfield GLainas 7/

/81 7/

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Nr. John E. Haier CC Harry H. Voigt, Esquire

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae 1333 Hew Hampshire

Avenue, N.

W.

'Suite 1100 Washington, D. C.

20036 Hr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618""

Ezra Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department, of Law 2 World Trade Center Hew York, Hew York 10047 Jeffrey Cohen Hew York State Energy Office'wan Street Building Core 1, Second Floor Empire State P.laza

Albany, Hew York 12223

Director, Bureau of Nuclear Operations State of Hew York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza

Albany, Hew York 12223 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, Hew York 14604 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road West

Ontario, New York 14519 Resident Inspector R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.

HRC 1503 Lake Road

Ontario, New York 14519 Nr. Thomas B. Cochran Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 I Street, N.

W.

Suite 600 Washington, D. C.

20006 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN'IS COORDINATOR 26 Federal Plaza Hew York, New York 10007 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr.

Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

Con.aini'ent Systems Branch Evaluation Report on SEP Topic YI-4, Containment Isolation System for the R. E. Ginna t'uclear Plant, Unit 1 Oocke No. 50-244 Introduction The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 began comm rcial operation in 1971.

Since then safety review criteria have changed.

As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP),

the containment isolation sys----

tern for the R. E. Ginna plant has been re-evaluated.

The purpose of this evaluation is to document the deviations from current safety cri-teria as they relate to the containment isolation system.

The signifi-cance of the identified deviations, and recommended corrective measures J

to i-prove safety, will be the subject of a subsequent, integrated asses-ment of the R. E. Ginna plant.

Review Criteria The safety criteria used in the current evalua ion of the containment isolation system -"or the R.

E. Ginna plant are contained in the following re.erences:

1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Oesign Criteria for nuclear Power Plants (GOC 54, 55, 56 and 57).

2)

NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (SRP 6.2.4, Containm nt Isolation System).

3)

Regulatory Guide 1.11, Instru.

nt Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containm nt.

EflCL0SURE

4)

Regulatory Guide 1.141, Revision 1, Contain, ent Isolation Prov. sio..s for Fluid Syste"..s.

III Related Safety To ics The review areas identified below are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion of the re-evaluation. of the con-tainment isolation system for the R. E. Ginna plant.

These review areas are included in other SEP topics or ongoing Generic

Reviews, as indicat d

belo~:

(2) III-4.C, (3) III-5.A, (5) III-6,.

(6) III-12, (7) YI-6, (8)

YII-2, (9) VIII-2, (10) YIII-4, Classification of Structures, Components and Systems

- 'Seismic and QUality)

A" Internally Generated f!issil es Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Compo-nents Inside Containm nt Pipe Break Ou side Containment Seismic Design Considerations Environm ntal Qualification of Safety-Related Equ'"-,. nt Con tai nm nt Leak Te sti ng Engineered Safety Feature System Control Logic and Design Onsite Emergency Power Systems

- Diesel Generator Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment (11)

HUREG-0730, Clarification of THI Action Plan Requirements, Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability (12) tlUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the T."iI-2

Accident, Item II.E.4.4, Containment Purging and Yenting Requirements

IY R vi w Guidelines The containment isolation system of a nuclear power plant is an engi-neered safety feature that functions to allow the normal or emergency passage of fluids through the containment boundary while preserving the ability of the boundary to prevent or limit the escape of fission pro-

. ducts to the environs that may result from postulated accidents.

GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 pertain to the con-tainm nt isolation system of a nuclear power plant.

GOC 54 establishes design and test require-.en.s for the leak detection provi sions, the isolation function and the containment capability of the isolation barriers in. lines penetratigg the primary reactor containment.

From the standpoint of con ai nrent isolation, leak detection provisions should be capable of quickly detecting and responding to a spectrum of pcs.ulated pipe break accident conditions.

To accoimplish this, diverse pal p...eters shoul d be moni tored to initiate the contain;,;=nt isolation uniction.

The parame ers selected should assure a positive, rapid re-sporise to tiie developing accident condition.

Tnis aspect of the contain-ment isolation syst m review will be addressed during the review of the post-TViI requirements approved for implementation, as stated in NUREG-0737 at Item II.E.4.2.

Leak detection capability should also be provided at the system level to alert the operator of the need to isolate a system'train equipped with re...o.e m=nual isolation valves.

SRP 6.2.4, at Item II.ll, provides guid-arice in this regard.

! '.th respect, to the design requirements for the isolation function, all non-essential systems should be automatically isolated (with manual valves sealed closed),

and valve closure times should b'e selected to as-sure rapid isolation of the containment in the event of an accident.

