ML17254A694
| ML17254A694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1985 |
| From: | ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17254A693 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8512310158 | |
| Download: ML17254A694 (19) | |
Text
TABLE 3.5-7 Radiation Accident Monitorin Instrumentation Instrument 1.
Containment Area (R-29 and R-30) 2.
Noble Gas Effluent Monitor's Minimum Channels
~Oerable Action 111
'v
~
v ~
Plant Vent (R-14)
A Main Steam Line (R-31)
B Main Steam Line (R-32)
Containment Purge (R-12A)
Air Ejector (R-15A)
Action Statements Action 1 - With the number of operable channels less than required by the Minimum Channels Operable requirements, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to operable status within 7 days of the event, or prepare and submit.
a Special Report to the Commission within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.
only when the shutdown purge system flanges are removed.
8512310158 851223 PDR ADOCK 05000244 I
p PDR
- 3. 5-22 Proposed
3.6.3 3.6.3.1 Containment. Isolation Valves With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve operable in each affected penetration that is open and either:
a 0 Restore the inoperable valve(s) to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or b.
c d.
Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or 1I Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or Be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6
hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
3.6.4 3.6.4.1
- 3. 6.4.2 Isolation valves are inopeable from a leakage standpoint if the leakage is greater than that allowed by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
Combustible Gas Control When the reactor is critical, at least two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be operable.
One of the monitors may be the Post Accident Sampling System.
With only one hydrogen monitor operable, restore a
second monitor to operable status within 30 days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
3.6.4.3 With no hydrogen monitors operable, restore at least one monitor to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
3.6.5 Containment. Mini-Pur e Whenever the containment integrity is required, emphasis will be placed on limiting all purging and venting times to as low as achievable.
The mini-purge isolation valves will remain closed to the maximum extent practicable but.may be open for pressure control, for AIARA, for respirable air quality consider-ations for-personnel entry, for surveillance tests that reguire the valve to be open or other safety related reasons.
3.6-2 Proposed
PENT.
NO.
121 121 121 121 123 124 124 125 126 127 128 0
e 129 130 131 132 140 IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Nitrogen to PRT Reactor Makeup water to PRT Cont. Press.
transmitter PT-945 (10)
Cont. Press.
transmitter PT-946 (10)
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) to GA Excess letdown supply and return to heat exchanger Post Accident air sample "C" fan Component Cooling Mater (CW) from 1B RCP COW from lA RCP CCM to lA RCP CON to 1B.RCP RCDT 6 PRT-to Vent Header CCM to reactor support cooling COW to reactor support cooling Mini-Purge exhaust RHR pump suction from "A" Hot leg ISOLATION BOUNDARY CV 528 CV 529
-PT 945 PT 946 AOV 1789 AOV 745 CV 743 MV 1569 MV 1572 MOV 759B MOV 759A CV '750A CV 750B AOV 1787 CV 1713 MOV 813 MOV 814 AOV 7970 MOV 701(20)
MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)
NA NA NA NA 60 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 NA 60 60 NA ISOLATION BOUNDARY MV 547(8)
AOV 508 MV 1819A MV 1819B MV 1655(7)
MV 1571 MV 1574 (12)
(12)
MOV 749A MOV 749B AOV 1786 (19)
(19)
AOV 7971 (6)
MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME ="(SEC)
NA 60 NA
- NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 60 NA NA NA
PENT.
NO.
141 142 143 IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION RHR-Ijl pump suction from Sump B
RHR-g2 pump suction from Sump B
RCDT pump suction ISOLATION BOUNDARY MOV 850A(13)
MOV 850B(13)
AOV 1721 NA NA 60 MOV 851A(13)
MOV 851B(13)
.ISOLATION ISOLATION TIME "(SEC)
BOUNDARY MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME "-(SEC)
NA NA 60 60 201 202 203 203 204 205 0
a 206 206 207 207 209 210 Reactor Compart. cooling Unit A 6 B "B" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot 8 main)
Contain, Press.
tr'ansmitter PT-947 8-948 Post accident air sample to "B" fan Shutdown Purge Supply Duct Hot leg loop sample Przr..liquid space sample "A" S/G sample Przr.
