ML17256B086
| ML17256B086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1982 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-01, TASK-3-1, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8207010070 | |
| Download: ML17256B086 (12) | |
Text
REGULATORY (FORMATION DISTRIBUTION SY M (RIDS)
AOCESSION NBR:8207010070 DOC ~ OATEN'2/06/25 NOTARIZED:
NO DOGKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plantr Uni,t ii Rochester G
05000244 AUTH BYNAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MAIERgJ ~ E ~
Rochester
.Gas 8 Electric Corp.
RHC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ORUTCHF IELDi D ~
Operating Reactors Branch 5
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A035S TITLE: SEP 'Topics NOTES:NRR/DL/SEP 1cy ~
SUBJECT:
Responds to issues raised by NRC 811230 ltr 8 Frank Research Ctr technical evaluation reptiTER 5257 429 Topic III-i~ "Quality Group -Classification of Compo Sys."
Remaining issues will be addressed before end COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SI lin re.SEP nents 8
of 1982 ~
ZE:
05000244 INTERNAL:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ORB ¹5 BC 01 NRR/DE/ADMQE 13 NRR/DL/ORAB 11 EB REG F
04 COPIES LTTR ENCL 7
7 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR/DE/HGEB 10 NRR/DL/SEPB 12 NRR/DS I/CSB 07 RGN1 COPIES LT'TR ENCL 2
2 3
1 1
1 1
ENTiERhAL:
14 02 10 10 1
1 LPDR NTIS 03 5
1 1
1
=1
'TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
L'TTR 32 ENCL 32
P w
l',
r' lt II II n
I tl
I////////lI
/mt 0/I/I////III liMÃ
/////////
/////////////
ZZ:
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN E. MAIER ViCe Prooitlont TKI.EPHONt:
ARL'*cooE lid 546-2700 June 25, 1982 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.
5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
SEP Topic III-l, Quality Group Classification of Components and Systems R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Crutchfield:
The NRC provided RGSE with a Safety Evaluation Report regarding this topic, by letter dated December 30, 1981.
Also included was a Franklin Research Center Technical Evaluation Report TER-5257-429.
Additionally, this topic was addressed in Section 4.7 of the draft SEP Integrated Plant Safety, Assessment (NUREG-0821),
May,1982.
n I
The attachment to this letter responds to a number of the issues raised.
The remaining issues will be addressed at a future date, expected to be, before the end of'982.
H Very truly yours, J
n E.
az.er Attachment 8207010070 820625.;
,.PDR.'ADOCK 05000244'oa
."I" ""'
A
JQ
'L w ',t
)
t, D
N J+l
Attachment:
Resolution of Certain Items Noted in 12/30/81 SER Regarding SEP Topic III-l, Classification Com nent In Section V.l of the December 30,
- 1981, SER it is noted that for 38 of 77 components, insufficient information is provided to define exemption from fracture toughness requirements.
RG6E has reviewed Table 5-1 of the FRC TER, and is providing the following additional information.
(1)
Reason for Exem tion Pressurizer Relief Tank Nitrogen Supply to Accumulators This tank is not. safety-related; is not required to meet code requirements-
i 8d'(pipes,"'fittings,
'pumps, and valves, with nominal pipe size of 6 inch diameter or less)
Piping and Valves to CSS Pumps from RWST 8a (thickness 4 5/8" )
Spray Additive Tank Piping 8d Interconnnecting Piping and Valves from CSS Pump Discharge to CSS Spray Nozzles Sd Non-Regenerative Heat.
Exchanger Shell Side Charging Pump Accumulators 8a 8e (austenitic stainless steel)
Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Shell Side 8a Seal Water Heat Exchanger Shell Side 8a Deborating Demineralizer Valves in Piping (Loop A)
Line Via Excess Letdown Heat Exchaner To and Including Valve HCV 133 Non Safety-Related Sd 1)
The reasons for exemption (e.g.,
8a, 8d) are those used in FRC Report TER-5257-429 which addressed this SEP Topic
l III I
tl S
k
/
g k
N N
2 Reason for Exem tion Valves in Charging Line from Pump Discharge to Containment Isolation Valve Sd Valves in Remainder of Interconnecting Piping and Valves 8d Valves from TCV145 Via Demineralizer to Valves ll06 and ll07 8d Valves from BAT Via Boric Acid Transfer Pump and Filter Sd Main Steam Safety Valves Sd Piping and Valves from Main Steam Line to AFW Pump Turbine Sd Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Motor Driven 8d Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Driven 8d Condensate Storage Tanks Piping and Valves from Pump Discharge to Valves 4000 C,
D Not Safety-Related 8d Piping and Valves from Pump Discharge to 4003, 4004 8d Piping and Valves to Suction of AFW Pumps 8d Turbine Driven Pump Lube Oil Tank,
- Pumps, and Piping 8a and 8d Containment Isolation System CI System included in above systems In Section V.2 of the December 30 SER, it was noted that information regarding Category C welds was required for certain pressure vessels.