The review of the classification of systems as essential or non-essential, and the automatic isolation provisions for non-essential systems by appro-priate signals, will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TMI requirements as stated in WUPEG-0737 at Item II.E.4.2.

The clo-sure time of the contain@ nt ven ila.ion system isolation valves will Le evaluated in conjunction. with the ongoing generic review of purging prac-

- tices, at operati,ng plants (see HUREG-0660 at Item II.E.4.4).

The electrical power supply, instru,.entation and controls systems should be designed to engi neered safety features criteria to assure acco.,plish-...ent oi the containment isolation function.

This aspect of the review is covered under SEP Topics VII-2 and VIII-2. Also, resetting the isola"ion si-nal should not result in the au.o;.a.ic r -opening of contain-..ent isolation valves.

This will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the pos-TMI requirements approved for implementation, as stated in HUREG-0737, at Item II.E.4.2.

With respect to the capabilities of contai nmment isolation barriers in lines penetrating primary coniainment, the isolation barriers should be designed to engineered safety feature criteria, and protected against mis-

siless, pipe whip and jet im,ing -.=nt.

Typical isolation arriers include valv s, closed systems and blind flanges.

Furthermore, provisions should be

.--ade to permii t periodic leak tes.ing of the isolation barriers.

The adequacy of the missile, pipe whip and jet impinge;,.=-nt protection will be covered under SEP Topics III-4.C, III-5.A and III-5.8.

The ac-ceptability of the design criteria originally used in the design of the containment 'isolation system components will be covered in SEP Topics III-l, III-6 and III-12.

The adequacy of the leak testing program will be covered under SEP Topic YI-6.

The acceptability of electrical penetrations will be covered in SEP Topic YIII-4.

GDC 55, 56 and 57 establish explicit requirements for isolation valving A

in lines p netrating the containment.

Specifically, they address the number and location of isolation valves (e.g.,

redundant valving with one locat d inside containment and the other located outside containm nt),

valve actuation provisions (e.g.,

automatic or remote m nual isolation valves),

valve position (e.g.,

locked closed, or the position of greater safetv in the event o,

an accident or power failure),

and valve type (e.g.,

a simple check valve is not a permissable automatic isolation valve out-side contai nm nt).

Figures I and 2 depict the explicit valve arrangements specified in GDC 55 and 56, and GDC 57, respectively.

GDC 55 and 56 also permit containment isolation provisions for lines pene-trating the primary containment boundary that differ from the explicit re-quirementss, provided tne basis for acceptability is defined.

This proviso is typically irvoked when establishing the containment isolation require-

, enis fol essential (i. e., safety rel a.ed) syste,.s, or.here i s a cl ear im-prove-... nt in safety.

0 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 55 AND 55 iSOLATION VALVE CRITERIA MISSILE PROTECTION INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE SEALED CLOSED AUTONTIC OR

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Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.2.4 at item II.3 presents guidelines for acceptable alternate containm nt isolation provisions for certain clas-ses of lines.

Containment isolation provisions that are found acceptable.

on the "other defined basis" represent conformance with the GDC and do not constitute exceptions.

The following evaluation addresses deviations in the containment isolation provisions'rom the explicit requirements of the General Design Criteria.

Evaluation The contai nment isolation provisions for the lines penetrating the primary reactor containm nt. of the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 are shown in Figures 3 through 20; Figure-21 defines the nom nclature-'and sym-bols used.

These figures appear in the R.

E.

Gi nna Final Safety Analysis Report '(FSAR) as Figures 5.2.2-1 through 5.2.2-19.

The containm nt isola-tion provi sions are also tabulated in Table 5.2.2-1 of the FSAR.

The evalu-a 4 i on of the conta i nn;.".. nt isol ati on provi si ons v as based on the R.

E.

Gi nna FSAR and other documen ed information referenced in Section YII.

There was insufficient information to complete the review; therefore, the licensee should provide the information identified as missing or incomplete.

The containment isolation provisions were evaluated against current safety criteria as set forth in GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57 (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50),

and the supplementary guidance of SRP 6.2.4 (Containment Isolation System),

where applicable.

Deviations from the explicit requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57, and the acceptance criteri a of SRP 6.2.4 are tabulated in Table l.

Section 5.2.2 of he R. E. Ginna FSAR identifies five class s for c t=gori-i ng the lines penetrating

.he containment.

For ease of reference, we have

nu.":.Dered the lines penetrating the contain."..ert as shown in Figures 3

through 20.

The following discussion addresses each penetration

class, and identifies the containment lines we have selected for inclusion in each class.

The licensee should verify the acceptability of our classi-fication of each line.

Class 1 - Outgoing lines - Reactor Coolant System Horrelly operating outgoing lines connected to the reactor coolant

'ystem are provided 'with at least one automatically operated trip Yal ve and one manual isolation valve in series located outside the containment.