Steam space sample "B" S/G sample Reactor Compart. cooling Units A 8 B Oxygen makeup to A 8 B recombiners MV 4757(16)
MV 4636(16)
MV 1076B MV 1084B PT 947 PT 948 MV 1563 MV 1566 flange (22)
AOV 966C AOV 966B AOV 5735 AOV 966A AOV 5736 MV 4758(16)
MV 4635(16)
MV 1080A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 60 60 60 NA NA NA SOV IV-3B SOV IV-5B MV 1819C MV 1819D MV 1565 MV 1568 AOV 5869 (22)
MV 956D(14)
MV 956E(14)
MV 5733(7)
MV 956F MV 5734(7)
SOV IV-.2A SOV IV-2B NA NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed
I
PENT.
NO.
300 301 303 304 o
305 I
305 305 307
~Q 308 0
mm309 310 310 311 312 313 IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Shutdown Purge Exhaust Duct Aux. steam supply to containment Aux. steam condensate return "A" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot and main)
Radiation Monitors R-,ll, R-12 6 R-10A Auto Inlet Isol.
R-ll, R-12 6 R-10A Outlet Post Accident air sampler (containment)
Fire Service Water Service Water to "A" fan cooler Mini-Purge supply
.Service Air to Contain.
Instrument Air to Contain.
Service Water from "B" fan cooler Service Water to "D" fan cooler Leakage test depressurization ISOLATION BOUNDARY flange (22)
MV 6151 MV 6175 MV 1084B MV 1076A AOV 1597 AOV 1599 MV 1554 MV 1557 MV 1560 CV 9229 MV 4627(16)
AOV '7478 CV 7226 CV-5393 MV 4630(16)
MV 4642(16) flange HAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME -(SEC)
NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ISOLATION BOUNDARY AOV 5879 (22)
MV 6165(15)
MV 6152(15)
SOV IV-5A SOV IV-3A MV 1596 AOV 1598 MV 1556 MV 1559 MV 1562 AOV 9227 AOV 7445 MV 7141 AOV 5392 MOV 7444 MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME " (SEC)
NA NA Normallly Closed NA Normallly Clos NA 60 60 NA NA (18)
NA NA 60 NA NA Normally Closed
PENT.
NO.
315 316 317 318 319 320 I
321 322 323 324 332 332 IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Service Water from "C" fan cooler Service Water to "B" fan cooler Leakage test supply Dead weight tester (decomissioned)
Service Water from "A" fan cooler Service water to "C" fan cooler A S/G Blowdown B S/G Blowdown Service Water from "D" fan cooler Demineralized water to Containment Cont. Press.
Trans.
PT-944, 949 8 950 Ieakage test and hydrogen monitor instrumentation lines ISOLATION BOUNDARY MV 4643(16)
MV 4628(16) flange welded shut MV 4629(16)
MV 4647(16)
- PT 950 MV 7448 MV 7452 MV 7456 SOV 921 SOV 922 SOV 923 SOV 924 MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME "(SEC)
NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ISOLATION BOUNDARY (ll)
(11)
MOV 7443 welded shut MV 5701(7)
MV 5702(7)
AOV 8418 MV 1819G MV 1819F MV 1819E cap cap cap (21)
(21)
(21)
(21)
MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)
NA NA Normally Closed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
(21) Acceptable isolation capability is provided for instrument lines by two isolation boundaries outside containment.
One of the boundaries outside containment may be a Seismic Class 1 closed system which is subjected to Type C leak rate testing.
(22) The flanges at penetrations 204 and 300 can only be removed at cold or refueling shutdown.
The flanges and associated double seals provide containment isolation and are a containment boundary for all modes of operation between cold shutdown and norrhal operation.