It should be noted that the regenerative heat exchanger and the excess letdown heat exchanger (tube side) were originally specified as Class A vessels, rather than Class C vessels.
These will be discussed below.
b.
The non-regenerative heat exchanger, the RHR heat exchangers, and the seal water heat exchanger are Class 2 vessels on the tube side only.
- Thus, no Category C
weld requirements apply to the Class 2 portions of these heat exchangexs.
C ~
Although the accumulators, volume control tank, reactor coolant filter, seal water injection filter and the charging pump accumulator are Class 2 components, their failure would not result ',in the release of significant amounts of radiation.
The failure of the volume control tank was analyzed in the Section 14.2.3 of FSAR as a
Design Basis Accident".
Theradiological consequences of this 'fai'lure were we'l within the, guidelines of 10CFR 100'.'hus',,it is n'ot conside'red-that 'failures of any of these welds would be of safety significance, and that therefore no additional radiography is required.
d.
It was noted in the Ginna FSAR that the regenerative heat exchanger and the excess letdown heat exchanger wer'e considered Class C vessels.
- However, the equipment specifications for these items actually specified the heat exchanger and the tube side of the excess letdown heat exchanger as Class A vessels.
- Thus, the fatigue analysis and radiography requirement deficiencies for these vessels do not apply.
In Section V.5 of the December 30, 1981
- SER, RGSE was requested to provide the below-listed information relative to the design of the Refueling Water Storage Tank, Boric Acid
- Tank, AFW Condensate Storage
a
~
Confirm that the atmospheric storage tanks meet current compressive stress requirements.
This evaluation will be performed in conjunction with the seismic analysis being performed on these tanks, as required by resolution of SEP Topic III-6, Seismic Design Considerations.
Note that the evaluation will not be performed for the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) and the Turbine Driven AFW Lube Oil Tank, since they are not required to perform a safety function.
Both the CST, which provides suction to the,AFW System, and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
- pump, have functions which can be performed by other safety-related systems (the Service Water System and the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System, respectively).
K II
~ I'i')a$
J I
b.
Confirm that the 0-15 psig storage tanks meet. current tensile allowables for biaxial stress field conditions.
RG6E will also provide this, information in conjunction with the seismic analyses-being performed, for the four tanks listed in 3a above.
C ~
Provide the codes or requirements to which Refueling Water Storage
- Tank, Condensate Storage
The analysis of the RWST is being performed to current regulatory seismic criteria.
Modifications resulting from this analysis will be performed to ensure that the RWST i's acceptable.
Current code requirements will be considered in the evaluation of these modifications.
As noted in 3a and 3b above, the Condensate Storage Tanks and the Turbine Driven AFW Lube Oil Tank are not required to perform a safety function.
No additional information is thus required to be submitted.
In Section V.4 of the December 30, 1981 SER, it was requested that RGSE provide the codes and requirements to which the Gas Stripper
- Pumps, Service Water Pumps, and Lube Oil Pumps for the Turbine Driven AFW pump bearings were designed.
RG&E is evaluating the Service Water Pumps as part of SEP Topic III-6.
This analysis is being performed to current seismic criteria.
Modifications resulting from this analysis will be performed to ensure that the Service Water Pumps are acceptable.
Current code requirements will be considered in the evaluation of these modifications.
The gas stripper pumps are not safety-related.
- Thus, no additional evaluation of the requirements for these pumps are considered necessary.
Also, as noted in paragraph 3 above, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
- pump, and its auxiliaries, perform safety functions which can be performed by other safety-related
- pumps, such as the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
In Section V.7 of the December 30, 1981
- SER, RGSE was asked to confirm the assumption used in FRC's temperature loading calculations, that the temperature drop from 1008 power to 0% power is comparable to that of the Palisades Plant (64'F).
For the Ginna Plant, the temperature drop is 602.5 547
= 55.5'F.
h N
II
/