GDC 55 applies to,Class 1 lines.

GDC 55 specifies that one valve should be located inside containment and one valve should be located outside containment, with the valves being either locked closed or autos-'atic isolation valves.

Fur hermore, a simple check valve out-side containent miay no be used as an automatic isolation valve.

The follcwing lines are included in this class:

4, 8, 10, 11, and 35.

The contain-ent isolation provisions for line 4 differ from the ex-plicit requirem nts of GDC 55 from the standpoint of the number of isolation valves.

There is no containment isolation valve in the line immediately outside the containment.

However, GDC 55 permits isolation provi sions that differ from the explicit requi rements pro-videdd the basis for acceptability is defined.

For line 4-, then, the closed safety-grade system outside containment (Residual Heat Pe-moval system) is a suitable isolation barrier in lieu of a valve ad-jacent to the containment.

On this basis the isolation provisions

'."or line 4 sa,isfy GDC 55.

Tn i sola7 ion provi sions for' 1 nes 'Oi 11 and 35 di fTel i l o..i'Ti.e

-plicit requirem nts of GDC 55 from the standpoint of valve actuation and/or. location.

For these lines, the isolation valves are all located outside containment.

The acceptability of this is contingent on the criteria used in the design of the piping between the containment and first valve, and the first valve, which must provide adequate assurance of integrity.

For line 10, valves B and C should be automatic isolation valves; for line 11, valve 8 should be an automatic isolation valve.

2.

Class 2 - Outgoing Lines tlormally operating outgoing lines not connected to the reactor coolant system and not.pr'otected against missiles throughout.heir l'ength in-side containment are provided with, at least-one automatically-operated trip valve or one remotely operated stop valve located outside contain-merit.

GD" 56 applies to Class'2 lines.

GDC 55 specifies that one valve should be located inside containment and one valve should be located outside containiment, with tne valves beino either locked closed or automatic isolation valves.

Furthermore, a simple check valve outside containment may not be used as an automatic isolation valve.

The following lines are included in this class:.

1, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 30 and 40.

The containment isolation provisions for lines 1, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 30 and 40 differ from the explicit requirerients of GDC 56 from the stand-point of valve location; all isolation valves are located outside con-tainment.

Class 1.

This may be acceptable,

however, based on tho discussion under

For lines ', 18.and 21, valve A should be an auto-,.atic isolation valve

-to satisfy the valve actuation requirem nts of GDC 56.

For lines I and 21, valve C is not a containm nt isolation valve.

For line 18, a simple check valve located outside containment is not an appropriate automatic isolation valve, and for this reason does not satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 56 with respect to valve type.

The judg... nt regarding its acceptability will be made in conjunction with the integrated assessment of the plant.

Alternatively, the pres-sure regulator valve (valve C) may be an acceptable isolation valve if additional i nformation is provided regarding the design and performance characteristics-of the valve controls.

In effect, the actuation provi-sions for a valve 'of this type must satisfy-the requirements for an automatic isolation valve.

Lines 25 and 40 should be equipped with two automatic isolation valves in series to satisfy the valve actuation reouire.;,ent of GDC 56.

Class 3 - Incoming Lines Two subclasses are identified for Class 3 lines:

GDC "5 or 56 apply to Class 3 lines, depending on the line function.

A.

Incoming lines connected to open systems outside the containment are provided with a check valve located inside containment, and a

remote operated valve or check valve and remote operated valve located outside containment.

The following lines are included in this subclass:

2, 3, 33 and 34.

The containment isolation provisions for lines 2 and 3 differ fro; he explicit requireme;ts of GD" 56 fro; t"e s

an"p int of va>ve actuation

Valve 8 in these lines sho'>d b= an automatic isolation valve.

Alternatively, for line 2, the pressure regulator valve (Valve C) may be an acceptable isolation valve if additional informa-tion is provided regarding the design and performance character-istics of the valve controls; the actuation provisions must satisfy the requirements for an automatic isolation. valve.

The containment isolation provisions for line 34 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve lo-cation; both of the locked, closed valves are located outside con-tainment.

This, however, may be acceptable based on the discus-sion-undet Class 1.

Incoming lines connected to closed systems outside containment are provided with at least one check valve or normally closed iso-lation valve located inside containment.

The following lines are included in this subclass:

6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 24 and 39.

The containment isolation provisions for line 6 (the residual heat removal (RHR) supply line) differ from the explicit require;-.arts of GOC 55 from the standpoint of valve actuation and number.

Valves A and 8 open upon receipt of a safety injection signal; however, it is possible to remote manually close the valves.

Also, there is no isolation valve identified outside containment in this line.