During cold and refueling shutdown when the flanges are removed integrity is provided by the 48 inch valves.
3.6-11 Proposed
REFUELING
~ld I.
Applies to operating limitations during refueling operations.
To ensure that no incident could occur during refueling operations that would affect public health and safety.
During refueling operations the following conditions shall be satisfied.
a ~
b.
C.
The equipment door, or a closure plate that restricts air flow from the containment, and at least one personnel door in the equipment. door or closure plate and in the personnel air lock shall be properly closed.
In addition, all automatic containment isolation valves shall be operable or at least one valve in each line shall be locked closed.
The 48 inch shutdown purge valves must also be operable or closed or the associated flange must. be installed.
Radiation levels in the containment shall be monitored continuously.
Core subcritical neutron flux shall be contin-uously monitored by at least two source range neutron monitors, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room available whenever core geometry's being changed.
When core geometry is not being changed at 3.8-1 Proposed
4
c I
shu down and depressurized untx repairs are effected and the local leakage meets the acceptance criterion.
Ifit is determined that the leakage through a
mini-purge supply and exhaust line is greater than 0..05 L an engineering evaluation shall a
be performed and plans for corrective action developed.
4.4.2.4 Test Fre enc a ~
b.
Except as specified in b., c.,
and d. below, individual penetrations and containment isolation valves shall be tested during each reactor shutdown for refueling, or other convenient intervals, but in no case at intervals greater than two years.
In addition, the four mini-purge isolation valves shall be tested at six month intervals.*
The containment equipment hatch, fuel transfer
- tube, and shutdown purge system flanges shall be
'tested at, each refueling shutdown or after each use, if that be sooner.
- (This requirement is applicable for two years following installation of the mini-purge system).
4.4-7 Proposed
I
~
\\
4 4I 4
c ~
The containment air locks shal be tested at intervals of no more than six months by pressurizing the space between the air lock doors.
In addition, following opening of the air lock door during the interval, a test shall be performed by pressurizing between the dual seals of each door opened, within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of the opening, unless the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition 4.4.3 4.4.3.1 at the time of the opening or has been subsequently brought to the cold shutdown condition.
A test shall also be performed by pressurizing between the dual seals of each door within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of leaving the cold shutdown condition, unless the doors have not been open since the last test performed either by pressurizing the space between the air lock doors or by pressurizing between the dual door seals.
Recirculation Heat Removal S stems Test a ~
The portion of the residual heat removal system that is outside the containment shall either be b.
tested by use in normal operation or hydrostati-cally tested at 350 psig at the interval specified in 4.4.3.4.
Suction piping from containment sump B to the reactor coolant drain tank pump and the discharge piping from.the pumps to the residual heat removal system shall be hydrostatically tested at. no less that 100 psig at the interval specified in 4.4.3.4.
4.4-8 Proposed
Attachment B
Containment purge and vent operations became a generic concern in 1978.
Since that time containment purge and vent has been the subject of many letters between the Staff and Rochester Gas and Electric Corp.
(RG&E).
In Reference 1, the Staff transmitted to RG&E a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which found RGE's interium commitments to be acceptable.
The SER provides a good summary of the correspondance and the commitments made concerning this subject.
The existing purge and vent systems at Ginna consist of a 48 inch purge system and a
6 inch containment vent.(depressurization) system.
The major issue concerning the purge system is the operability of the 48 inch purge valves during a design basis
- accident, loss of coolant accident (DBA-LOCA).
Therefore, RG&E has committed to maintaining the 48 inch purge valves closed while the reactor is critical until information demonstrating operability is submitted.
In response to the Staff's request to limit purge/vent operations to safety-related needs RG&E committed to limiting vent. system operation to a total of 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year.
To permanently resolve the purge and vent issue RG&E has decided to modify the 48 inch purge system so that it will only be used when the reactor is in cold or refueling shutdown, and install a
mini-purge system which will allow limited purging of containment..