Since line 6 has a pos i-accident safety function, automatic isolation of tt e line is not ppropriate; remot manual isolation capability for valves A and 8 is, therefore, acceptable.

Furthermore, the system outside contain.-. nt is a closed, safety-grade

system, and constitutes

an appropriate isolation barrier in lieu of a valve in the line outside containm nt.

For this reason, line 6 satisfies GDC 55 on the other defined basis.

Valves C and D in the branch lines in line 6 are not containment isolation valves

~

Valves A and B in line 6, and valve B in line 8, provide adequate isolation capability for the branch lines leading to the letdown line.

Also, local manual

valves, such as valves E and G, are not acceptable containm nt isolation valves unless they are administratively controlled closed.

The containm nt isolation provisions for line 7 difier from the ex-1 A'~

plicit requiremen-.s of GDC 55 from the standpoint of val ve actua-tion; valve 8 is a local manual valve.

Line 7,(charging line) has a post-accident safety function and the chemical volume control system outside containment is a closed safety grade syst m.

Conse-ouently, autom.tie isol ation of line 7 is not appropriate or neces-sary.

However, val ve B should have the capability for remote manual isolation from the control room to satisfy GDC 55 on the other de-fined basis.

There is a power operated valve in series with valve B in line 7.

The licensee should discuss the acceptability of this valve as a

remote manual contai nment isolation valve.

The containm nt isolation provisions for line 9 differ from the explicit requ i re,.enis.of GDC 55 from the standpoint oi val ve loca-tion and actuation.

Al 1 i sol ation valves are located outside con-ain..:nt =ndpo a"topatic or locked closed val ves are:. "vided.

Since line 9 is connected

.o.he closed, safety-grade chemical volum control system outside containr.. nt, a single automatic isolation valve outside containment would be acceptable.

In this regard, valve A should be an automatic isolation valve.

The containm nt isolation provisions for line 15 differ from the explicit requirement of GOC 56 from the standpoint of valve number and type.

Only one isolation valve (valve C - a simple check valve) is provided which is not an appropriate valve out-side containment.

The containm nt spray headers are typically provi ded with a check valve inside contzinr. nt and, because of their post-accident safety function, a remote manual valve out-

~I side containment.

Therefore, valve C should be moved inside containm nt and a power operated, remote manual valve should be provided outside containment.

.41so, test connections should be provi ~ed with two locked closed isolation valves in series.

The co..tainment isolation provisions for line 16 dlffel from the explicit requirments of GDC 55 from the stancpoint of valve lo-cation; all isolati'on valves are located outside containment.

This, however, may be acceptable based on the discussion under Class l.

The containment isolation provisions for line 17 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint of valve type and actuation.

Simple check valves are identified as contai.",.-.ent isolation valves outside contain-.;.ent, which is not appropriate, and t're automatic valves (desi "nated as Valve Aj open

-i'n the event

of an accident because of their safety function (safety injec-tion).

Because the safety injection system is a closed, safety-grade system outside containment and the A designated valves have remote manual closure capability double 'barrier isolation capability is provided without taking credit for the simple check valves outside containm nt.

Consequently, GDC 55 is m t on "som other defined basis,"

as d scribed. above.

The containment isolation provisions for line 24 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve actuation.

Line 24 is a non-essential line and, there-fore, 'should be automatically isolated.

Consequently, valve B

I should receive an automatic isolation signal.

The containmment isolation provisions for line 39 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of val ve rum'er.

An automatic isolation valve, similar to valve A, should be provided inside containment.

Class 4 - hissile Protected Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines which are con-nected to closed systems inside containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with at least one manual isolation valve outside containm nt.

GDC 57 applies to Class 4 lines.

GDC 57 specifies that a single auto.,'tic, remote manual or locked closed isolation valve should be located outside contain-.:. nt. ;uthermore, a sirqle check valve

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he follo~-

ing lines are included in this class:

22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 20, 31, 32, 41 and 42.

The containment isolation provisions for lines 26 (valve F),

31 (valve C),

32 (valve D), 41 (valve C) and 42 (valve 8) differ from the explicit requirements of GD" 57 from the standpoint of valve actuation.

All of these lines are equipped with local

-anual isolation valves.

These valv s should be automatic, re-mote manual or locked closed valves.

It is noted that lines 31, 32, 41 and 42 are served by the serviqe water system and tive system is.'apparently not s'eismic Category 1 outside containment.

Therefore, if these lines are I

non-essential, they should be automatically isolated.

Furthermore, the licensee should verify that the closed portion of the system inside containment is of safety grade design to assure that GDC 57 is the appropriate GDC to use in judging the acc ptabi lity of the containment isolation provisions.

If the system is not safety grade design, GOC 56 applies and automatic isolation valves should be provided insi de and outside containment, Class 5 - Special S rvice L'es 'which penetrate the containment and which may be opened S

contain-...ent at-...osohere

."ut which are normally c1osed d r-are prov~i d=d 4"i h

.is'0 1sol =tion va

~ ves in s ries or one isolation valve and one blind flange.

One of s>> c

~

~

s I s v>>c v 9

0 I cia@

I

~ o>> -"'--r is 1""--'-'-'-i"o V

r h

~

I OL oo

/plies Lo vkc D

I est "O I Io'i7kg 1 1nes. al in eluded in Class 5:

5, 2, 13, 14, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48.

The containm nt isolation provisions for line 5 (emeroency sump lines) differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoin of valve location and actutation, due to th ir post-accid n" sa ety function; r=-k."te manual valves ale P ov ded hi h

both valves located outsice containk. nt.

GDC 56 permiks such d

viati ons if the basis fol acceptabHi ty is de k ined Starldard Re-vie~ Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.4 provides cuidelires for accept=ble alternate'ontainkmkent isolation provisions for these lines.

Be-cause of the safety func.ion-of tkkese-lines, the val ve actuation p

~ ov1 51ons are acceptabl e.

';'.o";ever, he acccp ab11 i iy 0 1 ocatino k

botil val ves outs1de corta'--ant is contin"ent or the valve/pipino "as; cn, I hiich...ust oro"i='e a -ouate asskJk anCe I ka-I Ic

~ k C -" -ss-- i s.

as r.al

" *'-- ----~il'-v--

1 ki ~

VC '

kC co k

"" in..elk 1 so I": iofl p ovi sions for line 12

( fu 1 -.ra..sfer

.'e) differ from the ex I'.cit require.-.ants of GD" 56 frcm *'re standpoint oi isolation barrier type; a double casketed blind flange (1ea):

stable) i s provi ded inside containment.

A nor-mally closed manual cate valve is provided outside containmant.

The blind fiance is an acceptable isolation el l12r in lieu of igg id

>ok'r p

a a

s s

k a)k

~

'k ~

I v'I k

'v

The containm-.ent isolation provisions for lines 14, 43, 44 and 45 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location; there is no isolation valve inside containm nt.

The licensee should justify the acceptability of these arrangements, considering piping/valve integrity, and for line 14 the need for assuring the operability of the containment air monitor.

6.

Special Cases Equipment hatch and personnel airlock:

The equipr,ent hatch is closed by a bolted gasketed closure which is sea'led during reactor operation.

The licensee should address the leak testing capability of the equipment hatch.

The personnel ai rlock consists of two doors in series with m-chanical ai rlocks to assure that one door is closed at all tim s.

The licensee should address the leak testing capabil-ity of.he door seals, and snould discuss the accep.ability of isolation barriers on lines penetrating the airlock.

7.

Leak Detection Provisions Mhere remote manual isolation valves are used, the capability to detect system leakage to alert the operator of the need to isolate a line should be provided.

The licensee should address this issue.

s /

VI Conclusion The followina summarizes the deviations from review auidelines that have been identified and'escribed in Section Y of this report:

1.

The isolation valving arrangements of the following containm nt pene-trations do not meet the requirements of GDC 55 or 56 from the stand-point of valve location:

Penetrations 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, i5, 30, 34, 35, 40, 43, 44 and 45.

The isolation valves in these penetrations are located outside con-tainm nt.

The acceptability of this is con.ingent on the acceptabil-ity of the piping design criteria (SEP Topic III-I). Also, the li-censee should discuss the unique characteristics of the valves clos-est to the containm nt to.erminate valve s aft or bonnet seal leak-

age, or the provisions in the plant for control of leakage.

2.

The isolation valving arraneements of the following containment pere-trations do rot m et the reeuirerients of GDC 55 or 56 from the stand-ooint of ho 'ever, valve number:

Penetrations 4, 6, 15 and 39.

Lines' and 6, were found to meet the GDC on some othe defined basis.

3.

The isolation valves of the containment penetration numbers listed below differ from the explicit requirements of GOC 55, 56 and 57 from the s andpoint of valve type by using a check valve outside contain-ment:

Penetrations 15, 17 and 18.

A simple check valve located outside contain-;; nt is not an approprite

=:.o-2 ic i sol ati on valve.

The jude",.2nt,ec=rdira.i;s acceptabili y

will be made in conjunction with the integl ted 2ssessm=nt of the Cilia

~

r i '-h l age rd to line 17, the conte n:-..2nt iso ation prov i sloPs

were found acceptable on some other defined basis without consider-i ng the simple check valves outside containmant.

4.

The isolation provisions for the following containment penetra-tions do not meet the requirements of GDC 55, 56 and 57 from the standpoint of valve actuation:

Penetrations 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, 40, 41 and 42.