The technical specification changes presented in Attachment A are necessary to implement these modifications.
The following changes will be made to the 48 inch purge system:
The inboard 48 inch, butterfly-type containment isolation valves from both the supply and exhaust lines will be removed.
Each valve will be replaced with a special blind-flange type closure utilizing double 0-ring seals to provide redundant containment isolation barriers.
Test ports will be provided to permit peri-odic local leak rate testing of the double 0-ring seal.
The
.blind flange closures will be securely bolted in place during reactor operation and will only be removed during plant shutdowns.
The existing outboard 48 inch, butterfly-type automatic containment isolation valves will remain in place to provide an isolation barrier during refueling operations.
Since the blank flanges have a double seal,.it will no longer be necessary to rely on the outer 48 inch valves for containment isolation during power operation.
During cold or refueling
- shutdown, the flanges could be removed and the outer valves will be relied upon for refueling integrity.
Since the 48 inch valves are no longer relied upon for containment integrity the mechanical stops on the valves will be removed.
These stops were installed to reduce stresses in the valves resulting from closure during a DBA-LOCA.
Since the valves are no longer subject to a DBA-LOCA there is no reason to continue restricting air flow in the 48 inch system during shutdown.
1
'I
A new mini-purge system will be installed to provide the capability to purge containment atmosphere on a limited basis during all modes of reactor operation.
This 2000-cfm mini-purge system will consist. of a blower for supplying air to the containment. through existing 6 inch Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) vent line penetra-tion 309.
New 6 inch, air-operated, butterfly-type, inboard and outboard automatic containment isolation valves will be installed at penetration 309.
Air will be exhausted through the existing 6
inch depressurization penetration 132.and will be ducted into the Auxiliary Building ventilation system where it will be filtered and monitored prior to its release to the environment via the plant vent.
The existing 6 inch valves at penetration 132 will be replaced with new 8 inch, air-operated, butterfly-type, inboard and outboard containment isolation valves.
All four new containment isolation valves will be automatic and will be fully-qualified to close within 5 seconds from the time the isolation setpoint is reached against the maximum containment, pressures anticipated during a DBA-LOCA.
The inboard ends of the mini-purge supply and exhaust lines will be equipped with 1/2-inch mesh debris screen's.
The radiation accident monitor R-12A (Containment Purge) monitors the 48 inch purge exhaust.
Since the 48 inch purge will only be
'operable during cold and refueling shutdown, R-12A need only be operable during cold and refueling shutdown.
Therefore, Table 3.5-7 was modified to be consistant with operation of the shutdown purge system.
In accordance, with 10 CFR 50.91, these changes to the Technical Specifications have been evaluated against three criteria to determine if the operation of the facility in accordance with proposed amendment would:
1.
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3.
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The modification does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Installing a mini-purge system and installing flanges on the 48 inch valves does not increase the probability of an accident because the flanges eliminate the effects of any malfunction of the 48 inch valves and the new mini-purge valves are small and inherently more reliable than the 48 inch valves.
The consequences of any previously evaluated accident are.not increased by the modification because the flanges prevent any accident associated with the 48 inch system and clearly any accident associated with the mini-purge system is less limiting than an accident. associated with the 48 inch sytem.
S "f
A t
N 'l f
The modification does not create" the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.
Replacing the 48 inch purge system with a mini-purge system basically decreases the size of the purge system and therefore does not create a new or different kind of accident.
The modification does not. significantly reduce the margin of safety because the consequences of any accident with the mini-purge system would be less severe than an accident associated with the 48 inch system.
As outlined above, Rochester Gas and Electric submits that the issues associated with this amendment request are outside the criteria of 10 CFR 50.91, and therefore, a no significant hazards finding is warranted.
Reference 1
NRC letter from D.M. Crutchfield to R.W. Kober, "Completion of Generic Issue On Containment Purge and Vent Operation" June 21, 1984.
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