The actuation provisions for valves in lines 5, 6 and 17 were found to meet the GDC on some other defined basis.

For lines 1, 2; 7,',

10, 11, 18, 21, 25, 26, 31, 32, 40, 41 and 42, local manual valves are not appropriate-coniainment isolation valves unless they are administratively controlled closed.

Auto-matic isolation valves should be provided.

For lines 3, 24 and 25, rerote m nual valves are not appropriate.

Automatic isolation valves should be provided.

It should be noted that other lines contain open, local manual valves ihat are identified as containment isolation valves.

These valves were ignored where other identified isolation valves were found to satisfy the GDC.

5.

The isolation barriers in the containment penetrations listed below differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55, 56 and 57 from the standpoint that blind flanges are used as containment isolation bar-rierss.

Pen trations h ving blind flanges inside contain... nt:

12, 46 and 47.

For containment isolation configurations having a blind flange in-side containment, the blind flange is an acceptable isolation bar-rier in lieu of an isolation valve.

A blind flange without leak testing provisions is not a suitable isolation 'barrier.

The li-censee should address this. It is not known to what extent pipe caps were used on test, vent and drain connections located between isolation valves or in closed systems which constitute an isolation barrier.

tlevertheless, pipe caps are not suitable isolation bar-riers for containment isolation agd should be. replaced with locked closed manual valves or a blind flange that is leak t stable (SRP 6.2.4, Item II.3).

The licensee should address this.

6.

Certain penetrations have been provided with remote manual isolation

valves, which is acceptable.

However, provisions should b

made to allow the operator in the main control room to know when to isola e

fluid syste...s equipped with remote manual isolation valves (SRP 6.2.4, Item II.ll). This matter should be addressed by the licensee.

7.

Lines 2 and 18 identify a pressure regulator valve as. a contai nment isolation valve.

The licensee should provide additional information regarding the design and performance characteristics of the valve controls.

In esssence, the actuation provisions for a valve of this type must satisfy the requirements for an automatic isolation valve.

v

><< <<I s

<>5 C

\\ IJ>>oa>>>>>

~ e c<

<<'1 << <<5 6<

e ne 1 so l<>>i<os ~

>>>r>><v <-

sions

=or lines 31, 32, 41 and 42 (service h'ater system< lines) since a closed system was id ntified inside contain<ent.

The licensee should verify that this portion of the syst m is of, safety grade de-sign to assure that the use of GOC 57 is appropriate.

Also, as noted in'tem 4, automatic isolation valves should be provided, un-less it can be satisfactorily arcued that the lines are essential.

9.

The licensee should provide design inform<ation on the equip-<ent hatch and personnel airlock, including th leak testability of th hatch g sket and airlock door seals.

Also, test/instru;..ent lir<es p -.=-'.rating the airlock should be Ve-.tiified and tr, contair<...

n<t is"lation provisions for them should be justified.

10.

G C 55 and S6 specify that automatiic isolation valves should, upon loss o< actuating

power, take the position that provides greater sa>e.y.

The position o<

an isolation 'alve

<or r>ormal and shutCGwn operating conditions, and post-accident condit',on, depends on the fluid system>> unction.

!n the event of power failure to a valve

operator, the valve posi tion should be consistent with the line func-tion.

in this regard, separate po';er supplies

=or isolation valves in series may be requi red o assure he isolation of non-essential lines.

The licensee should provide the information on the position of isolation. valves, whether or not the line is essential and the isolation signals (including parameters sensed to actuate the signals) for each isolation valve.

Furthermore, the licensee should discuss and justify the acceptability of these isolation valve characteristics.'

21 1

="'-'inal - -ety "rajysis R<-o n yori, y'o]'.

Girna Plant

1 Desic n Or lras 013 424B 3~0

~

1 30 3-433K, 33013-434 330 13-425A

-'30~ ~-432

~ "

'-42GD, 330'-427, 330'3-422, 33013-529A, 33013-534, 33013 5]Qc' 4

V ~

L',censee responses update on SEP Topic yI-4 3

17 q 80 and 3

2 81 g ~

L1 censee res oonscs update 4-28-79 a nd 6-22-79, on IE Bulletins 7o 05$

nd 7n 0

0-Lion ~ re v ~

5.

Licensee responses update for SEP Topic X)l

, 6-18 80 6.

Licensee responses update on contain-n isolat.

10-17-79.

ion provisions, 7.

Licensee submitted inservice inspection progr interval, 7-2-79.

n program for the 1980-1981 8.

Appendix A to Provisional Qperating Licen Specifications for R.

E.

Ginna Nuclea p P'"- " Technical Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Dock t f nt Lnit t(o. l llo. 42, Vi y 1),

1981.

50-244, Am ndment

/ Ki ) I

~

f

~l=.)-- i O}>lt Vl-4 CONTAIIQfiLIMI l50i Al ION ~r'SV L.f J

l-/'ll U/U>!ON FINDII>GS / /

.'/ P7/

n/~

PLANT'

~ 'r /"""

PA(. E~

..V'avE S'ER VICE REVIElVER$ coHHEn/T "i

/j /- ~r///:-,".g.4D/=/

7'<'I~..)/

ll '.-.C!.'dt - /~(. 5 fi::-,,rr"./-:'./.",(c,PEP7raul.'8/

Vi:"R Slj<".i'.r:rt;=r/Ie'Z/7D,

(

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~ <'rirroo> - /)Cci//g

"".~l(= C ZZgrX 5r>t ry:<<i)/E" 5)278'n7 d(/."'r '.l.

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< pt.c

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0 IW=Rp R VIDUAL ':AT RZ.ALO't(,'AL LOO'UT, CO+TAIN~;.:+T

":(::RC( LATION ( ihe R. E. Ginna FS~R FIG. 5.2.2- ) ~ ~ i(c 5>OOa,l HEW i QPrNOv46 l ODP P-HR Loop o~ I OUTLET LIVE 02 P ~ I tK Oo FC V I hX a OV rs l To ~~4F 'ETY l;lkt=CTIQll SISTER ~ LOI Q> Srmpuur pc SYSTBH >gc-LO I 0 PH F:Hg. gqt:ass (.C.l 056.D S,VZTEW I I I I I I I I I ~ gH I-I e IO I llI aJ IIn I w I g I I

t. Vcivc.s axo csR 1N 4 LlNB v)9,'14'o'H'6'Ecvs To Y'vE l a,>COWN uMK leS>O~

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QEPCQOQ, CQQL+hY PQWV Q+4L WKYFR, 5QPPL'Y

\\ bNQ To /2, 4', PUMP f3 '8 g J gg 8 cC g cf 2(( pip O~ I l c vc.s I hws-rr~ M ( I I EKTiB,l-sash sm s,v,ovJH is ',sibthia-l LA55 h Dh siGN R,E. AC'7 GP C.OOLNNY PULOP SE,KL Vg gy BR. Q.F 7 VQ.H LlNC RC5 CP FO 0-M pa V ~ I ENCE $ 5 LFTDCvJA p h9.4i ExC.HxHGEQ I lO hb VC I Og S-1 W I. VCY'- VOLumv COV YROL YkZK (CLeS~D GEEST'~h~) P 4 TR. TIOY LI4"S, REACTOR COOL.-'NT PU>ViP S" A KV.-'TrR SUPPLY ( ".he R. E. Gir<<a FSAtl rlG. 5.2.2-5) FvOtA P,CS REAC'<OR COOLPNT SY"ZEN SPZIPLE LI~'E - FU L T.,ASS.=:"R TUBE ( the R. E. Ginra FSAR F1G. 5.2.2-6 ) Nl 0 u(Q3 pc GAS QND T P AQ.T(CuiAYE mown oa F< jS Qa Pc The gas and particulate monitor is protected against overpressurization by valves A, B, and C. In order to use this monitor after these valves are closed, the operator must institute a valve open signal to each of these valves. The logic matrix for valve B permit these valves to open upon a signal from the operator. Before valve C ~<11 open, the logic requires in addition to operator action, a 2/2 signal that is generated ~hen the line pressure is less than 5 psig; the detector design pressure ..on'tor isolation valve C and the sa=ple line are pressure rated at 300 and 150 psig, respectively. x/ce ( the R. E. Ginra FSH Fi~.g. ~;Z.-7 ) f pl h'lR TE.ST I icFQa I GoNT'hiNtNQT~ i 5VRAM PuhPs,l YAiV~s KH9 I ) aai~iao i ~QU hp'hw~ QQT C Q T EST L<NE F NYiRR SV SYi=M g4CWH > 5 'SS~ghN~ t-C.LOESS 5 C7 5hGQ. P:":"T. >>TJON i&ES - COAT='B '.~~ENT 5 ~.-' .::-.'&~:-RS ("h P.. E. Gin;,a =w ~ zIG. 5.2.2-$ ) F'Q.OV, ~C.cV th VL. 4t-OR 0-b OJ OO Hg$ Ss .3 I QCcvMULQTOR. 'TEST ltd I PJ J] LOLL ~QPLE LC U~ gJ pi !Qg Og I-g EVD50. p 2 io Qs 51 W'1 LAR S - 54PEYV 'lg7&cTlOA SLGghQ-OPGHS rRC.SC ~MYS,5 pRY-PR6.5s v R,~z.aR, Q.RL>HF '75N Y R.vJSt - g,SFuziiNC, RPrEK W'oraC= 7gb~EC. t=VV1f'E SNSi -m ~S, S--.SmiC. CLmS 2 0:S>C-.M 2= iETRATICN LB "S - SAFETY: i~ "CTiON 7 ~x"" SAFETY DiJECTIOib TEST Lc>:"S ( i>>a R. E. Giriria "," ~2 FIG. 5.2. -9) CC~~glM~ E.HY YEAST g~PC ER, RK4"'rog, Co"LAN> DP.4lh'ANK C55 Ah~l V~BR, L1NE-K'EW~TOR, CCÃl AQT DR,AlH 'TnA< g l ) P,OSCAR SUPPLY I,NO PENRT'RAT)OH ) Rt=hC ~ OR, ~LAN'T DR.AlberTg4L'l SCALAR,C 6, o ~M 0J V PRow PRY ll. T O ZO pc. ec 'AlDS I ~ [ REkORR. vS gT' I T 5 5 ~ Ces RNALYZKP e i s-iW I g,EAC.TOP, COOL. DR,~>H TP.NV NITRO( aH SUP'Pt Y 45hNLFOLQ (io0 PSIQ ) I I jC~ ~+ t-c RELIC iaaf~ C.ALA87 QR.4<8 Puv P5 F O'EL 'T.R-ANsraa. C.p NKL Og!1?4S IO'.i LD,:"S - CG'iT.-'Z.'i:-'.i 7:-.'iT:-:i.GER ~:-='. TOR COOL.-"'iT DP~ T=iK ('he R. E. Gi",."a F'SQ? FIG.:".2.2-10) ) ~ ~ I ~ C C ~ ~ COn,bi'ONE NY C.GOL)g G WP'TER. TO REOC'TQ< COO'L"~h',x 7'Qh>P. 7e >~r-~~woR, C.OCL-R NT Pun"iP C.DOLE R,'5 ~155 t LE 'bP R,R.F69, C,ONYM>dma NY Qg+ij IJQ Q I COD L//JG CARTER LooP ( Cz OSE D SYSta% ) E NtlR.F= 575,t Frn 'LS sEtstAlC. CLASS L DE,S'~ G-4 ~ F fioM R.R4c Top, C.c,OLQN 7 c.&L%,R5 ~go<PWJF~7 C UOL IUS. ur,(ez ~op (.c.icsr=c sw st ~ m) zs ~iN FACN'7 MiSStLE 0 RR;Q.iE8, COWPOr t=-nZ COO~>XC-- matte. a~on ReaC~a CaOLavv PUWS'P. Tg Ewviza svstam >s saisp~>c. c.cAss S Da s~ sg CChsPO)i=97 COOLING ti<7PK 'TO EXC.BSS L<7DOii' H - X. CcMpo gGht ccQL(Hc-wb+6 K v'Pew Bxc.F55 Q= s 'Qo'A'H H. K. P-I gl ~ Exc.ES,S I B.T' c W q wv +r 'EV.C Qt'HGSV, (. GL O5QD a~svzrn) MYFOP~/J7 CdO-'- IuC u.g I =>< V~P (c. ic>> ~o ~wS > G.~) 2 4t l lsF Cou7.'vnp swan%= fA T g~ is narc. c.L"ss 3 DE.Sl c-.g Pr i"TR.-'ON L~W" S - CO.i:PO.'iE.'iT COOL<KG V~.-'T:-~ TO:-.-'CTOH. COOL.~ iT DH'W PU'-i:P ( ~".~e R. E. Gir~;~a ~."IG. 5.2. -11) To ptJX. F.Yv. PUHP 7 VR,E/Ne

s. G. ELov~oouN ~t~pt E

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S - 4..~.'-'iEXT."JrE."'.L "R - SEr.VICE 'H, iii.-'DER - DEADViEIGH'T TESTER I Z~iZ R J~ A pi I pl crt Co~zhivhxE'QT pva,c,a suppL'9 ~i;aT ..R '~ R'Ut Pc 37 J Fc ~(~~~ ~l~~ s-iM 8 pkoM puRC P. gvppcY 74Qs C.oQ7~lg~i~~Y pu7GK pqApusr DucT I F -ro vvt.c-a, ~ ~ ~ ~x, Hsu~r FANS Q~ 8 Qs C.GW i W)MAXCQI P" XETrATION LDiES - CONT.-'Z..i'-:-Ã7 PRESSUFE RELIEF, Pi~~:" SUPPLY DUCT, PURGE EXHAUST (.he R. E. G)r,na FSAR FIG. 5.2.2-15) ~,B

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